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GREEK  IMPERIALISM 


GREEK  IMPERIALISM 


BY 

WILLIAM   SCOTT   FERGUSON 

PROFESSOR    OF    ANCIENT    HISTORY 
HARVARD    UNIVERSITY 


BOSTON   AND   NEW  YORK 

HOUGHTON  MIFFLIN  COMPANY 

(Stye  fitoerjsi&e  prcjsjS  Cambribge 


V1. 


1114 


COPYRIGHT,    1913,    BY   WILLIAM   SCOTT    FERGUSON 
ALL    RIGHTS    RESERVED 


Published  September  IQ13 


Cop 


TO   MY   MOTHER 


PREFACE 

This  book  contains  seven  lectures,  six  of  which  were 
delivered  at  the  Lowell   Institute  in   Boston  during 
February,  191 3.    In  the  first  of  them  the  main  lines  of 
imperial  development  in  Greece  are  sketched.    In  the 
^      others  I  have  tried  to  characterize,  having  regard  rather 
^J     to  clearness  than  to  novelty  or  completeness,  the  chief 
imperial   growths  which    arose  in  Greece   during  the 
transformance  of  city-states  from  ultimate  to  constitu- 
1        ent  political  units.   I  hope  that  these  discussions  of  the 
*^  .   theory  and  practice  of  government  in  the  empires  of 
Athens,  Sparta,  Alexander,  the  Ptolemies,  Seleucids, 
and  Antigonids  will  be  found  useful  by  the  general 
reader,  and  especially  by  the  student  of  politics  and  his- 
tory. The  idea  I  wish  particularly  to  convey,  however, 
j  is  that  there  was  continuity  of  constitutional  develop- 
Lment  within  the  whole  period.   The  city-state,  indeed, 
\  reached  its  greatest  efficiency  in  the  time  of  Pericles,  but 
the  federation  of  city-states  was  being  still  perfected 
two  hundred  years  afterwards.    In  government,  as  in 
science,  the  classic  period  was  but  the  youthful  bloom 
of  Greece,  whereas  its  vigorous  maturity  —  in  which  it 
was  cut  down  by  Rome  —  came  in  the  Macedonian 
time. 


viii  PREFACE 

Briefly  stated,  my  thesis  is  this:  The  city-states  of 
Greece  were  unicellular  organisms  with  remarkable 
insides,  and  they  were  incapable  of  growth  except  by 
subdivision.  They  might  reproduce  their  kind  indefi- 
nitely, but  the  cells,  new  and  old,  could  not  combine  to 
form  a  strong  nation.  Thus  it  happened  that  after 
Athens  and  Sparta  had  tried  in  vain  to  convert  their 
hegemonies  over  Greece  into  empires,  a  cancerous  condi- 
tion arose  in  Hellas,  for  which  the  proper  remedy  was 
not  to  change  the  internal  constitutions  of  city-states, 
as  Plato  and  Aristotle  taught,  but  to  change  the  texture 
of  their  cell  walls  so  as  to  enable  them  to  adhere  firmly 
to  one  another.  With  a  conservatism  thoroughly  in 
harmony  with  the  later  character  of  the  Greek  people, 
the  Greeks  struggled  against  this  inevitable  and  salu- 
tary change.  But  in  the  end  they  had  to  yield,  saving, 
however,  what  they  could  of  their  urban  separateness, 
while  creating  quasi-territorial  states,  by  the  use  of  the 
federal  system  and  deification  of  rulers.  These  two 
contrivances  were,  accordingly,  rival  solutions  of  the 
same  great  political  problem.  Nothing  reveals  more 
clearly  the  limitations  of  Greek  political  theory  than 
that  it  takes  no  account  either  of  them  or  of  their 
antecedents. 

Cambridge,  Mass.,  June,  1913. 


CONTENTS 

I.  IMPERIALISM  AND  THE  CITY-STATE 

I.  DEFINITIONS i~5 

1.  Of  empire,  I. 

2.  Of  emperor,  3. 

3.  Of  imperialism,  4. 

II.  THE   CITY-STATE 6-19 

1.  Its  origin,  6. 

2.  Its  characteristics,  9. 

c.   Fusion  of  agricultural,  trading,  industrial,  and 
commercial  classes,  9. 

b.  Theory  of  common  descent  of  citizens,  13. 

c.  So-called  worship  of  the  dead,  14. 

d.  Educative  power  of  the  laws,  16. 

e.  Municipality  and  nation  in  one,  17. 

III.  MEANS  OF  OBSCURING   IMPERIALISM   .      .       19-25 

1.  Symmachia  the  basis  of  the  Peloponnesian  league,  20. 

a.   Support  of  oligarchies,  21. 

2.  Stasis,  or  civil  war,  22. 

3.  Symmachia  the  basis  of  the  Athenian  empire,  23. 

a.  Support  of  democracies,  23. 

b.  Maintenance  of  the  union,  24. 

IV.  FAILURE   OF   HEGEMONIES 25-30 

I.  The  idea  of  proportionate  representation,  27. 

V.  MEANS  OF  EVADING   IMPERIALISM    .      .      .      30-34 

1.  Grant  of  Polity,  or  citizenship,  30. 

2.  Grant  of  Isopolity,  or  reciprocity  of  citizenship,  31. 

3.  Grant  of  Sympolity,  or  joint  citizenship,  32. 

VI.  MEANS  OF  JUSTIFYING   IMPERIALISM  .      .      34-37 
1.  Deification  of  kings,  35. 

II.  ATHENS:  AN   IMPERIAL  DEMOCRACY 

I.  ORIGIN   OF  THE   IMPERIAL   DEMOCRACY      .      38-41 

1.  Themistocles,  39. 

2.  Pericles,  41. 

II.  SIZE  AND   POPULATION   OF  ATHENS  AND    ITS 
EMPIRE 42-43 


x  CONTENTS 

III.  THE   FUNERAL  ORATION:   THE    IDEALS   OF 
PERICLEAN   DEMOCRACY 43-48 

IV.  THE   INSTITUTIONS  OF   DEMOCRACY     .      .      49-65 

1.  Ecclesia  and  heliaea;  their  conjoined  activity,  49. 

2.  The  council  of  the  500  and  the  committees  of  magis- 

trates, 51. 

a.  The  ten  prytanies,  52. 

b.  Election  by  lot;  annual  tenure  of  office;  rota- 

tion, 52,  53,  55. 

3.  The  ecclesia  an  assembly  of  high-class  amateurs,  57. 

c.  Its  use  of  experts,  58. 

b.   Its  choice  of  a  leader:  ostracism,  60. 

4.  The  economic  basis  of  democracy,  61. 

a.  The  place  of  slavery :  simply  a  form  of  capital  ,61. 

b.  The  object  of  indemnities:  political  equality,  64. 

V.  THE  EMPIRE 65-78 

1.  The  advantages  of  sea  power,  66. 

2.  The  demands  of  the  fleet,  68. 

3.  The  complaints  made  against  Athens,  70. 

a.  Misuse  of  tribute  money,  71. 

b.  Misuse  of  judicial  authority,  72. 

c.  Seizure  of  land  in  subject  territory,  73. 

d.  Extirpation  of  the  best,  74. 

4.  The  destruction  of  the  empire,  75. 

III.    FROM   SPARTA  TO  ARISTOTLE 

I.  SPARTA   IN   HISTORY 79^7 

1.  Crushing  of  early  Spartan  culture,  81. 

2.  The  military  life  of  the  Spartans,  84. 

3.  The  effect  of  the  Perioec  ring-wall,  85,  88. 

a.  The  Peloponnesian  league:  550-370  B.C.,  88. 

b.  The  Hellenic  league:  405-395  B.C.,  89. 

4.  The  hollowness  of  the  Spartan  hegemony,  90-95. 

a.    Cinadon,  91. 

5.  The  age  of  reaction,  96,  97. 

a.  Urban  particularism,  96. 

b.  The  ancestral  constitution,  96. 

II.  SPARTA  AND  ATHENS  IN  POLITICAL  THEORY    97-114 
1.  Plato,  99-107. 

a.  Neglect  of  History,  99. 

b.  Plato's  hatred  of  democracy,  IC2. 

c.  His  idealization  of  Sparta,  107. 


CONTENTS  xi 

2.  Aristotle,  107-114. 

a.  Relation  to  history,  108. 

b.  Aristotle's  hatred  of  imperialism,  no,  113. 

c.  Comparison  of  his  Politics  with  the  Prince  of 

Machiavelli,  in. 

d.  Aristotle's  failure  to  let  "strength"  operate  in 

international  politics,  114. 

IV.  ALEXANDER  THE  GREAT  AND  WORLD- 
MONARCHY 

I.  IDEAS  RECEIVED  BY  ALEXANDER  FROM  HIS 
PARENTS  AND  HIS  TUTOR 1 16-123 

a.  Alexander  and  Philip,  116. 

b.  Alexander  and  Aristotle,  119,  135,  147. 

II.  ACTS    BY  WHICH    ALEXANDER    DISCLOSED 

HIS  POLICIES 123-148 

1.  The  destruction  of  Thebes,  123. 

2.  The  visit  to  Troy,  124.  / 

3.  The  Gordian  knot,  125. 

4.  The  visit  to  the  oasis  of  Siwah,  126,  139. 

5.  The  burning  of  the  palace  of  the  Persian  kings,  129. 

6.  The  discharge  of  the  Greek  contingents,  130. 

7.  Proskynesis ,  131. 

8.  The  great  marriage  at  Susa,  136. 

9.  The  proskynesis  of  the  city-states,  147. 

V.  THE   PTOLEMAIC   DYNASTY 

I.  HISTORY  OF  THE  PTOLEMIES 149-160 

1.  Third  period  of  Ptolemaic  history:  80-30  B.C.,  151. 

c.    Ptolemy  the  Piper,  152. 
b.   Cleopatra  the  Great,  152. 

2.  First  period  of  Ptolemaic  history:  323-203  B.C.,  155. 

a.  Ptolemy  I.  Soter:  323-283  B.C.,  150,  155. 

b.  Ptolemy  II.    Philadelphus:  285-246  B.C.,  156. 

c.  Ptolemy  III.   Euergetes:  246-222  B.C.,  159,  179. 

d.  Ptolemy  IV.   Philopator:  222-203  B.C.,  160,  179. 

II.  EMPIRE  OF  THE  PTOLEMIES 160-182 

I.  Grounds  of  the  imperial  policy  of  the  early  Ptolemies, 
160. 
c.    Pride  of  possession,  160. 

b.  Checkmating  enemies,  161. 

c.  Commercial  advantages,  161. 

d.  Domestic  policy,  162. 


xii  CONTENTS 

2.  Triple  theory  of  Ptolemaic  state,  162. 

a.  For  Egyptians,  162. 

b.  For  Greek  city-states,  163. 

c.  For  Macedonians,  166. 

3.  The  Ptolemaic  army,  167. 

a.  Origin,  168. 

b.  Distribution  of,  in  Egypt,  172. 

c.  Influence  of,  upon  natives,  176. 

d.  Becomes  immobile,  242-222  B.C.,  179. 

e.  Opened  to  Egyptians,  180. 

4.  Second  or  domestic  period  of   Ptolemaic  history, 

200-80  B.C.,  180. 

a.   Absorption  of  Greek  by  native  population,  181. 

VI.    THE  SELEUCID   EMPIRE 

I.  HISTORY  OF  THE  SELEUCIDS 183-194 

1.  Antigonus  the  One-eyed,  creator  of  the  realm,  183. 

2.  Century  and  a  half  of  progress,  184-190. 

a.  Seleucus  I:  312-281  B.C.,  184. 

b.  Antiochus  I,  Soter:  281-262  B.C.,  185. 

c.  Antiochus  II,  Theos:  262-246  B.C.,  185. 

d.  Seleucus  II,  Callinicus:  246-226  B.C.,  186. 

e.  Seleucus  III,  Soter:  226-223  B.C. 

/.    Antiochus  III,  The  Great:  223-187  B.C.,  187. 
g.   Seleucus  IV:  187-175  B.C. 
h.  Antiochus  IV,  The  God  Manifest:  175-164  B.C., 
190, 213. 

3.  Century  of  decline:  164-163  B.C.,  190. 

4.  External  agents  of  destruction,  190. 

a.  Rome  disarms  Seleucids,   incites  revolt,   and 

keeps  alive  dynastic  struggles,  190. 

b.  Indo-Scythians  (Yue  Tchi)  occupy  East  Iran, 

192. 

5.  Internal  agencies:  revolt  of  Jews,  Parthians,  Arme- 

nians, 191,  192. 

II.  POLICY  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  THE  SELEUCIDS  195-214 

1.  Seleucus  I,  heir  of  Alexander's  ideas,  195. 

2.  Founding  of  city-states,  196. 

3.  Priestly  communities  and  feudal  states,  how  treated, 

197. 

4.  Royal  villages,  how  managed,  203,  205. 

5.  Land  either  property  of  king  or  of  city-states,  204. 

6.  City-states,  how  far  they  Hellenized  Asia,  206. 

7.  Relations  of  king  to  city-states,  208. 


CONTENTS  xiii 

8.  Comparison  of  Syria  and  Italy,  210. 

9.  Policy  of  Antiochus  IV:  conflict  with  Jews;  submis- 

sion to  Rome,  212. 

VII.    THE  EMPIRE  OF  THE  ANTIGONIDS 

I.  RELATION  OF   MACEDON   TO   HELLAS       .      .  215 

II.  MACEDONIAN    CONTRIBUTION    TO    ROME     .  215-216 

1.  War,  215. 

2.  Government  —  a  constitutional  and  not  an  absolute 

monarchy,  216. 

3.  Culture,  216. 

III.  MACEDONIAN  OPPOSITION  TO  ROME     .       .  217-218 

IV.  EARLY  HISTORY  OF  THE  ANTIGONIDS  .      .  218-222 

1.  Antigonus  I  —  the  exponent  of  unity  in  Graeco-Mace- 

donian  world,  218. 

2.  Demetrius  Poliorcetes  —  the  adventurer,  219. 

3.  Antigonus  and  Demetrius  not  really  kings  of  Mace- 

don,  220. 

V.  ANTIGONUS  GONATAS 222-234 

1.  Training  got  in  Greece  and  Macedon,  222. 

2.  Peace  with  Asia  and  Egypt,  223. 

a.  Inroad  of  Pyrrhus,  223. 

3.  Protected  Greece  from  northern  barbarians,  224. 

4.  Governs  Greece  by  "tyrannies,"  224. 

5.  Stoic  justification  of  "tyranny,"  225. 

6.  Ptolemy  Philadelphus  opposes  Antigonus  in  Greece, 

226. 

7.  Rise  of  the  ethne,  228. 

8.  Struggle  with  Egypt  for  sea  power,  229. 

c.   Aratus  seizes  Sicyon:  Alexander  rebels,  230. 

b.  The  Laodicean  War  saves  Antigonus,  231. 

c.  Possessions  of  Antigonus  at  end  of    struggle, 

233- 

VI.  POSITION  OF  ACH^A,  /ETOLIA,  AND  EGYPT 

AT  THE  END  OF  STRUGGLE 234 

VII.  THE  FEDERAL  MOVEMENT 235-240 

1.  Ethne  become  leagues,  236. 

2.  The  city-state  the  federal  unit,  237. 

3.  The  league  lacks  an  hegemon,  238. 

4.  Monarchical  traits,  239. 

5.  Relation  of  federal  to  local  authorities,  239. 


xiv  CONTENTS 

VIII.  DEMETRIUS  II 240-241 

I.  War  with  Achaeans  and  ^Etolians,  241. 

IX.  FALL  OF  THE  ACH/EAN   LEAGUE       .      .      .  241-242 

1.  Treachery  of  the  /Etolians,  241. 

2.  Desertion  of  Egypt,  242. 

3.  Policy  of  Antigonus  Doson,  242. 

4.  Cleomenes  of  Sparta,  242. 

X.  THE   HELLENIC   LEAGUE  OF  ANTIGONUS 

DOSON 242-245 

1.  Leagues,  not  cities,  the  units,  243. 

2.  Macedon  a  unit,  243. 

3.  League  assemblies  recognized  as  sovereign  authori- 

ties, 244. 

4.  Military  weakness,  244. 

XL  PHILIP  IV  AND  THE  LEAGUE      ....  245-248 

1.  The  Social  War,  246. 

2.  The  Roman  peril:  speech  of  Agelaus  of  Naupactus, 

246. 

3.  End  of  Hellenic  independence,  248. 


GREEK  IMPERIALISM 


GREEK  IMPERIALISM 


IMPERIALISM    AND    THE    CITY-STATE 

It  is  my  purpose  in  this  opening  chapter  to  define  some 
terms  which  I  shall  have  to  use  repeatedly  in  the  book ; 
to  make  a  somewhat  detailed  examination  of  the  charac- 
ter of  the  Greek  states  whose  political  integrity  was 
threatened  by  imperialism ;  to  trace  the  development  of 
imperialism  to  its  culmination  in  the  divine  monarchy 
of  Alexander  the  Great  and  his  successors;  and,  at  the 
same  time,  to  arrange  a  general  political  setting  for  the 
topics  to  be  discussed  in  the  six  succeeding  chapters. 

An  empire  is  a  state  formed  by  the  rule  of  one  state 
over  other  states.  It  is  immaterial  in  this  connection 
what  form  of  government  the  ruling  people  prefers. 
Power  may  be  exercised  there  by  a  monarchy,  an  oli- 
garchy, or  a  majority  without  altering  in  any  essential 
the  relation  of  the  sovereign  to  its  dependencies.  Still 
less  does  it  matter  whether  the  subject  people  is  gov- 
erned by  the  one,  the  few,  or  the  many ;  for  all  kinds 
of  governments  may  exist,  and  have  existed,  in  depend- 
encies. 


2  GREEK   IMPERIALISM 

Naturally,  an  empire  is  compatible  with  any  kind  of 
an  administrative  service  among  both  governors  and 
governed.  The  suzerain  may  attend  to  its  affairs  with 
the  aid  of  professional  and  specially  trained  officials, 
as  in  a  bureaucracy;  and  a  vassal  may  entrust  the  de- 
tails of  its  public  business  to  successive  fractions  of  its 
citizens,  as  in  some  republics :  no  imperial  relation  is 
established  unless  separate  states  or  parts  of  states 
are  involved.  But  when  these  are  related  in  a  whole 
as  superiors  and  inferiors,  an  empire  at  once  arises. 

The  relation  of  inferiority  and  superiority  is,  however, 
essential  in  any  empire.  In  modern  times  this  is 
acknowledged  with  the  utmost  frankness.  Upon  the 
higher  capacity  for  government  claimed  by  the  Chris- 
tian peoples,  the  Western  cultures,  or  the  Anglo- 
Saxons,  as  the  case  may  be,  modern  pride,  greed,  or  con- 
science bases  its  right  to  control  inferior  races.  "Take 
up  the  white  man's  burden  "  is  the  modern  substitute  for 
the  ancient  commandment,  "Go  ye  into  all  the  world 
and  preach  the  Gospel  to  every  creature."  The  pos- 
session of  a  better  rule  of  public  life  imposes  —  it  is 
affirmed  —  a  missionary  obligation  no  less  weighty 
than  the  possession  of  a  special  rule  of  eternal  life. 

Less  exasperating,  perhaps,  than  this  assumption  of 
moral  and  political  superiority  is  the  candid  profession 
of  the  right  of  the  stronger.  The  right  of  conquest  gives 
a  title  which  is  valid  in  international  law  when  every 
other  right  is  lacking.  When  superiority  is  stipulated  to 


IMPERIALISM   AND  THE  CITY-STATE     3 

be  absent,  the  product  is  a  federation  or  something 
similar  from  which  the  name  empire  is  withheld.  When, 
in  course  of  time,  superiority  dies  out  till  a  common 
right  eventually  embraces  subject  and  sovereign  alike, 
a  new  state  arises,  to  which,  as  in  the  case  of  the  present- 
day  British  world,  the  title  empire  is  applied  with  some 
impropriety. 

There  is,  however,  still  another  kind  of  empire.  In  it 
the  superior  authority  is  not  a  people,  but  an  individual. 
He  is  called  an  emperor,  and  his  family  a  dynasty.  His 
authority  is  bestowed,  as  the  present  German  Emperor 
said  at  Konigsberg  in  1910,  not  by  "parliaments,  and 
meetings,  and  decisions  of  the  peoples,  but  by  the  grace 
of  God  alone."  He  is  "a  chosen  instrument  of  Heaven," 
to  speak  with  the  same  high  authority,  and  "goes  his 
way  without  regard  to  the  views  and  opinions  of  the 
day."  An  emperor,  thus  defined,  is  not  properly  a  part 
of  his  state  at  all.  He  stands  outside  of  it,  and  is  equal 
or  superior  to  it.  He  is  a  state  unto  himself;  and  his 
jurisdiction  is  not  domestic  but  imperial,  in  that  he 
exercises  dominion  over  another  state.  Vetat  c'est  mot  is 
an  imperfect  definition  of  this  kind  of  empire,  however; 
for  it  presumes  the  absence  of  political  organization  and 
activity  among  the  subjects  of  the  emperor.  It  pre- 
sumes the  permanency  of  the  condition  of  absolute  sur- 
render (deditio)  which,  with  the  Romans,  prefaced  the 
work  of  restoration  —  the  reestablishment  of  civil 
rights  within  an  enlarged  state.    In  actual  experience, 


4  GREEK   IMPERIALISM 

moreover,  a  complete  autocracy  never  exists.  The  will 
of  every  emperor  is  bound  by  the  legislation  which  he 
has  himself  enacted,  or  accepted  with  the  throne  from 
his  predecessor.  If  responsible  to  nothing  else,  he  is 
responsible  to  his  own  past.  He  may  withdraw  his 
charters :  he  cannot  violate  them  with  impunity. 

The  policy  by  which  a  people  or  an  autocrat  acquires 
and  maintains  an  empire,  we  call  imperialism.  The  term 
is,  of  course,  a  legacy  from  Rome  —  a  mute  witness  to 
the  peculiar  importance  of  the  Roman  empire  in  the 
history  of  state-building.  And,  I  suppose,  it  is  the  policy 
of  Rome  that  we  think  of  most  instinctively  when  we 
allude  to  imperialism.  This  is  by  no  means  an  accident. 
For  not  simply  the  type,  but  also  many  of  the  most  note- 
worthy varieties  of  this  kind  of  policy,  are  found  in  the 
experience  of  the  Romans;  and  the  course  of  political 
progress  has  been  such  that  in  the  triumph  of  Rome 
imperialism  reached  its  logical  issue  more  closely  than 
either  before  or  since  in  the  history  of  the  world. 

For  the  logical  issue  of  a  thoroughgoing  imperial  policy 
—  one  in  which  the  possession  of  physical  ability  may  be 
presupposed  —  is  the  formation  of  an  universal  empire. 
And,  in  fact,  the  two  most  powerful  and  ardent  imperial- 
ists of  antiquity,  Alexander  the  Great  and  Julius  Caesar, 
aimed  to  include  in  their  dominions  the  entire  inhabit- 
able world.  This  issue  was,  however,  never  more  nearly 
reached  than  in  the  long  period  before  and  after  the 


IMPERIALISM   AND   THE  CITY-STATE    5 

Christian  era  during  which  only  shifting  nomads  and 
intractable  Parthians  disputed  successfully  the  will  of 
the  Roman  Senate  and  the  orders  of  the  Roman  em- 
perors. For  five  hundred  years  after  the  triumph  of 
Constantine  the  universality  of  the  Roman  empire  was 
as  mandatory  in  men's  thinking  as  was  the  catholicity 
of  the  Christian  Church.  "There  are  many  'empires'  in 
the  world  to-day,"  says  Professor  Bury1  in  explaining 
the  coronation  of  Charlemagne  in  800  a.d.,  "but  in  those 
days  men  could  only  conceive  of  one,  the  Roman 
imperium,  which  was  simple  and  indivisible;  two  Ro- 
man empires  were  unimaginable.  There  might  be  more 
than  the  one  emperor;  but  these  others  could  only  be 
legitimate  and  constitutional  if  they  stood  to  him  in 
a  collegial  relation."  How  thoroughly  the  Romans 
impressed  the  concept  of  universality  upon  the  term 
empire  may  be  judged  by  the  fact  that,  in  the  face  of  all 
realities,  the  Frankish  monarchs  at  Aachen  and  the 
Greek  kings  at  Constantinople  ruled  as  colleagues  a 
Roman  empire  which  stretched  from  the  borders  of 
Armenia  to  the  shores  of  the  Atlantic. 

Transcendent  as  is  the  imperial  achievement  of  the  • 
Romans,  and  unrivaled  as  is  the  political  sagacity  with 
which  they  consolidated  their  power  and  made  it  endur- 
ing, it  must  still  be  recognized  that  they  were  the  heirs, 
in  war,  diplomacy,  and  government,  of  the  Greeks,  their 
predecessors.  They  worked  with  greater  power  and  with 

1  A  History  of  the  Eastern  Roman  Empire,  pp.  319  /. 


6  GREEK   IMPERIALISM 

larger  units  than  did  the  Spartans  and  the  Athenians. 
They  benefited  by  the  brilliant  inventions  and  the 
costly  errors  of  the  Macedonians  whose  kingdoms  they 
destroyed.  But  their  success  simply  brought  to  a  cul- 
mination the  imperial  movement  in  which  Sparta, 
Athens,  and  Macedon  were  worthy  co-workers.  It  is  our 
task  in  this  series  of  essays  to  examine  in  turn  the 
imperial  experiments  by  which  the  Greeks  not  only  won 
a  field  for  the  display  of  their  own  talents,  but  also  pre- 
pared the  way  for  the  unification  of  the  ancient  world 
in  the  empire  of  Rome. 

I  alluded  a  moment  ago  to  the  smallness  of  the  units 
with  which  the  imperial  policy  of  Sparta  and  Athens 
had  to  deal.  Before  proceeding  in  the  latter  part  of  this 
chapter  to  trace  the  development  of  the  forms  by  which 
imperialism  was  obscured,  evaded,  and  ultimately  justi- 
fied in  Greece,  I  should  like  to  try  to  make  clear  the 
qualities  which  rendered  the  little  Hellenic  communities 
so  hard  for  imperial  digestion.  In  classic  Greece,  as  in 
renascence  Italy,  the  city  was  the  state.  It  had  not 
always  been  so ;  for  in  the  past  the  land  had  been  at  one 
time  in  the  possession  of  rudimentary  nations,  called 
ethne.  But  in  the  classic  epoch  these  loose  organisms 
persisted  only  in  certain  backward  regions  in  the  west 
and  north.  Elsewhere  city-states  had  everywhere  made 
their  appearance  as  early  as  the  sixth  century  B.C. 

The  circumstances  in  which  these  city-states  arose  are 


IMPERIALISM   AND  THE  CITY-STATE     7 

shrouded  in  the  mystery  which  surrounds  most  begin- 
nings. They,  accordingly,  present  all  the  better  oppor- 
tunity for  the  construction  of  a  theory;  and  perhaps  the 
theory  which  had  once  the  greatest  vogue  is  that  enun- 
ciated by  Fustel  de  Coulanges  in  his  brilliant  book  on 
The  Ancient  City.  Of  its  main  propositions,  however, — 
that  each  city-state  came  into  being  at  a  single  moment; 
that  it  was  an  artificial  structure  deliberately  modeled 
on  the  preexistent  family;  that  the  family  was  a  reli- 
gious association  created  and  organized  for  the  worship 
of  ancestors;  that  the  spirits  of  ancestors  were  the  first 
gods,  or,  indeed,  were  gods  at  all,  —  not  one  has  stood 
the  test  of  a  searching  inquiry.  On  the  contrary,  it 
seems  established  that  the  city-state  was  the  result  of  a 
natural  growth,  and  that  the  incidents  which  accom- 
panied its  development,  while  varied  and  numerous, 
were  all  manifestations  of  political  progress.  Growth  in 
the  direction  of  a  large  number  of  distinct  states  was 
natural  in  Greece  in  view  of  the  well-known  physical 
features  of  the  country;  but  the  study  of  geography 
does  not  explain  why  these  states  were  cities.  For  the 
true  explanation  of  this  phenomenon  we  must  not  con- 
fine our  observation  to  Greece.  Broadly  speaking,  high 
culture  is  everywhere  city-bred,  and  the  cities  have 
regularly  been  the  leaders  in  political  development.  In 
Babylonia  that  was  the  case,  though  the  urban  centres 
there  were  dominated  from  a  very  early  date  by  Semitic 
tribes  from  the  desert.  Free  cities,  like  Tyre  and  Sidon, 


8  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

were  the  prime  sources  of  Phoenician  enterprise.  The 
home  of  Roman  law  and  government  was  a  city,  and 
when  Italy  led  the  world  a  second  time,  she  was  a  com- 
plex of  city-states.  The  Hanse  towns  and  the  Flemish 
communes,  the  chartered  cities  of  England  and  France, 
acquired  political  liberty  or  political  rights  long  before 
the  rest  of  Central  Europe.  Where,  in  fact,  the  cities 
have  not  been  the  mother,  and  the  territorial  states 
simply  the  foster-mother,  of  freedom  and  culture,  excep- 
tional conditions  have  existed  —  such  as  the  need  of 
regulating  the  Nile's  overflow  in  Egypt,  and  the  model 
and  influence  of  the  Roman  empire  in  Mohammedan 
and  Christian  Europe. 

The  city  enables  men  to  cooperate  easily.  In  it  ideas 
and  feelings  spread  quickly.  Life,  property,  and  privi- 
leges are  there  protected  by  walls,  and,  if  need  be,  by 
street  barricades.  ' '  Two  voices  are  there, ' '  wrote  Words- 
worth in  1807,  his  vision  limited  by  the  peril  of  England 
and  Switzerland,  — 

'  one  is  of  the  sea, 
One  of  the  mountains;  each  a  mighty  Voice: 
In  both  from  age  to  age  thou  didst  rejoice, 
They  were  thy  chosen  music,  Liberty." 

The  voice  of  a  city  mob  —  that  of  Rome,  Alexandria, 
Constantinople,  Florence,  or  Paris,  for  example  —  was 
generally  raucous  and  often  cruel.  But  it  made  tyrants 
tremble  and  limited  absolutism  when  the  fear  of  assas- 
sination was  powerless. 


IMPERIALISM  AND  THE  CITY-STATE     9 

Fortunately,  it  is  not  with  the  origins,  but  with  the 
characteristics,  of  the  Greek  city-states  that  we  have  to 
do  mainly  when  we  seek  to  discover  the  grounds  of  their 
hatred  of  all  imperialistic  projects.  Let  us,  therefore, 
try  to  form  a  concrete  impression  of  the  salient  features 
of  the  hundreds  of  little  states  with  which  the  progres- 
sive parts  of  Greece  were  honeycombed  at  the  beginning 
of  the  classic  period,  in  the  sixth  century  B.C.  Each 
political  cell,  so  to  speak,  had  its  nucleus  in  a  walled 
town  and  its  substance  in  a  small  circuit  of  grain,  pas- 
ture, and  garden  land  which  the  inhabitants  of  the  town 
owned  and  cultivated.  Most  of  the  towns  were  simply 
hives  of  farmers.  Whether  the  farmers  were  landlords, 
small  proprietors,  or  peasants;  however  much  they  were 
divided  by  lines  of  social  cleavage,  they  were  all  able  to 
meet  on  the  common  ground  of  a  single  occupation. 
And  every  day  from  March  to  November,  from  the  out- 
cropping of  the  grass  and  foliage  in  the  spring,  through 
the  season  of  the  grain  harvest,  the  vintage,  and  the 
picking  of  the  olives,  to  the  fall  planting  and  seeding,  the 
ebb  and  flow  of  agricultural  life  carried  the  population 
of  the  city  to  the  country  in  the  morning  and  back  to 
the  city  again  in  the  evening. 

There  were  few  towns  in  Greece  whose  land  did  not 
touch  the  sea;  and  from  the  sea  another  harvest  was 
gathered.  Fishing  existed,  of  course;  but  that  was  not 
all.  Transmarine  commerce  is  never  wholly  absent  in 
any  maritime  country.    In   Greece  it  was  especially 


io  GREEK   IMPERIALISM 

favored  by  the  difficulties  of  land  transit,  and  by  the 
excellence  of  the  highways  which  the  sea  laid  while 
carving  the  country  up  into  a  myriad  of  islands,  head- 
lands, and  estuaries.  Hence,  by  the  opening  of  the  sixth 
century  B.C.  a  second  town  had  generally  appeared  on 
the  coast  of  each  little  state  when  the  chief  town  had 
developed,  as  was  commonly  the  case,  a  few  miles  in- 
land. In  the  new  settlement  the  tone  was  set  by  the 
sailor- folk  and  the  traders;  in  the  old  centre  by  the 
landed  proprietors  and  the  peasants.  But  the  landlords 
were  frequently  merchants,  and  the  peasants  could 
easily  attach  work-places  (ergasteria)  to  their  houses  — 
which,  though  in  the  towns,  were  really  farmhouses — 
and  become  manufacturers  in  a  small  way ;  while  it  was 
regularly  the  ambition  of  a  trader  or  seaman  to  crown 
a  successful  career  by  buying  a  farm,  a  ranch,  or  an 
orchard.  There  was,  accordingly,  a  very  close  connec- 
tion between  urban  and  agrarian  pursuits  and  inter- 
ests. 

It  is  true  that  with  the  Greek  occupation  of  the  coasts 
of  the  Mediterranean  and  Black  Seas  in  the  seventh 
century  B.C.  some  Greek  towns,  like  Miletus,  Samos, 
Corinth,  /Egina,  Chalcis,  and  Eretria,  became  cities  in 
the  modern  sense  of  the  term,  with  commercial  and 
industrial  interests  predominant.  But  even  there  the 
advantages  of  urban  life  were  within  reach  of  the 
farmers,  as  well  as  of  the  traders,  artisans,  and  mer- 
chants, since  all  alike  were  residents  of  the  city.   The 


IMPERIALISM   AND  THE  CITY-STATE     n 

only  difference  was  that  life  in  those  cities  was  more 
rich  and  diversified  than  elsewhere. 

The  contrast  between  life  in  cities,  with  its  complex 
social  organization,  its  playhouses,  its  excitements,  its 
stimuli  to  effort  and  to  vice,  its  intolerance  of  oddities  in 
manners  and  dress,  and  life  in  the  country,  with  its  sim- 
plicity which  degenerates  so  easily  into  brutality,  its 
monotony,  its  fanaticism  in  the  pursuit  of  wealth,  its 
contempt  for  the  effeminacy  of  the  shopkeeper,  its  piety 
and  sobriety  which  easily  accord  with  a  longing  to  see 
the  world  and  the  wickedness  thereof  —  this  contrast 
which  is  so  distressing  an  aspect  of  life  in  modern 
America,  was  almost  entirely  absent  in  classic  Greece, 
at  least  among  the  enfranchised  part  of  the  population. 

None  of  the  cities  was  so  large  as  to  shut  off  the  view 
of  the  country.  After  only  a  few  minutes'  walk  Socrates 
and  his  companions  might  escape  from  the  noise  and 
confusion  of  Athens  into  the  cool  and  fragrant  groves  of 
the  suburbs.  It  was  probably  only  into  the  biggest  of 
the  Greek  cities  that  the  olive  trees  and  the  grapevines 
did  not  push,  as  they  and  the  late-come  orange  and 
lemon  orchards  push  into  the  modern  Greek  hamlets. 
Even  in  Athens  the  crowing  of  the  cock  sounded  the 
reveille  for  almost  everybody,  and  it  would  never  have 
come  into  the  mind  of  an  Athenian  to  suggest,  as  has 
been  done  in  Boston,  that  a  zoo  should  be  stocked  first 
with  the  common  varieties  of  the  domesticated  animals. 
There  is,  says  a  French  writer,  a  flavor  of  the  barnyard 


12  GREEK   IMPERIALISM 

about  the  comedies  of  Aristophanes.  Yet  this  is  the  same 
Athens  in  which  there  were  engaged  in  the  building 
trades  alone,  according  to  Plutarch,  carpenters,  mould- 
ers, bronze-smiths,  stone-cutters,  dyers,  veneerers  in 
gold  and  ivory,  painters,  embroiderers,  embossers; 
factors,  sailors,  pilots ;  wagon-makers,  trainers  of  yoked 
beasts,  drivers;  rope-makers,  weavers,  cobblers,  road- 
builders,  and  miners.  This,  too,  is  the  Athens  into 
which,  as  an  ancient  Athenian  wrote,  were  swept,  be- 
cause of  its  maritime  empire,  the  choice  things  of  Sicily 
and  Italy,  of  Cyprus,  and  Egypt,  and  Lydia,  of  Pontus 
and  Peloponnesus,  and  many  another  place  besides. 
When  the  farmer  lived  side  by  side  in  Athens,  the  largest 
city  in  the  whole  Greek  world,  with  the  trader  and  the 
artisan,  the  fusion  of  town  and  country  must  have  been 
still  more  complete  in  the  forty- three  cities  of  Crete,  the 
ten  cities  of  Eubcea,  and  the  four  cities  of  Ceos  —  an  island 
only  ten  miles  broad  and  fourteen  long.  This  being  the 
case,  economic  conditions  tended  to  make  the  citizens  of 
each  state  homogeneous  to  a  degree  foreign  in  modern  ex- 
perience; for,  however  rapid  be  its  approach,  the  age  has 
not  yet  arrived  in  America  in  which  the  "country  is  to  be 
urbanized";  in  which,  to  speak  with  a  recent  essayist,1 
farming  is  to  be  "of  necessity  a  specialized  department 
of  urban  life";  "the  task  of  agricultural  production 
is  to  be  taken  over  by  the  classes  of  modern  indus- 
trial organization;  by  the  capitalist,  the  manager  and 

1  Atlantic  Monthly,  Oct.,  1912,  vol.  ex,  pp.  517  ff. 


IMPERIALISM  AND  THE  CITY-STATE     13 

the  laborer";  in  which  "there  is  to  be  a  continual  shift- 
ing of  laborers  of  the  poorer  classes  back  and  forth  be- 
tween the  town  and  the  country,"  and  "the  distinction 
implied  in  the  terms  '  townsman '  and  '  countryman '  is  to 
be  obliterated." 

Whether  our  essayist  be  right  or  wrong  in  his  forecast 
of  the  future  of  farming  in  America,  we  will  not  stop  to 
discuss.  It  is  enough  to  point  out  that  the  early  age  of 
Greece  was  such  a  one  as  he  desiderates ;  that  then  life 
was  exclusively  and  uniformly  urban:  with  the  result 
that  the  entire  population  of  any  given^city-state  could 
be  regarded  as  merely  a  great  family.  And  it  not  only 
could  be,  but  it  was  in  fact  so  regarded.  Were  not  all 
citizens  descendants  of  a  common  ancestor?  This  query 
aristocrats  might  answer  in  the  negative,  mindful  of  the 
special  god  or  demigod  of  whom  each  nobleman  thought 
himself  the  offspring.  But  his  negative  was  generally 
qualified  by  the  admission  that  he,  too,  if  he  were  an 
Athenian,  had  Zeus  and  Apollo  —  Zeus  of  the  home- 
stead and  Apollo  of  the  fatherland  —  as  his  progenitors; 
that  he,  too,  like  all  his  fellow-citizens,  was  a  descendant 
of  Ion  and  a  foster-child  of  Athena.  The  gods  and  god- 
desses of  the  Greeks  were  their  creators  in  the  literal 
physical  sense  of  the  word.  Men  projected  backward, 
even  to  the  age  of  the  gods  and  heroes,  with  which  the 
world  began,  the  fact  of  paternity  to  which  all  animal 
origins  were  attributable;  and  since  each  city  had  its 
peculiar  demigods,  from  which  its  citizens  were  directly 


14  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

sprung,  all  its  inhabitants  were  bound  to  one  an- 
other by  a  peculiar   tie  of  blood. 

The  family  aspect  of  the  Greek  city  is  accentuated  by 
the  fact  that  the  town  hall  was  a  town  hearth ;  that  the 
chief  subdivisions  of  citizens  were  brotherhoods,  and 
that  all  permanent  associations  of  them  for  public  pur- 
poses assumed  the  descent  of  their  several  members 
from  common  ancestors,  who  were  naturally  gods  or 
demigods.  When  heroes  had  to  be  discovered,  with  the 
help  of  the  Pythian  prophetess,  to  act  as  progenitors  for 
the  groups  of  citizens  artificially  united  in  the  new  elec- 
toral divisions  which  Clisthenes  established  in  Athens  in 
508  B.C.,  it  is  conceivable  that  popular  regard  for  purity 
of  stock  helped  Pericles  to  enact  the  notorious  law  of  451 
B.C.  limiting  citizenship  at  Athens  to  those  sprung  from 
the  legitimate  union  of  Athenian  parents.  Every  city  in 
Greece  inherited  from  its  distant  tribal  past  a  strong 
feeling  of  the  kinship  of  its  inhabitants,  in  comparison 
with  which  the  sense  of  ethnic  and  racial  unity  was  weak 
and  watery.  To  destroy  the  political  identity  of  a  city 
was  like  taking  human  life. 

We  must  make  allowance,  moreover,  in  appraising  the 
strength  of  local  attachments  among  both  Greeks  and 
Romans,  for  their  beliefs  as  to  the  fate  of  the  dead.  The 
ancient  world,  like  modern  Japan,  was  saturated  with 
the  idea  that  the  spirits  of  departed  ancestors  needed  the 
ministrations  of  the  living.  Without  the  meat  and  drink 
which  the  relatives  brought  to  the  grave;  without  the 


IMPERIALISM   AND  THE  CITY-STATE     15 

coins  —  or  the  articles  of  use  and  pleasure  which  money 
might  buy  — that  were  buried  with  the  body;  without 
the  covering  of  earth  that  was  strewn  over  the  dead, 
loved  ones  might  lack  life  altogether  in  the  underworld, 
or  might  lack  everything  that  made  the  spirit  life  toler- 
able. "The  beasts  of  the  field  and  the  birds  of  the  air," 
rang  the  impassioned  plea  of  Tiberius  Gracchus1  in 
introducing  his  agrarian  reforms,  "have  their  holes  and 
their  hiding-places,  but  the  men  who  fight  and  die  for 
Italy  enjoy  but  the  blessings  of  light  and  air.  Our  gen- 
erals urge  their  soldiers  to  fight  for  the  graves  and  the 
shrines  of  their  ancestors.  The  appeal  is  idle  and  false. 
You  cannot  point  to  a  paternal  altar.  You  have  no 
ancestral  tomb.  No!  you  fight  and  die  to  give  wealth 
and  luxury  to  others.  You  are  called  the  masters  of  the 
world:  yet  there  is  no  clod  of  earth  that  is  really  yours." 
Plutarch,  with  a  touch  which  shows  that  despite  his 
modernity  he  belongs  to  the  civilization  which  he  inter- 
prets, tells  us  that  the  Athenians  before  Salamis  were 
disposed  to  count  victory  dear  which  was  purchased  by 
the  desertion  of  the  temples  and  the  tombs  of  their 
fathers.  No  man  who  neglected  the  plot  where  his  dead 
lay  might  hold  the  chief  magistracies  in  Athens.  The 
soil  of  his  fatherland  was  thus  in  a  peculiar  sense  holy 
ground  to  the  citizen  of  a  Greek  city.  He  might  leave 
it,  but  not  to  an  enemy ;  and  if  he  were,  like  ^neas,  the 
last  of  his  family,  he  was  expected  to  carry  his  Lares  and 

t  *  Plutarch,  Ti.  Gracch.  9;  cf.  Greenidge,  A  History  of  Rome,  p.  III. 


16  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

Penates  with  him.  Into  a  pit  dug  on  the  new  site  every 
companion  of  Romulus,  we  are  told  in  a  legend  which 
merely  transfers  into  the  past  later-day  practice,  threw  a 
morsel  of  earth  brought  from  his  old  home  land.  This  he 
did  not  simply  from  an  intensification  of  the  feeling 
which  led  the  Scotch  girl  in  the  well-known  ballad  to 
take  with  her,  when  starting  for  America,  not  baggage, 
but  sods  from  her  mother's  grave.  He  did  it  from  the 
sentiment  which  led  General  Nogi  the  other  day  to  pro- 
vide for  the  spirits  of  his  ancestors  before  committing 
suicide.  Thereby  the  colonist  brought  his  dead  along 
with  him  to  the  new  city.  The  Greeks  and  the  Romans 
had,  accordingly,  a  very  special  reason  for  local  patriot- 
ism. Like  the  Hebrew  Christians,  they  were  "also  com- 
passed about  with  so  great  a  crowd  of  witnesses." 

We  have  made  our  peace  with  economics  by  consider- 
ing first  the  effect  of  occupation  and  residence  in  giving 
to  the  citizens  of  each  city-state  solidarity  of  interest 
and  attitude.  We  have  dwelt  a  little  on  the  force  which 
beliefs  as  to  their  origin  and  their  destiny  hereafter 
exerted  in  keeping  the  city-states  apart.  We  have  still  to 
notice  the  centrifugal  influence  on  the  Greek  race  of 
their  urban  institutions  and  politics. 

Each  city  in  Greece  had  its  own  laws  and  customs. 
These  were  not,  as  with  us,  cold  abstractions,  but  real, 
ever  active,  almost  living,  personal  forces,  moulding  in- 
cessantly their  subjects  according  to  a  given  model.  The 
citizens  of  each  city  had,  in  fact,  a  general  family  resem- 


IMPERIALISM  AND  THE  CITY-STATE    17 

blance,  due  to  the  imprint  set  upon  them  by  their  social 
and  political  institutions.  Cities  acquired  by  this  means 
clear-cut  individualities  which  were  capable  of  definition, 
not  simply  by  narrating  their  history,  but  also  in  terms 
of  physical,  intellectual,  and  emotional  qualities.  We 
may  illustrate  this  point  by  observing  that  the  Hellenes 
created  one  literary  type  which  we  have  not  borrowed 
from  them :  they  wrote  the  biographies  of  cities  as  well 
as  of  men.  Their  philosophers  studied  the  effects  upon 
urban  character  of  climate,  prevailing  winds  and  pur- 
suits, location  with  reference  to  the  sun  and  the  sea,  con- 
tact with  foreigners,  and  other  similar  agencies.  They 
even  had  specifics  which  they  prescribed  for  the  physio- 
logical and  pathological  ills  of  cities,  just  as  our  sciolists, 
on  a  much  more  slender  basis  of  facts,  however,  diagnose 
the  diseases  and  classify  the  good  and  evil  qualities 
of  nations. 

The  truth  is  that  cities  meant  to  all  the  Greeks  what 
(and  much  besides)  the  city  and  the  nation  combined 
mean  to  those  of  us  who  do  not  live  in  the  country.  They 
were  the  source  and  object  at  once  of  municipal  and  na- 
tional pride.  The  problems  which  city-states  had  to 
consider  and  solve  were  not  simply  those  in  which  good 
citizens  find  it  so  hard  nowadays  to  develop  a  wholesome 
interest.  Questions  of  police,  education,  public  works, 
appointments;  conflicts  of  racial,  sectional,  class,  and 
religious  ambitions;  rivalries  with  neighboring  cities  for 
commercial,  political,  and  cultural  leadership  —  con- 


18  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

troversies  of  this  order  are  common  to  all  cities  in  all 
times  and  places.  But  the  politics  of  the  Greek  cities  had 
a  high  seriousness  of  their  own.  Each  town  had  its  own 
foreign  policy  to  determine,  its  own  army  to  train  and 
direct,  its  own  church  to  equip  with  shrines  and  deities, 
its  own  gods  to  honor  with  games  and  tragedies.  Every 
move  on  the  complex  chessboard  of  the  Mediterranean 
world  might  be  pregnant  with  meaning  to  it.  On  one 
day  it  might  decide  that  the  time  had  come  to  seize  some 
borderland  in  dispute  with  its  immediate  neighbors.  On 
another  it  might  conclude  an  alliance  which  imposed  the 
obligation  to  wage  a  great  war  against  frightful  odds. 
On  another  the  subject  of  voting  might  be  the  recogni- 
tion of  a  new  god  or  goddess,  which,  in  fact,  was  often 
tantamount  to  a  new  creation.  And  in  considering  all 
these  matters  citizens  were  simply  doing  what  their 
fathers  and  forefathers  had  done  from  time  immemorial. 
Memories  of  great  actions  done  in  olden  times  were  pre- 
served by  monuments  of  bronze  or  marble,  and  revived 
annually  by  appropriate  ceremonies.  Legend  and  fact, 
blended  in  an  edifying  tradition,  —  the  repository  of  the 
yearnings  and  ideals  of  dead  generations,  — inspired 
the  living  to  bear  themselves  worthily  in  all  national 
crises.  "Love  thou  thy  land  with  love  far-brought  from 
out  the  storied  past"  was  an  admonition  of  which  Greek 
cities  of  the  classic  epoch  stood  in  little  need.  The  mis- 
chief was  that  the  land  which  they  loved  was  not  all 
Greece,  but  merely  the  territory  of  a  single  town. 


IMPERIALISM  AND  THE  CITY-STATE    19 

The  national  fanaticism  of  the  countries  of  modern 
Europe  is  probably  more  tolerant  of  foreign  interference 
than  was  the  passionate  patriotism  of  the  little  urban 
units  with  which  the  imperial  policy  of  Athens  and 
Sparta  had  to  deal. 

If  you  were  to  look  at  a  map  of  Greece  which  distin- 
guished the  states,  and  not  the  meaningless  ethnical  or 
tribal  divisions  of  the  people,  you  would  observe  that 
from  the  outset  Sparta  and  Athens  were  destined  to 
greatness,  if  by  nothing  else,  by  the  size  and  material 
resources  of  their  territories.  They  were,  however,  them- 
selves city-states,  and  inferior  to  none  in  the  strength 
with  which  they  held  to  the  conviction  that  no  greater 
humiliation  could  befall  them  than  to  have  to  submit  to 
the  domination  of  another  city  or  the  will  of  a  foreign 
lord.  With  what  show  of  reason,  therefore,  could  they 
adopt  a  policy  of  imperialism?  They  had  to  deal  with 
Greeks,  and  not  with  barbarians.  Hence  they  could  not 
invoke  in  the  interest  of  their  ambition  the  convenient 
doctrine  that  inferior  races  need  a  political  guardian. 

In  estimating  the  territory  of  Sparta  we  have  included 
in  it  not  simply  the  land  of  the  citizens  which  the  serfs 
or  Helots  tilled  for  them,  but  also  the  much  larger,  but 
less  valuable,  mass  of  enveloping  land  which  belonged  to 
the  Pericecs;  for  the  hamlets  of  the  latter  were  really 
Spartan  municipalities.  It  was,  moreover,  with  the 
resources  of  the  whole  complex  that  Sparta  held  the 


20  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

Peloponnesians  united  under  her  leadership  for  one  hun- 
dred and  eighty  years  (550-370  B-c-)«  On  the  other 
hand,  it  was  with  the  combined  strength  of  the  Pelopon- 
nesians that  Sparta  broke  up  the  Athenian  empire  in 
405  B.C.,  and  widened  the  area  of  her  leadership  so  as  to 
include  all   Hellas.  Thereafter  Sparta's  Peloponnesian 
league  was  simply  the  core  of  a  general  Hellenic  league. 
The  question  is:  What  position  did  Sparta  occupy  in  it? 
Her  legal  rights  rested  solely  upon  a  treaty  of  alliance 
(symmachia)  which  she  had  struck  with  each  city  in  the 
league.   But  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  she  had  often 
secured  the  treaty  in  the  first  place  by  force,  and  that 
she  interfered  thereafter  in  the  local  affairs  of  both  the 
Peloponnesian  and  the  other  Hellenic  allies  in  a  way 
not  provided  by  its  stipulations.  But,  however  outra- 
geous her  conduct  might  be  in  fact,  it  was  never  formally 
reprehensible  so  long  as  the  interference  achieved  its 
object.   This  was  to  establish  or  maintain,  first  against 
tyranny,  and  later  against  democracy,  an  aristocratic 
government  in  the  allied  cities.    Since  the  aristocrats 
were  always  in  a  minority,  they  were  bound  to  invite 
Spartan  intervention  for  their  own  defense.    Hence  it 
was  only  when  they  failed  to  retain  control  of  the  gov- 
ernment that  an  ally  could  regard  Sparta's  intermed- 
dling as  anything  but  the  welcome  act  of  a  friendly 
power.   "  Perhaps  some  one  may  expostulate,"  writes  a 
pamphleteer  in  400  B.C.  while  commending  to  his  fellow- 
citizens  of  Larisa  a  proposal  that  they  join  the  Hellenic 


IMPERIALISM   AND  THE  CITY-STATE     21 

league; l  "but  Sparta  sets  up  an  oligarchy  everywhere. 
That  is  true.  But  it  is  such  a  one  as  we  prayed  and 
yearned  for  for  ages,  and  lost  when  we  had  enjoyed  it  for 
but  a  brief  moment.  Just  compare  the  oligarchy  they 
favor  with  the  one  we  have  already.  Where  is  there  a 
city  in  their  domain,  be  it  ever  so  small,  in  which  a  third 
of  the  population  does  not  take  part  in  public  affairs? 
It  is  not  by  the  Lacedaemonians,  but  by  fortune,  that 
those  who  have  no  arms  or  other  capacity  for  public  ser- 
vice are  disfranchised.  Their  exclusion  lasts  only  so  long 
as  their  political  worthlessness.  How  do  we  stand  by 
comparison?  It's  my  belief  that  were  we  to  pray  for  a 
constitution  we  would  not  ask  the  gods  for  a  different 
one  from  that  which  Sparta  wishes."  To  even  moderate 
men  who  thought  as  this  speaker  did,  unruly  Spartan 
garrisons  seemed  quite  compatible  with  local  autonomy. 
They  came  to  Larisa  at  the  call  of  the  home  authorities 
and  remained  at  the  disposal  of  those  who  called  them. 
Their  captains,  the  long-haired  harmosts,  took  orders 
and  did  not  give  them.  Their  presence  involved  no  sus- 
pension of  the  constitution,  no  violation  of  the  laws,  no 
seizure  of  public  revenues.  Naturally,  the  two  thirds 
who  were  disfranchised  thought  differently;  but  it  is  a 
good  rule  of  international  law  that  a  foreign  state  deal 
with  the  Government,  and  not  with  the  Opposition.  The 

1  f  HpwSov],  Iltpl  IIoXiTtCas,  30  (Ed.  Drerup).  With  characteristic  con- 
servatism the  English  scholars,  Adcock  and  Knox  (Klio,  1913,  pp.  2^gff.)t 
uphold  the  attribution  of  this  pamphlet  to  Herodes  Atticus. 


22  GREEK   IMPERIALISM 

mischief  of  this  system,  in  the  circumstances  then  exist- 
ing in  Greece,  was  that  it  bred  civil  war  within  the  cities. 
"War,"  says  the  Larisaean  pamphleteer  just  quoted, 
"is  conceded  to  be  the  greatest  of  all  evils  by  as  much  as 
peace  is  the  greatest  of  all  blessings.  Yet  stasis,  or  civil 
war,  as  far  exceeds  war  in  the  magnitude  of  its  evil  as 
war  exceeds  peace."  The  incentive  to  stasis  was  that 
Athens,  with  a  naval  power  as  irresistible  as  was  the  land 
power  of  Sparta,  and  an  equally  imposing  array  of  allies, 
had  long  continued  to  reach  out  a  supporting  or  encour- 
aging hand  to  the  two  thirds  whom  Sparta  tried  to  keep 
down.  Athens,  too,  was  the  apostle  of  a  great  political 
idea,  "the  constitutional  equality  of  the  many,"  and 
whenever  she  succeeded  in  putting  those  who  believed 
in  this  creed  in  control  of  an  allied  city,  or  in  keeping 
them  in  control  once  they  had  the  advantage,  her  inter- 
ference was  formally  justifiable  or  at  least  justified.  Not 
she,  but  the  government  she  upheld,  had  the  responsi- 
bility. 

With  the  outbreak  of  the  great  duel  for  national 
leadership  between  Sparta  and  Athens  which  fills  the 
final  third  of  the  fifth  century  B.C.,  the  war  was  carried 
in  the  form  of  stasis  into  every  city  of  the  two  confeder- 
acies. For  the  leaders  of  both  the  one  third  and  the  two 
thirds,  says  Thucydides  in  a  famous  passage  of  his  his- 
tory of  the  Peloponnesian  War1  "used  specious  names, 

1  Thucy.,  in,  82,  8.  (The  translation  used  here  and  elsewhere  in  the 
book  is  that  of  Jowett.) 


IMPERIALISM   AND  THE  CITY-STATE    23 

the  one  professing  to  uphold  the  constitutional  equality 
of  the  many,  the  other  the  wisdom  of  an  aristocracy, 
while  they  made  the  public  interests,  to  which  in  name 
they  were  devoted,  in  reality  their  prize.  Striving  in 
every  way  to  overcome  each  other,  they  committed  the 
most  monstrous  crimes;  yet  even  these  were  surpassed 
by  the  magnitude  of  their  revenges,  which  they  pursued 
to  the  very  utmost,  neither  party  observing  any  definite 
limits  either  of  justice  or  public  expediency,  but  both 
alike  making  the  caprice  of  the  moment  their  law. 
Either  by  the  help  of  an  unrighteous  sentence,  or  grasp- 
ing power  with  the  strong  hand,  they  were  eager  to 
satiate  the  impatience  of  party  spirit.  Neither  faction 
cared  for  religion  ;  but  any  fair  pretence  which  suc- 
ceeded in  effecting  some  odious  purpose  was  greatly 
lauded.  And  the  citizens  who  were  of  neither  party  fell 
a  prey  to  both;  either  they  were  disliked  because  they 
held  aloof,  or  men  were  jealous  of  their  surviving.  Thus 
stasis  gave  birth  to  every  form  of  wickedness  in  Greece." 
The  singleness  of  purpose  with  which  Sparta  made 
vocational  training  the  aim  of  her  public  education 
achieved  the  happy  result  that  she  had  no  men  of  letters 
to  betray  to  posterity  damaging  secrets  of  state.  Hence 
no  one  has  done  for  her  what  Thucydides  has  done  for 
Athens :  let  us  have  an  insight  into  the  conscience  of  the 
city  at  the  time  of  its  greatness.  With  brutal  candor 
Cleon  and  others  in  Thucydides'  narrative  brush  aside 
the  formal  justification  of  the  Athenian  empire  and  lay 


24  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

bare  the  fact  that  it  was  in  reality  a  tyranny,  a  sover- 
eignty exercised  without  a  moral  sanction,  one  which 
self-respecting  people  had  a  solemn  duty  to  overthrow. 
"You  should  remember,"  said  Cleon  to  the  Athenians  in 
427  B.C.,1  "that  your  empire  is  a  despotism  exercised 
over  unwilling  subjects  who  are  always  conspiring 
against  you ;  they  do  not  obey  in  return  for  any  kindness 
which  you  do  them  to  your  own  injury,  but  in  so  far  as 
you  are  their  mistress;  they  have  no  love  of  you,  but 
they  are  held  down  by  force." 

Dependence  upon  Sparta  or  Athens  was,  in  fact, 
regarded  by  none  of  their  allies  except  as  the  less  of  two 
evils:  the  greater  was  dependence  upon  their  domestic 
foes.  Hence  the  tyranny  just  described  did  not  arise 
with  the  consent  of  the  tyrannized.  The  allies  of  Athens 
had  consented  to  enter  only  into  alliance  (symmachia) 
with  her  on  stipulated  terms  and  for  a  stipulated  purpose 
—  protection  against  Persia.  What  they  had  neglected 
to  stipulate  was  the  time  for  which  they  were  to  remain 
allies.  Athens,  accordingly,  denied  them  the  right  to 
secede,  and  when  particular  cities  tried  none  the  less  to 
withdraw,  she  made  the  preservation  of  the  union  a 
moral  ground  for  coercion,  and  with  the  aid  of  such 
cities  as  remained  faithful,  and  the  fleet  which  she  kept 
ready  for  action  by  the  financial  contributions  of  all,  she 
forced  them  back  on  terms  such  as  a  conqueror  could 
dictate.    A  new  treaty  of  alliance  was,  however,  the 

1  Thucy.,  hi,  37,  2. 


IMPERIALISM   AND  THE  CITY-STATE     25 

future,  as  it  had  been  the  ancient,  tie.  And  speaking 
broadly,  we  may  affirm  that  in  the  city-state  world  of 
classic  Greece  an  empire  was  legally  impossible :  what  we, 
and  the  ancients,  looking  to  realities,  call  an  empire  was 
an  aggregate  knit  together  by  treaties,  the  very  forma- 
tion of  which  shows  that  we  have  to  do,  not  with  a  single 
sovereign,  but  with  a  group  of  sovereigns.  In  other 
words,  the  city  remained  the  ultimate  political  unit. 
The  rule  of  Athens  and  Sparta  was,  strictly  speaking,  an 
hegemony  and  not  an  arche;  a  shifting  and  temporary 
leadership,  and  not  a  permanent  suzerainty.  It  was  a 
necessity  of  circumstances  assumed  to  be  exceptional. 

Unfortunately,  experience  showed  that  the  circum- 
stances in  which  imperialism  was  a  political  necessity 
recurred  constantly.  After  the  fall  of  Athens  in  404  B.C., 
a  defensive  war  against  the  barbarians  —  the  Macedon- 
ians in  Thessaly,  the  Persians  in  Ionia  —  served  as  a 
justification  to  Sparta  in  employing  force  to  maintain 
the  hegemony  which  she  had  won.  But  in  387  B.C.  the 
peace  known  as  the  "King's  Peace,"  or  the  "Peace  of 
Antalcidas,"  was  concluded  with  Persia,  whereupon  it 
became  impossible  to  use  any  longer  the  national  cause  as 
even  a  pretext  for  tyranny.  The  hegemony,  however,  was 
not  abandoned.  It  had  to  be  maintained,  it  was  alleged, 
to  keep  the  other  cities  free,  and  to  this  end  Persia  lent 
aid  to  Sparta  and  Thebes  successively.  If  an  empire 
could  only  be  prevented  by  an  empire,  and  national  recre- 


26  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

ancy  to  boot,  the  times  were  surely  out  of  joint.  Such  an 
issue  was  the  reductio  ad  absurdum  of  the  system  of  he- 
gemonies, as  both  reformers  and  statesmen  in  Greece 
came  speedily  to  realize. 

The  reformers  strove  to  alter  the  untoward  circum- 
stances, and  in  a  later  chapter  we  shall  have  occasion  to 
note  how  Plato  and  Aristotle,  with  a  blind  faith  in  the 
power  of  education  and  of  legislation,  aimed  to  divert  citi- 
zens from  work  to  leisure  and  from  war  to  peace,  and  both 
to  eradicate  the  greed  for  land  and  money  and  to  restrict 
the  natural  increase  of  population  to  which  they  traced 
the  imperialistic  spirit.  Some  of  the  statesmen  followed 
their  lead.  Others,  however,  conceding  that  unity  was  de- 
manded for  the  preservation  and  spread  of  civilization, 
and  that  the  world  needed  not  fewer  but  more  Greeks, 
either,  like  the  great  publicist  Isocrates,  advocated  an 
hegemony  on  the  old  lines  but  endowed  with  stability 
through  being  based  on  general  consent,  or  favored  one 
of  several  new  devices  for  welding  cities  into  a  perma- 
nent territorial  state.  Respect  for  progress  bids  us  to 
view  at  this  point  somewhat  narrowly  these  unitarian 
movements. 

The  position  attained  by  Thebes  in  Greece  after  her 
victory  over  Sparta  at  Leuctra  in  371  B.C.  was  simply 
an  hegemony  of  the  earlier  model  —  the  reoccupation 
of  lines  proved   twice  already  to  be  untenable.1    On 

r  l  The  same  is  true  of  the  second  Athenian  empire.  The  confederation 
from  which  it  grew  had  no  reason  to  outlast  the  occasion  which  had  called 


IMPERIALISM   AND  THE  CITY-STATE     27 

the  other  hand,  the  position  occupied  by  Thebes  in  Bceo- 
tia  prior  to  387  B.C.  was  clearly  anticipatory  of  what 
the  future  was  to  bring  to  Greece  as  a  whole.  Bceotia 
was  thereby  blocked  off  into  six  districts,1  one  (Thebes) 
with  four  electoral  divisions,  two  (Orchomenus  and 
Thespiae)  with  two  each,  and  three  with  one  apiece.  Six 
of  the  ten  city-states  of  Bceotia  —  the  six  little  lake 
cities  —  were  confined  to  two  of  the  eleven  divisions. 
This  was  a  setback  to  them  and  a  boon  to  Thebes,  seeing 
that  each  division  furnished  one  of  the  eleven  Bceo- 
tarchs  who  formed  the  executive  of  the  league,  sixty  of 
the  six  hundred  and  sixty  councillors  who  formed  .the 
Boeotian  synod,  and  its  corresponding  share  of  the 
league  judges.  Thebes  thus  became  the  Prussia  of 
Bceotia,  and  in  return  for  the  political  advantages  which 
it  gained  and  four  elevenths  of  the  revenues  which  it 
received,  it  undertook  to  provide  four  elevenths  of  the 
soldiers  and  four  elevenths  of  the  taxes.  In  this  way  the 
burdens  and  the  advantages  of  the  league  were  distrib- 
uted according  to  the  population  and  wealth  of  the  dif- 
ferent parts  of  the  country.  That  was  equitable;  and 
since  the  city-states,  though  thrust  into  the  back- 
ground and  held  responsible  for  decisions  in  the  making 
of  which  they  had  often  little  influence,  formed  a  single 
ethnos  and  spoke  a  single  dialect,  they  were  evidently 

it  into  existence — the  "  tyranny  "  of  Sparta.  It  was,  therefore,  by  design 
at  least,  a  temporary,  and  not  a  permanent,  union. 
1  Hellenica  Oxyrhyn.,  n,  2-4. 

r 


28  GREEK   IMPERIALISM 

fairly  well  satisfied.  As  the  league  was  constituted, 
Thebes  was  forced  to  struggle  with  Orchomenus  and 
Thespiae  for  the  control  of  the  six  little  lake  cities.  In 
this  she  was  normally  successful  —  so  successful,  in 
fact,  that  in  387  B.C.  Sparta,  while  enforcing  the  King's 
Peace,  dissolved  the  league  in  order  to  destroy  her  influ- 
ence. It  was  not  revived  when  Thebes  reunited  Bceotia 
(377-371  B.C.),  and  under  Epaminondas  we  may  more 
properly  speak  of  Bceotia  as  a  single  city-state  like 
Attica  than  as  a  league  of  city-states. 
I  Though  sacrificed  at  home  to  the  ambition  of  Thebes, 
the  Boeotian  league  maintained  a  high  prestige  abroad. 
Some  of  its  institutions  had  been  transferred  to  Athens 
during  the  revolution  of  41 1  B.C.,  and  others  had  been 
adopted  in  Arcadia  after  they  had  been  set  aside  in 
Bceotia.  Moreover,  and  this  is  an  important  historical 
connection  which  the  wonderful  epigraphical  researches 
of  Adolph  Wilhelm  *  enable  us  to  establish,  the  Boeotian 
league  reappears  mutatis  mutandis  in  the  organization 
imposed  upon  all  Greece  by  Philip  of  Macedon  after 
his  crowning  victory  at  Chseronea  in  338  B.C.  For  if 
we  equate  Philip  and  the  Committee  of  Public  Safety 
with  the  eleven  Bceotarchs,  the  synod  of  Corinth  with 
the  Boeotian  synod  of  six  hundred  and  sixty,  and  the 
districts  into  which  Hellas,  including  Macedon  and 
excluding  only  Sparta,  was  divided   for  federal   pur- 

1  AUische  Urkunden,  1  Teil.  (Sitzb.  d.  Akad.  in  Wien.  Phil.-hist.  Klasse. 
165,6,  1911). 


IMPERIALISM  AND  THE  CITY-STATE     29 

poses,  with  the  six  districts  which  had  existed  in  Bceo- 
tia,  it  is  evident  that  the  political  system  used  by  Philip 
for  organizing  the  Greeks  was  borrowed  from  Boeotia 
no  less  than  the  military  system  with  which  he  con- 
quered them.  It  was  not  for  nothing  that  the  king  of 
Macedon  had  spent  his  youth  as  a  hostage  in  Thebes. 

Characteristic  of  the  Boeotian  league  and  of  Philip's 
Hellenic  league  is  the  synod.  It  was  in  each  a  strictly 
representative  body.  Its  members  were  apportioned  to 
the  area  constituting  the  league  in  such  a  way  that  the 
larger  states  had  several  representatives  and  the  smaller 
r,tates  had  one  representative  between  them;  while  in 
the  Hellenic  league  neighboring  states  and  federated 
states  were  treated  as  a  unit  and  given  proportional 
representation.  That  this  made  all  but  the  largest  state 
—  Macedon  —  the  largest  state's  inferiors  and  subor- 
dinated many  city-states  to  the  federal  districts  to  which 
they  belonged,  is  obvious.  And  in  this  case  loss  of  local 
liberty  was  compensated  for  very  imperfectly  by  the 
consideration  that  what  the  constituent  states  surren- 
dered the  Hellenic  synod,  which  met  at  Corinth,  gained. 
The  national  appeal  was  far  weaker  than  the  ethnic 
appeal  had  been  in  Boeotia.  The  liberty  lost  had  indeed 
been  a  bane  and  not  a  blessing.  After  338  B.C.  the  cities 
could  no  longer  enjoy  the  excitement  of  waging  private 
wars  and  fomenting  revolutions.  No  longer  were  they  free 
to  be  enemies  of  Philip.  Henceforth  they  must  contribute 
the  quota  of  horsemen,  hoplites,  light-armed  troops,  and 


30  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

sailors  for  which  their  representation  in  the  synod  obli- 
gated them,  or  pay  a  heavy  fine  for  every  day  their  con- 
tingents were  absent  from  the  national  levy.  The  synod 
completed  its  organization  by  choosing  Philip  its  hege- 
mon by  land  and  sea,  and  selected  as  its  executive  board 
a  Committee  of  Public  Safety  which  seemingly  had  its 
sessions  at  Pydna.  The  committee  the  confederates 
probably  welcomed  as  a  possible  champion  of  their 
interests.  The  unwelcome  organ  of  the  league,  and  the 
one  for  which  there  was  no  parallel  in  Bceotia,  was  the 
hegemon.  Subordination  to  a  synod  was  offensive  enough 
to  city-states  which  regarded  complete  independence  as 
alone  ideal.  It  was  intolerable  to  them  to  submit  to  a 
synod  which  its  hegemon,  Philip  of  Macedon,  controlled, 
—  one  which  could  never  have  any  one  but  the  con- 
temporary king  of  Macedon  as  its  hegemon.  The  hegem- 
ony of  Macedon  was  sugar-coated,  but  it  was  none  the 
less  an  hegemony,  and,  as  such,  illegal  and  unaccept- 
able.1 

A  notable  start  in  the  direction  of  uniting  city-states 
legally  in  a  larger  whole  had  been  made  by  Athens 
during  the  epoch  of  her  empire.  She  had  then  founded 
many  colonies  (cleruchies) ,  which,  though  organized  as 
separate  cities,  retained  for  their  residents  citizenship  in 
Athens.  Why  not  grant  citizenship  (polity)  to  the  inhab- 
itants of  other  cities  as  well?    There  were  some,  and 

1  It  was  revived  on  much  less  objectionable  terms  by  Antigonus 
Doson.  See  below,  page  34  and  chapter  vil. 


IMPERIALISM   AND  THE   CITY-STATE     31 

among  them  the  comedian  Aristophanes,1  who  can- 
vassed this  idea.  "Let  us  assume,"  he  says,  "that  our 
city  is  a  heap  of  wool,  and  that  each  of  our  allied  cities  is 
a  fleck  of  wool.  Let  us  take  all  the  wool  and  spin  it  into 
yarn,  and  weave  the  yarn  into  a  great  blanket  with 
which  to  protect  our  lord  Demos  against  the  cold."  But 
for  this  drastic  measure  the  times  were  not  ripe.  It  was 
altogether  repugnant  to  the  pride  of  the  Athenians  to 
share  with  everybody  advantages  which  they  had  sacri- 
ficed so  much  to  acquire;  and  there  was  little  in  the 
advantages  thus  diluted  to  compensate  other  cities  for 
the  at  least  partial  loss  of  identity  which  they  were 
bound  to  sustain  on  acquiring  Athenian  citizenship.  In 
the  one  instance  in  which  this  course  was  taken,  the 
Samians,  to  whom  Athens  gave  her  full  ciyic  rights  in 
the  supreme  agony  of  the  Peloponnesian  War,  had  both 
earned  them  and  come  to  appreciate  them  by  sacrificing 
their  own  territory  rather  than  desert  their  ally. 

Another  less  heroic  expedient  for  bringing  about  a  per- 
manent entente  between  cities  was  the  grant  of  isopolity, 
or  reciprocity  of  citizenship.  In  certain  cases  this  was 
the  concession  of  the  passive  rights  of  citizenship 
(civitas  sine  stiff ragio)  to  all  citizens  of  a  particular  city 
who  should  take  up  residence  in,  or  even  merely  visit, 
the  territory  of  the  grantor.  Thus  circumscribed,  how- 
ever, it  amounted  simply  to  an  exchange  of  commercial 
privileges,  and  proved  barren  of  political  consequences 

1  Lysistrata,  579  ff. 


32  GREEK   IMPERIALISM 

in  that  each  city  reserved  to  itself  complete  control  of 
its  own  policy,  thus  rendering  impossible  any  advance 
in  state  building.  It  remained  for  the  Romans  to  render 
this  institution  fruitful  to  an  astonishing  degree  by 
making  the  legal  exercise  of  Roman  citizenship  inde- 
pendent of  migration  to  Rome. 

Substantially  the  same  result  was  achieved  by  the 
Greeks  through  what  they  termed  sympolity,  or  joint 
citizenship.  This  was  possessed  from  of  old  by  rudi- 
mentary nations,  like  the  Achaeans  and  the  ^Etolians,1 
among  whom  the  towns  and  hamlets  had  never  become 
independent  and  self-sufficient  political  units;  so  that 
the  inhabitants  were  Achaeans  from  JEguiva,  or  Achaeans 
from  Cerynia,  or  Achaeans  from  some  other  of  the  ten 
so-called  cities  of  which  the  Achaean  nation  or  league 
was  constituted.  In  like  fashion  the  ^Etolian  hamlets 
had  a  double  citizenship.  An  essential  part  of  this 
scheme,  evidently,  was  that  each  city  had  an  equal 
voice  in  the  election  of  the  officials  of  the  league  and  in 
the  settlement  of  all  federal  matters.  And  so  satisfac- 
tory a  safeguard  of  urban  autonomy  did  this  prove  to  be 
that  in  the  last  half  of  the  third  century  B.C.  city  after 
city  in  the  Peloponnesus  outside  the  ancient  limits  of 
Achaea  took  the  irrevocable  step  of  acquiring  Achaean 
citizenship  in  addition  to  its  own ;  while  in  Central  Greece 
the  ^Etolians  by  fair  means  or  foul  bestowed  a  dual 
citizenship  upon  all  their  neighbors.  Athens  and  Sparta 

1  See  below,  chapter  vn. 


IMPERIALISiM   AND   THE   CITY-STATE     33 

alone  persisted  in  their  isolation,  the  former  on  the 
strength  of  an  international  guarantee  of  autonomy, 
the  latter  in  stubborn  reliance  upon  its  own  powers.  The 
other  city-states  entrusted  to  an  international  board, 
not  for  a  definite  or  indefinite  term  of  years,  but  for  all 
future  time,  complete  control  of  their  foreign  relations. 
Each  city  put  permanently  the  international  authority 
between  itself  and  the  outside  world,  thus  escaping 
individual  danger  by  the  surrender  of  individual 
diplomacy.1 

In  this  way  arose  what  by  the  general  consent  of  his- 
torians and  jurists  is  the  most  perfect  state  which  antiq- 
uity produced.  The  antinomy  between  the  city-state 
and  the  imperial  spirit  which  had  existed  for  centuries 
was  reduced  to  a  minimum  by  the  nice  balance  of  the 
federal  system. 

There  were  defects  in  the  Achaean  and  JEtoYmn 
leagues  which  their  statesmen  did  not  remove.  "Equal- 
ity," says  Aristotle,  "is  just,  but  only  between  equals." 
The  cities  which  had  an  equal  voice  in  the  international 
board,  like  the  modern  nations  which  cast  a  vote  each 
at  the  Hague  Congress,  were  unequal  in  population  and 
in  wealth. 

The  Achaeans  and  ^Etolians  came  nearer  than  any 
ancient  republicans  to  entrusting  power  to  representa- 
tives; but,  besides  creating  a  large  legislative  council, 
constituted  in  successive  years,  in  the  one  case,  of  dif- 

1  See  below,  chapter  vil. 


34  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

ferent  fractions  of  the  citizens  of  each  city,  and  in  the 
other,  of  deputies  apportioned  to  the  constituent  cities 
according  to  their  size,  they  showed  the  ingrained  dis- 
trust held  by  all  Greeks  for  oligarchy  by  requiring  the 
reference  to  a  general  assembly  of  all  matters  of  high 
importance. 

How  to  satisfy  the  just  claims  of  those  whom  distance 
or  lack  of  leisure  prevented  from  coming  to  the  meeting- 
place,  they  did  not  discover. 

However,  it  was  not  these  institutional  imperfections 
which  prevented  the  unification  of  Hellas  in  a  single 
federation.  For  this  result  could  not  now  be  achieved 
by  any  triumph  of  political  science.  Antigonus  Doson 
(229-221  B.C.)  whose  name  ought  not  to  be  unknown 
where  Callicratidas,  Agesilaus,  Iphicrates,  and  Phocion 
are  household  words,  attempted  with  equal  skill  and 
generosity  to  combine  the  new  federal  idea  with  the  old 
idea  of  a  representative  national  congress  meeting  at 
Corinth  under  the  hegemony  of  the  king  of  Macedon ; * 
but  the  best  that  can  be  said  of  the  combination  he  made 
is  that  despite  its  great  promise  and  possibilities  it 
proved  unacceptable  to  Hellas,  and  hence  ineffective.2 
The  situation  had  now  got  beyond  the  control  of  the 
Greek  people.  It  may,  perhaps,  be  realized  best,  if  we 
imagine  that  the  European  nations  of  to-day,  weak- 
ened politically  by  continuous  emigration  and  incessant 
conflicts,  economically,  by  the  withdrawal  of  industry 

1  See  above,  page  30.  *  See  below,  chapter  VII. 


IMPERIALISM  AND  THE  CITY-STATE    35 

and  commerce  to  more  favorably  situated  districts 
under  European  control,  let  us  say  in  the  East,  were 
to  pool  their  diplomatic  and  military  interests,  and 
entrust  them,  not  to  a  European  parliament,  but  to 
warring  Latin  and  Teutonic  parliaments,  and  were  to 
take  this  step  only  to  escape  the  Russian  peril  and  when 
America  was  already  thundering  at  their  shores,  if  that 
be  imaginable,  coming  with  irresistible  might,  at  once 
to  save  and  to  destroy. 

To  describe  how  the  Roman  republic  emancipated 
Greece  from  Macedon,  impressed  her  will  upon  the 
Greek  kingdoms  of  the  East,  and  built  up  a  universal 
empire  of  diverse  fragments,  lies  beyond  the  scope  of  this 
book.  We  may  note  simply  that  to  some  cities  she  gave 
her  citizenship,  or  polity,  thus  destroying  their  identity 
altogether;  that  to  others  she  gave  isopolity,  or  reciproc- 
ity of  citizenship,  and  with  it  the  local  advantages  pre- 
served in  Greece  by  sympolity,  or  joint  citizenship,  thus 
creating  the  municipality  and  organizing  wards,  so  to 
speak,  of  the  city  of  Rome  all  over  Italy;  that  some  (the 
socii,  or  Italian  allies)  she  bound  to  herself  by  irrevoca- 
ble treaties  till  she  was  forced  to  give  them  municipal 
status,  and  others  (the  "friends,"  amici,  or  the  "friends 
and  allies,"  amici  et  socii,  in  what  later  became  the  pro- 
vinces) by  understandings  or  temporary  treaties  till  she 
had  familiarized  herself  with  deification  of  rulers,  which 
was  the  Greek  method  of  legalizing  absolutism. 

A  word  on  this  strange  institution  and  I  have  finished 


36  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

this  survey  of  the  expedients  devised  by  the  Greeks  to 
obscure,  evade,  and  finally  to  justify  imperialism.  The 
Greek  method  of  legalizing  despotism  was  Alexander  the 
Great's  genial  adaptation  to  state  building  of  an  idea 
which  his  tutor,  Aristotle,  had  developed  in  his  Politics.1 
It  was  a  means  of  uniting  cities  or  provinces  in  an  indis- 
soluble whole  while  preserving,  on  the  one  hand,  the 
superiority  and  freedom  of  action  of  the  suzerain,  be  it 
an  emperor  or  a  republic,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
self-respect  of  the  inferior  states,  without  which  their 
status  was  politically  intolerable.  Deification  of  rulers 
did  the  impossible:  it  reconciled  completely  the  antin- 
omy between  the  city-state  and  imperialism.  It  resolved 
the  antagonism  into  two  harmonious  duties;  the  duty  of 
the  ruler  to  command  and  of  the  subject  to  obey. 

To  Alexander  the  Great  governments  have  been  in 
serious  debt  for  over  two  thousand  years.  From  him  to 
Kaiser  Wilhelm  II  runs  an  unbroken  line.  So  long  as  the 
world  had  many  gods  and  did  not  believe  in  the  super- 
natural power  of  any  of  them,  there  was  no  religious  dif- 
ficulty in  adding  to  its  stock  another  such  deity  in  the 
person  of  the  living  monarch.  With  the  decadence  of 
polytheism,  however,  a  slight  change  was  necessary.  In 
Constantine's  time  god-kings  suffered  the  same  fate  as 
other  pagan  gods;  but  with  a  difference.  The  heathen 
gods  became  devils  or  were  metamorphosed  into  saints. 

1  See  especially  Ed.  Meyer,  Kleine  Schriften,  283^".,  and  below,  chapter 

IV. 


IMPERIALISM  AND  THE  CITY-STATE  37 
The  kings  became  men  chosen  for  their  high  office  by 
God,  Most  High.  Crowned,  usually  by  their  predeces- 
sors, and  anointed  by  God's  priests,  the  patriarchs,  they 
governed  by  divine  right  and  acknowledged  responsibility 
only  to  their  Creator.1  In  a  less  ecclesiastical  world,  as  in 
modern  Prussia,  the  kings  crown  themselves.  But  with 
these  later  developments  we  have  no  concern  in  this 
book.  I  shall  endeavor,  however,  in  chapters  iii-vi,  to 
trace  the  growth  of  deification  in  the  world-monarchy  of 
Alexander  the  Great,  and  to  make  clear  the  purpose  it 
served  in  the  empires  of  the  Ptolemies  and  Seleucids. 

SELECT  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

1.  DE  Coulanges,  Fustel.  La  cite  antique"1  (1879). 

2.  Busolt,  G.  Die  griechischen  Staats-  und  Rechtsalter turner,2 
(1892).  In  Miiller's  Handbuch  der  klassischen  Altertums- 
wissenschaft,  iv,  1. 

3.  Schomann-Lipsius.    Griechische  Alterthumer,4  11  (1892). 

4.  Francotte,  H.  La  Polis  grecque  (1907). 

5.  Wilamowitz-Moellendorff,  Ulrich  von.  Staat  und 
Gesellschaft  der  Griechen  (19 10).  In  Hinneberg's  Die 
Kidtur  der  Gegenwart.  Teil  11,  Abteilung  iv,  1. 

6.  Zimmern,  Alfred.    The  Greek  Commonwealth  (191 1). 

7.  Keil,  Bruno.  Griechische  Staatsaltertiimer  (1912).  In 
Gercke  and  Norden's  Einleitung  in  die  Altertumswissen- 
schaft,  pp.  297  ff. 

1  Bury,  J_.  B.,  The  Constitution  of  the  Later  Roman  Empire  (1910),  pp. 
10/.,  36. 


'114 


«J  -t 


II 

Athens:  an  imperial  democracy 

No  form  of  government,  or  profession  of  political  idea, 
saves  a  state  from  imperialism.  Even  this  country, 
which  is  dedicated,  as  is  no  other  of  the  modern  great 
powers,  to  the  concept  of  popular  sovereignty;  which 
uprears  the  structure  of  its  state  upon  a  belief  in  the 
essential  equality  of  men,  and  treats,  or  at  least  aims  to 
treat,  as  comparatively  negligible  the  differences  cre- 
ated by  birth  and  race,  education  and  religion,  property 
and  occupation;  —  even  this  idealistic  republic  has  be- 
come an  empire  in  our  own  time  and  almost  without 
our  perceiving  it.  M.  Bouche-Leclercq  has  given  a  prom- 
inent place  in  his  Leqons  d'  histoire  romaine  1  to  the  dis- 
comforting doctrine  that  the  Romans  conquered  the 
world  in  spite  of  themselves  —  a  debatable  question,  as 
he  himself  shows.  It  is  not  our  sense  of  truth  that  is 
gratified  when  we  are  told  that  the  beatitude,  "Blessed 
are  the  meek,  for  they  shall  inherit  the  earth,"  desig- 
nates the  English.  Yet  Seeley  has  maintained  the  thesis 
that  the  British  empire  was  secured  in  a  "prolonged  fit 
of  national  absence  of  mind."  Unwittingly,  it  seems,  the 
modern  foster-mother  of  liberal  institutions  has  become 
the  mistress  of  countless  millions. 

1  Pages  27  ff. 


ATHENS:  AN   IMPERIAL   DEMOCRACY    39 

There  never  was  a  people  which  made  the  principle 
that  all  its  citizens  were  equal  a  more  live  reality  than  the 
Athenians  made  it;  and  no  state  to  my  knowledge  was 
more  cunningly  contrived  to  insure  the  government  of 
the  people  than  was  theirs.  Yet  they  became  imperial- 
ists with  ardor  and  conviction,  and  with  this  much 
of  logical  consequence,  that,  while  they  believed  in 
democracy  for  everybody,  they  did  not  doubt  that  the 
Athenians  had  earned  the  right  to  rule  both  Greeks 
and  barbarians  by  the  acquisition  of  superior  culture. 
Equality  among  its  citizens  Athens  carefully  distin- 
guished from  equality  among  all  men. 

The  foundations  of  Athenian  democracy  and  empire 
were  laid  by  Themistocles,  whose  figure  moves  weird  and 
gigantic  through  the  golden  mist  in  which  Herodotus 
has  enveloped  the  great  Persian  War.  And  it  was  this 
genial  statesman,  to  whose  unerring  skill  in  discerning 
the  course  of  coming  events  the  austere  historian  Thu- 
cydides  pays  a  rare  tribute,  who  mapped  out  for  his  city 
the  foreign  policy  by  which  it  had  the  best  chance  of 
realizing  its  imperial  ambition.  Let  it  use  its  great  fleet, 
which  by  fifteen  years  of  persistent  advocacy  he  had  led 
the  Athenians  to  build,  as  its  arm  of  offense,  and  its 
impregnable  walls,  which  he  had  enabled  the  Athenians 
to  construct  despite  the  treacherous  opposition  of 
Sparta,  as  a  bulwark  of  defense  and  a  basis  for  timely 
advance  against  its  powerful  continental  rivals.  Let  it 
utilize  the  wave  of  democratic  fervor  then  sweeping 


40  GREEK   IMPERIALISM 

through  Greece  to  consolidate  its  power  within  the  Con- 
federacy of  Delos  and  to  undermine  and  eventually  to 
overthrow  the  leadership  which  Sparta,  by  the  support 
of  dying  mediaeval  aristocracies,  had  hitherto  possessed 
in  Hellenic  affairs.  Let  it  make  peace  on  advantageous 
terms  with  Persia ;  use  the  liberty  thus  secured  to  break 
the  power  of  Sparta,  and,  on  the  basis  of  a  consoli- 
dated Hellas,  strike  boldly  for  Athenian  dominion  of 
the  world. 

It  seems  almost  incredible  that  a  clear-headed  man 
should  have  entertained  a  programme  of  such  magni- 
tude. But  we  must  remember  that  never  had  human 
beings  more  clearly  performed  the  obviously  miracu- 
lous. We  know,  on  the  authority  of  a  German  military 
expert,1  that,  had  the  host  which  followed  Xerxes  to 
Athens  numbered  the  5,283,220  men  attributed  to  it  by 
Herodotus  "without  taking  count  of  women  cooks,  con- 
cubines, eunuchs,  beasts  of  burden,  cattle,  and  Indian 
dogs,"  its  rear  guard  must  have  been  still  filing  out  of 
Sardis  while  its  van  was  vainly  storming  Thermopylae. 
But  what  Herodotus  reports  is  what  the  Athenians  be- 
lieved. They  had  met  and  routed  the  might  of  all  Asia. 
They  had  mastered  in  fair  fight  the  conquerors  of  all 
other  peoples.  The  world  was  theirs:  it  was  merely  a 
question  of  taking  possession. 

Themistocles   had,    accordingly,    to    reckon   with   a 

1  Delbriick,  Die  Perserkriege  und  die  Burgunderkriege,  pp.  137  ff. ;  Beloch, 
Griechische  Geschichte,  1  (1893),  p.  368,  n.  3. 


ATHENS:  AN   IMPERIAL   DEMOCRACY    41 

national  self-confidence  which  knew  no  bounds.  And 
this  had  been  increased  by  famous  victories  of  Cimon 
over  the  Persians,  and  a  revolt  of  the  Helots  which  dis- 
closed the  fatal  weakness  of  Sparta,  when  in  461  B.C.  the 
task  of  conducting  the  fierce  current  of  national  energy, 
first  for  fifteen  years  (461-446  B.C.)  in  a  heroic,  but  fruit- 
less, struggle  by  sea  and  land  against  the  Greeks  and 
Persians  simultaneously,  and  then  for  fifteen  further 
years  (446-431  B.C.)  in  the  prosecution  of  glorious  works 
of  peace,  fell  upon  the  broad  shoulders  of  Pericles, 
Xanthippus's  son. 

It  is  conceded  that  there  is  no  taskmaster  so  ruthless 
as  one's  own  will.  The  impulse  to  action  during  this 
strenuous  epoch  came  from  the  Athenian  people  itself, 
not  from  its  chief  statesman.  That  fact  does  not,  how- 
ever, diminish  the  credit  of  Pericles.  The  golden  age  of 
Greece  is,  properly  speaking,  a  golden  age  of  Athens, 
and  to  its  birth  many  things  contributed;  but  decisive 
among  them,  in  addition  to  the  intensity  of  national  life 
already  alluded  to,  was  an  unrivaled  facility  for  great 
leaders  to  get  into  effective  contact  with  the  masses 
under  conditions  in  which  there  was  the  fullest  oppor- 
tunity for  men  in  general  to  use  their  natural  powers  to 
the  utmost.  This  happy  combination  of  creative  genius 
and  receptive  multitude  arose  in  the  main  from  the  dem- 
ocratic institutions  of  Athens;  but,  for  the  public  and 
private  wealth  without  which  Athenian  democracy 
proved  unworkable,  and  for  the  imaginative  stimulus 


42  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

which  enterprises  of  great  pitch  and  moment  alone  give, 
the  possession  of  empire  was,  perhaps,  essential. 

In  the  age  of  Pericles,  Athens  was  a  city  with  a  popula- 
tion of  about  150,000.  Attica,  the  territory  of  the  Athe- 
nians, had  an  approximately  equal  number  of  inhabit- 
ants. Of  the  300,000  thus  accounted  for,  about  one  third 
was  servile  and  one  sixth  foreign.  The  free  and  fran- 
chised  population  made  up  one  half  of  the  total,  and 
yielded  about  50,000  males  of  military  age. 

The  empire  of  the  Athenians  consisted  of  five  prov- 
inces, the  Thracian,  Hellespontine,  Insular,  Ionian,  and 
Carian,  with  a  total  population  of  perhaps,  2,000,000. 
It  formed  a  complex  of  islands,  peninsulas,  and  estu- 
aries, the  most  remote  extremities  of  which  were 
distant  two  hundred  or  two  hundred  and  fifty  miles 
from  Athens.  The  highways  of  this  empire  were  the 
land-locked  channels  and  lakes  which  make  up  the 
JEgean  Archipelago.  Their  greatest  length  in  normal 
circumstances  was  a  continuous  voyage  of  about  eight 
days.  On  the  other  hand,  no  land  way  of  more  than  a 
single  day's  march  need  be  traversed  by  an  Athenian 
expedition  aimed  at  any  of  its  subject  cities.  Without 
the  control  of  the  sea  the  empire  was,  accordingly,  un- 
thinkable. This  absent,  the  district  fell  at  once  into 
more  than  four  hundred  fragments,  the  thousand 
"cities"  from  which,  according  to  the  comedian  Aris- 
tophanes, the  Athenians  gathered  tribute. 


ATHENS:  AN  IMPERIAL  DEMOCRACY  43 
The  Athenian  sphere  of  naval  operations  and  of  politi- 
cal and  commercial  interests  reached  far  beyond  the 
frontiers  of  the  empire.  It  included  points  like  Sicily, 
Egypt,  Phoenicia,  and  the  Euxine,  distant  over  six  hun- 
dred miles  from  the  Piraeus.  An  Athenian  fleet  might 
thus  require  the  best  part  of  a  month  to  reach  its  destina- 
tion. The  world  which  had  to  take  careful  account  of 
the  Athenian  naval  power  in  all  its  political  and  military 
calculations,  the  world  which  Athens  under  Pericles 
sought  to  dominate,  must  have  had  a  population  of  over 
20,000,000. 

If,  then,  we  take  into  account  the  ratio  of  dominant, 
subject,  and  foreign  elements,  and  also  the  time  con- 
sumed in  reaching  with  ships,  orders,  or  explanations, 
the  outer  limits  of  authority,  the  magnitude  of  Athens's 
imperial  undertaking  will  stand  comparison  with  that  of 
England  in  modern  times. 

In  Sparta  the  gravestone  of  a  citizen  was  inscribed 
regularly  with  his  name  alone.  No  epitaph  was  needed 
there  to  tell  the  tale  of  a  life;  for  the  life  of  one  citizen 
was  the  well-known  life  of  all.  If,  however,  a  man  had 
died  for  his  country,  two  words,  eV  7roXe/ift),  "in  war," 
expressed  with  laconic  brevity  his  ground  of  distinction. 

For  those  who  fell  in  battle  Athens  set  apart  a  public 
cemetery  near  the  Dipylon  Gate,  and  at  the  end  of  every 
campaign  a  commemorative  service  was  held  there  in 
honor  of  the  year's  crop  of  martyrs.  A  man  high  in  pub- 


44  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

lie  esteem  voiced  the  nation's  gratitude  for  the  sacrifice. 
On  such  an  occasion,  at  the  end  of  the  first  year  of  the 
Peloponnesian  War,  Pericles  reversed  the  normal  pro- 
cedure, and,  instead  of  expatiating  on  the  merits  of  the 
fallen,  he  explained  in  an  eloquent  speech  why  Athens 
was  worthy  of  loyalty  unto  death.  Thucydides  heard 
his  words,  and,  perhaps  many  years  afterwards,  repro- 
duced them  as  best  he  could  in  the  famous  Funeral 
Oration. 

The  statesman  did  not  linger  long  over  the  legendary 
glories  of  Athens.  Her  alleged  boons  to  humanity  — 
grain,  the  norms  of  civilized  life,  the  drama;  the  serv- 
ices, that  is  to  say,  upon  which  the  later  Athenians 
dwelt  with  special  pride  —  had  no  meaning  for  him. 
Two  things  their  ancestors  had  done:  they  had  de- 
fended their  country  successfully,  and  had  transmitted 
to  their  descendants  a  free  state.  "And  if  these  were 
worthy  of  praise,"  *  proceeds  his  splendid  exordium, 
"still  more  were  our  fathers,  who  added  to  their  inherit- 
ance, and  after  many  a  struggle  transmitted  to  us  their 
sons  this  great  empire.  And  we  ourselves  assembled 
here  to-day,  who  are  still  most  of  us  in  the  vigor  of  life, 
have  chiefly  done  the  work  of  improvement,  and  have 
richly  endowed  our  city  with  all  things,  so  that  she  is 
sufficient  for  herself  both  in  peace  and  war.  Of  the  mili- 
tary exploits  by  which  our  various  possessions  were 
acquired,  or  of  the  energy  with  which  we  or  our  fathers 

1  Thucy.,  ii,  36,  2. 


ATHENS:  AN   IMPERIAL   DEMOCRACY    45 

drove  back  the  tide  of  war,  Hellenic  or  Barbarian,  I  will 
not  speak;  for  the  tale  would  be  long  and  is  familiar  to 
you.  But  ...  I  should  like  to  point  out  by  what  princi- 
ples of  action  we  rose  to  power,  and  under  what  insti- 
tutions and  through  what  manner  of  life  our  empire 
became  great." 

In  these  words  of  Pericles  I  should  like  you  to  find 
stated  the  theme  of  my  second  chapter.  And  were  it 
not  that  Pericles  left  unexplained,  what  the  Athenians 
whom  he  addressed  knew  without  explanation,  the  so- 
cial and  political  forms  by  which  they  realized  their 
ideals,  I  might  absolve  my  task  by  one  long  quotation. 
I  might  transcribe  the  whole  Oration  and  have  done 
with  it. 

That  being  inexpedient,  I  cannot  do  better  than 
present,  using  again  Pericles's  own  words  as  a  sort  of 
text,  the  main  principles  of  Athenian  policy.  But  in 
passing  I  may  be  permitted  to  observe  that  were  our 
knowledge  of  Athens  dependent  solely  upon  the  Fu- 
neral Oration;  had  we  to  form  our  idea  of  political 
life  in  fifth-century  B.C.  Greece  from  it  alone,  we  might 
still  infer  a  unique  epoch  in  the  history  of  mankind. 
Fortunately,  that  is  not  the  case.  The  "  tooth  of  time  and 
razure  of  oblivion"  have  spared  the  Parthenon  and  its 
matchless  sculptures,  the  noble  tragedies  of  ^Eschylus 
and  Sophocles,  and  the  undying  charm  of  Herodotus. 
Ideals  are  always  grounded  in  some  measure  in  realities. 
At  the  least  they  stand  to  them  as  the  "perfect  round" 


46  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

to  the  "broken  arc."  Even  in  Plato's  psychology  the 
mind  needs  to  be  sharpened  by  observation  and  reflec- 
tion before,  as  in  a  flash  of  light,  the  glimpse  of  the 
divine  idea  suddenly  appears.  Hence,  were  the  affirma- 
tions of  the  Funeral  Oration  unsupported  by  contem- 
porary monuments  of  similar  spirit,  they  would  still  be 
helpful  revelations  of  Athenian  democracy.  And  this 
conclusion,  as  I  hope  to  show,  rests  not  upon  logical 
inference  alone,  but  also  upon  the  evidence  of  minute 
research. 

11  It  is  true,"  said  Pericles,1  "we  are  called  a  democracy, 
for  the  administration  is  in  the  hands  of  the  many  and 
not  of  the  few.  But  while  the  law  secures  equal  justice 
to  all  alike  in  their  private  disputes,  the  claim  of  excel- 
lence is  also  recognized,  and  when  a  citizen  is  in  any 
way  distinguished,  he  is  preferred  to  the  public  service, 
not  as  a  matter  of  privilege,  but  as  the  reward  of  merit. 
Neither  is  poverty  a  bar,  but  a  man  may  benefit  his 
country  whatever  be  the  obscurity  of  his  condition. 
There  is  no  exclusiveness  in  our  public  life,  and  in  our 
private  intercourse  we  are  not  suspicious  of  one  another, 
nor  angry  with  our  neighbor  if  he  does  what  he  likes; 
we  do  not  put  on  sour  looks  at  him  which,  though  harm- 
less, are  not  pleasant.  While  we  are  thus  unconstrained  in 
our  private  intercourse,  a  spirit  of  reverence  pervades 
our  public  acts;  we  are  prevented  from  doing  wrong  by 
1  Thucy.,  II,  37  /. 


ATHENS:  AN   IMPERIAL  DEMOCRACY    47 

respect  for  authority  and  for  the  laws,  having  an  especial 
regard  to  those  ordained  for  the  protection  of  the  injured 
as  well  as  to  those  unwritten  laws  which  bring  upon  the 
transgressor  of  them  the  reprobation  of  the  general  senti- 
ment. .  .  .  Wealth  we  employ  not  for  talk  and  ostenta- 
tion, but  when  there  is  a  real  use  for  it.  To  avow  pov- 
erty with  us  is  no  disgrace :  the  true  disgrace  is  in  doing 
nothing  to  avoid  it.  An  Athenian  citizen  does  not  neg- 
lect the  state  because  he  takes  care  of  his  own  house- 
hold ;  and  even  those  of  us  who  are  engaged  in  business 
have  a  very  fair  idea  of  politics.  We  alone  regard  a  man 
who  takes  no  interest  in  public  affairs,  not  as  a  harmless 
but  as  a  useless  character;  and  if  few  of  us  are  origi- 
nators, we  are  all  sound  judges  of  a  policy.  The  great 
impediment  to  action  is,  in  our  opinion,  not  discussion 
but  the  want  of  that  knowledge  which  is  gained  by  dis- 
cussion preparatory  to  action.  For  we  have  a  peculiar 
power  of  thinking  before  we  act  and  of  acting  too.  .  .  . 
And  we  have  not  forgotten  to  provide  for  our  weary 
spirits  many  relaxations  from  toil;  we  have  regular 
games  and  sacrifices  throughout  the  year;  at  home  the 
style  of  our  life  is  refined ;  and  the  delight  which  we  daily 
feel  in  all  these  things  helps  to  banish  melancholy.  Be- 
cause of  the  greatness  of  our  city  the  fruits  of  the  whole 
earth  flow  in  upon  us;  so  that  we  enjoy  the  goods  of 
other  countries  as  freely  as  of  our  own.  .  .  .  We  are 
lovers  of  the  beautiful,  yet  simple  in  our  tastes,  and  we 
cultivate  the  mind  without  loss  of  manliness.  ...  To 


48  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

sum  up :  I  say  that  Athens  is  the  school  of  Hellas,  and 
that  the  individual  Athenian  in  his  own  person  seems  to 
have  the  power  of  adapting  himself  to  the  most  varied 
forms  of  action  with  the  utmost  versatility  and  grace. 
This  is  no  passing  and  idle  word,  but  truth  and  fact; 
and  the  assertion  is  verified  by  the  position  to  which 
these  qualities  have  raised  the  state.  .  .  .  And  we  shall 
assuredly  not  be  without  witnesses;  there  are  mighty 
monuments  of  our  power  which  will  make  us  the  wonder 
of  this  and  of  succeeding  ages;  we  shall  not  need  the 
praises  of  Homer  or  of  any  other  panegyrist  whose 
poetry  may  please  for  the  moment,  although  his  repre- 
sentation of  the  facts  will  not  bear  the  light  of  day.  For 
we  have  compelled  every  land  and  every  sea  to  open  a 
path  for  our  valor,  and  have  everywhere  planted  eternal 
memorials  of  our  friendship  and  of  our  enmity." 

Such  were  the  proud  claims  of  the  great  Athenian 
statesman.  Of  art  there  was  said  no  word  except  in  so 
far  as  art  was  embodied  in  the  monuments  of  empire. 
Music  and  the  drama  are  alluded  to,  but  in  the  same 
breath  with  athletic  contests,  as  theu*elaxation  of  over- 
worked men.  The  speaker  has  no  apology  to  make  for 
democracy.  He  gloried  in  imperialism.  Had  he  met 
Plato  in  Elysium  —  Plato  who  was  born  in  the  year  after 
Pericles's  death,  and  both  embodied  and  expressed  the 
higher  ideals  of  a  later  generation  of  Athenians  —  he 
would  have  disdained  to  reply  to  the  philosopher's  accu- 


ATHENS:  AN   IMPERIAL  DEMOCRACY    49 

sation  that  he  had  filled  the  city  with  traders  and  shops 
and  ships  and  dockyards  and  such  rubbish,  instead  of 
with  righteousness  and  justice. 

Taking  the  Funeral  Oration  as  my  text,  I  should  like 
to  explain  at  this  point  by  what  institutions  the  princi- 
ples of  Periclean  democracy  and  imperialism  were  con- 
verted into  facts. 

It  was  in  the  ecclesia,  or  general  assembly,  and  in  the 
helicsa,  or  popular  courts  of  justice,  that  sovereign  power 
was  vested  in  Athens.1  The  heliaea  demanded  of  its 
jurors  only  that  they  should  be  citizens  in  good  stand- 
ing, but  each  year  it  drew  according  to  need  from  a 
specially  constituted  list  of  6000.  So,  too,  of  the  50,000 
citizens  who  might  attend  the  ecclesia,  6000  were  re- 
garded as  a  quorum  when  a  quorum  was  required,  and 
commonly  an  even  smaller  number  was  present.  Meet- 
ings of  the  ecclesia  were  held  either  in  the  city  or  at  the 
harbor;  hence  the  urban  element  tended  to  dominate. 
Stated  meetings  occurred  four  times  a  month,  but  others 
might  be  called  by  the  generals  or  the  council.  Various 
panels  of  from  401  to  2001  jurymen  each  might  be 
allotted  to  tribunals  on  every  day  of  the  year  which 
was  not  set  aside  for  a  public  festival  or  preempted  by  a 
meeting  of  the  ecclesia.  Usually  poor  men  of  advanced 
years,  such  as  were  unsuited  for  more  active  work  and 

1  For  the  following  sections  see  especially  Aristotle's  Constitution  of  the 
Athenians. 


50  GREEK   IMPERIALISM 

were  satisfied  with  the  indemnity  of  two  obols '  per  day, 
volunteered  for  registration  among  the  6000  jurors. 

The  work  of  Parliament  was  divided  between  the 
ecclesia  and  the  heliaea ;  for  legislation  in  the  strict  sense 
of  the  term  could  be  enacted  only  by  the  joint  action  of 
the  two  bodies.2  Administrative  decrees,  moreover,  by 
means  of  which  the  ecclesia  disposed  of  all  important 
public  business,  and  which  might  differ  from  laws  only 
in  a  formal  way,  could  be  suspended  at  the  initiative  of 
individuals  and  were  incontestable  only  when  passed 
on,  as  to  constitutionality  or  public  expediency,  by  the 
heliaea.  The  men  who  sat  in  the  heliaea  were  but  com- 
mon citizens  like  those  who  voted  in  the  ecclesia;  but 
they  came  to  sit  in  judgment  on  both  laws  and  decrees 
by  the  accident  of  the  lot  and  not  because  of  any  par- 
ticular interest  in  the  questions  concerned.  In  other 
words,  the  courts  could  not  be  packed  with  partisans  as 
the  meetings  of  the  ecclesia  commonly  were.  This  fact, 
together  with  the  delay  which  necessarily  occurred, 
protected  the  state  against  the  verdict  of  a  chance  ma- 
jority, which  was  in  fact  usually  a  minority  of  all  the 
citizens.  There  was  no  such  thing  in  Athens  as  the  final 
settlement  of  controversial  matters  by  a  single  popular 
vote. 

The  heliaea  acted  as  sovereign  in  one  further  particu- 
lar. Upon  it  devolved  the  duty  of  determining  whether 

1  Seven  cents,  equal  in  purchasing  power  to  thirty-five  cents  perhaps. 
*  Greenidge,  Greek  Constitutional  History  (1896),  pp.  170^. 


ATHENS:  AN  IMPERIAL  DEMOCRACY  51 
the  magistrates  and  councilors  observed  the  laws  and 
conducted  themselves  honestly  during  their  years  of 
office.  It  was  to  the  sworn  assembly  of  the  Athenians, 
accordingly,  that  all  those  engaged  in  civil  administra- 
tion were  responsible.  The  ecclesia,  on  the  other  hand, 
had  the  right  to  impeach  and  dismiss  those  officials 
who,  being  given  discretionary  powers,  abused  them. 

The  main  work  of  the  heliaea  was  of  course  to  settle 
domestic  and  imperial  litigation.  As  we  shall  see,  the 
judicial  power  of  the  heliaea  gave  it  a  large  measure  of 
political  control  over  all  the  subject  cities  of  Athens. 

The  heliaea  was  the  brake  on  the  democratic  machine: 
the  ecclesia  was  the  dynamo.  The  intent  of  the  Athe- 
nians was  that  all  political  decisions  of  importance  should 
be  reached,  after  full  debate,  by  the  ecclesia.  It  was, 
however,  obvious  that  an  assembly  of  from  five  to  fifty 
thousand  men  would  proceed  with  disastrous  slowness 
if  all  matters,  great  and  small,  were  laid  before  it,  or 
even  if  it  considered  only  significant  affairs,  but  consid- 
ered them  without  previous  examination  and  formula- 
tion. Perversion  of  modern  democracies  results  most 
notably  from  the  usurpation  of  power  on  the  part  of 
those  who  sift  proposals  for  popular  reference.  Athens 
had  to  guard  against  a  similar  danger.  Hence  the 
harbinger  of  democracy,  Clisthenes,  created  for  it  one 
of  the  most  peculiar  probuleutic,  or  deliberative,  bodies 
which  ever  had  the  handling  of  large  affairs.  This  was 
the  council  of  the  Five  Hundred. 


52  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

It  was  constituted  anew  each  year  and  was  made  an 
exact  miniature  of  the  ecclesia  which  it  was  to  serve. 
Every  ward  and  township  of  Attica,  to  the  number  of 
one  hundred  and  over,  first  eliminated  such  of  its  mem- 
bers as  had  not  yet  reached  their  thirtieth  year  or  had 
already  served  two  terms  in  the  council,  and  then  se- 
lected by  lot  from  among  the  rest  the  councilor  or  coun- 
cilors to  which  it  was  entitled  on  the  basis  of  popula- 
tion. Accordingly,  each  successive  council  had  from  two 
hundred  and  fifty  to  five  hundred  new  and  inexperienced 
members.  Not  desire  or  fitness  but  pure  chance  deter- 
mined its  personnel.  Every  section,  interest,  and  class  of 
Attica  —  if  we  exclude  young  men  between  eighteen 
and  thirty  —  was  adequately  represented  in  it.  There 
was,  therefore,  a  general  presumption  that  it  would  take 
the  same  view  of  public  questions  as  the  ecclesia;  that  it 
would  do  a  disservice  to  its  own  members  should  it 
foster  their  temporary  rights  as  councilors  at  the  expense 
of  their  lifelong  rights  as  members  of  the  ecclesia;  that  it 
would,  in  other  words,  labor  to  the  best  of  its  ability  to 
present  to  the  ecclesia  a  well-considered  and  sufficiently 
inclusive  programme  of  business.  Otherwise,  the  heliaea 
had  to  be  faced  at  the  end  of  the  twelve  months. 

A  committee  of  five  hundred  impresses  us  as  little 
less  unwieldy  than  an  assembly  of  five  thousand. 
Clisthenes  was  of  the  same  opinion.  Hence  he  divided 
his  council  into  ten  sections,  or  prytanies,  of  fifty  mem- 
bers each,  and  arranged  that  each  prytany  should  act 


ATHENS:  AN   IMPERIAL  DEMOCRACY    53 

for  the  whole  for  thirty-six  days  in  an  order  determined 
by  lot  at  the  latest  possible  moment.  The  prytany  was 
constituted  in  such  a  way  that  it  was  a  miniature  of 
the  council,  just  as  the  council  was  a  miniature  of  the 
ecclesia.  The  lot,  again  applied  at  the  latest  possible 
moment,  determined,  furthermore,  which  of  its  fifty 
members  should  be  its  chairman,  and  be  present  with 
one  third  of  his  colleagues  in  the  council  chamber  for 
the  single  twenty-four  hours  for  which  he  served.  The 
same  man  was  chairman  of  the  council  at  its  daily  ses- 
sion, and  he  also  presided  at  the  ecclesia,  should  a  meet- 
ing of  the  citizens  be  held  on  his  day  of  office.  A  chance 
nomination  for  a  single  day's  service,  at  a  time  not 
previously  known,  was,  Clisthenes  thought,  a  sufficient 
safeguard  of  council  and  ecclesia  against  successful 
scheming,  conspiracy,  collusion,  or  other  interference 
with  the  popular  will  on  the  part  of  the  chairman.  He 
was  mistaken ;  and  the  later  democracy  took  the  further 
precaution  of  requiring  the  chairman  to  relinquish  the 
presidency  at  the  meetings  of  the  council  and  ecclesia 
to  a  board  of  nine  men  chosen  by  lot  for  that  specific 
purpose  from  the  non-officiating  prytanies  of  the  council. 
One  of  the  nine,  designated  likewise  by  lot,  was  given 
the  special  honor  and  responsibility  of  putting  the 
motions  and  declaring  the  votes. 

Only  proposals  which  originated  in  a  council  thus 
organized  came  before  the  ecclesia;  but  there  they  might 
be  discussed  ad  libitum,  emended,  accepted,  rejected, 


54  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

or  referred  back  to  the  council ;  and  it  was  even  possible 
during  their  consideration  to  substitute  for  the  resolu- 
tion of  the  council  an  entirely  different  bill,  or  to  move 
that  the  council  bring  in  a  proposition  at  the  next  meet- 
ing on  an  altogether  irrelevant  matter.  It  was  the 
deliberate  intention  of  the  Athenians  that  the  ecclesia 
should  consider  everything  it  wanted  to  consider. 

The  management  of  civil  administration,  subject 
to  the  constant  direction  of  the  ecclesia  and  the  watch- 
ful supervision  of  the  council,  —  which  in  this  matter 
also  acted  for  the  body  of  which  it  was  a  miniature,  — 
was  entrusted  to  a  multitude  of  committees,  each  com- 
posed normally  of  ten  members.  Aristotle,  in  his 
Constitution  of  the  Athenians,  specifies  the  duties  of 
twenty-five  such  committees  and  estimates  at  seven 
hundred  the  number  of  citizens  engaged  annually  in 
domestic  administration.  The  work  of  each  committee 
was  definitely  circumscribed  by  law  and  formed  a  small 
bundle  of  routine  matters.  The  committees  may  be 
thought  of  as  standing  drawn  up  in  a  long  line  for  the 
council  to  inspect.  Had  they  been  placed  one  behind 
the  other  in  files,  the  rear  committee  being  responsible 
to  the  one  before  it  and  so  on  down  to  the  front,  the 
council  would  have  come  into  direct  contact  only  with 
a  few  powerful  committees.  Such  committees,  however, 
must  have  proved  impossible  for  inexperienced  coun- 
cilors to  manage.  Besides,  while  the  councilors,  as  agents 
of   the   ecclesia,  and  subject  to  its  commands,  might 


ATHENS:  AN   IMPERIAL   DEMOCRACY    55 

properly  hold  all  the  civil  magistrates  to  a  monthly  ac- 
counting, it  was  not  thought  in  accord  with  democracy 
that  one  group  of  citizens  who  happened  to  hold  one 
civil  office  should  have  under  their  direction  another 
group  of  citizens  also  engaged  temporarily  on  public 
work.  Though  all  the  committees  were  thus  on  the  same 
plane,  and  recognized  only  the  council  as  their  common 
superintendent,  the  work  that  they  did  was  by  no  means 
of  equal  dignity  or  importance.  It  ranged  all  the  way 
from  managing  the  scavengers  to  managing  the  Great 
Dionysia. 

All  committees  were  reconstituted  annually.  No 
man  could  be  a  member  of  the  same  committee  twice 
in  his  lifetime.  At  the  end  of  his  year  each  magistrate 
was  required  to  render  an  indescribably  minute  account- 
ing of  his  public  acts,  first  to  specially  appointed  audit- 
ing committees,  and  finally  to  the  heliaea.  It  was  an 
easy  matter  to  get  an  office  in  Athens,  but  a  very  diffi- 
cult task  to  get  honorably  rid  of  it.  For  the  lot  was  used 
to  select  the  requisite  number  of  members  for  each 
committee  from  among  the  citizens  thirty  years  old  or 
older  who  had  not  disqualified  themselves  by  earlier 
service.  The  theory  that  one  citizen  was  as  competent 
as  another  for  public  office  was  thus  put  into  practice. 
Every  office  was  refilled  annually  by  a  chance  group  of 
new  and  necessarily  inexperienced  men. 

While  defining  constitutions  Aristotle  lays  down  the 
condition  for  a  thoroughgoing  democracy  that  all  citi- 


56  GREEK   IMPERIALISM 

zens  should  hold  governmental  positions  in  turn.  On 
this  theory,  there  should  have  been  an  approximate 
agreement  between  the  number  of  places  in  Athens 
and  the  number  of  citizens  reaching  their  thirtieth  year 
annually.  That,  however,  was  not  the  case.  Even  if  we 
assume  that  men  were  councilors  only  once  and  held 
only  one  magistracy  in  their  lifetime,  we  need  to  include 
some  of  the  seven  hundred  (?)  imperial  posts  in  our 
calculation,  and  regard  them,  too,  as  subject  to  the 
conditions  of  tenure  assumed  for  domestic  positions,  in 
order  to  reach  the  required  total  of  about  thirteen  hun- 
dred. This  is,  naturally,  an  unwarranted  and  unwork- 
able series  of  assumptions.  It  is,  however,  reasonable 
to  suppose  that  the  majority  of  Athenian  citizens,  and 
practically  all  of  those  who  made  a  habit  of  attending 
the  meetings  of  the  ecclesia  held  a  detne,  or  municipal, 
position,  let  us  say,  in  their  youth;  a  post  in  the  council 
or  in  the  domestic  or  imperial  administration  in  their 
maturity;  and  a  place  in  the  register  of  the  six  thousand 
jurors  in  their  advancing  years.  Recall,  now,  that  three 
hundred  and  sixty  of  the  five  hundred  councilors  had 
to  preside  at  meetings  of  fifty  and  five  hundred  men, 
and,  if  chance  willed,  at  one  of  from  five  to  fifty 
thousand  also;  observe  that  magistrates  had  not  only 
to  know  the  duties  of  their  office,  —  which  included 
the  reception  and  preparation  of  some  kind  of  cases  for 
submission  to  a  panel  of  jurors,  over  which  they  had, 
moreover,  to  preside,  —  but  had  also  to  keep  accounts 


ATHENS:  AN  IMPERIAL  DEMOCRACY  57 
which  they  must  defend  in  a  law  court;  reflect  that  jury 
service  involved  acting  as  judge  and  jury  in  both  domes- 
tic and  imperial  litigation,  and  it  will  appear  that  the 
knowledge  of  reading  and  writing  which  Clisthenes  pre- 
supposed in  all  citizens  would  not  have  carried  a  man 
far  in  the  age  of  Pericles ;  he  must  then  have  had  a  work- 
ing knowledge  of  parliamentary  forms,  he  must  have 
had  the  view  of  administration  which  comes  of  being 
on  the  inside  of  the  wicket;  he  must  have  been  so  con- 
versant with  the  law  and  legal  procedure  that  he  could 
assume  heavy  personal  responsibility  for  the  legality 
of  all  bills  proposed  by  him  and  could  argue  his  own 
cases  when  acting  as  plaintiff  or  defendant  in  a  law  suit. 
It  was  a  proverb  in  Athens  that  "office  will  show  the 
man."  We  may  be  sure  that  most  men  took  some  pains 
in  advance  that  it  did  not  show  them  wholly  incom- 
petent. It  must  have  left  them  with  a  new  insight  into 
public  affairs.  It  is  fair  to  say  that,  as  a  consequence 
of  all  this,  the  normal  town  meeting  of  the  Athenians 
was,  from  one  point  of  view,  an  assembly  of  experts, 
while  viewed  differently  it  possessed  simply  a  high  level 
of  amateur  attainment,  comparable,  perhaps,  with  that 
Mr.  H.  G.  Wells  postulates  in  his  socialistic  Utopia. 

The  office  assigned  by  Pericles  to  this  assembly  of 
high-class  amateurs  was  to  choose  the  best  among 
divergent  policies  proposed  to  it  by  citizens  of  excep- 
tional endowment.    The  ecclesia  by  no  means  closed 


58  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

the  door  in  the  face  of  such  real  experts  as  it  possessed. 
Thus  it  did  not  leave  it  to  the  council  to  draw  up  the 
specifications  for  the  construction  of  the  naval  arsenals 
or  any  similarly  technical  job,  but  it  could  and  did  dele- 
gate such  tasks  to  men  of  special  competence.  Nor  was 
it  so  doctrinaire  as  to  entrust  the  command  of  its  expe- 
ditions or  the  conduct  of  its  diplomacy  to  chance  per- 
sons ;  but  it  both  elected  its  generals,  reelected  them  as 
often  as  it  cared  to,  and  gave  them  special  rights  of 
calling  and  canceling  meetings  of  the  ecclesia  and  of 
laying  proposals  directly  before  them.  It  was,  accord- 
ingly, aware  of  the  difficulty  and  danger  which  it  faced 
in  settling  questions  of  foreign  policy,  where  the  ele- 
ments involved,  being  the  resources,  aims,  sentiments, 
and  traditions  of  other  states,  far  transcended  the 
knowledge  of  the  common  citizen ;  and  where  error  might 
mean  irreparable  disaster;  where,  in  fact,  error  did 
mean  irreparable  disaster. 

The  surest  way  to  avoid  error  was  to  pick  out  a  single 
individual  of  high  character,  intelligence,  and  compe- 
tence, and  give  him  cordial  and  resolute  support  in  the 
policy  he  advocated.  The  ecclesia  was  accordingly  a 
great  "contest,"  or  agon,  of  statesmen.  The  Athenians 
believed  in  competition.  A  public  contest,  in  which 
excellence  might  be  displayed  and  determined,  was 
arranged  to  encourage  effort  in  every  conceivable  em- 
ployment. To  digress  a  little,  there  was  a  contest  of 
potters,  as  we  learn  from  a  gravestone  on  which  an  un- 


ATHENS:  AN   IMPERIAL  DEMOCRACY    59 

known  affirms  by  a  mighty  oath  that  he  was  adjudged 
the  first  of  all  the  potters  of  Attica.  There  were  prob- 
ably contests  of  painters  and  sculptors  as  well.  There 
were  contests  of  horse-breeders  —  the  chariot-  and 
running-races;  contests  of  athletes  of  all  ages  in  all 
kinds  of  physical  exercises,  of  torch-racers  on  foot  and 
on  horseback;  there  were  contests  between  the  succes- 
sive prytanies  of  the  council,  between  detachments  of 
cavalry,  and  between  regiments  of  foot;  at  each  of  many 
festivals  there  were  contests  in  singing  of  five  choruses 
of  boys  and  five  choruses  of  men,  each  fifty  voices 
strong,  so  that  a  single  festival  called  for  the  training 
of  five  hundred  singers  annually  and  the  production 
of  ten  new  musical  compositions;  there  were  contests 
of  rhapsodists  in  reciting  Homer,  contests  of  rhetori- 
cians; above  all  contests  of  tragedians  and  contests  of 
comedians,  each  tragic  contest  demanding  twelve  new 
plays  annually  and  the  participation  of  one  hundred 
and  eighty  choral  singers  and  dancers,  each  comic 
contest  involving  six  new  plays  yearly  and  one  hundred 
and  forty-four  choral  singers  and  dancers.  The  rivalry 
which  produces  Olympic  records  and  superdread- 
naughts  nowadays,  the  Athenians  turned  to  advantage 
in  art  and  music  as  well :  with  the  result  that  the  taste 
and  skill  of  the  artisan  as  well  as  the  sculptor  and 
painter,  of  the  consumer  as  well  as  the  producer,  became 
well-nigh  faultless;  that  in  the  hundred  years  of  the 
empire  close  to  two  thousand  plays  of  picked  quality 


60  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

were  written  and  staged  in  Athens,  while  during  the 
same  time  from  five  to  six  thousand  new  musical  com- 
positions were  made  and  presented.  It  is  estimated  that 
upwards  of  two  thousand  Athenians  had  to  memorize 
the  words  and  practice  the  music  and  dance  figures  of  a 
lyric  or  dramatic  chorus  every  year.  Hence,  a  normal 
Athenian  audience  must  have  been  composed  in  large 
part  of  ex-performers,  a  fact  which  students  of  Sophocles 
and  Aristophanes  would  do  well  to  bear  constantly  in 
mind. 

The  reward  of  victory  in  an  athletic  or  musical  con- 
test was  the  glory  and  the  prize.  Great,  indeed,  was  the 
reward  which  the  victor  in  the  supreme  contest,  the 
struggle  for  political  leadership  in  the  ecclesia,  obtained. 
The  man  to  whom  the  Athenians  gave  their  confidence 
became  stronger  than  a  king.  "  In  form,"  says  Thucyd- 
ides,  "their  government  was  a  democracy:  in  reality 
it  was  the  rule  of  their  ablest  citizen."  The  man  who 
was  vanquished  in  a  chariot-race  might  be  the  victor  on 
the  next  occasion.  Not  so  the  victim  of  a  decisive 
political  defeat.  His  fate  was  ostracism.  That  is  to 
say,  he  was  exiled  without  dishonor  or  loss  of  property 
for  ten  years.  The  way  was  thereby  cleared  for  the 
victor.  By  this  strange  device  the  Athenians  saved 
themselves  for  over  two  generations  from  the  procras- 
tination and  uncertainty  of  distracted  counsels.  It  was 
ostracism  which  made  possible  the  uncrowned  kingship 
of  Themistocles,  Cimon,  and  Pericles;  and  when,  after 


ATHENS:  AN   IMPERIAL  DEMOCRACY    61 

the  death  of  Pericles  in  429  B.C.,  this  institution  failed 
them  utterly,  the  Athenians  were  pulled  this  way  and 
that  by  rival  leaders;  till  finally,  misled  by  Alcibiades 
and  Cleophon,  they  were  convicted  by  disaster  of  being 
wwsound  judges  of  foreign  policy. 

There  is  nothing  that  dies  so  hard  as  a  well-nurtured 
delusion.  In  the  romantic-idealizing  view  of  the  Greeks 
which  was  long  current,  the  Athenians  found  leisure 
for  art,  literature,  and  philosophy  by  having  all  their 
work  done  for  them  by  their  slaves.1  By  this  means,  too, 
they  were  enabled  to  devote  themselves  freely  to  poli- 
tics. If  this  were  so,  the  inference  of  Calhoun  was  a 
sound  one,  that  seen  "in  its  true  light"  slavery  was 
"the  most  safe  and  stable  basis  for  free  institutions  in 
the  world."  The  "first  lie"  is  that  the  Athenians  of  the 
great  age,  whose  dominant  characteristic  was  their 
vibrant  mental  and  physical  activity,  were  in  any  sense 
men  of  leisure.  The  few  among  them  who  had  slaves 
and  other  property  to  the  extent  of  great  wealth  had 
to  make  and  manage  their  own  investments.  The  major- 
ity of  the  farmers  had  to  till  the  land  with  their  own 
hands.  Many  citizens  —  at  least  one  third  of  the  whole, 
in  all  probability  —  had  to  earn  their  living  by  selling 
their  labor.  This  they  could  do  easily  in  the  time  of  the 
empire.  For  during  that  period  of  rapid  commercial  and 

1  See  particularly  Ed.  Meyer,  Die  Sklaverei  itn  Altertum  (Kleine  Schriftent 
pp.  169/.). 


62  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

industrial  expansion  the  demand  for  labor  was  so  great 
that  the  price  could  be  regulated  only  by  the  constant 
import  of  slaves  and  by  a  steady  stream  of  immigration 
from  less  prosperous  parts  of  Greece.  Outside  labor 
served  the  purpose  in  Athens  which  immigrant  labor 
serves  in  the  United  States  to-day.  With  its  growth 
grew  the  need  that  the  material  prosperity  which  occa- 
sioned it  should  endure.  The  problem  of  food-supply 
became  progressively  acute  and  the  control  of  the  sea 
was  soon  seen  to  be  an  economic  necessity.  More  than 
one  half  of  the  grain  sold  on  the  Athenian  market  came 
ultimately  from  abroad,  as  did  an  even  larger  propor- 
tion of  the  raw  materials  of  Athenian  industry.  "The 
Athenians  are  the  only  people  in  the  Hellenic  and  bar- 
barian world,"  wrote  an  Athenian  aristocrat1  in  about 
420  B.C.,  "who  are  able  to  control  an  abundant  supply 
of  raw  materials.  For  if  a  state  is  rich  in  timber  for  ship- 
building, where  will  it  find  a  market  for  it  if  not  with  the 
masters  of  the  sea?  If  another  abounds  in  iron  or  bronze 
or  linen  yarn,  where  will  it  find  a  market  except  with 
the  sea-lord?  Yet  this  is  the  stock  from  which  ships  are 
made  in  Athens.  One  city  yields  timber  to  her,  another 
iron,  a  third  bronze,  a  fourth  linen  yarn,  a  fifth  wax, 
and  so  on.  Moreover,  Athens  prevents  her  rivals  from 
transporting  goods  to  other  countries  than  Attica  by 
the  threat  of  driving  them  from  the  sea  altogether." 

1  Pseudo-Xenophon,  State  of  the  Athenians,  11,  10.  (The  translation  used 
here  and  elsewhere,  with  a  few  modifications,  is  that  of  Dakyns.) 


ATHENS:  AN   IMPERIAL   DEMOCRACY    63 

The  demands  put  upon  the  time  of  Athenian  citizens 
by  the  state  were  enormous,  but  not  such  as  to  cripple 
economic  production.  A  comparison  with  modern  con- 
ditions will  make  this  clear.  A  little  less  frequently  than 
once  a  week  the  ecclesia  met,  but  the  attendance  was 
generally  less  than  one  tenth  of  those  qualified.  That 
represents  a  suspension  of  work  roughly  equivalent  to 
our  Saturday  afternoons  and  legal  holidays.  A  little 
oftener  than  once  a  week  a  contest  or  other  public 
festival  occurred,  and  to  these  there  was,  it  seems,  a 
pretty  general  resort.  They  correspond  to  our  fair-days 
and  Sundays.  Preparation  for  the  contests  was,  per- 
haps, not  more  destructive  of  money-earning  time  than 
are  our  collegiate  and  university  courses.  During  their 
nineteenth  and  twentieth  years  young  Athenians  of  the 
upper  third  trained  for  the  army;  but  it  was  not  till  a 
century  after  Pericles's  death  that  universal  military 
service  for  a  similar  period  was  made  compulsory  — 
as  in  modern  Europe.  We  may  assume  that  at  least  two 
years  of  every  citizen's  life  was  required  for  deliberative 
and  administrative  work;  and,  having  regard  to  the 
imperial  service,  we  may,  perhaps,  advance  this  require- 
ment to  three.  That  is  an  enormous  enlargement  of 
modern  demands.  The  same  ratio  would  give  the 
United  States  two  million  and  a  half  or  three  million 
public  employees,  exclusive  of  postmasters  and  postal 
clerks,  tax-collectors,  and  day  laborers  of  every  descrip- 
tion.  But  a  bald  comparison  of  this  sort  is  misleading. 


64  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

Athens  regularly  employed  a  committee  of  ten  to  do  one 
man's  work,  with  the  result  that  all  of  them  were  free 
to  give  nine  tenths  of  their  time  to  their  private  busi- 
ness. The  council  during  the  year  and  the  jury  courts 
at  its  expiry  were  there  to  insure  the  state  that,  even  if 
his  colleagues  would  let  him,  any  particular  official  did 
not  neglect  his  public  duties.  Nor  was  the  Athenian 
practice  wildly  extravagant  so  long  as  the  magistrate 
received,  not  a  living  salary,  but  an  indemnity  equal 
only  to  a  common  workman's  daily  wage.  The  Atheni- 
ans employed  four  hundred  or  even  two  thousand  jurors 
where  we  employ  twelve;  but  they  had  neither  high 
salaried  judges  nor  exacting  lawyers  to  pay,  since  the 
judicial  system  worked  without  either.  The  juryman's 
fee,  moreover,  was  a  meagre  indemnity,  comparable 
to  the  old-age  pension  paid  in  the  progressive  countries 
of  modern  Europe. 

The  payment  of  indemnities  for  service  in  the  council, 
the  magistracies,  the  jury  courts,  and  for  attendance  in 
the  theatre,  music-hall,  and  stadion,  was  a  Periclean 
innovation.  He  did  not  intend  to  create  a  class  of  sala- 
ried officials ;  nor  yet  to  make  an  advance  toward  com- 
munism. His  ideal  was  political,  not  economic,  equal- 
ity —  to  enable  all,  irrespective  of  wealth  or  station,  to 
use  the  opportunities  and  face  the  obligations  which 
democracy  brought  in  its  train.  Like  all  the  great 
democratic  leaders  who  preceded  him,  he  was  a  noble- 
man by  birth  and  breeding,  and,  like  them,  he  did  not 


ATHENS:  AN   IMPERIAL  DEMOCRACY    65 

doubt  for  a  moment  that  the  culture  which  ennobled 
the  life  of  his  class  would  dignify  and  uplift  that  of  the 
masses  also.  To  give  the  workingman  the  political 
insight  and  knowledge  of  the  Eupatrids;  to  lend  to  him 
the  grace  and  elasticity  of  movement  which  physical 
culture  gave  them;  to  fill  his  memory  with  the  noble 
thoughts  set  in  melodious  and  stirring  words  which  they 
got  from  their  intimacy  with  great  poetry;  to  inspire 
in  him,  though  a  mere  artisan,  an  artist's  taste  and  fer- 
vor for  formal  beauty  —  that  was  to  bless  him  with 
more  than  leisure.  It  was  to  unite  the  whole  people  in 
a  community  of  high  ideas  and  emotions.  It  was  to 
make  them  a  nation  of  noblemen.  We  do  not  wonder 
much  that  in  the  furtherance  of  this  cause  the  men  of 
large  wealth  in  Athens  volunteered  to  assume  in  turn 
financial  and  personal  responsibility  for  the  support  of 
the  theatre,  the  opera-house,  the  stadion,  and  the 
gymnasia.  It  was  a  heavy  burden,  but,  in  the  absence 
of  a  regular  property  or  income  tax,  generosity  became 
at  once  a  duty  and  a  wise  precaution. 

A  nation  of  noblemen  is  a  luxury  for  which  somebody 
has  to  pay.  Athens,  in  Pericles's  memorable  phrase, 
was  "the  school  of  Hellas."  It  was  right,  he  thought, 
that  the  Hellenes  should  sacrifice  something  for  their 
education.  He  had  tried  to  make  them  all  contribu- 
tory allies  of  Athens,  but  had  failed  in  the  attempt.  As 
a  good  schoolmaster  he  was  determined,  none  the  less, 


66  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

to  hold  those  "well  in  hand"  whom  he  had  under  his 
care. 

The  physical  means  to  this  end  was  the  control  of  the 
sea.  The  advantages  of  sea  power  in  warfare,  in  enabling 
the  holder  of  it  to  circumscribe  according  to  his  con- 
venience the  area  of  military  action,  as  well  as  in  facil- 
itating mobilization,   transport,   and   communications, 
were  not  perceived  for  the  first  time  by  the  English 
Admiralty,    much    less    by   Clausewitz   and    Captain 
Mahan.      They  are  stated  in  the  clearest  terms  by  a 
contemporary  of  Pericles.1   Here  is  what  he  says:  "The 
subjects  of  a  power  which  is  dominant  by  land  have  it 
open  to  them  to  form  contingents  from  several  small 
states  and  to  muster  in  force  to  battle.  But  with  the 
subjects  of  a  naval  power  it  is  different.  As  far  as  they 
are  groups  of  islands  (and  the  whole  world,  we  may 
remark  in  passing,  is  now  simply  a  magnified  iEgean 
Archipelago)  it  is  impossible  for  their  states  to  meet 
together  for  united  action,  for  the  sea  lies  between  them, 
and  the  dominant  power  is  master  of  the  sea.   And  even 
if  it  were  possible  for  them  to  assemble  in  some  single 
island  unobserved,  they  would  only  do  so  to  perish  of 
famine.    And  as  to  the  states  subject  to  Athens  which 
are  not  islanders,  but  situated  on  the  continent,  the 
larger  are  held  in  check  by  need  and  the  small  ones 
absolutely  by  fear,  since  there  is  no  state  in  existence 
which  does  not  depend  upon  imports  and  exports  and 

1  Pseudo-Xenophon,  Slate  of  the  Athenians,  n,  2  ff. 


ATHENS:  AN   IMPERIAL   DEMOCRACY     67 

these  she  will  forfeit,  if  she  does  not  lend  a  willing  ear 
to  those  who  are  masters  of  the  sea.  In  the  next  place, 
a  power  dominant  by  sea  can  do  certain  things  which  a 
land  power  is  debarred  from  doing;  as,  for  instance, 
ravage  the  territory  of  a  superior,  since  it  is  always 
possible  to  coast  along  to  some  point,  where  either  there 
is  no  hostile  force  to  deal  with  or  merely  a  small  body; 
and  in  case  of  an  advance  in  force  on  the  part  of  the 
enemy  they  can  take  to  their  ships  and  sail  away.  Such 
a  performance  is  attended  by  less  difficulty  than  that 
experienced  by  the  army  marching  along  the  seaboard 
to  the  rescue.  Again,  it  is  open  to  a  power  so  dominating 
by  sea  to  leave  its  own  territory  and  sail  off  on  as  long 
a  voyage  as  you  please.  Whereas  the  land  power  cannot 
place  more  than  a  few  days'  journey  between  itself  and 
its  own  territory,  for  marches  are  slow  affairs;  and  it  is 
not  possible  for  an  army  on  the  march  to  have  food  sup- 
plies to  last  for  any  great  length  of  time.  Such  an  army 
must  either  march  through  friendly  territory  or  it  must 
force  a  way  by  victory  in  battle.  The  voyager  mean- 
while has  it  in  his  power  to  disembark  at  any  point 
where  he  finds  himself  in  superior  force;  or,  at  the  worst, 
to  coast  by  until  he  reaches  either  a  friendly  district  or 
an  enemy  too  weak  to  resist.  Again,  those  diseases 
to  which  the  fruits  of  the  earth  are  liable  as  visitations 
from  heaven  fall  severely  on  a  land  power,  but  are 
scarcely  felt  by  the  naval  power,  for  such  sicknesses 
do  not  visit  the  whole  earth  everywhere  at  once.  .  .  . 


68  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

There  is  just  one  thing  which  the  Athenians  lack.  Sup- 
posing they  were  the  inhabitants  of  an  island,  and  were 
still,  as  now,  rulers  of  the  sea,  they  would  have  had  it  in 
their  power  to  work  whatever  mischief  they  liked  and 
suffer  no  evil  in  return." 

At  all  costs  Athens  must  retain  control  of  the  sea. 
That  meant  to  keep  the  fleet  constantly  in  fighting  trim. 
In  the  effort  the  Athenians  made  the  most  heroic  finan- 
cial and  personal  sacrifices,  demonstrating  clearly  that 
popular  government  need  not  be  self-indulgent.  Neither 
the  aristocracy  in  England  nor  Napoleon  in  France  was 
as  hard  a  taskmaster  of  the  people  as  the  majority  which 
ruled  in  Athens.  Between  410  and  402  B.C.  —  a  time 
of  great  economic  distress  —  a  well-to-do  citizen  was 
called  upon  to  expend  twenty  thousand  franks  — 
which  are  perhaps  equal  in  purchasing  power  to  as  many 
dollars  —  on  what  we  may  call  national  education  and 
entertainment.  His  taxes  on  the  account  of  the  fleet 
amounted  in  the  same  years  to  double  as  much,  or 
forty- three  thousand  franks.  Great  as  was  the  burden  of 
the  rich,  that  of  the  commons  was  conceded  by  their  ad- 
versaries to  have  been  still  greater.  "  In  the  first  place," 
writes  an  aristocrat  in  about  420  B.C.,1  "it  is  only  just 
that  the  poorer  classes  and  the  'people'  of  Athens  should 
have  the  advantage  over  the  men  of  birth  and  wealth, 
seeing  that  it  is  the  people  who  man  the  fleet  and  put 
round  the  city  her  girdle  of  power.   The  steersman,  the 

1  Pseudo-Xenophon,  State  of  the  Athenians,  1,  2. 


/ 


ATHENS:  AN  IMPERIAL  DEMOCRACY  69 
boatswain,  the  lieutenant,  the  look-out-man  at  the  prow, 
the  shipwright  —  these  are  the  people  who  engird  the 
city  with  power  far  rather  than  her  heavy  infantry  and 
men  of  birth  and  quality."  Plutarch1  tells  us  that  on 
a  peace  footing  Athens  kept  a  fleet  of  sixty  ships  on  the 
sea  for  eight  months  of  every  year.  To  man  such  a 
squadron  10,200  rowers,  480  officers,  and  600  marines 
would  be  required.  In  other  words,  one  quarter  of  all 
the  citizens  of  Athens  would  have  lived  on  their  battle- 
ships for  three  quarters  of  every  year.  We  might  believe 
this  report,  if  it  were  not  contradicted  by  Aristotle,  who 
in  a  place,  where  exaggeration,  not  reduction,  is  sus- 
pected,2 makes  the  fleet  of  Athens,  which  was  constantly 
in  service  in  time  of  war,  consist  only  of  twenty  guard- 
ships.  Hence  one  twelfth  and  not  one  quarter  of  all  the 
Athenians  were  on  active  naval  duty  during  the  sailing 
season  of  almost  every  year.  In  addition,  two  thousand 
men  were  drafted  yearly  by  lot  to  serve  in  garrisons 
throughout  the  empire;  so  that,  if  these  are  added  to 
the  seven  hundred  (?)  imperial  magistrates,  and  the  five 
hundred  guards  of  the  arsenals,  nearly  another  one 
twelfth  of  the  citizens  was  involved. 

This  computation  takes  no  account  of  the  demands  of 
naval  warfare.  In  the  Athenian  dockyards  lay  ready  for 
action  four  hundred  battleships,  from  which  the  requisite 
number  was  selected  for  each  particular  expedition. 
If  two  hundred  and  fifty  vessels  were  mobilized,  as 

1  Plut.,  Pericles,  XI,  4.  *  Const,  of  the  Athenians,  24,  3. 


70  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

occasionally  happened,  nearly  fifty  thousand  additional 
sailors  were  required.  With  the  use  of  every  possible 
citizen  Athens  could  not  produce  such  a  number.  She 
commonly  did  her  utmost  and  called  upon  the  allies  for 
the  rest. 

It  is  true  that  tribute  was  collected  from  the  allies 
to  enable  Athens  to  build  the  ships  and  pay  the  sail- 
ors; but  it  is  also  true  that,  in  addition,  huge  sums  were 
contributed  for  mobilization  expenses  by  rich  Atheni- 
ans and  were  advanced  for  heavy  war  expenses  by  the 
Athenian  treasury.  And  Athens  gave  freely  not  only  of 
her  money  but  also  of  her  blood.  The  death  roll  of  one 
of  the  ten  corps  into  which  the  Athenians  were  divided 
for  army  and  navy  purposes  is  extant  for  the  year  459 
B.C.  "Of  the  Erechtheid  phyle,"  it  runs,  ''these  are  they 
who  died  in  the  war,  in  Cyprus,  in  Egypt,  in  Phoenicia, 
at  Halieis,  in  ^Egina,  at  Megara,  in  the  same  year"; * 
and  one  hundred  and  seventy- two  names  follow.  It  was 
not  the  year  of  a  great  battle,  or  of  an  Athenian  dis- 
aster, yet  in  it  the  death  rate  must  have  been  nearly 
twice  as  great  as  the  birth  rate;  so  costly  in  lives  was 
the  empire  to  its  lords  in  war-time. 

On  three  specific  points  and  on  one  general  ground, 
contemporaries  both  within  and  without  Athens  as- 
sailed the  treatment  accorded  by  the  Periclean  democ- 
racy to  its  subjects.    In  no  instance,  however,  is  the 

1  Bury,  J.  B.,  A  History  of  Greece  (1900),  p.  355. 


ATHENS:  AN   IMPERIAL   DEMOCRACY    71 

charge  of  misbehavior  established  conclusively,  though 
in  this  matter,  as  in  so  many  others  in  the  history  of 
Greece,  our  judgment  is  dependent  upon  the  point  at 
which  we  transfer  our  sympathy  from  the  city-states, 
which  were  the  bearers  of  culture  in  the  Greek  Middle 
Ages,  to  the  whole  people,  for  whose  progress  and  inde- 
pendence urban  particularism  was  finally  fatal.  "Surely 
Hellas  is  insulted  with  a  dire  insult,"  declared  the  oppo- 
nents of  Pericles,1  "and  manifestly  subjected  to  tyranny 
when  she  sees  that,  with  her  own  enforced  contributions 
for  the  war,  we  are  gilding  and  bedizening  our  city, 
which,  for  all  the  world  like  a  wanton  woman,  adds  to 
her  wardrobe  precious  stones  and  costly  statues  and 
temples  worth  their  millions."  To  this  accusation  the 
proper  retort  was,  not  that  having  provided  adequate 
protection  against  Persia,  Athens  was  free  to  spend  the 
money  contributed  by  the  subjects  in  any  way  she 
pleased ;  for  the  logical  inference  was  then  that  the  con- 
tributions were  excessive.  Pericles  may  not  have  cared 
to  be  logical,  but  he  could  not  ignore  forms.  Had  he  been 
able  to  show,  as  has  been  claimed  recently,  that  he  used 
for  building  purposes  only  the  sixtieth  of  the  tribute, 
which  had  been  dedicated  as  the  first  fruits  to  Athena, 
he  would  never  have  been  attacked  at  all.  Evidently,  he 
spent  on  Athenian  public  works  much  larger  sums  de- 
rived indirectly  from  the  tribute,  for  which  course  the 
defense  actually  made  seems  to  have  been  that  the 

1  Plut.,  Pericles,  12.    (Translated  by  Perrin.) 


? 


72  GREEK   IMPERIALISM 

money  was  due  Athens  for  losses  sustained  during  the 
invasion  of  Xerxes  and  for  sums  advanced  to  the  war 
fund  during  the  continuance  of  the  struggle  with  Persia. 
In  any  case  the  tribute  paid  was  a  mere  bagatelle  as 
compared  with  what  the  subjects  saved  through  having 
no  fleets  of  their  own  to  maintain. 

The  charge  is  more  serious  that  in  order  to  enjoy  "  the 
steady  receipt  of  salaries  throughout  the  year  derived 
from  the  court  fees";  to  "manage  the  affairs  of  the  sub- 
jects while  seated  at  home  without  the  expense  of  naval 
expeditions";  to  "preserve  the  partisans  of  democracy 
and  ruin  its  opponents";  to  boost  the  business  of  hotel 
keepers  and  such  ilk  in  Athens,  and  to  win  for  the  com- 
mon citizens  the  flattery  and  consideration  that  would 
be  shown  otherwise  only  to  generals  and  ambassadors, 
the  Athenians  "compelled  the  allies  to  voyage  to  Athens 
in  order  to  have  their  cases  tried."  For  it  seems  clear 
that  the  law  courts  at  Athens  were  usually  so  clogged 
with  litigation  that  the  gain  in  having  a  model  code  of 
law  and  in  escaping  the  fierce  partisanship  of  the  local 
tribunals  was  largely  neutralized  by  the  added  expense 
and  humiliation.  The  real  justification  of  the  practice 
was  that  it  obviated  the  necessity  of  sending  out  naval 
expeditions. 

In  the  third  place  Athens  took  from  the  allies  lands 
and  settled  them  with  impecunious  Athenians;  but  in 
payment  therefor  reductions  of  tribute  were  given.  On 
the  other  hand,  thousands  from  the  allied  cities  migrated 


ATHENS:   AN    IMPERIAL   DEMOCRACY    73 

to  Athens,  and,  while  not  escaping  military  or  financial 
service,  or  obtaining  Athenian  citizenship,  they  were 
cordially  welcomed,  and  enjoyed  to  the  full  the  commer- 
cial and  industrial  advantages  of  the  metropolis.  Again, 
Athenians  often  found  it  less  profitable  to  invest  capital 
in  Attic  land,  which  was  exposed  to  hostile  attack,  than 
in  lands  on  the  islands  of  the  empire,  which  the  fleet  pro- 
tected. Hence  there  were  many  Attic  farmers  in  the 
subject  territory,  their  right  to  own  foreign  real  estate 
being  secured  by  commercial  treaties.  There  was  accord- 
ingly economic  give  and  take,  the  military  preponder- 
ance of  Athens  being,  however,  responsible  for  the  result 
that  the  Athenians  abroad  were  often  policemen,  the 
allies  in  Athens,  hostages. 

In  all  three  instances  of  alleged  misbehavior,  it  must 
be  admitted  that  the  defense  offered  by  the  Athenian 
apologists  simply  added  insult  to  injury  in  the  view  of 
a  majority  of  the  subjects.  But  for  them  Athens,  arro- 
gant or  conciliatory,  malefactor  or  benefactor,  was  al- 
ways a  foreign  governor  to  be  gotten  rid  of  at  any  cost. 
Such  uncompromising  sentiments  time  alone  could  alter, 
and  to  secure  the  benefits  of  time  Pericles  endeavored  to 
avoid  an  Hellenic  war.  His  policy  of  peace  after  446  B.C. 
was,  therefore,  the  sound  policy  of  an  imperialist. 

The  general  ground  on  which  contemporaries  criti- 
cized the  Athenian  regime  was  that  under  it  every  assist- 
ance was  given  by  the  state  to  the  least  cultivated 
portion  of  the  inhabitants  both  of  Athens  and  of  its 


74  GREEK   IMPERIALISM 

four  hundred  and  twenty  subject  cities,  at  the  expense 
of  the  most  intelligent  and  cultivated  elements;  that  the 
highest  goal  of  endeavor  was  moral  and  intellectual 
mediocrity.  There  may  be  some  truth  in  this  conten- 
tion. The  case  would  be  more  conclusive,  however,  if  the 
tendency  of  the  critics  to  identify  intelligence  with  wealth 
and  cultivation  with  birth  were  less  obvious.  If  the 
point  be  granted,  we  must  accept  the  opinion  of  those 
historians  who  affirm  that  Athens  was  great  in  this  age 
despite,  and  not  because  of,  its  democracy.  Personally, 
I  do  not  believe  that  this  was  so.  I  cannot  admit  that 
extirpation  of  the  best  was  practiced  in  an  age  in  which 
ideas  were  created  and  forms  were  perfected  for  their  lit- 
erary and  artistic  expression  which  have  been  the  wonder 
and  despair  of  the  men  of  the  highest  cultivation  from 
that  day  to  this.  Does  it  not  seem  like  irony  that  a 
regime  is  charged  with  promoting  mediocrity  under  which 
rose  Sophocles,  Herodotus,  Phidias,  Pericles,  Euripides, 
Hippocrates,  Socrates,  and  Thucydides?  Much  more 
important  than  the  leveling  tendency  of  the  democracy 
was  the  facility  it  afforded  for  men  of  ability  both  to  rise 
to  the  top  and  to  find  there  a  sympathetic  and  critical 
audience.  So  much  for  democracy. 

The  empire  stands  approved  by  the  fact  that  the 
sharpest  accusation  now  made  against  the  democracy  is 
that  it  failed  to  make  the  empire  enduring.  On  this  point 
the  last  word  —  unless  it  be  that  no  political  order  has 
ever  been  enduring,  and  that  those  which  have  lasted 


ATHENS:  AN   IMPERIAL   DEMOCRACY    75 

the  longest  have  been  generally  of  the  least  worth  — 
was  said  by  Thucydides  l  over  twenty-three  hundred 
years  ago,  and  I  present  in  conclusion  his  masterly 
account  of  the  circumstances  which  led  to  the  downfall 
of  the  Athenian  Empire :  — 

"During  the  peace  while  Pericles  was  at  the  head  of 
affairs  he  ruled  with  prudence;  under  his  guidance 
Athens  was  safe,  and  reached  the  height  of  her  greatness 
in  his  time.  When  the  war  began,  he  showed  that  here, 
too,  he  had  formed  a  true  estimate  of  the  Athenian  power. 
He  survived  the  commencement  of  hostilities  two  years 
and  six  months;  and,  after  his  death,  his  foresight  was 
even  better  appreciated  than  during  his  life.  For  he  had 
told  the  Athenians  that  if  they  would  be  patient  and 
would  attend  to  their  navy,  and  not  seek  to  enlarge 
their  dominions  while  the  war  was  going  on,  nor  imperil 
the  existence  of  the  city,  they  would  be  victorious;  but 
they  did  all  that  he  told  them  not  to  do,  and  in  matters 
which  seemingly  had  nothing  to  do  with  the  war,  from 
motives  of  private  ambition  and  private  interest  they 
adopted  a  policy  which  had  disastrous  effects  in  respect 
both  of  themselves  and  of  their  allies;  their  measures, 
had  they  been  successful,  would  have  brought  honor  and 
profit  only  to  individuals,  and,  when  unsuccessful,  crip- 
pled the  city  in  the  conduct  of  the  war.  The  reason  of 
the  difference  was  that  he,  deriving  authority  from  his 
capacity  and  acknowledged  worth,  being  also  a  man  of 

1  Thucy.,  11,  65,  5  ff. 


76  GREEK   IMPERIALISM 

transparent  integrity,  was  able  to  control  the  multitude 
in  a  free  spirit;  he  led  them  rather  than  was  led  by  them; 
for,  not  seeking  power  by  dishonest  arts,  he  had  no  need 
to  say  pleasant  things,  but,  on  the  strength  of  his  own 
high  character,  could  venture  to  oppose  and  even  to 
anger  them.  When  he  saw  them  unseasonably  elated 
and  arrogant,  his  words  humbled  and  awed  them;  and 
when  they  were  depressed  by  groundless  fears,  he  sought 
to  reanimate  their  confidence.  Thus  Athens,  though  still 
in  name  a  democracy,  was  in  fact  ruled  by  her  greatest 
citizen.  But  his  successors  were  more  on  an  equality 
with  one  another,  and,  each  struggling  to  be  first  him- 
self, they  were  ready  to  sacrifice  the  whole  conduct  of 
affairs  to  the  whims  of  the  people.  Such  weakness  in  a 
great  and  imperial  city  led  to  many  errors,  of  which  the 
greatest  was  the  Sicilian  expedition ;  not  that  the  Athe- 
nians miscalculated  their  enemy's  power,  but  they  them- 
selves, instead  of  consulting  for  the  interests  of  the 
expedition  which  they  had  sent  out,  were  occupied  in 
intriguing  against  one  another  for  the  leadership  of  the 
democracy,  and  not  only  grew  remiss  in  the  management 
of  the  army,  but  became  embroiled,  for  the  first  time, 
in  civil  strife.  And  yet,  after  they  had  lost  in  the  Sicilian 
expedition  the  greater  part  of  their  fleet  and  army,  and 
were  distracted  by  revolution  at  home,  still  they  held 
out  three  years  not  only  against  their  former  enemies, 
but  against  the  Sicilians  who  had  combined  with  them, 
and  against  most  of  their  own  allies  who  had  risen  in 


ATHENS:  AN   IMPERIAL  DEMOCRACY    77 

revolt.  Even  when  Cyrus,  the  son  of  the  King,  joined 
in  the  war  and  supplied  the  Peloponnesian  fleet  with 
money,  they  continued  to  resist,  and  were  at  last  over- 
thrown, not  by  their  enemies,  but  by  themselves  and 
their  own  internal  dissensions." 

A  summarization  such  as  this,  in  style  austere  and 
authoritative,  in  content  the  product  of  penetrating 
insight  and  wonderful  sense  for  political  realities,  not 
only  bears  witness  to  the  greatness  of  Thucydides;  when 
it  is  contrasted  with  similar  analyses  in  Plato  and  Aris- 
totle it  testifies  to  the  loss  of  power  for  sustained  histori- 
cal thinking  which  Greece  suffered  when  men  of  genius 
were  no  longer  enriched  by  the  experience  which  came 
through  living  in  a  state  like  the  imperial  democracy  of 
Athens.  Not  the  least  of  its  merits  is  its  self-restraint. 
Having  concluded  that  the  reckless  rivalries  of  her  would- 
be  leaders  and  the  reckless  dissensions  of  her  citizens 
ruined  Athens,  he  refrains  from  assigning  a  cause  for  the 
spirit  of  lawlessness.  It  is  not  Thucydides,  but  Alcibia- 
des,  who  declared  that  democracy  was  "  manifest  folly  " ; 
not  he,  but  Cleon,  who  reiterated  that  "a  democracy 
cannot  manage  an  empire."  Thucydides  does  not  de- 
spair of  democracy.  In  the  case  of  Athens  it  was  less  the 
unsoundness  of  the  "majority"  than  the  selfishness  of 
the  "remnant"  that  caused  the  nation  to  perish.  For 
the  demoralization  of  their  leaders,  however,  the  Athe- 
nians themselves  held  Socrates  responsible,  meaning  to 
incriminate  the  Sophistic  movement.  Who  shall  say  that 


78  GREEK   IMPERIALISM 

they  were  wrong?   And  who  shall  hold  democracy  re- 
sponsible for  the  evils  of  the  Sophistic  movement? 

SELECT   BIBLIOGRAPHY 

1.  WlLAMOWITZ-MoELLENDORFF,     UlRICH     VON.        Votl     deS 

attischen  Retches  Herrlichkeit  (1877).    In  Reden  und  Vor- 
trage,  pp.  27  ff. 

2.  Jebb,  R.  C.    The  Age  of  Pericles  (1889).    In  Essays  and 
Addresses,  pp.  104^. 

3.  Meyer,  Eduard.    Geschichte  des  Altertums,  iv  (1901). 

4.  WlLAMOWITZ-MOELLENDORFF,     ULRICH    VON.      Staat    Ufld 

Gesellschaft  der  Griechen  (1910):  C.   Die  athenische  Demo- 
kratie,  pp.  95  ff. 

5.  Zimmern,  Alfred.   The  Greek  Commonivealth  (191 1). 

6.  Cavaignac,  E.   Histoire  de  VAntiquite,  11:  Athlnes  (480- 
330),  (1912). 


Ill 

FROM   SPARTA  TO  ARISTOTLE 

A  curious  legend  about  the  Spartans  arose  in  the  age 
that  followed  the  conquest  of  Persia  by  Alexander  the 
Great.  It  was  then  reported  that  they  were  the  kinsmen 
of  the  Jews.  According  to  one  version  of  the  story, 
Judaea  was  founded  by  a  Spartan  named  Judaeus,  who 
had  accompanied  the  god  Dionysus  from  Thebes  on  his 
triumphal  progress  through  Asia.  According  to  another 
account,  the  Spartans  were  descendants  of  Abraham,  the 
strongest  of  the  children  of  Israel  having  migrated  to 
Greece  at  the  time  Moses  led  the  remainder  out  of  Egypt 
to  the  land  of  Canaan.1 

This  absurd  legend,  of  which  the  Greek  origin  is 
unmistakable,  seems  to  have  been  responsible  for  a  cer- 
tain rapprochement  between  the  two  peoples.  Despite 
the  first  book  of  the  Maccabees,  which  affirms  the  con- 
trary, it  is,  indeed,  impossible  that  Areus  I,  king  of 
Sparta  between  308  and  264  B.C.,  wrote  to  Onias  I, 
Jewish  high  priest,  demanding  and  offering  a  commu- 
nity of  goods,  and  that  Jonathan  Maccabaeus,  one  hun- 
dred and  fifty  years  afterwards,  sent  greetings  to  the 
Spartans,  together  with  the  word  that  the  Jews  "at  all 

1  Schiirer,  Geschichte  des  jiidischen  Volkes  im  Zeitalter  Jesu  Christi,  I  * 
(1901),  pp.  236/.  See  notes. 


80  GREEK   IMPERIALISM 

times  without  ceasing  both  in  their  feasts  and  other  con- 
venient days  remembered  them  in  the  sacrifices  which 
they  offered,  and  in  their  prayers,  as  reason  was,  and 
as  it  becameth  them  to  think  upon  their  brethren."1 
Nothing  is  more  unlikely  than  that  the  Spartans  volun- 
teered to  divide  their  "cattle"  and  property  with  the 
Jews  only  a  short  time  before  they  crushed  with  great 
bloodshed  a  communistic  movement  among  their  own 
citizens,  unless  it  be  the  thought  that  the  prayers  and 
offerings  of  the  Jews  went  up  continually  to  Jehovah  for 
the  prosperity  of  heathen  who  were  also  backsliders. 
Nevertheless,  that  communications  were  actually  estab- 
lished between  the  Judaea  of  Onias  and  Jonathan  and 
the  Sparta  of  Areus  and  Menalcidas,  we  cannot  doubt; 
and,  indeed,  we  have  still  other  evidences  that  the  alleged 
community  of  origin  was  turned  to  account  by  the  Jews. 
There  was  evidently  a  considerable  Jewish  settlement  in 
Sparta. 

When  we  seek  to  discover  the  reason  for  this  strange 
conjunction  of  the  warrior  community  by  the  Eurotas 
and  the  religious  community  by  the  Jordan,  we  are 
helped  by  observing  that  in  another  Hellenistic  legend 
the  Jews  are  made  the  kinsmen  of  the  gymnosophists,  or 
naked  philosophers,  of  India.  The  Greek  mind  was  at 
this  time  fascinated  by  the  great  problem  of  subordinat- 
ing the  species  of  things  to  their  proper  genera,  of  per- 
ceiving the  types  by  means  of  which  individual  objects 
1  i  Mace,  xii,  ii. 


FROM   SPARTA  TO  ARISTOTLE  81 

became  intelligible  parts  of  a  cosmos.  It  was  the  age  of 
Aristotle  and  Theophrastus,  Menander  and  the  New 
Comedy,  of  idealistic  portraiture.  Hence  the  temptation 
was  irresistible  to  bring  into  family  relationship  the 
various  societies  of  men  in  which  the  principle  of  caste 
dominated ;  to  regard  it  as  unessential  that  in  Judaea  the 
people  were  there  to  support  the  priests,  in  Laconia  to 
support  the  soldiers,  in  India  to  support  the  Brahmans. 
In  each  case  there  was  found  an  odd  community,  in 
which,  so  far  at  least  as  the  state  could  accomplish  it,  all 
human  interests  were  subordinated  to  one,  be  it  war  and 
preparation  for  war,  religious  practices  of  a  ritualistic 
character,  or  theosophical  speculation. 

Had  the  Greeks  known  it,  there  was  a  further  analogy 
of  an  external  sort  between  the  Spartans  and  the  Jews 
which  they  would  have  delighted  to  establish.  For  at 
about  the  same  time  that  a  richly  diversified  national 
life  was  narrowed  down  in  Judaea  to  a  single  interest 
under  the  stress  of  complete  preoccupation  with  the 
means  of  regaining  Jehovah's  favor  for  his  chosen  people, 
Sparta  ruthlessly  compressed  and  crushed  a  many-sided 
and  progressive  culture  to  the  end  that  her  citizens  might 
become  trained  soldiers,  having  but  one  esprit,  the  esprit 
de  corps  of  a  professional  army. 

Prior  to  580  B.C.  Sparta  was  the  home  of  poets  and  mu- 
sicians. It  was  for  a  chorus  of  Spartan  maidens,  the  elite 
of  the  noble  families,  that  Alcman  wrote  the  exquisite 
lines  on  the  breathless  calm  of  nature  which  Goethe  has 


82  GREEK   IMPERIALISM 

made  familiar  to  all  lovers  of  poetry.  In  hollow  Lacedae- 
mon  —  a  valley  rich  with  vegetation  suggestive  of  boun- 
tiful harvests,  down  which  the  steel-gray  Eurotas  runs, 
swift  and  turbulent,  over  its  rocky  bottom,  and  over 
which  rise  on  either  side  the  snow-capped  ridges  of 
Taygetus  and  Parnon,  their  slopes  resonant  with  the 
songs  of  the  nightingales  in  the  mating  season  —  in  this 
secluded  spot,  whose  haunting  beauty  is  a  joy  forever  to 
all  who  have  seen  it,  there  was  reared  a  famous  temple 
of  Athena,  "Athena  of  the  Brazen  House,"  at  a  time 
when  in  Athens  itself  the  city's  protecting  goddess  had 
to  be  content  with  a  crude,  primitive  sanctuary. 

All  this,  and  much  besides,  was  observed,  and  the 
proper  inferences  drawn,  by  Eduard  Meyer  twenty 
years  ago;1  so  that  the  amazement  with  which  the 
English  archaeologists,  who  have  excavated  in  Laconia 
during  the  past  five  or  six  years,  report  their  remarkable 
"finds"  is  a  source  of  no  little  amusement  to  the  wary. 
They  have  discovered  that  prior  to  580  B.C.  Sparta  was 
the  maker  of  a  kind  of  artistic  pottery  which  was  known 
and  imitated  in  far-distant  Cyrene  and  Tarentum;  that 
she  then  had  trade  relations  with  Egypt  and  Lydia; 
that  "combs,  toilet-boxes,  elaborate  pins  and  bronze 
ornaments,  seals,  necklaces,  and  gold  and  ivory  gew- 
gaws" were  made  and  used — witnesses  for  "a.  golden 
age  of  Spartan  art,"  against  the  puritanical  spirit  tra- 
ditionally attributed  to  early  and  middle  Sparta.2 

1  Geschichte  des  Altertums,  II >  (1893),  pp.  562/. 

»  Dickins,  Journal  of  Hellenic  Studies,  xxxn  (1912),  p.  12. 


FROM  SPARTA  TO  ARISTOTLE  83 

In  Athens,  as  we  have  seen,  supremacy  in  art  and 
literature  was  attained  by  making  universal  among 
citizens  the  spirit  and  culture  of  the  aristocracy,  the 
whole  people,  thus  ennobled,  being  supported  on  the 
shoulders  of  the  tributary  allies  and  enriched  by  the 
commercial  advantages  of  maritime  empire.  The  devel- 
opment of  Sparta  was  directly  the  reverse  of  this.  There 
the  aristocracy,  whose  exuberance  of  life  and  responsive- 
ness to  sensuous  impressions  are  attested  with  sufficient 
certainty,  was  destroyed  in  the  sixth  century  B.C. 

This  century  was  one  of  repression  in  Greece  gener- 
ally; whence  some  historians  have  called  it  the  epoch 
of  the  Greek  Reformation.  It  is  the  time  of  the  "Seven 
Wise  Men,"  from  one  of  whom  came  the  Delphian  motto 
"nothing  in  excess,"  a  time  in  which  the  riotous  joy 
of  living  and  the  fresh  spontaneity  of  the  so-called  Ionian 
Renascence  were  subdued  by  a  force,  which  might  have 
been  everywhere  a  blight,  —  as  in  Sparta,  —  but  which 
in  fact,  when  later  the  inspiration  of  the  great  Persian 
War  came,  exerted  the  gentle  restraint  which  marks 
the  classic  in  Greek  art  and  letters.  In  this  perilous 
period  the  aristocracy  of  Sparta  perished,  and  with  it 
the  ideals  and  accomplishments  of  which  it  had  been 
the  exponent. 

The  instrument  of  repression  of  all  that  was  superior 
to  the  average  in  Spartan  life  was  the  college  of  the  five 
ephors,  which  Cicero  compares  with  the  tribunate  in 
Rome.  The  ephors  acquired  such  power  that  they  made 


84  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

the  continuance  of  even  the  kingship  dependent  upon 
the  submission  of  the  kings  to  their  authority ;  and  upon 
the  kings,  as  upon  all  others,  they  enforced  the  new 
rules  of  law  of  which  they  were  the  living  expositors. 

The  development  of  Sparta,  like  the  development  of 
Rome,  from  aristocratic  to  republican  government  is 
characterized  by  the  absence  of  tyrants.  The  fact  is  that 
the  tribunate  in  the  one  case  and  the  ephorate  in  the 
other  was  tyranny  in  commission,  the  division  of  its 
powers  between  ten  and  five  annually  changing  officers 
respectively  having  proved  to  be  a  sufficient  safeguard 
against  the  concentration  of  executive  power  in  the 
person  of  a  single  individual,  be  he  an  inherited  king 
robbed  of  monarchical  rights  or  an  ambitious  demagogue 
aiming  at  their  restoration. 

The  new  rules  of  law  which  the  ephors  enforced  pre- 
scribed in  minute  detail  the  life  of  the  citizen  from  the 
moment  of  his  birth  to  the  time  of  his  death.  They 
were  the  regulations  of  a  military  school  in  which  war 
alone  was  taught,  of  military  barracks  when  war  was 
already  declared.  From  seven  years  of  age  to  sixty 
the  entire  energies  of  the  male  half  of  the  population 
were  directed  toward  being  prepared  for  war.  Boys 
and  men  drilled  and  hunted,  learned  to  use  their  weap- 
ons and  campaigned,  danced  and  exercised,  ate  in 
the  "messes"  year  in  and  year  out,  and  never  escaped 
the  watchful  eyes  of  trainers,  subalterns,  officers,  and 
ephors. 


FROM  SPARTA  TO  ARISTOTLE  85 

No  one  in  Sparta  had  to  make  his  own  way  in  life. 
His  whole  course  was  mapped  out  for  him  before  he  was 
born.  No  citizen  had  any  business  cares;  for  all  trade 
and  industry  were  tabooed,  and  the  lands  which  he  in- 
herited he  could  not  sell.  Neither  could  he  buy  those 
of  another.  The  agricultural  laborers  were  serfs,  the 
sullen  and  recalcitrant  Helots,  of  whom  there  were 
fifteen  to  every  Spartan ;  the  clothing  and  weapons  were 
made  by  the  contented  and  tractable  Perioecs,  who 
outnumbered  the  Spartans  five  to  one,  and  formed  with 
their  one  hundred  hamlets  and  their  contiguous  terri- 
tories an  insulating  band  round  Helots  and  Spartans 
alike.  Iron  money  was  the  only  local  currency,  though 
silver  had,  of  course,  to  be  given  in  payment  for  the 
articles  which  were  imported  from  abroad.  These,  how- 
ever, were  reduced  to  a  minimum,  and  such  foreigners 
as  made  their  way  through  the  wall  of  Perioecs  were 
rounded  up  at  intervals  and  forcefully  expelled. 

All  the  pretty  things  of  their  earlier  life,  the  Spartans 
chose  to  do  without.  Coarse  fare  and  unlovely  houses, 
piazzas  devoid  of  statues  and  inclosed  in  unsightly  and 
flimsy  public  buildings;  no  theatres,  no  new  music,  no 
new  ideas  of  any  kind ;  mothers  who  gave  up  their  little 
children  and  their  grown  sons  without  flinching;  wives 
who  violated  fundamental  instincts  that  their  offspring 
might  be  more  perfect;  homeless  boys  who  went  half- 
naked  winter  and  summer,  slept  in  pens  in  the  open  air 
like  cattle  and  got  their  food  and  living  by  their  wits; 


86  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

girls  who  would  hardly  have  known  their  brothers, 
brides  who  would  hardly  have  recognized  their  husbands, 
mothers  who  would  hardly  have  been  able  to  distinguish 
their  own  sons,  were  it  not  that  there  were  less  than  five 
thousand  brothers,  husbands,  and  sons  in  all  —  of 
such  was  the  new  Sparta,  to  whose  citizens  the  ephors 
issued  the  annual  command  "to  shave  their  mustaches 
and  obey  the  laws."  Long-haired  and  tangly-bearded, 
in  groups  of  about  fifteen  each,  they  lounged  and  ate 
and  slept  in  the  three  hundred  tents,  or  barracks,  which 
lined  Hyacinth  Street.  There  they  kept  their  long 
spears  and  their  armor.1  Thence,  clad  in  their  scarlet 
cloaks,  they  issued  in  time  of  danger  or  of  war  to  take 
their  places,  group  by  group,  in  the  five  carefully  drilled 
regiments  of  which  the  Spartan  phalanx  was  composed. 
Quietly,  at  an  appointed  hour  in  a  single  night,  the 
whole  army  might  steal  away  without  confusion,  trail- 
ing after  it,  on  occasion,  thirty-five  thousand  Helots 
to  attend  to  the  commissariat.  Five  thousand  Perioec 
hoplites  might  follow  at  its  heels,  and  with  machine-like 
precision,  to  the  sound  of  flutes  played  in  the  austere 
Dorian  mode,  ten  thousand  Lacedaemonian  soldiers 
might  advance  into  battle  against  foemen  who  were 
always  comparatively  ill-organized,  and  who  often  fled 
before  a  single  blow  was  struck. 

The  secret  of  this  strange  perversion  of  the  natural 
life  of  man  is  to  be  found  in  the  declaration  of  war 

1  Schoemann-Lipsius,  Griechische  AUerthiimer,  *  I  (1897),  pp.  261  ff. 


FROM  SPARTA  TO  ARISTOTLE  87 

annually  made  by  the  ephors  upon  the  Helots.  They 
could  not  follow  it  up  by  a  campaign  waged  in  regular 
fashion ;  for  that  would  have  been  to  destroy  their  own 
serfs.  But  they  picked  out  young  soldiers,  and  sent 
them  about  among  the  Helots,  with  instructions  to 
strike  down  secretly  all  who  seemed  restless  or  over- 
ambitious.  The  chief  centre  of  Helot  disaffection,  at 
least  in  the  seventh  and  sixth  centuries  B.C.,  was  on  the 
far  side  of  Mount  Taygetus,  in  Messenia.  There  the 
yoke  of  serfdom  chafed  more  than  elsewhere,  not  least 
because  those  whose  estates  the  Helots  of  Messenia 
tilled  for  one  half  the  yield  lived  beyond  the  snow- 
capped ridge  which  shuts  in  that  country  on  the  east. 
The  Messenians  aspired  to  regain  their  lost  independ- 
ence. The  Helots  of  the  Eurotas  Valley  had  no  such 
ambition.  They  were,  therefore,  slower  to  revolt  against 
injustice;  but  their  aim,  when  an  insurrection  did  come, 
could  be  nothing  less  than  the  extermination  of  their 
masters,  or  at  least  an  exchange  of  position  with  them. 
Moreover,  their  very  proximity  to  the  five  villages 
which  constituted  the  unwalled  city  of  Sparta,  and  the 
very  weight  of  their  numbers  made  the  Spartans  live 
in  ever-present  fear  of  a  massacre.  Constant  prepared- 
ness for  war  was,  accordingly,  a  simple  mandate  of  self- 
preservation. 

The  Spartans  thought  it  unwise  that  any  of  their  serf- 
tilled  estates  should  lie  in  or  outside  the  ring  of  Pericec 


88  GREEK   IMPERIALISM 

land.  It  would  not  do  to  have  fuses,  so  to  speak,  of 
Helots  running  through  the  wall  to  the  outside  world, 
or  to  have  masses  of  Helots  beyond  the  wall,  exposed 
directly  to  foreign  manipulation.  Hence  the  formation 
of  the  Pericec  ring  set  definite  limits  to  the  territory  of 
Sparta.  It  could  be  enlarged  in  but  one  way  —  the 
widening  of  the  ring  by  the  reduction  of  more  and  more 
outlying  states  to  the  status  of  Pericecs.  And  it  was  in 
this  way  that  the  Spartan  dominions  were  in  fact 
enlarged  in  the  seventh  century  B.C.1 

At  the  end  of  this  century,  however,  Sparta  came 
into  conflict  with  cities  which,  unlike  the  mountain  and 
maritime  hamlets  situated  roundabout  Laconia  and 
Messenia,  were  too  strong  and  high-spirited  to  submit 
to  Spartan  control.  They  had,  therefore,  to  be  treated 
leniently,  since  Sparta  could  not  crush  them  altogether 
and  would  not  leave  them  alone.  And  the  reasons  for 
conciliatory  action  were  strengthened  by  the  fact  that 
Sparta  had  now  to  act  abroad  with  a  sharp  eye  to  the 
possibility  of  a  servile  insurrection  at  home.  There  was 
never  anything  mechanical  or  idealistic  in  the  foreign 
policy  of  the  ephors.  Hence,  first  with  Tegea  at  about 
560  B.C.,  and  thereafter  with  all  the  states  in  the  Pelo- 
ponnesus, excepting  Argos  and  Achaea,  Sparta  con- 
cluded a  treaty,  the  imperialistic  aspect  of  which  was 
that  they  agreed  individually  to  accept  Sparta's  leader- 

1  See  particularly  Niese,  op.  cit.  in  Select  Bibliography  at  end  of  chap- 
ter. 


FROM  SPARTA  TO  ARISTOTLE  89 

ship  in  all  defensive  wars  and  in  offensive  wars  to  which 
they  had  assented. 

The  Peloponnesian  league,  thus  formed,  stood  for 
the  autonomy  and  freedom  of  its  members;  but  Sparta, 
by  championing  aristocracies  against  tyrants  and  de- 
mocracies, and  using  to  its  own  advantage  the  jealous- 
ies of  its  allies  as  well  as  their  fears  of  outside  powers, 
dominated  it  for  one  hundred  and  eighty  years,  and 
made  it  during  all  that  time  the  main  steadying  influ- 
ence in  Greek  politics.  Twice  it  was  enlarged  into  an 
Hellenic  league,  first  during  the  three  years  of  the  great 
Persian  invasion  (480-478  B.C.),  and  again  for  ten  years 
after  the  dissolution  of  the  Athenian  empire  (405- 
395  B.C.).  On  the  earlier  occasion,  the  ephors  felt 
relieved  of  an  intolerable  burden  when  in  477  B.C.  the 
^Egean  cities,  over  four  hundred  and  twenty  in  number, 
abandoned  Spartan  for  Athenian  leadership.  And  in  the 
forty-six  years  that  followed,  not  they  but  the  Athenians 
were  the  aggressors.  During  that  epoch  of  democratic 
fervor,1  it  was  an  uphill  struggle  for  the  champions  of 
aristocracy  to  maintain  their  position;  and  the  war  of 
political  principles  was  even  carried  into  Sparta,  when, 
in  464  B.C.,  the  Helots  of  Messenia  made  a  last  desperate 
fight  for  their  liberty.  The  Spartans  profited,  however, 
during  the  last  third  of  the  fifth  century  B.C.,  by  the 
discredit  into  which  democracy  came  among  cultivated 
people  through  the  mistakes  and  excesses  of  Athens; 

1  Beloch,  Griechische  Ceschichte,  I  (1893),  pp.  439  ff. 


90  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

and  at  the  end  of  the  Peloponnesian  War  they  were 
again  able  to  make  the  Peloponnesian  league  an  Hel- 
lenic league  by  incorporating  into  it  Athens  and  the 
JEgean  cities  which  they  had  just  "liberated"  from 
Athenian  tyranny. 

A  successful  war  may  strengthen  a  nation,  but  not 
when  victory  lays  upon  it  a  task  that  is  beyond  its 
powers  to  perform.  Such  would  have  been  the  case  had 
Athens  won  at  Syracuse.  Such  was  the  issue  of  ^Egos- 
potami.  This  we  can  readily  see  by  examining  briefly, 
first  the  situation  in  Sparta,  and  then  the  position  of 
Sparta  in  Hellas,  during  the  existence  of  her  second 
Hellenic  league. 

The  Spartans  of  military  age  now  numbered  only 
about  two  thousand.  War  had  done  its  part  in  reducing 
them  to  this  handful.  Close  intermarriage  had  done  even 
more.  In  the  case  of  large  families,  the  subdivision  of 
lots  which  then  occurred  impoverished  sons  so  greatly 
that  they  could  no  longer  stand  the  expense  of  the  mil- 
itary clubs,  upon  membership  in  which,  however,  citi- 
zenship depended.  So  far  did  the  evil  implicit  in  this 
condition  go  that  brothers  refused  to  divide  their  in- 
heritance, and  possessed  not  only  one  house,  but  one 
wife  in  common.  Men  could  neither  buy  land  nor  sell 
it,  but  they  might  acquire  it  by  marriage  or  by  gift;  and 
since  the  rich,  then  as  always,  tended  to  marry  among 
themselves,  property,  and  with  it  citizenship,  remained 
eventually  in  the  possession  of  a  very  few.   Much  of  the 


FROM   SPARTA  TO  ARISTOTLE  91 

land,  which  was  the  only  wealth,  came  into  the  hands 
of  women.  A  plutocracy  thus  developed  in  Sparta  as 
the  number  of  the  Spartans  diminished ;  and  in  this  way 
the  domestic  situation  became  still  further  ominous  by 
the  growth  in  the  city  of  a  considerable  body  of  disfran- 
chised and  discontented  "inferiors"  and  half-breeds. 

The  perils  which  attended  this  situation  are  revealed 
by  the  following  incident  as  described  by  Xenophon  in 
his  Hellenica: l  — 

"Now  Agesilaus  (401-360  B.C.)  had  not  been  seated 
on  the  throne  one  year  when,  as  he  sacrificed  one  of  the 
appointed  sacrifices  in  behalf  of  the  city,  the  soothsayer 
warned  him,  saying:  'The  gods  reveal  a  conspiracy  of 
the  most  fearful  character' ;  and  when  the  king  sacrificed 
a  second  time,  he  said : '  The  aspect  of  the  victims  is  now 
even  yet  more  terrible ' ;  but  when  he  had  sacrificed  for 
the  third  time,  the  soothsayer  exclaimed :  '  O  Agesilaus, 
the  sign  is  given  to  me,  even  as  though  we  were  in  the 
very  midst  of  the  enemy.'  Thereupon  they  sacrificed  to 
the  deities  who  avert  evil  and  work  salvation,  and  so 
barely  obtained  good  omens,  and  ceased  sacrificing. 
Nor  had  five  days  elapsed  after  the  sacrifices  were  ended, 
ere  one  came  bringing  information  to  the  ephors  of  a 
conspiracy,  and  named  Cinadon  as  the  ringleader;  a 
young  man  robust  of  body  as  of  soul,  but  not  one  of  the 
peers.  Accordingly,  the  ephors  questioned  their  inform- 
ant: '  How  say  you  the  occurrence  is  to  take  place? '  and 

1  in,  3.4  #• 


92  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

he  who  gave  the  information  answered :  '  Cinadon  took 
me  to  the  limit  of  the  market-place,  and  bade  me  count 
how  many  Spartans  there  were  in  the  market-place ;  and 
I  counted  —  king,  and  ephors,  and  elders,  and  others, 
maybe  forty.   But  tell  me,  Cinadon,  I  said  to  him,  why 
have  you  bidden  me  count  them?  and  he  answered  me :  Those 
men,  I  would  have  you  know,  are  your  sworn  foes;  and  all 
those  others,  more  than  jour  thousand,  congregated  there  are 
your  natural  allies.  Then  he  took  and  showed  me  in  the 
streets,  here  one  and  there  two  of  our  enemies,  as  we 
chanced  to  come  across  them,  and  all  the  rest  our  natural 
allies;  and  so  again  running  through  the  list  of  Spartans 
to  be  found  in  the  country  districts,  he  still  kept  harp- 
ing on  that  string :  Look  you,  on  each  estate  one  foeman  — 
the  master  —  and  all  the  rest  allies  ! '   The  ephors  asked : 
1  How  many  do  you  reckon  are  in  the  secret  of  the  mat- 
ter?'  The  informant  answered:  'On  that  point  also  he 
gave  me  to  understand  that  there  were  by  no  means 
many  in  their  secret  who  were  prime  movers  of  the  affair, 
but  those  few  to  be  depended  on;  and  to  make  up,  said 
he,  we  ourselves  are  in  their  secret,  all  the  rest  of  them  — 
Helots,  enfranchised,  inferiors,  Pericecs,  one  and  all.  Note 
their  demeanor  when  Spartans  chance  to  be  the  topic  of 
their  talk.   None  of  them  can  conceal  the  delight  it  would 
give  him  if  he  might  eat  up  every  Spartan  raw.1  Then,  as 
the  inquiry  went  on,  the  question  came : '  And  where  did 
they  propose  to  find  arms?'  The  answer  followed: 'He 
explained  that  those  of  us,  of  course,  who  are  enrolled  in 


FROM   SPARTA  TO  ARISTOTLE  93 

regiments  have  arms  of  our  own  already,  and  as  for  the 
mass  —  he  led  the  way  to  the  war  foundry,  and  showed 
me  scores  and  scores  of  knives,  of  swords,  of  spits,  hatch- 
ets, and  axes,  and  reaping  hooks.  Anything  or  everything, 
he  told  me,  which  men  use  to  delve  in  the  earth,  cut  timber, 
or  quarry  stone,  would  serve  our  purpose;  nay,  the  instru- 
ments used  for  other  arts  would  in  nine  cases  out  of  ten  fur- 
nish weapons  enough  and  to  spare,  especially  in  dealing 
with  unarmed  antagonists.''  Once  more  being  asked  what 
time  the  affair  was  to  come  off,  he  replied  his  orders 
were  not  to  leave  the  city." 

The  ephors,  wishing  to  remove  Cinadon  from  Sparta 
without  suspicion,  sent  him  on  a  mission  to  Aulon.  He 
was  to  arrest  certain  persons,  and  among  them  "a 
woman,  the  fashionable  beauty  of  the  place  —  supposed 
to  be  the  arch-corruptress  of  all  Lacedaemonians,  young 
and  old,  who  visited  Aulon."  His  escort  seized  him  in- 
stead and  wrested  from  him  the  names  of  his  accom- 
plices. "  His  fate  was  to  be  taken  out  forthwith  in  irons, 
just  as  he  was,  and  to  be  placed  with  his  two  hands  and 
his  neck  in  the  collar,  and  so  under  scourge  and  goad  to 
be  driven,  himself  and  his  accomplices,  round  the  city. 
Thus  upon  the  heads  of  those,"  concludes  the  pious 
Xenophon,  "was  visited  the  penalty  of  their  offense." 

Beset  with  dangers  such  as  this,  the  Spartans  had  to 
tread  warily.  They  drafted  Pericecs  into  their  army  so  as 
to  make  it  about  fifty-six  hundred  strong.  They  picked 


94  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

out  Helots,  trained  and  emancipated  them,  and  used 
them  abroad  as  soldiers.  They  took  mercenaries  into 
their  service  and  distributed  them  according  to  local 
needs  under  Spartan  captains,  acting  always,  however, 
on  requests  from  local  governments.  They  got  large  con- 
tingents of  troops  from  their  old  allies,  whom,  however, 
they  left  free  of  tribute,  financing  their  government  with 
a  thousand  talents  raised  annually  from  the  former  allies 
of  Athens.  With  the  funds  thus  secured  they  hired 
rowers  and  marines  for  the  warships  which  their  allies 
furnished  and  thus  patrolled  the  sea  as  well  as  the  land. 
They  got  a  moral  mandate  for  empire  by  upholding 
everywhere  aristocracy,  real  or  sham,  against  democ- 
racy, and  by  assuming  the  r61e  of  champion  of  Greece 
against  the  barbarians.  This  did  not  prevent  them, 
however,  from  forming  an  alliance  with  Dionysius  I,1 
who  had  just  made  himself  tyrant  of  Syracuse,  or  from 
working  in  harmony  with  Persia  as  long  as  that  was 
possible. 

"The  growth  of  Lacedaemon,"  said  Timolaus  of  Cor- 
inth2 in  394  B.C.,  "seems  to  me  just  like  that  of  some 
mighty  river  —  at  its  sources  small  and  easily  crossed, 
but  as  it  further  and  further  advances,  other  rivers  dis- 
charge themselves  into  its  channel,  and  its  stream  grows 

1  The  successive  tyrannies  in  Syracuse  and  the  empires  of  Syracuse  over 
the  West  Greeks  have  been  omitted  of  necessity  in  this  book.  They  have 
been  examined  with  particular  care  by  Freeman  in  his  History  of  Sicily  and 
with  particular  sympathy  by  Beloch  in  his  Griechische  Geschichte. 

*  Xenophon,  Hellenica,  IV,  2,  1 1  ff. 


FROM   SPARTA  TO  ARISTOTLE  95 

ever  more  formidable.  So  it  is  with  the  Lacedaemonians. 
Take  them  at  the  starting-point  and  they  are  but  a  single 
community,  but  as  they  advance  and  attach  city  after 
city  they  grow  more  numerous  and  more  resistless.  I 
observe  that  when  people  wish  to  take  wasps'  nests  — 
if  they  try  to  capture  the  creatures  on  the  wing,  they  are 
liable  to  be  attacked  by  half  the  hive;  whereas,  if  they 
apply  fire  to  them  ere  they  leave  their  homes,  they  will 
master  them  without  scathe  themselves.  On  this  princi- 
ple, I  think  it  best  to  bring  about  the  battle  within  the 
hive  itself,  or,  short  of  that,  as  close  to  Lacedaemon  as 
possible." 

The  advice  was  sound;  but  the  wasps  could  not  be 
caught  at  home.  It  was  not  till  Athens  had  beaten  the 
Spartans  at  sea,  and  Thebes  had  beaten  them  on  land, 
that  Epaminondas  reached  the  hive.  He  then  broke  up 
the  Peloponnesian  league,  emancipated  the  Helots  of 
Messenia,  and  substituted,  for  the  once  considerable 
power  which  had  saved  the  Peloponnesus  from  serious 
attack  for  two  hundred  years,  a  multitude  of  little  city- 
states  such  as  existed  elsewhere  in  Greece  —  rather, 
such  as  came  to  exist  elsewhere  in  European  Greece,  when, 
a  few  years  later,  with  Epaminondas's  death,  the  su- 
premacy of  Thebes  ceased,  Athens  was  abandoned  by 
the  states  which  had  joined  her  against  Sparta,  and  the 
empire  of  Dionysius  I  in  the  west  dissolved,  shortly 
after  his  death,  into  its  constituent  parts. 

Theoretically,  conditions  should  then  have  been  ideal. 


\ 


96  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

In  the  case  of  the  Greeks  the  deep-seated  human  instinct 
to  compare  the  present  disadvantageously  with  the  past 
was  not  checked  by  a  theory  of  evolution  conceived  as 
progress,  such  as  misleads  many  sensible  people  nowa- 
days to  imagine  that  the  farther  back  they  go  the  more 
rudimentary  political  and  social  conditions  become.  The 
golden  age  of  the  Greeks  lay  in  "  the  dark  backward  and 
abysm  of  time."  In  early  days,  before  the  rise  of  the 
Spartan  and  Athenian  empires,  every  city,  so  it  was 
believed,  had  "lived  in  peace,  free  and  autonomous,  and 
in  secure  possession  of  its  own  territory."  For  more  than 
a  century  men  had  struggled  to  bring  back  those  blessed 
times,  and  now  at  length  their  efforts,  it  might  have 
seemed,  had  been  crowned  with  success.  Every  city  in 
Greece,  great  and  small,  had  apparently  regained  its 
liberty  and  autonomy. 

At  the  same  time  men  had  made  a  persistent  effort  to 
reestablish  in  each  city  "  the  constitution  of  the  fathers," 
and  under  the  Spartan  hegemony  the  favorable  oppor- 
tunity for  success  in  this  campaign  had  seemingly  come. 
But  it  then  appeared  that,  apart  from  the  general  under- 
standing that  citizenship  was  to  be  reserved  to  those  who 
could  afford  to  pay  taxes  and  provide  themselves  with 
the  arms  and  knowledge  of  arms  necessary  for  fighting, 
no  two  persons  agreed  as  to  what  the  "ancestral  consti- 
tution" was.  It  proved  to  be  in  reality  the  ideal  of  each 
reformer  and  each  politician,  and  since  the  age  was  one 
in  which  most  of  the  ordinary  restraints  were  lacking  as 


FROM   SPARTA  TO  ARISTOTLE  97 

they  seldom  are  in  the  history  of  civilized  man,  the  tran- 
sition from  an  unpopular  ideal  to  a  conspiracy  was  apt 
to  be  singularly  abrupt.  The  outcome  of  the  attempts 
to  restore  the  urban  particularism  of  mediaeval  Greece 
and  the  constitutions  of  the  over-praised  olden  time  was 
unsatisfactory  to  everybody.  Barren  wars  of  city  against 
city  instead  of  large  enterprises  directed  by  imperial 
ambitions;  an  atmosphere  murky  with  plots  and  coun- 
ter-plots, where  once  there  had  blown  the  strong  wind  of 
steady  civic  progress;  and,  in  addition,  national  disaster 
and  humiliation  despite  manifest  military  superiority  — 
these  were  the  bitter  fruits  of  political  reaction  in  Greece 
during  the  Spartan  supremacy. 

It  was  in  this  unhappy  age  that  the  science  of  govern- 
ment was  born,  and  it  bears  its  birthmark  to  the  present 
day.  The  midwife,  to  use  his  own  homely  figure,  was 
Socrates,  whom  the  Athenians,  tarred  on  by  Aristoph- 
anes, put  to  death  "  for  corrupting  the  youth  and  intro- 
ducing strange  gods."  He,  of  course,  denied  the  accusa- 
tions, and  claimed  that  he  deserved  the  honors  of  a  public 
benefactor  for  taking  men  individually  and  showing  to 
them  how  ill  they  understood  the  virtues  on  which 
all  societies  are  based,  to  wit,  justice,  wisdom,  temper- 
ance, and  courage.  No  one,  he  thought,  could  make 
them  better  citizens  except  by  promoting  truth  and  dis- 
pelling ignorance  about  these  things.  His  execution  con- 
secrated his  mission.  It  was  the  sowing  of  dragon's  teeth 


98  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

from  which  sprang  up  armed  warriors,  of  whom  the  most 

doughty  were  Plato  and  Aristotle. 

The  vice  of  the  Socratic  school  was  a  noble  one  —  an 
enormous  overestimate  of  the  value  of  education.  ' '  Truth 
is  the  beginning  of  every  good  thing,"  says  Plato,1  "both 
to  gods  and  men;  and  he  who  would  be  blessed  and 
happy,  should  be  from  the  first  a  partaker  of  the  truth, 
that  he  may  live  a  true  man  as  long  as  possible,  for  then 
he  can  be  trusted;  but  he  is  not  to  be  trusted  who  loves 
voluntary  falsehood  and  he  who  loves  involuntary  false- 
hood is  a  fool."  There  was,  of  course,  only  one  truth; 
which,  being  discovered,  should  be  taught;  which,  being 
taught,  must  be  acted  upon,  since,  if  men  really  knew 
what  was  right,  it  was  impossible,  Plato  thought— ig- 
noring the  frailty  or  obstinacy  of  the  human  will  —  that 
they  should  not  do  it.  "Discover  the  truth."  "Teach 
it."  These  are  the  two  Socratic  commandments. 

I  have  no  intention  to  make  an  exposition  of  the  po- 
litical philosophy  of  Plato  and  Aristotle,2  but  to  do 
something  much  more  modest :  to  explain  wherein  and 
wherefore  they  missed  the  truth  in  the  matter  of  Greek 
imperialism,  and  to  notice  some  of  the  historic  forces 
which  they  disregarded.  If  I  deal  with  the  Laws  rather 
than  the  Republic  of  Plato,  it  is  because  it  is  his  more 
mature  and  less  imaginative  work. 

1  Laws,  v,  p.  730.  (The  translation  used  here  and  elsewhere  in  the  book  is 
that  of  Jowett.) 

1  For  what  is  here  omitted  see  the  excellent  little  book  by  von  Arnim, 
Die  politischen  Theorien  des  Alter  turns. 


FROM  SPARTA  TO  ARISTOTLE  99 

It  was  upon  his  immediate  present  that  Plato  focused 
his  attention ;  to  the  analysis  of  its  political  and  moral 
strength  and  weakness  that  he  turned  his  penetrating  in- 
telligence; for  its  betterment  that  he  wrote  and  taught 
and  suffered.  The  past  he  peopled  with  creations  of  his 
own  exuberant  fancy,  of  popular  misconception,  of 
defective  knowledge.  He  can  be  easily  convicted  of 
gross  historical  errors.  And  what  is  more  serious;  he  has 
no  real  regard  for  historical  truth  and  no  sense  whatever 
for  the  real  factors  in  historical  developments.  Without 
the  slightest  qualm  of  conscience,  and  without  taking  the 
least  pains  to  ascertain  the  facts,  Plato  alters  the  divine 
and  profane  history  of  his  people  to  make  it  serve  his 
purpose.  And  he  does  this  on  principle :  "The  legislator,' 
he  says,1  "has  only  to  reflect  and  find  out  what  belief 
will  be  of  the  greatest  public  advantage,  and  then  use  all 
his  efforts  to  make  the  whole  community  utter  one  and 
the  same  word  in  their  songs  and  tales  and  discourses  all 
their  life  long."  To  disagreeable  things  in  the  sacred 
story  he  gives  a  short  shrift.  Since  the  gods  are  perfect, 
every  report  that  tends  to  tarnish  the  lustre  of  their 
reputation  must  be  false.  The  history  of  mankind  is 
solved  by  a  similar  formula;  since  justice  is  the  sine  qua 
non  of  public  and  private  prosperity  and  happiness,  all 
reports  which  affirm  the  conjunction  of  injustice  with 
well-being,  or  of  righteousness  with  misfortune,  need 
correction  or  suppression.2    History,  accordingly,  be- 

1  Laws,  11,  p.  664.  *  Laws,  n,  p.  662. 


loo  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

comes  a  happy  hunting-ground  for  edifying  storie3.  It  at 
once  ceases  to  yield  lessons,  which,  being  grounded  in 
the  realities  of  human  experience,  are  less  apropos,  per- 
haps, than  the  political  theorist  may  like,  but  are  alone 
valuable. 

Plato's  absorption  in  the  present  led  him  to  misread 
not  only  the  past,  but  also  the  future.  For  the  false 
standard  with  which  he  measured  past  policies  and  in- 
stitutions is  not  less  characteristic  than  the  false  judg- 
ment which  he  formed  of  the  drift  of  contemporary 
events.  The  future  belonged,  not,  as  he  dreamed,  to  the 
autonomous,  archaizing  city-state,  but  to  the  move- 
ment for  their  unification  which  he  condemned.  He  tried 
to  mend  city  constitutions  when  the  world  required  the 
creation  of  larger  territorial  states.  He  watched  with 
attention  domestic  politics  when  foreign  politics  were 
chiefly  worth  watching. 

A  glance  at  the  ideal  state  portrayed  by  Plato  in  the 
Laws  l  shows  in  what  sense  he  read  his  history.  His  citi- 
zens are  to  have  "their  food  and  clothing  provided  for 
them  in  moderation,"  the  latter  through  "entrusting 
the  practice  of  the  arts  to  others,"  the  former  through  get- 
ting from  the  land,  which  slaves  till  for  a  part  of  the  pro- 
duce, "a  return  sufficient  for  men  living  temperately." 
They  are  to  have  "common  tables  in  which  the  men  are 
placed  apart,  and  near  them  are  the  common  tables  of 
their  families,  of  their  daughters  and  mothers,  which, 

1  VII,  p.  806. 


FROM   SPARTA  TO  ARISTOTLE         101 

day  by  day,  the  officers,  male  and  female,  are  to  inspect." 
They  are  not,  however,  to  live  fattening  like  beasts;  for 
"such  a  life  is  neither  just  nor  honorable,  nor  can  he  who 
lives  it  fail  of  meeting  his  due ;  and  the  due  reward  of  the 
idle  fatted  beast  is  that  he  should  be  torn  to  pieces  by 
some  other  valiant  beast  whose  fatness  is  worn  down  by 
brave  deeds  and  toil." 

Naturally,  Plato  does  not  wish  his  ideal  citizens  to 
meet  such  an  ignominious  end.  He  proceeds  to  prescribe 
a  regime  for  them  in  which,  after  a  most  carefully  nur- 
tured childhood,  three  years  are  spent  on  reading  and 
writing,  three  more  on  learning  to  play  the  lyre,  and 
others  still  on  the  study  of  arithmetic,  geometry,  astron- 
omy, and  law,  and  on  the  practice  of  dancing,  wrestling, 
running,  hunting,  and  many  kinds  of  military  exercises. 
The  citizens  to  be  protected  from  fatty  degeneration  in 
this  way  are,  it  should  be  observed,  the  women  as  well  as 
the  men. 

The  children's  stories  are  prescribed  and  are  unalter- 
able; so  are  the  music  and  the  dancing  and  the  poetry. 
The  law  studied  is  that  of  the  commonwealth,  with  which 
every  citizen  is  to  be  inoculated.  The  moral  and  religious 
ideas  are  to  be  fixed,  and  death  is  the  penalty  set  for 
heterodoxy.  Everything  is  to  be  made  and  kept  rigid, 
the  number  of  the  houses,  of  the  farms,  of  the  citizens,  of 
the  children,  of  traders,  artisans,  and  foreigners,  the 
maximum  and  minimum  wealth  of  everybody.  In  other 
words,  the  community  which  Plato  in  his  old  age  pro- 


102  GREEK   IMPERIALISM 

posed  as  a  model  is  not  a  thorough-going  communism, 
like  that  of  his  more  youthful  and  more  famous  Republic. 
It  is  simply  a  system  of  governmental  control  carried  to 
its  logical  extreme  —  an  emended  and  perfected  edition 
of  Sparta. 

That  a  well-born  Athenian,  disgusted  at  the  license 
which  resulted  from  letting  people  live  as  they  pleased, 
should  have  planned  to  put  all  citizens  in  an  adminis- 
trative strait- jacket,  is  not  surprising.  Many  of  us 
to-day  object  to  a  "wide-open  town."  But  that  Plato, 
whose  practice  in  discussion  was  "  to  follow  the  argument 
whithersoever  it  might  lead,"  should  have  idealized  a 
state  in  which  freedom  of  thought  and  freedom  of  speech 
were  denied  altogether,  shows  (even  if  we  make  all  allow- 
ances for  the  idea,  that,  if  things  were  perfect  and  there 
was  but  one  perfection,  all  changes  must  be  harmful) 
how  unreal  and  involved  in  self-contradiction  was  the 
thinking  of  the  best  Greeks  in  this  age  of  reaction. 

The  theory  of  individual  liberty,  as  applied  in  Athens, 
had  led,  in  the  economic  sphere,  thought  Plato,  to  the 
exploitation  of  the  poor  by  the  rich,  and,  in  the  political 
sphere,  to  the  exploitation  of  the  rich  by  the  poor.  Plato, 
therefore,  discarded  the  theory  of  individual  liberty  alto- 
gether. He  was  dominated  by  a  general  view  of  life  in 
which  all  the  natural  human  instincts  and  cravings  were 
harmful.  The  only  hope  for  states  was  that  they  should 
educate  their  best  citizens  to  be  their  governors.  Plato, 
accordingly,  nailed  to  the  mast  the  doctrine  of  salvation 


FROM  SPARTA  TO  ARISTOTLE         103 

by  education,  and  despaired  of  all  states  in  which  the 
carefully  trained  few  of  high  intellectual  capacity  did  not 
make  the  laws  and  enforce  them.  Of  all  these  ideas  the 
Athenian  democracy  was  the  negation,  and  Plato  hated 
it  with  the  bitterness  of  a  passionate  nature. 

That  Plato  hated  the  Periclean  democracy  as  a  politi- 
cal system  is  also  intelligible  from  his  hatred  of  imperial- 
ism upon  which  it  was  based ;  and  there  are  those  to-day, 
who,  for  the  same  reason  and  also  because  of  a  mistaken 
notion  of  its  dependence  upon  slavery,  find  Athenian 
democracy  justified,  if  at  all,  by  its  fruits;  who  contem- 
plate its  art  and  literature  with  the  same  mingled  feelings 
with  which  they  view  the  hectic  beauty  of  the  consump- 
tive. Plato  is  not  of  their  company.  The  fruits  he  finds 
even  more  deleterious  than  the  stock  which  bore  them. 
"In  music,"  he  writes,1  meaning  thereby  poetry  inter- 
preted by  the  voice  with  musical  accompaniment, — 
"in  music  it  was  that  there  first  arose  the  universal  con- 
ceit of  omniscience  and  general  lawlessness ;  —  freedom 
came  following  afterwards,  and  men,  fancying  that 
they  knew  what  they  did  not  know,  had  no  longer  any 
fear,  and  the  absence  of  fear  begets  shamelessness.  For 
what  is  this  shamelessness,  which  is  so  evil  a  thing,  but 
the  insolent  refusal  to  regard  the  opinion  of  the  better 
by  reason  of  an  over-daring  sort  of  liberty?"  Whereto 
the  Spartan  who  is  his  interlocutor  says:  "Very  true." 

1  Laws,  in,  p.700.  The  same  initial  cause  of  degeneracy  is  postulated  in 
Plato's  Republic,  vm,  p.  546. 


104  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

11  Consequent  upon  this  freedom,"  continues  the  speaker, 
"comes  the  other  freedom,  of  disobedience  to  rulers ;  and 
then  the  attempt  to  escape  the  control  and  exhortation 
of  father,  mother,  elders,  and  when  near  the  end,  the 
control  of  the  laws  also ;  and  at  the  very  end  there  is  the 
contempt  of  oaths  and  pledges,  and  no  regard  at  all  for 
the  gods,  —  herein  they  exhibit  and  imitate  the  old  so- 
called  Titanic  nature,  and  come  to  the  same  point  as 
the  Titans  when  they  rebelled  against  God,  leading  a  life 
of  endless  evils." 

The  modern  critic,  even  if  he  endorses  the  sharp 
indictment  of  Euripides,  the  poet  of  the  most  radical 
democracy,  —  that  he  destroyed  the  character  of  Attic 
tragedy  by  introducing  into  it  elements  from  melodrama 
and  the  operatic  concert,  by  perverting  the  grand  style 
of  its  text  and  music  by  vulgar  flippancies  and  incon- 
gruous measures,  by  substituting  for  artistic  develop- 
ment of  characters  and  plot  disturbing  discussions  of 
the  woman  question  and  the  latest  sensations  in  phi- 
losophy and  science,  by  turning  the  ancient  gods  and 
heroes  into  burlesque  through  having  them  argue  and 
act  like  contemporary  sycophants  and  sophists,  —  the 
modern  critic,  even  Professor  Shorey,1  for  example,  in 
his  spirited  defense  of  the  Sophoclean  drama,  would 
abandon  Plato,  I  fancy,  when  he  makes  the  drama  the 
fundamental  cause  for  the  decline  of  Athenian  greatness. 

In  his  Laws,  Plato  is  dealing  with  what,  chastened  by 

1  Greek  Literature  (The  Columbia  University  Press,  1912),  p.  11. 


FROM  SPARTA  TO  ARISTOTLE         105 

age  and  experience,  he  regarded  as  correctible  things. 
The  lust  for  private  possessions,  for  land  and  home,  wife 
and  children,  he  once  placed  in  this  category,  but  he  does 
so  no  longer;  and  in  other  respects  he  makes  wide  con- 
cessions to  human  frailties.  With  greed  for  wealth,  how- 
ever, he  concluded  no  truce.  It  is  Greeks,  mark  you, 
of  whom  Plato1  says:  "  Love  of  wealth  wholly  absorbs 
men,  and  never  for  a  moment  allows  them  to  think  of 
anything  but  their  own  private  possessions;  on  this  the 
soul  of  every  citizen  hangs  suspended,  and  can  attend 
to  nothing  but  his  daily  gain.  Mankind  are  ready  to 
learn  any  branch  of  knowledge,  and  to  follow  any  pursuit 
which  tends  to  this  end,  and  they  laugh  at  every  other. 
.  .  .  From  an  insatiate  love  of  gold  and  silver,  every  man 
will  stoop  to  any  art  or  contrivance,  seemly  or  unseemly, 
in  the  hope  of  becoming  rich ;  and  will  make  no  objection 
to  performing  any  action,  holy  or  unholy  and  utterly 
base,  if  only  like  a  beast  he  have  the  power  of  eating  and 
drinking  all  kinds  of  things,  and  procuring  for  himself 
in  every  sort  of  way  the  gratifications  of  his  lusts." 

Such  were  the  evil  conditions  of  the  present  when  one 
citizen  despoiled  his  fellow  and  every  city  its  neighbor. 
It  had  been  different  in  the  past.  Before  the  introduc- 
tion of  luxurious  tastes  to  stimulate  inventions  and  of 
coined  money  to  destroy  a  sense  for  the  natural  limits 
of  wealth,  men  had  "worked  in  summer,  commonly, 
stripped   and   barefoot,2   but   in   winter   substantially 

1  Laws,  viii,  p.  831.  ■  Republic,  n,  p.  372  b. 


106  GREEK   IMPERIALISM 

clothed  and  shod.  They  fed  on  barley-meal  and  flour 
of  wheat,  baking  and  kneading  them,  making  noble 
cakes  and  loaves ;  these  they  served  up  on  a  mat  of  reeds 
or  on  clean  leaves,  themselves  reclining  the  while  upon 
beds  strewn  with  yew  or  myrtle.  And  they  and  their 
children  feasted,  drinking  of  the  wine  which  they  had 
made,  wearing  garlands  on  their  heads,  and  hymning 
the  praises  of  the  gods,  in  happy  converse  with  one 
another.  They  took  care  that  their  families  did  not 
exceed  their  means:  having  an  eye  to  poverty  or  war." 
But  it  was  not  to  an  age  of  such  rude  simplicity  that 
Plato  would  recall  his  contemporaries.  He  would, 
indeed,  restore  the  virtues  which  existed  among  the 
early  country  folk  before  the  rise  of  modern  cities  and 
the  establishment  of  the  capitalistic  regime ;  but,  while 
hostile  to  transmarine  commerce,  retail  trade,  industries, 
banking,  interest,  and  all  other  accompaniments  of 
interchange  between  cities,  which  he  regarded  as  gen- 
erally undesirable  and  provocative  of  wars  and  con- 
quests, he  imagines  his  ideal  people  in  possession  of  city 
culture  and  the  articles  of  luxury  and  convenience 
secured  through  the  capitalistic  organization.  His  citi- 
zens are,  indeed,  farmers,  but  they  are  gentlemen 
farmers,  who  have  their  money  invested  in  land  and 
slaves  and  live  on  their  dividends,  free  to  devote  their 
leisure  to  athletic,  intellectual,  and  other  worthy  pur- 
suits. They  will  be  free  from  greed  of  wealth  because 
they  all  possess  a  competency,  which  Plato  defines  as 


FROM   SPARTA  TO  ARISTOTLE         107 

enough  to  live  "temperately,"  Aristotle  as  enough  to 
live  "with  liberality  and  temperance."  Neither  phi- 
losopher thinks  of  poverty  except  as  the  ordainer  of 
body-  and  soul-destroying  work,  work  which  degrades 
those  who  have  to  perform  it,  and  makes  slavery  their 
natural  condition.  Plato  and  Aristotle  would  make  all 
tillers  of  the  soil  and  workers  at  the  trades  and  crafts 
slaves  and  aliens.  They  were  to  exist  simply  to  provide 
the  conditions  of  "good  living"  for  their  masters  or 
superiors;  whereupon  "we  must  not  conceal  from  our- 
selves," says  Aristotle,1  "that  a  country  as  large  as  the 
Babylonian  or  some  other  of  boundless  extent  will  be 
required  if  it  is  to  support  five  thousand  citizens  in  idle- 
ness." Even  in  America,  where,  to  use  the  current 
formula,  ten  per  cent  of  the  people  own  ninety  per  cent 
of  the  wealth,  the  economic  situation  proposed  as  ideal 
by  the  most  enlightened  reformers  of  the  fourth  cen- 
tury B.C.  has  hardly  been  reached.  Whether  Plato  failed 
to  realize  that  he  was  condemning  nine  tenths  of  people 
to  perpetual  bondage  and  ignorance;  or,  realizing  it, 
refused  to  think  of  anything  but  the  perfection  of  the 
few,  the  conclusion  is  alike  inevitable:  he  had  failed 
miserably  to  trace  to  their  historical  causes  both  the 
cultural  barrenness  of  Sparta  and  the  astounding  fer- 
tility of  his  own  Athens. 

1  Politics,  11,  3  (6),  3,  p.  1265  a.    (The  translation  used  here  and  else- 
where in  the  book  is  that  of  Welldon:  the  text  that  of  Immisch.) 


108  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

Had  Aristotle  lived  in  the  commonwealth  of  Plato's 
Laws,  he  must  have  suffered  the  same  fate  that  Socrates 
suffered  in  Athens.  For,  though  far  from  ungrateful  to 
his  teacher,  he  was  not  a  docile  pupil.  By  birth  he  was 
a  Stagirite,  by  experience  a  citizen  of  the  world.  He  did 
not,  like  Plato,  form  his  youthful  impressions  in  a  milieu 
that  was  poisoned  with  bitterness  at  a  demoralized 
democracy.  The  Athens  to  which  he  came  as  a  lad  of 
seventeen  was  still  a  democracy,  and  a  very  unhealthy 
one  at  that,  and  for  it  he  had  little  liking;  but  his  was  a 
more  dispassionate  nature  than  was  Plato's.  He  was 
not  a  great  historian.1  That  the  discovery  in  Egypt  in 
1890  of  one  of  his  many  lost  historical  works  has  proven 
clearly;  but  he  was  a  very  learned  man,  and  perhaps 
came  to  as  close  a  comprehension  of  earlier  Greek  his- 
tory as  was  possible  for  a  political  philosopher  who  had 
nothing  to  guide  him  but  the  unscientific  methods  then 
in  vogue  for  investigating  the  past. 

By  its  very  nature  science  is  objective.  It  is  not  in- 
human, but  it  is  deliberately  impersonal.  In  this  respect 
it  contrasts  sharply  with  the  arts.  The  greatest  artist 
may  be  the  man  who  embodies  in  his  verse  or  stone  or 
colors  moods  and  thoughts  which  must  be  in  "widest 
commonalty  spread,"  but  which  constitute  in  the  aggre- 
gate his  own  self  or  soul.  History  is  of  course  a  science, 
but  not  one  of  the  common  type.  Unlike  the  ordinary 
scientist,  the  scientific  historian  has  to  practice,  not 

1  Bury,  J.  B.,  The  Ancient  Greek  Historians,  pp.  182^. 


FROM   SPARTA  TO  ARISTOTLE         109 

self-suppression,  but  self-expansion.  He  must  become 
conscious,  so  far  as  that  is  possible,  of  the  prejudices  and 
special  interests  of  his  own  age,  and,  divested  of  them, 
he  must  migrate  into  a  strange  land  in  order  to  bring 
back  thence  a  report  that  is  at  once  an  unbiased  account 
of  what  he  has  seen  and  a  story  that  is  comprehensible 
to  his  fellow-citizens,  or,  at  least,  to  his  fellow-historians. 
He  dare  not  treat  the  past  as  one  in  spirit  with  the  pres- 
ent, or  as  resolvable  into  precisely  the  same  factors.  He 
must  be  alive  to  the  existence  of  many  different  pasts 
leading  to  the  present  in  no  pre-de terminable  succession, 
much  less  progression.  The  points  must  make  a  line, 
but  the  line  may  be  of  any  conceivable  curve.  Aristotle 
was  far  from  arriving  at  a  full  appreciation  of  the  diffi- 
culties of  historical  inquiry;  but,  unlike  Plato,  he  took 
infinite  pains  to  acquire  historical  knowledge. 

He  did  not  idealize  the  constitutions  of  the  olden 
times.  Since  all  men  then  carried  daggers,  the  presump- 
tion, he  says,  is  that  they  needed  them  and  used  them. 
Since  conditions  where  violence  reigned  must  have  con- 
tinued indefinitely,  if  political  change  had  been  pro- 
hibited, he  finds  it  good  as  well  as  inevitable  that  laws 
be  modified  from  time  to  time.  The  permanency  of 
those  of  Sparta  is  worthy  of  high  praise ;  but  he  traces 
the  corruption  and  decay  of  the  Spartan  state  to  failure 
to  make  needed  reforms.  In  general  he  strikes  a  much 
more  just  balance  between  Spartan  and  Athenian 
achievement  than  does  Plato. 


no  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

The  first  test  he  applies  to  institutions,  such  as  the 
family  and  the  state,  is  their  naturalness  —  their  source 
in  the  nature  of  man  as  that  is  revealed  in  his  history. 
He  was  well  aware  that  a  political  science  that  was  based 
upon  perfected  human  nature  was,  indeed,  suited  only 
for  "gods  and  sons  of  gods";  that  the  only  principles 
of  government  which  had  real  value  were  those  which 
had  approved  themselves  in  practice.  "All  discoveries," 
he  says,1  "have  been  already  made,  although  in  some 
cases  they  have  not  been  combined,  and  in  others,  when 
made,  are  not  acted  upon."  "The  Politics  of  Aristotle," 
says  a  recent  writer,  "is  the  one  great  book  on  the  sci- 
ence of  government  because  it  is  the  only  one  which  is 
wholly  empirical." 

That  is  too  high  praise.  For  the  Politics  of  Aristotle 
differs  from  the  Prince  of  Machiavelli  in  other  respects, 
of  course,  but  noticeably  in  that  the  Greek  has  moral 
ideals,  the  Italian  none.  With  Aristotle,  as  with  Plato, 
the  state  has  an  ethical  purpose.  He  requires  it  to  jus- 
tify not  only  its  acts  but  its  existence.  Iniquitous  gov- 
ernments might  exist,  —  Aristotle's  world  was  full  of 
them,  in  fact,  —  and  his  mind  was  too  curious  of  all 
things  political  for  him  to  leave  them  out  of  his  obser- 
vation: he  has,  indeed,  considered  minutely  the  ways 
and  means  for  the  preservation  of  all  kinds  of  states, 
and  has  shown  therein  that  he  had  as  keen  an  eye  for 
the  realities  as  had  Machiavelli  himself.   But  he  would 

1  Politics,  H,  2  (5),  10,  p.  1264  c. 


FROM   SPARTA  TO  ARISTOTLE         in 

never  have  permitted,  much  less  advised,  his  legislator 
to  use  foul  means  to  establish  a  just  government  or  fair 
means  to  establish  an  unjust  one. 

On  the  establishment  of  governments,  moreover,  he 
spends  very  little  thought.  This,  however,  is  with 
Machiavelli  the  main  matter,  as  he  himself  says  near 
the  opening  of  the  second  part  of  his  work:  "The  chief 
foundations  of  all  states,  new  as  well  as  old  or  composite, 
are  good  laws  and  good  arms;  and  as  there  cannot  be 
good  laws  where  the  state  is  not  well  armed,  it  follows 
that  when  they  are  well  armed  they  have  good  laws. 
I  shall  leave  the  laws  out  of  the  discussion  and  shall 
speak  of  the  arms."  Had  the  Greek  heard  him  he  would 
have  scoffed  at  both  the  argument  and  the  conclusion. 
The  argument  is,  of  course,  sophistical,  and  the  conclu- 
sion saved  only  by  the  fact  that  Machiavelli  had 
already  considered  the  political  weapons  with  which 
rulers  should  operate.  The  Politics  is  a  handbook  for 
legislators;  the  Prince  a  set  of  instructions  for  potentates. 
For  the  latter  the  ways  and  means  of  acquiring  power 
was,  in  Machiavelli's  judgment,  the  all-important 
thing;  whereas  the  legislator's  possession  of  power  is 
taken  for  granted  by  Aristotle,  and  it  is  assumed  through- 
out his  entire  treatment  that,  if  the  lawgiver  knows  the 
constitution,  the  laws,  and  the  system  of  education  which 
are  best  adapted  to  the  economic,  social,  and  political 
conditions  of  his  state,  he  can  at  once  introduce  them. 

In  a  measure,  therefore,  the  Prince  and  the  Politics 


112  GREEK   IMPERIALISM 

supplement  each  other,  though  Aristotle  would  have 
been  horrified  at  the  idea.  For  in  his  thinking,  in  any- 
thing approximating  to  an  ideal  world,  each  city  was 
free  to  order  its  internal  affairs  as  it  thought  best,  and, 
having  this  liberty,  if  it  was  shown  what  was  best,  it 
must,  according  to  the  Socratic  psychology,  immedi- 
ately adopt  it ;  whereas  —  to  give  the  devil  his  due  — 
Machiavelli  was  actuated,  in  formulating  his  precepts 
for  Prince  Lorenzo,  by  the  vision  of  a  united  Italy, 
the  realization  of  which  by  his  pupil  was  to  wash  away 
the  crimes  committed  in  subjecting  to  his  will  the  city- 
states  of  the  peninsula.  The  conquest  of  Italy  was, 
accordingly,  the  goal  of  the  ideal  Prince's  endeavor; 
whereas,  though  Aristotle  in  one  passage  of  the  Politics1 
notes  that  "if  the  Greeks  were  united  in  a  single  polity 
they  would  be  capable  of  universal  empire,"  he  regards 
such  a  union  as  highly  undesirable.  To  him  a  state  that 
was  not  a  city  was  a  rudimentary  and  very  imperfect 
state.  It  ceased  to  be  a  state  at  all  when  it  ceased  to  be 
free.  Hence  a  city  could  have  subjects,  that  is  to  say, 
slaves,  but  not  dependencies.  And  since  in  his  thinking 
it  was  natural  inferiority  alone  that  justified  slavery, 
and  this  was  found  especially  among  the  nations  of 
Asia,  and  not  at  all  in  Greece,  no  Greek  city  could  rightly 
enslave  the  inhabitants  of  any  other  Greek  city:  it  could 
wage  war  and  organize  slave  raids  only  against  barba- 
rians. 

1  vii  (iv),  6  (7),  I,  p.  1327  b. 


FROM  SPARTA  TO  ARISTOTLE  113 
The  birthmark  which  we  have  noted  on  Plato  is  an 
inheritance  from  unreasoning  hatred  of  democracy. 
That  which  mars  above  all  the  political  thinking  of 
Aristotle  comes  from  the  aversion  instinctively  felt  by 
his  age  for  imperialism.  That  this,  too,  is  a  disfigure- 
ment, we  may  show  in  a  few  concluding  remarks.  "It 
is  necessary,"  says  Aristotle 1  in  concluding  his  plea  that 
a  mixed  constitution  is  best  for  the  common  run  of 
states,  "it  is  necessary  to  begin  by  assuming  a  principle 
of  general  application,  viz.,  that  the  part  of  the  state 
which  desires  the  continuance  of  the  polity  ought  to 
be  stronger  than  that  which  does  not" ;  and  he  proceeds 
to  point  out  that  "strength"  consists  neither  in  num- 
bers, nor  property,  nor  military  or  political  ability  alone, 
but  in  all  of  them  combined,  so  that  regard  has  to  be 
taken  of  "freedom,  wealth,  culture,  and  nobility,  as 
well  as  of  mere  numerical  superiority."  Nothing  could 
be  more  cold  and  objective  than  the  thinking  of  Aris- 
totle on  this  important  matter.  Yet  by  an  extraordinary 
oversight  he  lets  "strength"  exert  a  decisive  influence 
within  the  city-states,  while  he  ignores  altogether  the 
effect  of  varying  population,  wealth,  and  political  and 
military  ability  in  determining  the  relations  between 
them. 

The  whole  of  the  political  thinking  of  Aristotle  is 
dominated  by  the  idea  that  the  world  of  men  is  made  up 
of  an  infinite  procession  of  inferiors  and  superiors,  the 

1  Politics,  iv  (vi),  10  (12),  1,  p.  1296  b. 


114  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

desire  to  forge  ahead  being  one  of  the  most  fundamental 
instincts  of  human  beings.  If  an  omniscient  God  were  to 
arrange  the  inhabitants  of  each  city  in  a  line  according 
to  their  real  "strength,"  he  would  place  few  of  them 
abreast.  No  Greek  betrays  more  naively  than  Aristotle 
does  the  national  consciousness  of  the  Hellenes  that  they 
stood  at  the  head  of  the  honor  roll  of  peoples.  It  was, 
therefore,  imperative  upon  them  to  conquer  the 
Asiatics ;  for  he  finds  it  to  be  a  beneficent  command  of 
nature,  issued  primarily  for  the  advantage  of  the  weaker, 
that  superiors  should  rule  inferiors. 

Among  moral  philosophers  Aristotle  is  characterized 
by  his  refusal  to  let  himself  be  led  astray  by  a  visionary 
ideal  of  human  equality.  Nevertheless,  while  recogniz- 
ing that  Greek  cities,  even  more  than  individuals,  dif- 
fered in  "strength,"  he  refused  to  let  the  "strong"  use 
their  advantage.  He  sets  apart  the  sphere  of  interurban, 
that  is  to  say,  international,  relations  as  one  in  which  the 
"  universal  principle,"  that  superior  rule  inferior,  shall 
not  apply.  In  a  visionary  world,  the  "strong"  man,  on 
Aristotle's  theory,  is  a  "gentle"  man;  but  in  the  real 
world,  he  is  a  ruler.  Had  Aristotle  not  been  blinded  by 
the  prejudices  of  his  age  against  imperialism,  he  must 
have  seen  the  necessity  that  in  the  real  world  the 
"strong"  state  would  also  be  the  ruler.  It  is  one  of  the 
enigmas  of  history  that  Aristotle  was  the  contemporary 
and  subject  of  Philip  II  of  Macedon,  one  of  its  ironies 
that  he  was  the  tutor  of  Alexander  the  Great. 


FROM  SPARTA  TO  ARISTOTLE         115 

SELECT  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

1.  Schomann-Lipsius.    Griechische  Allertumer,4 1  (1892),  pp. 

197  #• 

2.  Bury,  J.  B.  A  History  of  Greece  to  the  Death  of  Alexander 
the  Great  (1900). 

3.  Meyer,  Eduard.  Geschichte  des  Altertums,  v  (1902). 

4.  Niese,  B.  Neue  Beitrdge  zur  Geschichte  und  Landeskunde 
Lakeddmons:  Die  lakedamonischen  Perioken.  In  Nach- 
richten  der  Gott.  Gesell.  d.  Wissenschaften  (1906),  pp.  101  ff. 

5.  Arnim,  Hans  von.  Die  politischen  Theorien  des  Altertums 
(1910). 

6.  Gomperz,  Th.  Greek  Thinkers,  in  (1905),  iv  (1912). 


IV 

ALEXANDER   THE   GREAT  AND  WORLD   MONARCHY 

Alexander  the  Great  was  born  in  356  B.C.  His 
mother,  Olympias,  was  a  half-civilized  Molossian  prin- 
cess whose  fresh  beauty,  revealed  at  a  wild  religious 
fete  on  mystic  Samothrace,  had  caught  the  roving  fancy 
of  Philip  of  Macedon.  Their  union  had  the  further 
attraction  to  Philip  that  it  might  bring  Epirus  under 
his  suzerainty. 

Philip  wished  his  wife  to  be  his  chief  concubine  rather 
than  his  consort.  Olympias,  a  proud  and  passionate 
woman,  chafed  at  her  husband's  marital  infidelities,  and 
had  the  will  and  courage  to  revolt  and  act  for  herself 
when  Philip  set  her  aside  in  337  B.C.  She  cannot  be 
acquitted  of  guilty  knowledge  of  the  murder  of  Philip 
which  occurred  a  year  later  at  the  marriage  arranged 
by  him  between  her  daughter  and  her  brother.  The  act 
was  timed  to  assure  the  accession  of  her  son,  who  was  its 
chief  beneficiary. 

"My  father,"  Alexander  is  reported  to  have  said 
twelve  years  later  to  his  mutinous  Macedonian  soldiers,1 
14  found  you  nomadic  and  poor.  Clad  in  sheepskins,  you 
tended  your  meagre  herds  on  the  mountains,  and  had  to 
fight  grievously  for  them  against  the  Illyrians,  Triballi, 

1  Arrian,  Anabasis,  vn,  9,  2  ff. 


ALEXANDER  AND  WORLD   MONARCHY    117 

and  Thracians  on  your  borders.  He  gave  you  cloaks  to 
wear  in  place  of  hides,  he  led  you  down  from  the  hills 
into  the  plains,  he  made  you  the  match  in  battle  of  the 
barbarians  who  dwelt  near  you ;  so  that  you  depended 
for  your  safety  thenceforth,  not  on  the  inaccessibility 
of  your  country,  but  on  your  own  valor.  He  taught  you 
to  live  in  cities;  he  appointed  good  laws  and  customs 
for  your  governance.  He  made  you  lords,  instead  of 
slaves  and  subjects  of  those  barbarians  by  whom  you 
and  your  possessions  had  long  been  harried.  The  great- 
est part  of  Thrace  he  annexed  to  Macedon.  By  seizing 
the  most  suitable  points  on  the  seacoast,  he  threw  open 
your  country  to  commerce.  He  gave  you  the  chance  to 
work  your  mines  in  safety.  The  Thessalians,  before 
whom  you  had  cowered,  half  dead  with  fright,  he  taught 
you  to  conquer,  and  by  humbling  the  Phocians  he  made 
your  road  into  Greece,  hitherto  narrow  and  difficult, 
broad  and  easy.  To  such  a  degree  did  he  lower  the 
Athenians  and  the  Thebans,  who  had  ever  been  ready 
to  fall  upon  Macedon,  —  and  herein  had  he  my  help,  — 
that,  instead  of  your  paying  tribute  to  Athens  and  taking 
orders  from  Thebes,  it  was  to  us  in  turn  that  they  went 
for  protection.  Into  the  Peloponnesus  he  passed  and  set 
matters  to  rights  there;  and,  being  appointed  com- 
mander-in-chief of  united  Greece  in  its  projected  war 
against  Persia,  he  achieved  this  high  distinction,  not 
so  much  for  himself  as  for  the  commonwealth  of  Mace- 
donia." 


u8  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

The  words  are  not  those  of  the  great  king  himself: 
they  are  at  the  best  a  paraphrase  of  the  ideas  expressed 
by  him  on  the  occasion;  at  the  worst  they  are  the  free 
invention  of  an  historian  concerned  only  with  having 
Alexander  say  what  the  situation  seemed  to  him  to 
demand.  However  that  may  be,  they  are  a  good  ac- 
count of  the  wonderful  work  which  Alexander,  as  a  boy 
and  young  man,  saw  his  father  accomplish  for  Macedon. 
"What  a  man  we  had  to  fight,"  said  Demosthenes,1  his 
great  enemy.  "For  the  sake  of  power  and  dominion 
he  had  an  eye  put  out,  his  shoulder  broken,  an  arm  and 
a  leg  injured.  Whatever  limb  fortune  demanded,  that 
he  gave  up,  so  that  the  remnant  of  his  body  might  live 
in  glory  and  honor."  "Taking  everything  into  account," 
says  Theopompus,2  the  far  from  generous  contemporary 
historian  of  his  achievements,  "Europe  has  never  pro- 
duced the  like  of  Philip,  the  son  of  Amyntas." 

The  court  of  Philip  was  rough  and  boorish.  Revels, 
disgraced  by  drunkenness  and  debauchery,  interrupted 
the  king's  wars  and  amours.  In  Pella  men  behaved  like 
Centaurs  and  Lsestrygonians,  sneered  the  fastidious 
Athenians;  and  the  frenzy  which  wine  inspired  in 
Philip,  religion  inspired  in  Olympias.  In  wild  abandon 
she  let  herself  be  possessed  with  the  spirit  of  the  god, 
Dionysus,  and  roamed  the  hills  at  night  in  the  company 
of  other  women  equally  intoxicated,  brandishing  the 
thyrsus  and  the  "wreathed  snake,"  shouting  with 
1  De  Cor.  67.  2  Muller,  F.  H.  GM  I,  Frg.  27. 


ALEXANDER  AND  WORLD   MONARCHY    119 

ecstasy.  Hers  was  the  religion  which  William  Vaughn 
Moody,  with  poetic  license,  singled  out  in  the  splendid 
Prelude  to  his  Masque  of  Judgment  as  characteristic 
of  the  world  into  which  Christ  was  born.  It  was  really 
abhorrent  to  the  best  Greek  feeling,  and  was  repressed 
with  stern  cruelty  by  Rome. 

Passion,  fierce  and  generous,  the  main  source  of  heroic 
action,  was  bred  in  the  bone  of  Alexander.  His  imagi- 
nation, naturally  fervent,  was  fed  by  tales  of  his  ancestor 
Achilles  which  he  heard  at  his  mother's  knee,  and  fired 
by  the  vistas  opened  out  to  it  by  the  exploits  of  his 
father.  At  thirteen  Philip  gave  him  Aristotle  as  his 
tutor,  and  during  the  formative  years  of  his  youth 
he  studied  poetry  with  this  great  teacher.  The  poetry 
was  Greek,  not  Macedonian.  In  it  were  found  the  ideals 
of  the  people  to  which  Alexander  belonged  in  spirit  and 
in  blood,  if  not  in  nationality;  thence  came  the  ideas 
tinged  with  emotion  which  fasten  themselves  like  barbed 
arrows  in  the  memory  of  the  learner  —  the  ideas  of  right 
and  wrong,  of  heroism  and  tenderness,  of  regard  for 
parents  and  for  duties;  as  Plato  would  say,  of  justice, 
wisdom,  temperance,  and  courage  —  which  color  all 
subsequent  thinking  and  constitute  character.  The 
Greeks  have  still  something  to  teach  us  as  to  the  educa- 
tive power  of  great  poetry. 

The  commandments  of  Homer,  whom  Aristotle  never 
ceases  to  cite  in  his  philosophical  works,  went  over  into 
the  flesh  and  blood  of  Alexander,  and  in  him  Achilles, 


120  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

the  youthful  hero  of  the  Iliad,  became  in  a  real  sense 
incarnate.  Next  after  Homer,  Alexander  rated  and 
knew  the  Attic  tragedians,  the  continuators  and  improv- 
ers of  Homer,  according  to  Aristotle,  who,  therefore, 
bases  his  Poetics  largely  upon  tragedy,  as  being  the  high- 
est form  of  dramatic  art. 

There  can  be  no  question  of  the  influence  of  Aristotle 
in  determining  the  literary  interest  and  taste  of  Alexan- 
der. It  seems  also  clear  that  the  young  prince  came  at 
least  to  know,  and  probably  to  share,  his  teacher's  curi- 
osity as  to  natural  history;  for  he  afterwards  sent  speci- 
mens back  from  Asia  for  Aristotle's  botanical  and  zoo- 
logical collections.  This  being  the  case,  it  seems  incred- 
ible that  he  should  have  received  from  him  no  instruc- 
tion in  politics ;  that  Aristotle,  the  pupil  of  Plato,  who  had 
himself  gone  to  Sicily  to  educate  the  young  Dionysius  II 
for  his  high  place,  should  have  failed  to  communicate 
to  the  future  ruler  of  Macedon  and  of  Greece  the  ideas 
which  he  had  formed  as  to  the  best  kind  of  government. 
We  can  imagine  the  thousand  opportunities  which  their 
three  years  of  close  association  in  the  country  seat  at 
Mieza  offered  for  the  discussion  of  politics:  how  Aris- 
totle explained  that  virtue  or  merit  or  political  capacity, 
or  however  the  elusive  Greek  word  arete  be  translated, 
gave  the  best  claim  to  leadership,  and  that  the  best  of 
all  forms  of  government  was  that  in  which  the  man  of 
the  highest  virtue  ruled;  "that,"  to  use  his  own  words,1 

1  Politics,  ill,  II  (17),  12,  p.  1288  o. 


ALEXANDER  AND  WORLD   MONARCHY    121 

"wherever  there  is,  as  it  happens,  a  whole  family  or  an 
individual  so  superior  in  virtue  to  all  the  rest  that  the 
virtue  of  this  individual  or  family  exceeds  that  of  all 
others  in  the  state,  in  that  case  it  is  but  just  that  this 
family  should  enjoy  a  regal  or  supreme  position  and  that 
this  individual  should  be  king.  For . . .  this  is  not  only  in 
accordance  with  the  principle  of  justice  usually  alleged 
by  the  founders  of  polities,  whether  aristocracies,  oli- 
garchies, or  democracies,  in  all  of  which  the  claim  to  rule 
is  dependent  on  superiority,  although  the  superiority  is 
not  the  same;  but  it  accords  also  with  the  theory  we 
laid  down  before.  For  assuredly  it  is  not  proper  to  put 
to  death  or  outlaw  or  even  ostracize  this  preeminent  in- 
dividual or  to  require  him  to  become  a  subject  in  his  turn. 
.  .  .  The  only  alternative  is  that  they  should  yield  him 
obedience,  and  that  he  should  be  supreme,  not  on  the 
principle  of  alternation,  but  absolutely.  ...  It  will  be 
a  wrong,"  he  urged,1  "to  treat  him  as  worthy  of  mere 
equality,  when  he  is  so  vastly  superior  in  virtue  and  po- 
litical capacity,  for  any  person  so  exceptional  may  well 
be  compared  to  a  deity  upon  the  earth."  Again  and 
again,  in  season  and  out  of  season,  often  doubtless  to  the 
annoyance  of  the  impatient  young  prince,  who  feared 
lest  his  father's  victories  should  leave  him  nothing  to  do, 
Aristotle2  must  have  harped  on  the  theme  that  "man 
is  naturally  a  city-dwelling  animal  and  that  one  who  is 

1  Politics,  in,  8  (13),  1,  p.  1284  a. 
*  Politics,  I,  1  (2),  9,  p.  1253  a. 


122  GREEK   IMPERIALISM 

not  a  native  of  a  city,  if  the  cause  of  his  isolation  be  nat- 
ural and  not  accidental,  is  either  a  superhuman  being  or 
low  in  the  scale  of  civilization,  as  he  stands  alone  like  a 
'blot'  on  the  backgammon  board.  The  'clanless,  law- 
less, hearthless'  man  so  bitterly  described  by  Homer  is  a 
case  in  point;  for  he  is  naturally  a  native  of  no  city  and  a 
lover  of  war,"  We  can  imagine  the  philosopher  insisting 
that  just  as  city  life  was  synonymous  with  civilized  life, 
so  city  was  synonymous  with  state ;  that  the  highest  of 
all  human  activities,  the  exercise  of  political  functions, 
was  destroyed  the  moment  a  city  became  dependent  upon 
an  outside  power;  that  subjects  could  not  exist  perma- 
nently unless  the  conquered  were  natural  inferiors  like 
the  Asiatics;  that  it  was,  however,  to  the  interest  of  such 
persons  that  they  should  be  ruled  by  their  superiors,  in 
the  case  of  Asiatics,  by  the  Greeks.  Such  were  the  oft- 
repeated  maxims  of  the  political  philosopher  in  whose  age 
Philip  rejoiced,  it  is  said,1  "that  his  son  was  born,  since 
his  teaching  would  make  him  worthy  of  his  father  and 
equal  to  the  position  to  which  he  was  to  succeed."  Such 
was  the  literary  and  political  education  of  Alexander: 
his  military  training  and  his  knowledge  of  affairs  he  got 
in  the  unrivaled  school  of  his  father;  but  in  this  connec- 
tion it  is  well  to  remember  the  admission  of  Napoleon:2 
"War  is  a  singular  art ;  I  can  assure  you  that  fighting 
sixty  battles  taught  me  nothing  I  did  not  know  at  the 

1  Aulus  Gellius,  Nodes  Attica,  IX. 

■  Johnston,  R.  M.,  The  Corsican,  p.  498. 


ALEXANDER  AND  WORLD   MONARCHY    123 

first  one.  The  essential  quality  of  the  general  is  firmness, 
and  that  is  a  gift  from  heaven." 

It  is  not  my  purpose  to  give  a  biographical  sketch  of 
Alexander,  nor  yet  to  tell  the  story  of  his  marvelous 
conquests,  or  to  estimate  the  consequences  of  his  work 
on  the  later  course  of  history.  I  have  had  in  mind  while 
preparing  this  chapter  first  to  emphasize  such  features 
in  his  family  and  education  as  help  to  explain  his  politi- 
cal thinking,  and  then,  somewhat  in  Plutarch's  fashion, 
to  pick  up  such  incidents  in  his  career  as  show  concretely 
how  precisely  he  aimed  to  organize  his  world  empire. 

Where  the  political  sagacity  of  Alexander  stood  forth 
most  conspicuously,  according  to  Napoleon,  was  in  the 
skill  with  which  he  appealed  to  the  imagination  of  men. 
Love  of  symbolism  was  ingrained  in  his  nature.  By  an 
act  which  he  went  deliberately  out  of  his  way  to  perform 
he  contrived  again  and  again  to  illumine  an  entire  situa- 
tion, to  drive  home  a  lesson,  to  reveal  a  policy.  In  a  way 
it  was  a  kind  of  advertising ;  a  means  of  conveying  to  the 
world  at  large  in  an  unmistakable  manner  the  will  and 
attitude  of  the  monarch.  But  it  was  more  than  that.  It 
was  the  application  in  the  world  of  politics  of  a  mode  of 
expression  with  which  the  Greeks  were  familiar  in  the 
world  of  the  plastic  arts. 

The  first  instance  of  this  sort  of  thing  was  the  destruc- 
tion of  Thebes  in  335  B.C.  At  the  accession  of  Alexander 
a  year  earlier,  all  Greece  had  seethed  with  insurrection. 


124  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

Philip  was  dead  in  the  full  vigor  of  manhood,  and  a  strip- 
ling of  twenty  was  about  to  take  his  place.  By  a  prompt 
advance  southward  Alexander  nipped  the  threatened 
revolt  in  the  bud;  and  to  secure  himself  for  the  future, 
he  put  a  garrison  in  the  citadel  of  Thebes,  where  the  most 
manifest  disaffection  had  existed.   A  few  months  later, 
however,  while  he  was  cleansing  his  northern  frontiers, 
preparatory  to  attacking  Persia,  the  Thebans,  acting  on 
the  false  report  that  he  had  fallen  in  battle,  and  in  con- 
junction with  Athens  and  other  Greek  cities,  revolted  a 
second  time.  With  almost  incredible  secrecy  and  celerity 
Alexander  came  upon  Thebes,  took  it  by  assault,  sold 
the  inhabitants  into  slavery,  and  razed  the  city  to  the 
ground.  No  such  disaster  had  overtaken  a  Greek  city 
(outside  of  unhappy  Sicily)  since  the  destruction  of 
Miletus  by  the  Persians  in  493  B.C.    It  showed  beyond 
the  shadow  of  a  doubt  what  the  Greeks  had  to  expect 
if  they  continued  to  make  trouble  while  Alexander  was 
absent  in  Asia.   And  on  this  occasion  one  object  lesson 
was  contained  within  another:  by  sparing  the  house  of 
Pindar,  the  destroyer  of  Thebes  proclaimed  his  regard 
for  Hellenic  civilization;  distinguished  himself  clearly 
from  the  destroyers  of  Miletus  and  other  barbarians. 

Next  year,  when  about  to  open  his  attack  on  the  Per- 
sian empire,  Alexander  sent  his  army  across  the  Helles- 
pont by  the  usual  route  from  Sestus  to  Abydus;  but  he 
himself  proceeded  to  Elaius  where  he  sacrificed  at  the 
tomb  of  Protesilaus,  and  prayed  that  he  might  have  a 


ALEXANDER  AND  WORLD   MONARCHY    125 

better  fate  than  was  his  who  first  of  Agamemnon's  men 
set  foot  on  the  soil  of  Asia.  Then  crossing  the  Helles- 
pont to  Harbor  of  the  Achaeans,  he  went  up  to  Ilium 
where  he  dedicated  his  armor  to  Athena  I  lias  and  took 
in  its  place  some  weapons  said  to  have  been  used  in  the 
Trojan  War.  After  appeasing  the  manes  of  Priam  and 
entreating  them  to  forgive  him,  a  descendant  of  Neoptol- 
emus,  Priam's  slayer,  he  laid  a  wreath  on  the  tomb  of 
Achilles,  while  his  bosom  friend,  Hephaestion,  laid  an- 
other on  that  of  Patroclus.  W7hereupon  he  proceeded  to 
rejoin  his  army.  The  incident  stirred  in  every  Greek  a 
thousand  memories.  He  saw  another  Agamemnon  set 
out  to  take  another  Troy ;  another  champion  of  the  Hel- 
lenes in  their  eternal  struggle  with  the  peoples  of  Asia. 
In  no  way  could  Alexander  more  clearly  identify  his 
undertaking  with  the  long  cherished  dreams  of  the  whole 
Greek  race.  It  was  the  nearest  that  a  ruler  of  that  time 
could  come  to  proclaiming  a  holy  war. 

At  Gordium,  where  Alexander's  troops  spent  their 
first  winter  in  Asia,  there  stood  on  the  citadel  the  cart  in 
which,  according  to  the  story,  Midas,  a  peasant's  son, 
had  driven  to  the  meeting-place  of  the  Phrygians  on  the 
day  when  unexpectedly  he  was  proclaimed  their  king. 
The  legend  had  spread  thence  around  the  country  that 
whosoever  unfastened  the  knot  of  cornel  bark  which  held 
the  yoke  to  the  shaft  of  this  cart  would  become  king  of 
Asia.  This  task  Alexander  essayed  in  vain.  Then  he 
drew  his  sword  and  cut  the  thong  in  two.    Thereby  he 


I26  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

announced  both  his  departure  from  the  policy  of  Philip, 
which  had  been  simply  to  emancipate  the  Ionian  Greeks, 
and  the  forthcoming  execution  of  his  own  policy,  which 
was  to  take  from  the  Persians  their  dominion  over  Asia. 
After  his  first  victory  at  the  Granicus  River  Alexander 
advanced  along  the  JEgean  seaboard  as  far  as  Cilicia, 
securing  as  he  went  all  the  coast  towns  in  Asia  Minor 
which  had  contributed  ships  to  the  Persian  fleet.   This 
plan  of  campaign  he  adhered  to  after  his  second  victory 
at  Issus  over  Darius,  when,  instead  of  keeping  in  touch 
with  his  defeated  enemy  and  of  following  him  into  the 
interior,  as  the  ordinary  common  sense  of  war  com- 
manded, he  let  the  King  go,  and  spent  a  year  in  seizing 
the  naval  towns  between  Cilicia  and  Cyrene.   This  he 
did  in  order  to  destroy  the  Persian  fleet,  an  end  which  he 
could  not  otherwise  attain,  since  he  had  no  ships  of  his 
own.    To  leave  the  enemy's  fleet  in  possession  of  the 
Mediterranean,  however,  while  he  was  campaigning  far 
in  the  heart  of  the  continent  would  have  been  to  jeop- 
ardize all  that  he  had  already  accomplished,  and,  in  par- 
ticular, to  leave  to  the  Persians  the  means  of  causing  a 
general  insurrection  among  the  Greeks,  whom  he  rightly 
feared  more  than  the  Persians.  This  long  detour  south- 
ward to  Egypt  is,  accordingly,  amply  explained  by  sound 
strategical  considerations.    That,  however,  cannot  be 
said   of   Alexander's   sensational    march    through    the 
Sahara  to  the  oasis  of  Siwah  in  the  hinterland  of  Cyrene. 
There,  in  mysterious  aloofness,  lay  an  oracle  of   the 


ALEXANDER  AND  WORLD   MONARCHY    127 

Egyptian  Ammon  whom  the  Greeks  called  Zeus.  Just 
as  Dodona  in  Epirus  had  been  eclipsed  in  times  past  as 
an  oracular  seat  by  the  shrine  of  Apollo  at  Delphi,  so 
this  in  turn  had  waned  in  prestige  and  credit  when  it 
became  known  gradually  to  the  Greeks  that  Zeus  Am- 
mon revealed  unfailingly  the  future  to  his  priests  at 
Siwah.  For  more  than  two  generations  prior  to  Alexan- 
der's visit  the  Ammonium  had  been  the  Mecca  of  pil- 
grims, and  the  recipient  of  gifts  from  all  parts  of  the 
Greek  world.  Athens  had  even  built  a  sacred  trireme, 
the  so-called  "ship  of  Ammon,"  to  carry  public  mes- 
sengers to  and  from  the  oracle.  In  Egypt  the  Ammon  of 
Siwah  was  of  no  account  as  compared  with  the  Ammon 
of  Thebes;  but  among  the  Greeks  the  Ammon  that  was 
known  and  revered  was,  to  speak  with  Plato,  the  Ammon 
of  Cyrene.  Alexander  knew  well  the  impression  which 
would  be  produced  in  the  official  and  pious  world  of  Hel- 
las should  the  priests  of  Ammon  greet  him  as  the  son  of 
their  god.  This,  however,  they  were  bound  to  do  on  his 
arrival  at  the  temple,  since  to  omit  this  formality  would 
have  been  to  refuse  allegiance  to  the  new  Pharaoh  who 
had  just  been  recognized  in  Egypt;  for  every  Pharaoh 
from  time  immemorial  was  officially  a  son  of  Ammon. 
It  was  the  peculiarity  of  Siwah  that  the  ruler  greeted 
there  as  the  son  of  Ammon  was  presented  authoritatively 
to  the  Greek  world  as  the  son  of  Zeus. 

The  march  across  the  desert  to  Ammonium  was  ac- 
complished only  with  supernatural  assistance,  according 


128  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

to  the  official  report;  and  deliberate  mystery  shrouded 
the  interview  of  Alexander  with  the  god.  It  is  with  no 
impropriety,  as  we  shall  see  presently,  that  Tennyson 
brings  his  fine  poem  on  the  great  king  to  a  climactic 
close  with  an  allusion  to  the  occurrence :  — 

"High  things  were  spoken  there,  unhanded  down; 
Only  they  saw  thee  from  the  secret  shrine 
Returning  with  hot  cheek  and  kindled  eyes." 

One  thing,  however,  was  stressed  in  the  official  ver- 
sion of  what  happened :  the  desired  greeting  was  given 
publicly  to  Alexander  by  the  eldest  of  the  priests.  And 
its  import  was  enhanced  by  the  arrival  of  messengers  to 
say  that  oracles  to  the  same  effect  had  been  given  simul- 
taneously by  the  Sibyl  of  Erythrae  and  Apollo  at  Bran- 
chidce,  where  a  long  silence  of  over  one  hundred  and  fifty 
years  was  interrupted  thereby.  As  to  the  private  inter- 
view Alexander  wrote  to  his  mother  that  "secret  things 
were  divulged  to  him  which  he  could  communicate  only 
to  her  personally." 

I  shall  revert  to  the  significance  of  the  visit  to  Siwah 
presently.  Meanwhile,  it  will  suffice  to  note  that  it  was 
quite  in  character  with  the  methods  already  adopted  by 
Alexander  that  he  should  seek  in  this  bizarre  way  to 
impress  upon  the  imagination  of  men  a  new  idea ;  to  dis- 
close by  a  sensational  action  of  this  kind  an  important 
change  of  policy.  And  it  is  paralleled  by  several  inci- 
dents in  his  later  career. 


ALEXANDER  AND  WORLD   MONARCHY    129 

Twelve  months  after  leaving  Siwah,  Alexander  was 
master  of  Persepolis.  This  was  the  capital  of  Persis,  a 
land  of  some  half  a  million  inhabitants  whom  Cyrus  and 
Darius  had  made  lords  of  a  subject  population  not  much 
below  that  of  the  Roman  empire.  For  over  two  hun- 
dred years  forty  millions  of  people  had  looked  to  Persis 
and  Persepolis  as  the  seats  of  the  mighty.  The  "city  of 
the  Persians"  and  the  palace  of  their  kings  which  it  con- 
tained were  the  manifest  symbols  of  empire:  the  one 
Alexander  gave  over  to  his  soldiers  to  pillage,  the  other 
he  fired  with  his  own  hand,  thus  proclaiming  to  the  world 
that  the  end  of  a  dynasty  had  come.  His  own  part  in 
this  catastrophe  —  which  affected  the  imaginations  of 
men  in  some  such  way  as  did  the  capture  of  Rome  by 
Alaric  in  410  a.d.  —  was  taken  conspicuously.  Starting 
up  from  a  banquet,  he  and  his  companions,  among  whom 
was  the  beautiful  Athenian  courtesan  Thais,  went  in 
Dionysiac  revel  to  the  sound  of  flutes  through  the  streets 
to  the  palace,  and  threw  the  torches  which  they  had 
taken  with  them  from  the  feast  upon  the  cedar  beams  of 
the  roof.  Once  the  flames  had  shot  up  and  the  desired 
effect  had  been  produced,  Alexander  ordered  the  fire  to 
be  extinguished. 

Early  in  the  following  year  Alexander  entered  Ecba- 
tana,  the  summer  capital  of  the  Persian  empire,  and 
Darius  became  a  fugitive.  Up  to  this  point  Alexander 
had  been  hegemon  of  the  Hellenic  league  as  well  as  king 
of  Macedon,  and,  on  liberating  the  Greek  cities  in  Asia 


i3o  GREEK   IMPERIALISM 

from  Persian  control,  he  had  added  them  to  the  league. 
Now  that  the  war  against  Persia,  for  which  the  league  had 
been  ostensibly  formed,  had  ended,  Alexander  thought 
the  time  had  come  to  relieve  himself  of  the  partnership 
into  which,  following  the  policy  of  Philip,  he  had  entered 
at  the  opening  of  his  reign.  This  he  did  in  his  usual  dra- 
matic way.  He  discharged  all  the  Greek  troops  put  under 
his  command  by  the  league,  and  made  elaborate  provi- 
sion for  their  transport  back  to  the  coast  and  across  the 
Mediterranean  to  Greece.  To  every  Greek  city  which 
had  sent  him  a  contingent,  its  return  was  a  message  that 
Alexander  was  no  longer  bound  by  the  treaties  made 
when  the  league  was  formed.  This  did  not  mean,  as  he 
took  pains  to  show,  that  it  was  freed  thereby  from  all 
obligations  toward  him.  Over  the  Macedonians  he 
ceased  at  this  point  to  be  hegemon,  but  he  still  remained 
their  king.1 

A  little  later  he  appeared  before  his  astonished  Ma- 
cedonian officers  clad  in  what  pleased  him  of  the  costume 
of  the  Persians.  The  tiara  and  the  sleeved  jacket  and  the 
baggy  trousers  he  did  not  adopt,  but  he  took  their  soft 
undergarments,  and,  as  the  symbol  of  authority,  the 
diadem.  He  also  remodeled  his  court  in  the  Oriental 
fashion,  adding  purple  to  the  uniform  of  the  guards, 
chamberlains,  and,  if  a  dubious  report  is  to  be  trusted,  a 
harem.  Finally  in  327  B.C.,  shortly  after  his  romantic 
marriage  with  Roxane,  a  Persian  princess  of  the  Sogdian 

1  See  above,  page  28,  and  below,  page  243. 


ALEXANDER  AND  WORLD   MONARCHY    131 

nobility,  he  added  the  requirement  that  all  who  were 
admitted  to  his  presence  should  kneel  at  his  feet  and 
kiss  the  dust  before  him.  "Chares  of  Mytilene,"1  who 
was  master  of  ceremonies  when  this  custom  was  inaugu- 
rated, "says  that  Alexander,  while  drinking  at  a  sympo- 
sium, offered  his  goblet  to  one  of  his  comrades,  who, 
taking  it,  rose  and  went  to  the  hearth,  where,  quaffing 
it  off,  he  first  knelt  and  kissed  Alexander's  feet,  then 
kissed  his  cheek  and  returned  to  his  couch.  All  present 
did  the  same  except  Callisthenes,"  who  proffered  the 
kiss  on  the  cheek  without  first  kneeling  and  thus  earned 
the  disfavor  of  the  king.  With  this  rather  lame  conclu- 
sion was  enacted  the  prologue  of  what  his  old  Macedon- 
ian nobles  regarded  as  a  great  tragedy. 

"It  has  been  thought,"  says  Eduard  Meyer,2  "that 
proskynesis"  —  to  use  the  technical  term  for  this  cere- 
mony — ' '  was  only  the  natural  expression  of  the  fact  that 
by  the  arbitrament  of  battle  Alexander  had  become  lord 
of  the  Persian  empire  and  legitimate  successor  of  Darius. 
And,  indeed,  there  is  truth  in  this  idea.  But  the  meaning 
of  the  requirement,  and  the  historical  significance  of  the 
occurrence  and  of  the  conflict  which  it  occasioned,  are 
by  no  means  exhausted  when  proskynesis  is  regarded  as 
a  harmless  concession  to  the  views  of  his  Oriental  sub- 
jects. The  essential  point  is  that  Alexander  demanded 
it  of  the  Macedonians  and  Greeks  also.  It  is  precisely 
in  this  matter,  however,  that  the  views  of  Orientals  and 

1  Plut.,  Alex.  54.  ■  Kleine  Schriften,  pp.  314/. 


i32  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

Europeans  collide  most  squarely  and  typically.  Herein 
exists  an  antagonism  which  is  independent  altogether  of 
race  and  nationality.  We  cannot  say  how  it  arose,  but  it 
dominates  the  whole  course  of  the  cultural  and  political 
development  of  the  regions  in  question.  The  Oriental, 
be  he  a  Semite,  an  Egyptian,  an  Indo-European,  a  China- 
man, or  of  any  other  stock,  finds  it  natural  that  in  inter- 
course with  others  he  has  to  humble  himself;  that  he  call 
himself  their  servant,  them  his  masters;  that  he  kneel  in 
the  dust,  not  only  before  the  king,  but  before  all  supe- 
riors, without  lessening  thereby  the  sense  of  personal 
pride  with  which  he,  too,  may  be  animated. 

"To  the  European,  on  the  other  hand,  such  demeanor 
involves  the  destruction  of  his  own  personality.  Never 
will  a  free  man  call  himself  the  slave  of  another.  Rather, 
he  will  always  speak  of  himself  in  confident  tones,  with 
a  strong  feeling  of  his  own  worth.  .  .  .  Prostration  and 
kissing  the  dust  are  due,  in  European  thinking,  only  to  a 
god  who  is  thereby  acknowledged  to  be  the  lord  of  the 
worshiper,  in  whose  presence  the  worshiper  can  have  no 
will  of  his  own. 

"It  was  among  the  Greeks,  in  their  free  republics, 
that  this  feeling  developed  to  its  full  strength.  It  finds 
typical  expression  in  the  story  of  the  Spartan  heralds, 
Sperthies  and  Bulis,  who,  although  they  had  surrendered 
themselves  to  the  Persian  king  to  be  executed,  refused  to 
prostrate  themselves  before  him;  'for  in  their  country,' 
Herodotus  makes  them  say, '  it  was  not  customary  to  kiss 


ALEXANDER  AND  WORLD   MONARCHY    133 

the  dust  before  a  man,  nor  had  they  come  for  that  pur- 
pose.' The  stories  of  Themistocles  who  rendered  the 
required  homage,  and  of  Conon  who  on  its  account 
avoided  an  audience  with  the  King  altogether,  despite 
the  high  value  it  would  have  had  for  him,  are  similarly 
significant.  In  demanding  proskynesis,  accordingly, 
Alexander  offended  Greek  sentiment  violently.  Rather, 
what  he  thereby  demanded  was  the  acknowledgment 
that  officially,  in  his  capacity  of  king,  —  his  private 
position  is  a  different  matter  altogether,  —  he  was  no 
longer  a  man,  but  a  god." 

In  other  words,  when  Alexander  demanded  that 
Greeks  and  Macedonians  fall  at  his  feet  and  kiss  the 
dust  before  him,  he  demanded  that  they  recognize  him 
as  a  god,  as  in  fact  the  son  of  Zeus.  This  ceremony  had 
no  such  implications  for  the  Persians ;  but,  as  we  shall 
see  in  a  moment,  in  Alexander's  thinking,  the  Persians 
were  to  cease  to  exist ;  they  were  to  be  made  Hellenes  by 
education. 

Alexander  set  out  for  Asia  with  a  firm  belief  in  the 
absolute  superiority  of  Hellenic  culture;  and  in  this 
belief  he  remained  fixed  to  the  end.  To  establish  Hel- 
lenic life  throughout  Asia,  he  regarded  as  the  main  ob- 
ject of  his  conquests.  His  Hellenic  ideals  he  revealed  to 
the  astonished  natives  at  almost  every  halting-place  on 
his  march ;  for  on  such  occasions  he  again  and  again  held 
gymnastic  and  musical  contests  after  the  Greek  pat- 
tern.  As  we  have  seen,  he  had  learned  from  Aristotle 


134  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

that  city-life  and  Hellenic  life  were  synonymous,  and 
that  without  political  activity  city-life  was  animal 
rather  than  human  in  character.  Accordingly,  he  dis- 
played a  feverish  energy  in  founding  Greek  city-states 
everywhere  in  the  conquered  territory,  but  particularly 
in  the  regions  of  the  Far  East  where  urban  life  had  been 
hitherto  lacking.  Like  mushrooms  overnight,  towns  by 
the  scores  sprang  up  behind  him  on  his  line  of  march;  so 
vast  was  the  immigration  into  Asia  from  Greece  and 
Macedon  even  during  the  thirteen  brief  years  of  his 
reign. 

The  fact  was  that  by  founding  cities  Alexander  less- 
ened enormously  his  military  and  administrative  diffi- 
culties. For  every  city  took  from  his  shoulders  re- 
sponsibility for  maintaining  order,  collecting  taxes,  and 
dispensing  justice  in  the  territory  assigned  to  it  —  neces- 
sary tasks,  now  that  a  European  state  was  arising  in 
Asia,  which  could  be  performed  otherwise  only  by  the 
creation  of  a  bureaucratic  system  of  officials.  This,  how- 
ever, was  a  non-Hellenic  institution  for  which  Alexander 
had  naturally  no  liking.  In  the  future  he  saw  the  whole 
world  —  that  of  Asia  which  he  had  already  conquered 
and  that  of  the  Far  West  which  he  meant  to  conquer  — 
honeycombed,  like  Greece  itself,  with  a  multitude  of 
city-states,  each  a  separate  cell  with  a  town  in  its  cen- 
tre, each  possessed  of  a  general  assembly  and  a  council, 
magistrates  of  its  own  choosing  and  laws  of  its  own 
making  or  adoption,  each  the  home  of  free  men  speaking 


ALEXANDER  AND  WORLD  MONARCHY  135 
the  Greek  language,  fostering  Greek  art  and  letters,  and 
fighting  with  Greek  arms  and  tactics.  It  was  a  grand 
vision,  which  failed  of  realization  in  Alexander's  time 
and  thereafter;  but  it  set  forth  an  ideal  toward  which 
future  generations  moved  for  over  five  centuries. 

It  is  clear  that  Alexander  never  lost  faith  in  the  abso- 
lute supremacy  of  Hellenic  culture.  Certainly  the  place 
of  unlimited  authority  which  he  reserved  for  himself 
above  the  world  of  city-states  and  their  law-bound  citi- 
zens, was  the  one  prescribed  for  the  ideal  wise  man,  the 
man  of  supreme  political  ability,  by  Aristotle  his  tutor. 
That  Aristotle  thought  of  a  different  pambasileus  for 
each  city-state  and  Alexander  of  a  single  "absolute 
monarch"  for  all,  is  a  non-essential  difference,  and 
it  is  simply  in  the  institutions  which  Alexander  found 
necessary  to  translate  the  idea  of  the  philosopher  into 
the  world  of  reality  that  Hellenic  practice  and  custom 
were  violated. 

These  outlandish  institutions,  however,  Alexander 
employed  as  means  for  the  better  dissemination  of 
Greek  life  and  thought,  without  being  conscious,  per- 
haps, that  they  were  destructive  of  the  spirit  which 
they  were  intended  to  preserve. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  is  indisputable  that  Alexander 
revised  his  tutor's,  and  his  own  youthful,  opinion  as  to 
the  worth  of  the  Asiatics.  What  he  came  to  think  of 
Semites  and  Egyptians  we  do  not  know;  and  it  may  be 
that  he  continued  to  regard  them  as  naturally  servile 


i36  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

and,  hence,  condemned  them  to  remain  forever  hewers 
of  wood  and  drawers  of  water  for  the  Hellenic  or  Hellen- 
ized  citizens  in  whose  cities  they  were  to  live.  But  as  to 
the  Medes  and  Persians  and  the  kindred  Iranian  stocks 
of  the  Far  East,  the  views  of  their  conqueror  changed 
radically  when  he  came  really  to  know  them,  and  to 
appreciate  fully  the  magnitude  of  the  task  which  he  had 
undertaken. 

He  found  that  they  had  spirit  and  capacity  compar- 
able to  those  of  the  Greeks  and  Macedonians  themselves. 
That  they  caused  him  no  physical  repulsion  is  shown  by 
his  falling  in  love  with  and  marrying  Roxane.  Teach 
them  the  Greek  language,  draw  them  along  with  the 
immigrant  Greeks  into  the  body  politic  of  the  new 
cities,  equip  them  with  Macedonian  weapons,  drill  them 
in  the  Macedonian  fashion,  and  distribute  them  in  the 
Macedonian  regiments;  above  all,  use  the  nobles  in  the 
high  administrative  posts,  and  it  seemed  to  Alexander 
possible,  within  a  short  time,  to  fuse  the  new  masters  of 
Asia  with  the  old  into  a  new  cosmopolitan  race. 

With  iron  resolution  he  carried  this  policy  forward 
despite  all  opposition.  Then,  choosing  the  dramatic 
moment  of  his  return  to  Susa  after  his  Indian  campaign, 
he  arranged  an  extraordinary  marriage  as  a  symbol  of 
the  contemplated  fusion  of  the  dominant  peoples  of 
Europe  and  Asia.  "He  himself,"  says  Arrian  in  his 
Anabasis,1  quoting  Aristobulus,  an  eye-witness,  "mar- 

1  vii,  4.  4  ff- 


ALEXANDER  AND  WORLD   MONARCHY    137 

ried  Barsine  (rather  Stateira),  the  eldest  of  the  daughters 
of  Darius,  and,  in  addition  to  her,  another,  the  young- 
est of  the  daughters  of  Ochus  (the  able  predecessor  of 
Darius),  Parysatis.  Earlier,  too,  he  had  wedded  Roxane, 
the  daughter  of  Oxyartes  of  Bactria.  To  Hephsestion 
he  gave  Drypetis,  who,  too,  was  a  daughter  of  Darius 
and  sister  of  the  wife  he  took  himself;  for  he  wished  the 
children  of  Hephaestion  to  be  cousins  of  his  own  child- 
ren. To  Craterus  he  gave  Amastrine,  the  daughter  of 
Oxyartes,  Darius's  brother;  to  Perdiccas,  the  daughter 
of  Atropates,  satrap  of  Media;  to  Ptolemy,  his  aide,  and 
to  Eumenes,  his  private  secretary,  children  of  Artabazus, 
to  the  one  Artacama,  to  the  other,  Artonis.  To  Near- 
chus  he  gave  the  daughter  of  Barsine  and  Mentor,  to 
Seleucus  the  daughter  of  Spitamenes  of  Bactria;  and  in 
like  manner  to  his  other  companions  he  gave  the  most 
famous  of  the  daughters  of  the  Medes  and  Persians,  to 
the  number  of  eighty.  The  marriages  were  celebrated  in 
the  Persian  manner.  Seats  were  placed  in  order,  and  on 
them  the  bridegrooms  reclined";  and  at  this  point  we 
may  let  Chares,  master  of  ceremonies,  interrupt  Arrian 
and  describe  the  setting  which  he  had  arranged  for  the 
service. 

"  It  was,"  he  says,1  "a  hall  of  a  hundred  couches,  each 
large  enough  for  two  to  recline  at  table,  and  in  it  each 
couch,  made  of  twenty  minas'  worth  of  silver,  was 

1  Athenaeus,  xn,  pp.  538  ff.  (Translated  by  Wheeler  in  his  Alexander 
the  Great,  pp.  477  /.) 


138  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

decked  as  for  a  wedding.  Alexander's  had  feet  of  gold. 
And  to  the  feast  were  bidden  all  his  Persian  friends,  and 
given  places  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  hall  from  himself 
and  the  other  bridegrooms.  And  all  the  army  and  the 
sailors  and  the  embassies  and  the  visitors  were  assem- 
bled in  the  outer  court.  The  hall  was  decorated  in  most 
sumptuous  style,  with  expensive  rugs,  and  hangings  of 
fine  linen,  and  tapestries  of  many  colors  wrought  with 
threads  of  gold.  And  for  the  support  of  the  vast  tent 
which  formed  the  hall  there  were  pillars  thirty  feet  high, 
plated  with  silver  and  gold,  and  set  with  precious  stones. 
And  around  about  the  sides  were  costly  portieres,  em- 
broidered with  figures  and  shot  through  with  gold 
threads,  hung  on  gilded  and  silvered  rods. 

"The  circuit  of  the  court  was  half  a  mile.  Everything 
was  started  at  the  signal  of  a  trumpet-blast,  whether  it 
was  the  beginning  of  the  feast,  the  celebration  of  the 
marriages,  or  the  pouring  of  one  of  the  various  libations, 
so  that  all  the  army  might  know."  "After  the  banquet," 
resumes  Arrian,1  "the  brides  entered  and  seated  them- 
selves each  beside  her  fianc6,  who  thereupon  took  her 
by  the  hand  and  kissed  her;  and  the  first  to  do  this  was 
the  king.  .  .  .  Then  each  man,  taking  his  wife,  led  her 
away.  Their  dowries  Alexander  gave  to  every  one  of 
them.  And  he  caused  the  names  to  be  written  down  of 
all  the  other  Macedonians  who  had  married  Asiatic 
women,  and  there  were  said  to  be  over  ten  thousand  of 

1  vii,  4,  7/. 


ALEXANDER  AND  WORLD   MONARCHY    139 

them.   To  these,  too,  gifts  were  given  by  Alexander  at 
the  marriage  feast." 

For  five  consecutive  days  artists  from  every  land  and 
people  entertained  the  cosmopolitan  assembly  with  dis- 
plays of  skill  as  various  as  were  the  ideas  and  interests 
to  which  they  catered.  But  the  discord  was  lessened 
and  the  dominant  motiv  repeated  again  and  again  by 
the  appearance  and  reappearance  of  the  greatest  Greek 
masters  of  the  dramatic  and  musical  arts. 

It  being  established  by  these  many  incidents  that  it 
was  a  salient  trait  of  Alexander's  character  to  disclose 
his  fundamental  policies  by  acts  elaborately  staged  and 
performed  before  the  largest  possible  audiences,  we  may 
return  to  his  extraordinary  visit  to  the  temple  of  Ammon 
of  Cyrene.  He  had  first  to  proceed  one  hundred  and 
seventy-five  miles  along  the  Libyan  coast  and  then 
southwest  for  about  seven  days  before  reaching  his  goal. 
A  month  of  the  most  difficult  marching,  at  a  time  when 
every  day  was  precious,  was  the  high  price  which  Alex- 
ander thought  it  economical  to  pay  for  the  recognition 
which  he  there  received  as  the  son  of  Zeus.  What  was, 
then,  the  value  of  this  well-advertised  recognition? 

That  it  had  none  for  Egypt  and  the  nations  of  Asia, 
to  whom  the  god  of  Siwah,  like  the  prophet  in  his  own 
country,  was  without  honor,  implies  that  Alexander 
esteemed  highly  its  value  in  the  Greek  world,  where  the 
voice  heard  at  Siwah  was  in  fact  an  admonition  to  the 


i4o  GREEK  IMPERIALISM' 

pious  and  might  be  an  embarrassment  to  all  in  official 
positions.  An  oracle,  however,  was  always  addressed 
primarily  to  him  who  received  it.  Other  persons  could 
neglect  it  with  impunity.  Nevertheless,  Alexander  had 
made  it  improbable  that  anybody  should  be  unaware 
that  Zeus  had  acknowledged  him  as  his  son.  Doubtless, 
much  discussion  was  provoked ;  but  there  the  matter 
seems  to  have  ended  so  far  as  Hellas  was  concerned 
till  seven  years  later,  at  the  time  of  the  feast  at  Susa, 
when  Alexander  issued  a  mandate  to  all  the  Greek  city- 
states,  new  and  old,  that  they  should  recognize  him  as 
a  god. 

Strange  as  it  may  seem  to  us,  among  whom  church 
and  state  are  separated  sharply,  and  religion  depends 
upon  a  revelation  which  can  be  interpreted  but  not  sup- 
plemented, the  question  was  one  which  came  properly 
within  the  province  of  the  general  assembly  of  the  citi- 
zens of  each  city.  At  this  very  time  the  Athenians,  for 
example,  had  waiting  within  their  gates  many  foreign 
deities  whose  claims  to  official  recognition  were  being 
pressed  upon  the  ecclesia  by  votaries  among  both  the 
alien  and  the  native  population.  Such  were  Isis  the 
Egyptian,  and  the  Cypriote  Aphrodite.  In  compara- 
tively recent  times,  moreover,  the  ecclesia  had  yielded  to 
similar  solicitations,  and  had  enrolled  among  the  deities 
of  the  Athenian  people  Asclepius  and  the  Thracian 
Bendis.       . 

In  a  polytheistic  world  there  is  no  logical  limit  to  the 


ALEXANDER  AND  WORLD   MONARCHY    141 

possible  number  of  gods;  so  that  the  chance  always 
existed  that  there  were  deities  whom  a  given  community 
had  not  yet  discovered  at  any  given  moment.  There  is, 
in  such  a  world,  a  logical  necessity  that  anarchy  should 
be  absent  from  heaven.  Hence  each  community  had  to 
rank  its  gods  and  goddesses  according  to  their  power  and 
spheres  of  activity.  The  lowest  god,  demigod  or  hero 
was,  accordingly,  separated  from  mankind  by  no  deep  or 
broad  chasm.  With  most  of  their  deities,  in  fact,  the 
Greeks  were  on  terms  of  familiar  intimacy,  as  were 
mediaeval  Christians  with  their  saints.  Various  of  the 
lesser  gods,  Theseus  and  Heracles  among  the  ancestors 
of  Alexander  for  example,  had  once  been  men  who  had 
been  elevated  to  Olympus  by  the  grace  of  Zeus  because 
of  the  many  services  which  they  had  rendered  to  men. 
It  is  true  that  they  were  the  children  of  Zeus;  but  had 
not  Zeus  also  claimed  Alexander  as  his  own  son?  Why, 
then,  should  not  he  too  be  deified? 

The  difficulty  from  the  standpoint  of  religion  —  of 
the  sentiment  which  had  led  in  the  past  to  the  heroizing 
of  men  —  was  that  he  was  still  living.  And  this  was  an 
insurmountable  difficulty.  From  the  religious  concep- 
tions of  the  Greeks  the  worship  of  the  living  ruler  could 
never  be  derived;  and,  in  fact,  it  was  by  pious  people 
and  for  theological  reasons  that  the  rendering  of  divine 
honors  to  Alexander  was  opposed  in  Athens  and  else- 
where.1 The  most  that  could  be  expected  from  men  of 

1  In  Macedon,  by  the  regent  'AvrtTarpos,  aaefits  tovto  icplvas  (Suidas). 


142  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

religious  convictions  was  a  sullen  acquiescence  in  some- 
thing which  they  could  not  prevent. 

The  apotheosis  of  Alexander  was  grounded  in  im- 
piety, in  disbelief  in  the  supernatural  altogether.  For 
the  age  in  which  he  lived  was  marked  by  this  very  thing. 
In  that  time  of  storm  and  stress  the  ancient  Greek  reli- 
gion became  bankrupt.  For  enlightened  people  —  and 
their  name  was  then  legion  —  the  gods  had  ceased  to 
have  objective  reality.  Like  the  spirits  of  the  departed 
whom  Ulysses  had  recalled  to  consciousness  by  giving 
them  blood  to  drink,  they  were  dependent  for  their 
existence  upon  the  kindliness  of  men.  Without  the  min- 
istrations of  the  living  they  would  not  merely  be  for- 
gotten; they  would  be  annihilated.  It  was  the  gratitude 
of  mankind  which  had  kept  the  memory  of  benefactors 
green  by  rites  deemed  and  called  religious.  Once,  to  be 
sure,  the  deities  had  been  real  beings,  but  that  was 
before  they  had  died,  while  they  were  living  upon  the 
earth  as  men.  Then  they  had  performed  great  services 
—  had  founded  cities,  conquered  worlds,  established 
laws,  invented  arts,  developed  grains  and  fruits,  and 
trained  animals.  So  at  least  many  men  of  talent  and 
learning  already  taught.  But  it  remained  for  Euhemerus 
of  Messene,  about  fifty  years  later  (ca.  280  B.C.),  to  give 
the  idea  classic  expression  in  an  entertaining  work  of 
popularization.1    With    all     the    circumstantiality   of 

1  Pauly-Wissowa,  Real-encydopddie,  vi,  I,  pp.  952  ff.;  Wendland,  Die 
Hellenistisch-romische  Kultur  (1907),  pp.  67  ff. 


ALEXANDER  AND  WORLD  MONARCHY  143 
Defoe,  he  tells  how,  in  the  course  of  his  voyaging,  he  was 
driven  southward  into  the  Indian  Ocean  from  Araby  the 
Blest,  till  he  came  to  the  island  of  Panchaea.  There  he 
found  a  model  community  whose  social  and  political 
organization  he  described  in  the  manner  familiar  to  us 
from  Plato's  Republic.  There,  too,  he  made  a  remark- 
able discovery  —  an  account  written  on  golden  tablets 
in  "reformed  Egyptian"  by  Hermes  of  the  lives  and 
achievements  of  Chronus,  Zeus,  and  all  the  other  gods 
and  goddesses  of  the  Greek  hierarchy.  They  had  been 
kings  and  notables  of  Panchaea,  and  some  of  them,  like 
Zeus  and  Dionysus,  had  been  world  conquerors.  Others, 
indeed,  had  earned  the  favorable  verdict  of  posterity  by 
very  questionable  acts.  Aphrodite  was  the  first  prosti- 
tute, and  Cadmus,  the  grandfather  of  Dionysus,  was  the 
cook  of  a  king  in  Sidon  and  had  run  away  with  a  flute 
girl  named  Harmonia. 

This  "sacred  writ"  was  naturally  the  latest  and  most 
authoritative  revelation.  It  was  saved,  moreover,  from 
being  a  gospel  of  atheism  because,  as  Cumont *  says,  "It 
left  to  the  eternal  and  incorruptible  stars  .  .  .  the  dig- 
nity of  original  gods  and  exalted  them  in  proportion 
as  it  lowered  their  rivals  of  bygone  days."  The  signal 
merit  of  Chronus  had  been  to  introduce  the  worship 
of  the  heavenly  bodies  in  Panchaea. 

In  this  respect  the  Scriptures  of  Euhemerus  accorded 
with  a  strong  current  of  both  earlier  and  contemporary 

1  Astrology  and  Religion  among  the  Greeks  and  Romans  (19 12),  p.  55. 


144  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

religious  thought.  Most  men  at  that  time  recognized 
supernatural  powers  of  a  certain  sort,  like  Tyche, 
11  Chance,"  —  the  favorite  deity  of  the  Hellenistic  world, 
—  whose  play  in  human  affairs  modern  disbelievers  in 
religion  also  would  be  the  last  to  deny.  But  they  declined 
to  recognize  as  efficacious  the  gods  and  goddesses  in 
whose  honor  the  cities  maintained  temples,  priests, 
sacrifices,  and  games,  except  when  they  had  lived  on  the 
earth  as  men  and  women. 

At  the  best,  therefore,  these  deities  were  simply  pro- 
totypes of  Alexander,  who  had  founded  seventy  cities 
and  given  them  their  constitutions  and  laws,  who  had 
conquered  all  the  territory  which  Dionysus  had  once 
overrun,  and  who  was  planning  to  build  a  highway  along 
the  coast  of  North  Africa  to  the  pillars  set  by  Heracles 
at  the  limits  of  the  world ;  who,  moreover,  was  moulding 
the  masses  of  Europe  and  Asia  into  a  new  race,  and  up- 
held, as  no  god  had  ever  done,  the  social  and  political 
framework  of  the  world. 

Religion  was  unable  to  elevate  a  living  man  to  god- 
hood.  Even  in  Egypt  the  sacred  animals  were  but  sacred 
animals  till  seventy  days  after  their  death,  when  they 
became  deities.  But  irreligion,  having  degraded  all  gods 
to  the  level  of  human  beings,  had  no  reason  to  withhold 
from  great  men  the  homage  which  it  accorded  to  the 
great  dead. 

The  fundamental  document  on  the  deification  of 
Greek  kings  comes  to  us  stamped  with  the  seal  of  the 


ALEXANDER  AND  WORLD   MONARCHY    145 

Athenian  state.  It  was  sung  by  the  multitude  at  the  offi- 
cial reception  of  its  sovereign,  the  young  Macedonian 
king,  Demetrius  Poliorcetes,  on  his  return  to  Athens  in 
290  B.C.1  "The  king  comes,  light-hearted  as  befits  a 
god,  fair  and  laughing,  yet  majestic  withal  in  his  circle  of 
courtiers,  he  the  sun,  they  the  stars :  hail !  child  of  mighty 
Poseidon  and  of  Aphrodite.  The  other  gods  are  a  long 
way  off,  or  have  no  ears,  or  no  existence,  or  take  no  care 
of  us,  but  thee  we  see  face  to  face  —  a  true  god,  not  one 
of  wood  and  stone."  This  catchy  bit  of  blasphemy  makes 
it  impossible  for  any  reasonable  doubt  to  linger  as  to  the 
regions  of  thought  from  which  the  worship  of  Greek 
rulers  sprang. 

But  why  should  men  who  regarded  the  gods  they 
already  had  as  useless  burden  the  state  with  the  cult 
of  another  whose  power  was  only  too  real?  Why  aban- 
don King  Log  for  a  possible  King  Stork?  It  is  on  this 
point  chiefly  that  scholars  disagree  to-day.  There  are 
those  who  make  the  apotheosis  of  Alexander  a  tribute 
paid  by  the  Greeks  to  transcendant  genius,  a  result  of 
the  reverence-compelling  personality  of  the  man.  I 
confess,  however,  that  enthusiastic  admiration  such  as 
this  presupposes  does  not  seem  to  me  to  harmonize  with 
the  contemptuous  expressions  which  marked  the  estab- 
lishment of  his  cult  in  certain  places  in  Greece.2  In 
Sparta,  Damis  moved,  in  regard  to  Alexander's  message 

1  Ferguson,  Hellenistic  Athens,  p.  143. 

*  Meyer,  Ed.,  Kleine  Schriften,  p.  330,  n.  a. 


146  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

that  he  be  decreed  a  god,  that  the  Spartans  "let  him  be 
called  a  god  if  he  wishes  it";  while  in  Athens  Demos- 
thenes advised  his  fellow-citizens  "to  acknowledge  the 
king  as  the  son  of  Zeus,  or,  for  all  he  cared,  as  the  son  of 
Poseidon,  if  such  was  his  pleasure."  In  other  places, 
however,  the  recognition  seems  to  have  been  spontane- 
ous enough,  and  to  have  been  an  expression  of  real 
gratitude  for  services  rendered  or  expected.  But  Greeks 
on  earlier  occasions,  and  other  peoples  as  well,  were 
equally  grateful  and  no  less  servile  without  deifying  the 
object  of  those  sentiments.  Why  then  did  admiration, 
gratitude,  or  servility  take  this  form  in  this  particular 
instance? 

It  is  true  that  deification  was  demanded  of  the  Greek 
cities  by  Alexander,  and  that  it  was  in  response  to  a 
mandate  sent  out  by  him  from  Susa  in  324  B.C.  that 
"sacred  ambassadors,"  such  as  were  sent  to  gods  and 
not  to  kings  or  states,  arrived  at  Babylon  in  the  spring 
of  323  B.C.  a  few  weeks  before  Alexander's  death,  bearing 
the  decrees  in  which  his  request  was  granted.  But  for 
the  following  fifty  years  it  was  at  the  initiative  of  the 
Greek  cities,  and,  at  times,  against  the  will  and  interest 
of  the  recipient,  that  such  honors  were  conferred  upon 
later  rulers.  Hence  we  may  be  certain  that  in  the  first 
instance  deification  was  an  accommodation  both  to 
Alexander  and  to  the  cities  in  his  realm.  Nor  can  we,  I 
think,  be  in  serious  doubt  as  to  the  character  of  the 
service  it  rendered. 


ALEXANDER  AND  WORLD   MONARCHY    147 

It  gave  a  legal  position  to  Alexander  in  the  world  of 
city-states  which  he  was  organizing.  It  was  unjust, 
Aristotle  had  taught  him,  that  a  man  of  supreme  politi- 
cal capacity  —  such  as  he  had  displayed  —  should  be 
treated  as  worthy  of  mere  equality  in  the  cities  of  his 
realm.  Yet  he  could  be  treated  in  no  other  fashion  if  he 
were  to  be  a  citizen  of  them.  On  the  other  hand,  now 
that  he  had  freed  himself  from  the  constitutional  limi- 
tations placed  upon  the  earlier  kings  of  Macedon  and 
from  the  treaties  which  he  had  formed  with  the  Hellenic 
cities  at  the  opening  of  his  reign,  he  ran  the  risk  of  being 
put  to  death  or  outlawed  or  ostracized,  if  he  were  not,  as 
Aristotle  suggested,  rated  as  a  deity  upon  the  earth. 

From  his  point  of  view,  his  rule  was  legitimatized 
when  he  was  enrolled  among  the  deities  recognized  by 
each  city;  for  thereafter  he  had  a  clear  right  to  issue 
orders  to  all  the  citizens  of  his  world.  From  their  point 
of  view,  on  the  other  hand,  by  deifying  Alexander  they 
escaped  from  the  intolerable  necessity  of  obeying  the 
commands  of  a  foreigner.  They  thereby  gave  their  con- 
sent to  be  ruled  by  him.  They  subordinated  their  will 
to  his. 

The  deification  of  rulers  was,  accordingly,  simply  the 
proskvnesis  of  cities.  Its  consequences  were  an  abso- 
lutism such  as  Europe  —  and  for  that  matter  Asia  — 
had  never  known  before  and  has  never  ceased  to  know 
since.  And  it  is  this  melancholy  consequence  of  apothe- 
osis which  has  only  too  frequently  obscured  its  signal 


i48  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

service :  that  it  made  possible  the  lasting  union  of  all  the 
city-states  of  the  world  in  a  single  great  territorial  state. 

SELECT  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

1.  Hogarth,  D.  The  Deification  of  Alexander  the  Great.  In 
English  Historical  Review,  n  (1887),  pp.  317  ff. 

2.  Niese,  B.  Zur  Wiirdigung  Alexander's  des  Grossen.  In 
Historische  Zeitschrift,  lxxix  (1897),  pp.  1  ff. 

3.  Wheeler,  B.  I.  Alexander  the  Great,  (1900). 

4.  Bevan,  E.  The  Deification  of  Kings  in  the  Greek  Cities.  In 
English  Historical  Review,  xvi  (1901),  pp.  625  ff. 

5.  Meyer,  Eduard.  Alexander  der  Grosse  und  die  absolute 
Monarchic   In  Kleine  Schriften  (1910),  pp.  283/". 

6.  Karst,  J.  Der  hellenistische  Herrscherkult.  Beilage  2  in 
Geschichtedeshellenistischen  Zeitalters,  II,  1  (1909),  pp.  374 ff. 

7.  Ferguson,  W.  S.  Legalized  Absolutism  en  route  from  Greece 
to  Rome.  In  American  Historical  Review,  xvm  (1912),  pp. 
29/. 


V 

THE  EMPIRE  OF  THE   PTOLEMIES 

The  death  of  Alexander  the  Great  was  followed  by 
some  days  of  indescribable  confusion.  When  a  certain 
semblance  of  order  was  restored  the  view  was  officially 
promulgated  that  he  had  not  died  at  all,  but  had  simply 
"departed  from  the  life  among  men."  His  memory  was, 
accordingly,  not  damned ;  and,  in  a  sense,  his  presence 
in  the  world  which  he  had  transformed  continued  to  be 
recognized.  But  not  in  any  real  sense.  The  imperial 
coins,  wherever  issued,  bore  for  some  time  the  great 
king's  face  as  Zeus  Ammon;  but  no  imperial  cult  existed 
to  bring  steadily  to  men's  consciousness  the  idea  that 
their  dead  lord  had  an  honored  place  among  the  Olym- 
pians. It  was  not  by  the  will  of  those  who  succeeded  to 
his  power,  but  by  the  force  of  historic  developments, 
that  his  acta  were  validated. 

His  heirs  were  the  Macedonians  whom  he  had  recently 
tried  to  oust  from  their  ancestral  partnership  with  him. 
They  were  now  to  be  found,  partly  in  Macedon,  partly 
in  detachments  throughout  the  empire,  and  partly  in 
Babylon  where  Alexander  had  died.  Those  in  Babylon 
took  it  upon  themselves  to  act  for  the  whole  people;  and 
what  they  did  was  to  establish  a  regency  in  the  interest 
of  Philip  Arrhidaeus  and  the  son  whom  Roxane  was 


i5o  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

expected  to  bear,  and  to  concur  in  the  "grab"  of  the 
important  western  satrapies  which  was  at  once  made  by 
their  chief  officers. 

It  was  they,  too,  who  decided  not  to  proceed  with 
Alexander's  ambitious  projects.  These,  as  read  to  them 
from  his  papers,1  were  "to  build  in  Phoenicia,  Syria, 
Cilicia,  and  Cyprus  one  thousand  battleships  of  the 
super- trireme  pattern  for  the  campaign  against  the 
Carthaginians  and  the  other  peoples  dwelling  on  the 
shores  of  the  Mediterranean  from  Libya  and  Iberia 
clear  round  to  Sicily ;  to  construct  a  road  along  the  coast 
from  Cyrene  to  the  Pillars  of  Hercules,  and  prepare 
harbors  and  naval  stations  at  suitable  places;  to  erect 
six  temples  at  the  enormous  cost  of  $1,890,000  each 
(fifteen  hundred  talents) ;  to  found  cities  and  transplant 
men  and  women  both  from  Asia  into  Europe  and  from 
Europe  into  Asia,  thus  linking  the  two  greatest  conti- 
nents by  understandings  based  upon  friendly  inter- 
course and  by  brotherly  feeling  due  to  intermarriages." 
Alexander,  it  appeared,  had  looked  upon  his  work  as 
only  half  done:  the  Macedonians  were  eager  to  enjoy 
the  fruits  of  an  enterprise  which  they  regarded  as 
already  finished. 

Their  sentiment  was  shared  by  Ptolemy,  son  of  Lagos, 
formerly  one  of  Alexander's  aides.  He  had  married  a 
Persian  princess  at  Alexander's  order,  but  now  he 
deserted  her,  and,  taking  his  Athenian  mistress,  Thais, 

1  Diodorus,  xvm,  4. 


THE   EMPIRE   OF  THE   PTOLEMIES     151 

with  him,  he  went  off  to  Egypt,  which  had  been  given 
to  him  as  his  province.  There  he  established  himself 
securely,  governed  with  power  and  sagacity  for  forty 
years,  and,  marrying  in  succession  two  Macedonian  prin- 
cesses, founded  a  dynasty  which  gave  to  Egypt  its  last 
great  queen,  Cleopatra  VI,  and  prior  to  her  accession, 
ten  kings,1  all  of  whom  were  named  Ptolemy.  Between 
them  they  reigned  two  hundred  and  seventy-one  years ; 
the  average  length  of  the  reign  was  over  thirty-two 
years ;  several  of  them  were  expelled  temporarily  and 
several  of  them  had  colleagues,  but  nine  of  them  died  in 
possession  of  the  throne.  That  constitutes  a  statistical 
record  which  it  is  hard  to  parallel  in  all  history. 

It  would  be  a  fascinating  study  of  human  enterprise 
and  human  depravity  to  trace  the  careers  of  these  eleven 
monarchs.  But  to  do  so  would  be  to  exhaust  the  space  at 
my  disposal  without  reaching  the  special  subject  of  my 
essay.  It  must  suffice,  therefore,  to  observe  that  the 
history  of  the  Ptolemies  falls  into  an  imperial  period  of 
four  reigns  and  one  hundred  and  twenty  years  (323- 
203  B.C.) ;  and  a  domestic  period,  likewise  of  one  hundred 
and  twenty  years  (200-80  B.C.),  in  which  the  native 
peoples,  encouraged  by  the  weakness  of  the  Ptolemies 
abroad,  and  by  a  ruinous  schism  between  the  military 
and  the  civil  elements  of  the  foreign-resident  population, 
gained  point  after  point  at  the  expense  of  the  dynasty. 
A  third  period  follows  of  fifty  years'  duration,  in  which 
*  Omitting  the  shadowy  Eupator,  Philopator  Neos,and  Alexander  II. 


i52  GREEK   IMPERIALISM 

Egypt  was  at  the  mercy,  not  now  of  the  Roman  Senate, 
but  of  the  all-powerful  generals  who  had  dethroned  it. 

The  last  king  of  Egypt,  Ptolemy  the  Piper,  a  bastard 
by  birth  and  instinct,  demeaned  himself  for  twenty-eight 
years  (80-52  B.C.) ;  but  by  bankrupting  his  treasury  and 
sacrificing  the  good  opinion  of  his  countrymen,  he  man- 
aged to  transmit  a  badly  tarnished  crown  to  his  famous 
daughter,  then  a  girl  of  seventeen  years. 

Cleopatra  VI  had  an  asset  of  much  greater  value  than 
the  servility  and  buffoonery  of  her  father,  namely,  her 
personal  attractiveness.  She  early  lost  all  repugnance 
against  using  her  physical  charms,  as  well  as  her  even 
more  notable  mental  graces,  in  what,  with  all  our  dis- 
like for  the  imperial  courtesan,  we  must  characterize 
as  her  gallant  and  patriotic  effort  to  rescue  her  country 
from  the  spoiler,  to  make  the  queen  of  Egypt  the  con- 
sort instead  of  the  slave  of  the  coming  Roman  monarch, 
to  set  proud  Alexandria  beside  imperious  Rome  at  the 
head  of  the  Mediterranean  peoples. 

She  gave  herself  to  Julius  Caesar;  bore  him  a  son;  left 
her  kingdom  and  joined  him  in  Rome,  where  Cicero  and 
others  paid  her  court  in  Caesar's  gardens,  wondering, 
perhaps,  if  she  was  to  become  their  titular  queen.  In 
contemporary  documents  Caesar  is  called  "the  savior 
and  benefactor  of  the  inhabitable  world";  and  during 
the  last  year  of  his  life  he  was  busied  with  projects  of 
universal  empire.  He  meant  to  add  the  districts  not  yet 
Roman  to  his  realm,  to  subdue  the  Getae,  the  Scythians, 


THE  EMPIRE  OF  THE   PTOLEMIES     153 

and  the  Parthians.  Why  was  not  Egypt,  the  richest 
prize  of  all,  included  in  the  list  of  his  intended  conquests  ? 
It  was  the  country  which  he  had  tried  over  twenty  years 
earlier  to  secure  as  his  own  province.  But  that  was 
before  he  had  met  Cleopatra.  That  he  left  it  out  of  the 
military  programme  on  which  he  was  engaged  at  the 
time  of  his  murder  shows,  I  think,  that  Cleopatra's  solu- 
tion of  the  Egyptian  question  was  likely  to  be  his  also. 
Ten  years  later  Alexandria  witnessed  an  extraordi- 
nary spectacle.1  On  a  stage  plated  with  silver  two 
thrones  of  gold  stood,  and  on  them  sat  side  by  side 
Antony  as  Dionysus  and  Cleopatra  as  Isis.  At  their  feet 
sat  Caesarion,  Cleopatra's  son  by  Caesar,  and  on  a  level 
with  him  Alexander,  her  oldest  son  by  Antony,  in  Per- 
sian costume  and  with  the  tiara  of  the  Persian  kings. 
Lower  down  sat  Alexander's  twin  sister,  Cleopatra 
Selene,  and  at  her  side  her  younger  brother,  Philadel- 
phus,  in  Macedonian  costume  and  with  the  headgear  of 
the  kings  of  Macedon.  The  significance  of  the  tableau 
Antony  himself  explained:  Cleopatra,  queen  of  Egypt, 
Cyprus,  and  Ccele-Syria,  was  henceforth  'queen  of 
queens';  her  son,  Caesarion,  'king  of  kings.'  Alexander 
was  declared  king  of  Armenia  and  of  the  states  lying 
between  the  Euphrates  and  India,  Philadelphus,  of 
Syria  and  all  the  lands  between  the  Euphrates  and  the 
Hellespont,  Cleopatra  Selene,  queen  of  Libya  includ- 

1  Bouche-Leclercq,  Histoire  des  Lagides,  n,  p.  278;  Plut.,  Antony,  54; 
Dio  Cassius,  xlix,  41. 


i54  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

ing  Cyrene.  It  was  the  restoration  of  the  ancient  empire 
of  the  Ptolemies,  and  in  Antony  "captured  Italy"  was 
symbolized.  The  Alexandrian  siren  had  regained  what 
her  ancestors  had  lost;  and,  had  the  Roman  whom  she 
had  enthralled  only  proved  equal  to  the  task  of  maintain- 
ing his  initial  ascendency  in  Italy,  she  might,  indeed, 
have  fulfilled  her  boast  and  administered  justice  on  the 
Capitol.  But  Antony  went  down  to  defeat  at  Actium 
and  the  young  Augustus  came  to  Egypt,  like  the  com- 
rades of  Ulysses  to  the  shore  of  the  tempters,  with  his  ears 
stuffed  with  wax. 

Pascal1  says:  Le  nez  de  Cleopdtre :  sHl  exit  ete  plus 
court,  toute  la  face  de  la  terre  aurait  change.  But  Pascal 
speaks  as  a  philosopher.  He  probably  did  not  know  that 
Cleopatra  had  a  prominent  nose.  He  was  certainly  ig- 
norant that  her  death  made  little  or  no  difference  in 
the  constitutional  position  of  Egypt.  In  a  sense  Au- 
gustus was  simply  the  executor  of  the  great  queen's 
policy;  for,  after  his  reorganization  of  the  Roman 
empire  was  completed,  "it  is,"  as  Mommsen  2  says, 
"quite  as  correct  to  say  that  the  kings  of  Egypt 
ruled  in  Rome  as  that  the  prince  of  the  Roman  peo- 
ple reigned  in  the  valley  of  the  Nile."  Be  that  as  it 
may,  the  empire  of  the  Ptolemies  could  not  have  been 
recalled  from  the  past  even  by  the  magic  of  a  woman's 

1  Pensees,  vi,  43  bis.  Ed.  Havet;cf.  Bouchk-Leclercq,  Hist,  des  Lagides, 
11,  p.  180,  n.  1. 

*  Gesammelte  Schriften,  IV,  p.  256. 


THE  EMPIRE  OF  THE  PTOLEMIES    155 

beauty;  for,  as  we  shall  see  when  we  come  to  look  at  the 
second  period  of  its  history,  the  death  it  had  died  was  a 
natural  one.  It  had  but  experienced  the  fate  to  which  its 
constitution  made  it  prone.  It  was  beset  from  its  birth 
with  incurable  weaknesses. 

None  the  less  it  made  a  brave  show  during  the  first 
century  of  its  existence;  and  during  the  reign  of  its 
second  monarch,  Ptolemy  Philadelphus  (285-246  B.C.), 
its  capital,  Alexandria,  was  the  London  of  the  ancient 
world.  Its  only  rival  in  trade  and  commerce  was  its 
neighbor  to  the  west,  Carthage.  The  golden  age  of  the 
Ptolemies  coincides  with  the  one  epoch  in  the  history  of 
the  world  in  which  Africa  was  the  leader  in  business 
enterprise,  in  money  power,  in  naval  strength,  in  luxury, 
in  science,  and,  till  the  real  test  came,  in  political  pres- 
tige and  influence.  The  commercial  aristocracy  of 
Carthage  and  the  enlightened  despots  of  Alexandria  had 
the  Mediterranean  divided  between  them.  West  of 
Sicily  lay  a  Carthaginian  lake,  into  which  foreign  ships 
entered  at  their  own  peril ;  east  of  it,  the  chief  harbors  in 
the  whole  circuit  from  Cyrene  to  Corcyra,  as  well  as  the 
islands  which  lay  in  the  area  thus  inclosed,  the  Ptolemies 
aimed  to  secure.  Possession  of  the  sea  between  Egypt 
and  the  Graeco- Macedonian  world  and  of  the  coasts 
which  it  washed  and  the  islands  which  it  surrounded, 
was  the  main  object  of  the  foreign  policy  of  the  early 
Ptolemies. 

The  founder  of  the  dynasty  was  a  brave  soldier,  but 


i56  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

a  cautious  general.  Again  and  again  he  withdrew  from 
Asia  before  a  land  attack  and  put  his  main  reliance 
upon  the  natural  defenses  of  Egypt.  He  was  no  sailor  at 
all ;  yet  he  became  an  admiral,  and  as  the  result  of  three 
great  maritime  expeditions  (308-306,  295-294,  288- 
287  B.C.),  he  handed  over  to  his  unwarlike  son  the  essen- 
tial body  of  the  possessions  of  the  family  outside  of 
Egypt.  The  founder  of  the  dynasty  was  at  the  same 
time  the  founder  of  the  empire. 

The  Solomon  of  the  Ptolemies,  Philadelphus,  is 
addressed  by  Theocritus,1  a  Sicilian  poet  who  had 
recently  come  to  Alexandria  looking  for  a  patron,  in  the 
following  adulatory  strains :  — 

"Lo  he  hath  seen  three  hundred  towns  arise, 
Three  thousand,  yea  three  myriad;  and  o'er  all 
He  rules,  the  prince  of  heroes,  Ptolemy. 
Claims  half  Phoenicia,  and  half  Araby, 
Syria  and  Libya,  and  the  ^Ethiops  murk; 
Sways  the  Pamphylian  and  Cilician  braves, 
The  Lycian  and  the  Carian  trained  to  war, 
And  all  the  isles;  for  never  fleet  like  his 
Rode  upon  ocean:  land  and  sea  alike 
And  sounding  rivers  hail  King  Ptolemy." 

The  hero  of  these  lines  had  just  brought  a  war  against  his 
brother  in  Cyrene  and  his  rival  in  Asia  to  a  successful 
termination  (273  B.C.) ;  and,  except  for  a  probable  inter- 
val of  four  years  (253-249  B.C.),  the  invincible  fleet 
which  he  then  possessed  ruled  the  sea  till  his  death.  But 
he  was  anything  but  a  warrior  king.    During  his  whole 

1  Idyll,  xvil.    (Translation  of  Calverley.) 


THE  EMPIRE  OF  THE  PTOLEMIES     157 

life  he  never  commanded  an  army  or  a  fleet  in  person. 
Like  Augustus  Caesar,  with  whom  he  has  been  compared, 
he  had  a  delicate  constitution  which  unfitted  him  for  the 
rough  and  tumble  of  war.  He  had  a  lively  intelligence, 
which  was  carefully  cultivated,  and,  like  the  Emperor 
Hadrian,  an  insatiable  thirst  for  novelties.  A  new  book, 
an  old  painting,  a  strange  animal,  a  useful  invention, 
alike  aroused  his  curiosity.  One  amazing  woman  —  his 
own  sister  —  swept  him  from  his  self-indulgent  moor- 
ings. She  made  herself  his  wife  —  as  any  Egyptian 
woman  might  do  with  her  brother  —  and,  though  she 
was  his  queen  for  six  years  at  most  (275-270  B.C.),  when 
she  was  over  forty  and  he  over  thirty-two,  he  followed 
her  policy  and  cherished  her  memory  for  many  long 
years. 

That  her  acta  might  not  be  invalid  he  had  her  deified 
after  her  death,  and  that  he  might  still  be  her  consort, 
he  had  himself  elevated  at  the  same  time  to  her  side  as 
the  first  self-constituted  god-king  since  Alexander. 

A  sensualist  by  instinct,  he  surrounded  himself  in 
Alexandria  with  everything  that  appealed  to  his  varie- 
gated lusts.1  The  women  whom  he  took  into  his  harem 
after  his  sister's  death  were  given  palaces  and  race- 
horses, public  statues,  —  in  costumes  which  were  not 
always  modest,  —  and  even  divine  honors.  Splendid 
new  quarters  were  laid  out  in  Alexandria,  and  public 
works  erected  there  and  elsewhere  in  his  realm.    The 

1  See  Droysen,  Geschichte  des  Hellenismus,2  m,  pp.  262  ff. 


i58  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

capital  thronged  with  scientific,  literary,  and  musical 
celebrities,  attracted  by  the  endowments  and  collections 
of  the  Museum,  the  richness  of  the  library,  the  profusion 
of  festivals,  and  the  liberality  of  the  king,  who  wished 
Alexandria  to  become  to  the  new  world  what  Athens 
had  been  to  the  old. 

Yet  despite  all  these  manifold  gratifications,  life 
palled  on  the  much-experienced  monarch.  He  turned 
from  the  doctors  to  the  quacks,  and,  shrinking  from  pain 
and  death,  experimented  with  draughts  that  were 
alleged  to  confer  immortality :  a  strange  act  for  one  who 
was  already  a  god !  While  suffering  agony  from  the  gout, 
he  envied  the  lot  of  the  fellahs,  whom  he  saw  from  his 
window  stretched  out  on  the  sand  in  the  sun  eating  their 
simple  meal.  "Ye  poor,"  he  is  said  to  have  once  ex- 
claimed, "would  that  I  had  been  one  of  you." 

"From  behind  the  rich  curtains  of  his  palace,"  as  his 
stout  adversary,  Antigonus  of  Macedon,1  phrased  it, 
Ptolemy  Philadelphus  played  cautiously  and  adroitly 
the  great  game  of  international  politics.  His  emissaries, 
laden  with  gifts  and  money,  were  to  be  found  at  every 
capital  from  the  Ganges  to  the  Tiber.  "  Mighty  kings" 
and  "great  cities,"  Theocritus  tells  us,2  were  in  his  pay; 
and  in  the  harbor  of  Alexandria  many  great  battleships 
lay  ready  to  give  emphasis  to  diplomacy,  to  support  the 
agents  whom  his  gold  had  brought  into  action. 

By  these  means,  too,  he  kept  open  the  roads  which 
1  Plut.,  Aratus,  xv.  *  Idyll,  xvn,  no/. 


THE  EMPIRE  OF  THE  PTOLEMIES     159 

led  across  the  sea  from  all  directions  to  Alexandria;  shut 
off,  by  a  fringe  of  Egyptian  possessions,  the  great  con- 
tinental empire  of  the  Seleucids  from  access  to  the 
Mediterranean;  and  kept  Greece  so  persistently  in 
insurrection  against  its  suzerain,  Macedon,  that  he  was 
able  to  ward  off  all  danger  from  that  quarter. 

He  enlarged  his  inherited  empire  by  seizing  Ionia 
when  Eumenes  I  of  Pergamum  threw  off  the  suzerainty 
of  the  Seleucids  and  shattered  their  authority  in  Asia 
Minor  (263-261  B.C.) ;  but  the  gains  he  then  made  he 
had  to  abandon  during  the  upheaval  which  accompa- 
nied the  revolt  of  his  "son"  in  Ephesus  (259-255  B.C.), 
and  he  suffered  still  further  losses  in  Asia  during  the 
war  he  waged  thereafter  (253-249  B.C.),  with  Macedon 
and  Syria  combined.  These,  however,  his  son,  Euer- 
getes,  at  the  opening  of  his  reign  (246-242  B.C.),  re- 
gained, and   he   acquired  districts  in    Ionia    and   the 
Hellespont  besides;  and  the  position  which  he  thereby 
secured  he  held  till  his  death  twenty  years  later.  On  the 
sea,  however,  he  showed  himself  less  persistent  than  his 
father.    Philadelphus  had  lost  control  of  the  ^Egean 
when  beaten  at  Cos  in  253  B.C.  by  Antigonus  of  Mace- 
don, but  had  not  rested  till  he  had  regained  it  four 
years  later,  when  the  league  of  the  Islanders,  which  was 
the  immediate  bone  of  contention,  came  again  under  the 
authority  of  his  admirals.  Euergetes  suffered  a  crushing 
naval  defeat  in  242  B.C.  off  the  island  of  Andros  at  the 
hands  of  the  "veteran"  Antigonus;  whereupon  he  let  the 


1 60  GREEK   IMPERIALISM 

Cyclades  go  altogether.  That  was  not  the  only  sequel, 
however ;  for  in  consequence  of  the  large  outlay  for  little 
gain  entailed  in  building  and  keeping  in  readiness  the 
huge  battleships  then  employed,  and  perhaps  also  in 
consequence  of  the  failure  of  the  Carthaginians,  despite 
great  naval  expense  and  preparations,  to  hold  the  sea 
against  the  improvised  fleets  of  Rome  in  the  First  Punic 
War  (which  had  just  ended),  the  third  Ptolemy,  like  the 
Barcid  government  in  Carthage,  abandoned  the  policy 
of  maintaining  a  fleet  strong  enough  to  drive  all  enemies 
from  their  respective  parts  of  the  Mediterranean.  It  was 
a  great  mistake  in  each  case.  When  at  the  end  of  the 
third  century  B.C.  Macedon  and  Syria,  the  traditional 
and  long-suffering  enemies  of  Egypt,  were  in  a  position 
to  renew  their  joint  struggle  with  the  Ptolemies,  the  far- 
spread  Ptolemaic  empire  fell  together  like  a  house  of 
cards,  and  Rome  alone  saved  the  dynasty  from  complete 
destruction. 

A  variety  of  motives  actuated  the  early  Ptolemies  in 
their  struggle  for  foreign  dominions.  Pride  of  possession 
was  among  them,  of  course.  The  court  poet  Callima- 
chus  l  struck  a  responsive  chord  when,  in  his  poem  on 
the  death  of  Arsinoe,  the  sister-wife  of  Philadelphus,  he 
has  the  sad  news  flashed  from  beacon  point  to  beacon 
point  till  it  reaches  Lemnos  at  the  outer  edge  of  the 
empire.    National  honor  is  a  strong  motive  for  action, 

1  Wilamowitz-Moellendorff,  Sitzb.  d.  Bed.  Akad.  xxix  (1912),  pp.  524^. 


THE   EMPIRE  OF  THE   PTOLEMIES     161 

but  it  is  commonly  stirred  by  the  fear  of  losing  some- 
thing possessed  rather  than  by  the  hope  of  acquiring 
something  new.  Hence  we  must  look  deeper  for  the 
reasons  which  led  cautious  statesmen  like  the  first  two 
Ptolemies  to  place  round  Egypt  its  girdle  of  power. 

The  motive  suggested  by  Polybius  l  is  quite  different. 
It  was  with  regard  to  possible  movements  on  the  part 
of  the  monarchs  of  Syria,  Asia  Minor,  Thrace,  and 
Macedcn  that  the  Ptolemies  held,  as  he  says,  "  the  most 
important  towns,  places,  and  harbors  along  the  whole 
coast"  of  the  eastern  Mediterranean.  And  there  can  be 
no  doubt  that  he  is  right  in  attributing  this  rather 
malicious  aim  to  them.  They  were,  doubtless,  great 
intriguers.  But  to  Polybius,  looking  on  from  without, 
from  one  of  the  districts  which  had  been  affected  by  the 
close  proximity  of  Egyptian  garrisons  and  naval  sta- 
tions, the  connection  of  these  posts  with  the  foreign 
policy  of  the  Ptolemies  was  apt  to  obtrude  itself  to  the 
exclusion  of  everything  else.  Nowadays  historians  are 
prone  to  a  similar  onesidedness  because  of  the  close 
attention  they  give  to  economic  factors.  They  are  quite 
right  when  they  stress  the  importance  of  Ptolemaic 
naval  power  and  of  the  vantage-points  held  in  Europe 
and  Asia  for  the  development  of  Alexandrian  commerce. 
The  lighthouse  which  Ptolemy  erected  at  the  mouth  of 
the  Nile  at  a  cost  of  a  million  dollars  (eight  hundred 
talents)  was  not  only  one  of  the  seven  wonders  of  the 

»  v,  34.  6-8. 


162  GREEK   IMPERIALISM 

world:  it  was  a  messenger  of  good  will  to  the  trading 
vessels  which  came  from  all  the  dependencies  with  or 
without  cargoes,  to  get  for  Greek  consumption  the 
varied  products  of  the  Alexandrian  factories,  the 
Egyptian  grain-fields,  and  the  Nile-borne  traffic  of 
Arabia,  India,  Somaliland,  and  Ethiopia.  What  the 
lighthouse  symbolizes,  the  growth  of  Alexandria  to  half 
a  million  in  a  hundred  years  proves:  the  magnitude  of 
the  commerce  which  the  transmarine  possessions  of 
Egypt  stimulated,  when  they  did  not  originate  it. 

Where  the  economic  historians  are  wrong,  however, 
is  in  doing  what  Polybius  did.  He  made  the  imperial 
policy  of  the  early  Ptolemies  primarily  foreign;  they 
make  it  primarily  commercial.  The  truth  is  that  it  was 
dictated  also  by  the  plain  necessities  of  the  domestic 
situation.   Let  us  see  what  that  was. 

The  first  Ptolemy  had  stepped  into  the  place  of  the 
Pharaohs  on  Alexander  the  Great's  death.  The  only 
right  he  cared  to  acknowledge  for  the  obedience  of  the 
Egyptians  was  the  right  of  conquest.  As  for  them,  we 
may  be  sure  that  just  as  they  created  the  myth  that 
Alexander  was  not  really  Philip's  child,  but  a  son  begot- 
ten from  Olympias  by  either  Nectanebus,  the  last  native 
Pharaoh,  or  Ammon,  the  great  god  himself  who  had 
taken  the  form  of  Nectanebus  for  the  purpose;  and  just 
as  they  in  later  times  represented  Caesar  and  Antony  as 
Ammon  reincarnate,  that  Cleopatra's  bastard  children 


THE  EMPIRE  OF  THE  PTOLEMIES  163 
might  be  legitimate  Pharaohs:  so,  too,  they  applied 
to  Ptolemy  the  fiction  by  which  for  thousands  of  years 
they  had  been  wont  to  bridge  over  the  gaps  in  the 
genealogy  of  their  kings.1 

The  bridge  was  necessary,  however;  for,  in  their  think- 
ing, the  gods,  who  had  once  lived  among  men,  on  with- 
drawing to  the  divine  abodes,  had  left  one  of  their 
number  to  rule  over  the  world  —  which,  of  course,  was 
Egypt.  From  him  all  their  kings  were  descended.  The 
Pharaoh  was,  accordingly,  the  only  god  who  resided  upon 
the  earth,  and,  as  such,  fittingly  the  mediator  between 
men  and  the  great  gods  and  goddesses  of  the  upper  and 
nether  world.2  The  Pharaoh  was,  therefore,  both  the 
god-king  and  the  chief  priest.  The  whole  land  and 
people  of  Egypt  were  his  property.  Without  his  pres- 
ence and  ministrations  the  earth  would  literally  languish 
and  grow  barren,  and  the  men,  women,  and  children 
would  perish.  Egypt  was,  accordingly,  bound  to  have  a 
legitimate  Pharaoh.  Ptolemy  could  be  made  Amnion's 
offspring  as  easily  as  Alexander  the  Great;  but  how  it 
was  done  we  do  not  know. 

On  his  arrival  in  Egypt,  Ptolemy  found  there  two 
other  states  in  addition  to  that  of  the  Egyptians.  These 
were  the  old  Greek  city  of  Naucratis  and  the  new  city  of 
Alexandria.    A  third  arose  when  he  himself  founded 


1  Bouche-Leclercq,  Histoire  des  Lagides,  in,  pp.  i  ff. 

2  Breasted,  J.  H.,  Development  of  Religion  and  Thought  in  Ancient 
Egypt  (1912). 


164  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

Ptolemais  to  be  to  Upper  Egypt  what  Alexandria  was  to 
Lower  Egypt  —  the  centre  and  rallying  point  of  Hel- 
lenic interests.  To  these  three  city-states  he  added  a 
multitude  of  others  in  and  about  the  Mediterranean 
when  he  acquired  for  his  house  its  foreign  dominions. 
The  convenient  thing  for  these  to  do  was  to  bind  them- 
selves to  him  by  the  Gordian  knot  of  religious  worship ; 
and,  as  Ptolemy  Soter,  or  the  Savior,  he  was  in  fact 
enrolled  in  the  circle  of  deities  recognized  by  the  several 
cities.  In  Alexandria  we  may  be  sure  that  its  founder, 
Alexander  the  Great,  had  been  accorded  divine  honors 
from  the  beginning,  and  that  after  his  death  the  citizens 
appointed  each  year  a  priest  of  Alexander,  just  as  they 
had  been  in  the  habit  of  doing  while  he  was  alive,  and 
just  as  they  appointed  one  for  Zeus  or  Apollo.  However, 
at  some  date  between  311  and  289  B.C.,  perhaps  on  his 
assumption  of  the  regal  title  in  306  B.C.,  Ptolemy  took 
into  his  own  hands  the  administration  of  his  capital,  and 
thenceforth  appointed  personally  the  priest  of  the  city- 
god  Alexander,  who  became  therewith  an  imperial  god. 
To  this  cult  Philadelphus  did  not  add  that  of  his  par- 
ents, "the  savior  gods,"  when  he  had  them  officially 
deified  at  their  death  (283  B.C.) ;  but  he  did  add  to  it  that 
of  his  deceased  queen  and  of  himself  when  in  270  B.C. 
he  inaugurated  the  worship  of  "the  brother  gods."  His 
example  was  followed  by  each  succeeding  pair  of  rulers 
to  the  end  of  the  dynasty,  except  that  the  savior  gods 
were  inserted  by  the  fourth  Ptolemy  in  their  proper 


THE  EMPIRE  OF  THE  PTOLEMIES    165 

place  after  Alexander.  So  that  central  among  the  gods 
of  the  capital  of  the  empire  stood  ultimately  the  long 
series  of  the  departed  rulers  and  at  its  head  the  living 
king  and  queen. 

Outside  the  capital,  in  the  city-states  of  the  realm,  as 
later  on  in  the  provinces  subject  to  the  Roman  emperors, 
the  reigning  monarchs  were  alone  the  recipients  of  divine 
honors.  The  living  Ptolemy,  by  recognizing  the  divinity 
of  his  predecessors,  assumed  responsibility  for  the  valid- 
ity of  all  their  acta.  They  had  issued  their  mandates 
(prostagmata)  as  gods;  so  long  as  they  remained  gods 
their  mandates  must  be  obeyed.  The  cities,  on  the  other 
hand,  had  no  concern  except  to  legalize  the  orders  issued 
to  them  by  their  living  rulers,  once  their  living  rulers 
had  legalized  and  thus  become  responsible  for  all  orders 
issued  by  the  dead.  At  Rome  the  memory  of  certain 
emperors  was  damned,  and  their  acts  rescinded.  That 
was  possible  there  because  the  emperor  was  theoretically 
only  an  officer  of  the  Roman  people.  One  means  em- 
ployed to  invalidate  the  acta  of  deposed  rulers  was  to 
refuse  to  have  them  among  their  gods  after  their  death. 
The  Alexandrians  had  no  such  discretion.  After  about 
306  B.C.  they  were  subjects  themselves,  not  masters,  of 
the  Ptolemies.  In  their  city  it  was  the  living  Ptolemy 
who  willed  his  own  deification,  and  he  could  withhold 
divine  honors  from  his  predecessor  only  when,  as  in 
the  solitary  case  of  the  founder  of  the  dynasty,  the 
monarch    neglected   to   have   himself    created   a  god 


166  GREEK   IMPERIALISM 

during  his  lifetime.  Since  his  wish  was  decisive,  it  is 
not  surprising  that  he  had  the  members  of  his  family, 
his  wife,  sisters,  children,  and  concubines,  elevated  to 
Olympus  along  with  himself.  Curiously  enough,  how- 
ever, Philadelphus  and  his  four  immediate  successors, 
while  demanding  that  their  subjects  should  worship 
them  as  deities,  treated  themselves  simply  as  kings,  and 
carefully  refrained  from  describing  themselves  as  gods 
even  in  their  public  communications.  The  fact  seems 
to  be  that  only  by  accepting  the  Egyptian  theory  of  a 
divine  incarnation  could  the  Ptolemies  find  a  theological 
ground  for  constituting  themselves  gods.  This  conces- 
sion to  native  thinking  the  proud  early  members  of  the 
dynasty  refused,  however,  to  make,  preferring  to 
challenge  by  their  own  self-denial  the  divine  honors 
which  they  required  from  others.  With  this  view  accords 
the  further  fact  that  the  first  Ptolemy  deliberately  to 
court  a  native  support  for  his  throne  —  Euergetes  II  — 
was  also  the  first  to  sign  his  edicts  as  6e<kt  or  "god." 

While  it  is  true  that  no  great  empire  ever  existed 
without  a  constitutional  fiction,  it  is  also  true  that  it 
never  endured  on  a  fiction  alone.  The  Macedonian 
soldiers  whom  Ptolemy  found  in  Egypt  and  those  whom 
he  brought  with  him  and  sent  for  later  were  essential  for 
the  maintenance  of  his  government.  So  long  as  the  son  of 
Alexander  the  Great  lived,  and,  indeed,  for  four  years 
longer  (till  306  B.C.),  Ptolemy  was  simply  their  general. 
Then  he  became  their  king,  and  to  legitimatize  this 


THE   EMPIRE   OF   THE   PTOLEMIES     167 

practical  usurpation,  the  legend  arose  that  he  was  not 
really  the  son  of  Lagos,  but  the  son  of  Philip.  It  is  to 
the  honor  of  Ptolemy  that  he  had  nothing  to  do  with 
this  libel  on  the  good  name  of  his  mother,  and  preferred 
rather  to  be  an  illegitimate  king  than  an  illegitimate  son. 
Besides,  it  was  only  necessary  to  go  back  a  generation 
or  two  to  attach  the  line  of  Ptolemy  to  that  of  the  an- 
cient ' '  Zeus-born  "  kings  of  Macedon.  The  wife  of  Lagos 
had  belonged,  in  fact,  to  the  royal  family,  as  the  Ptole- 
mies took  good  care  to  observe. 

The  Ptolemaic  empire  was,  accordingly,  based  on 
three  concurrent  theories,  one  for  the  native  Egyptians, 
one  for  the  Greek  city-states,  and  one  for  the  Mace- 
donians. 

Appian  of  Alexandria,1  writing  about  two  hundred 
years  after  the  death  of  Cleopatra,  cites  the  royal  regis- 
ters as  authority  for  his  report  that  Philadelphus  kept, 
for  land  operations  200,000  foot,  40,000  cavalry,  and 
arms  for  300,000  men;  in  addition,  300  war  elephants 
and  2000  war  chariots;  for  naval  warfare,  2000  trans- 
ports, 1500  battleships  with  three  to  five  banks  of 
rowers,  and  oars  and  rigging  for  twice  that  number. 
He  had  also,  according  to  the  same  authority,  800  royal 
barges  with  gilt  poops  and  beaks,  and  in  his  treasury  a 
reserve  of  740,000  Egyptian  talents,  or  $890,000,000. 

That  the  reserve  as  given  amounts  to  three  times  the 

1  Prooem.  10.  Tarn,  Antigonus  Gonatas,  pp.  454  ff. 


168  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

value  of  the  gold  and  silver  in  the  United  States  treasury 
shows  that  the  enumeration  belongs  only  in  the  history 
yet  to  be  written  of  the  absurdities  of  statistics.  More 
credible  estimates  of  the  Egyptian  army  place  it  at 
80,800  under  the  second  Ptolemy  and  (exclusive  of 
natives,  who  then  numbered  26,000)  49,700  under  the 
fourth  Ptolemy.1  These  are  very  large  totals.  It  will 
help  to  solve  many  questions  of  Ptolemaic  policy  to 
observe  where  the  soldiers  came  from. 

But  first  we  may  notice  that  they  could  not  come 
from  the  natives;  for  their  most  important  duty  was  to 
hold  them  in  subjection.  There  were  so  many  people  to 
keep  down !  Alexandria  itself  had  a  large  native  quar- 
ter. The  other  two  Greek  cities  in  the  land  were  but 
alien  flecks  in  the  midst  of  a  great  multitude.  Up  and 
down  the  valley  lay  the  native  hamlets,  to  the  number  of 
33,333  according  to  Theocritus,  teeming  with  the  seven 
million  people  whom  Egypt  then  sustained.  Alexander 
the  Great  may  have  dreamed  of  Hellenizing  these 
masses;  Ptolemy,  however,  had  no  such  thought,  as  is 
shown  conclusively  by  the  fact  that  under  his  dynasty 
and,  indeed,  for  at  least  two  centuries  after  its  fall, 
Naucratis,  and  probably  also  Ptolemais,  forbade  by  law 
marriages  between  their  citizens  and  the  natives.2 

The  sole  landowner  in  Egypt  was  the  king.  The  entire 
valley  of  the   Nile  was  literally  his  personal  estate. 

1  Athenseus,  v,  202/.;  Polybius,  v,  65. 
*  Wilcken,  Grundzuge,  13,  17,  47. 


THE   EMPIRE  OF  THE  PTOLEMIES     169 

Except  for  certain  portions  "set  apart"  for  particular 
purposes,  which  we  shall  examine  in  a  moment,  the 
arable  land  surrounding  the  countless  native  villages 
was  in  the  possession  of  tenants  of  the  crown,  who  paid 
to  the  king  about  seven  bushels  of  grain  per  acre  as  rent 
and  sowed  their  land  according  to  royal  orders  with  seed 
provided  by  him;  who  might  be  dispossessed  at  any 
time,  but  could  neither  abandon  their  plots  (at  least  in 
seeding-  and  harvest-time)  nor  their  villages  (except  for 
short  periods),  at  their  own  volition;  who  had  numerous 
services  in  connection  with  "geometry,"  irrigation, 
transport,  post,  and  similar  matters  to  perform,  and 
might  be  moved  or  forced  en  masse  to  redeem  and 
cultivate  dry  or  marsh  land  situated  near  their  hovels; 
who  paid  a  poll-tax  and  a  house-tax  to  the  king,  and 
one  sixth  of  the  yield  of  their  vineyards  and  orchards, 
when  they  had  any,  to  the  temple  authorities  whom  the 
king  appointed;  who  bought  their  beer,  oil,  fish,  honey, 
cloth,  soda,  bricks,  wood,  paper,  and  almost  every  other 
article  of  common  use  either  exclusively  from  the  king, 
who  was  the  sole  producer  and  seller,  or  in  certain  cases 
from  private  dealers,  who,  however,  paid  so  much  for 
their  license  that  they  could  not  undersell  the  king. 
Watchmen  were  everywhere  in  the  fields  to  see  that 
the  king  was  not  defrauded.  Gendarmes  patrolled  the 
country  to  guard  the  roads  and  deserts,  to  prevent 
smuggling  and  "moonshining."  Scribes  and  bankers 
were  in  every  village  to  keep  account  of  all  changes  in 


i7o  GREEK   IMPERIALISM 

families  and  in  leases;  to  vise  every  payment.  Every 
village  had  its  storehouse  of  records,  of  grain,  of  money. 
And  on  the  Nile  went  to  and  fro  the  royal  transports 
which  carried  the  surpluses  to  Alexandria,  and  the  pro- 
ducts of  the  royal  factories  to  the  local  depots  from 
which  they  were  sold.  The  king  of  Egypt  was,  accord- 
ingly, by  far  the  greatest  merchant  and  manufacturer  in 
the  whole  world.  Even  in  far  distant  Delos  the  price  of 
paper,  myrrh,  and  other  articles  was  fixed  by  the 
pleasure  of  the  royal  monopolist.  That  his  interference 
"regulated  the  market"  to  his  own  advantage  may  be 
inferred  from  the  fact  that  the  sheet  of  paper  which  was 
sold  in  296  B.C.  for  one  obol  (three  and  one  half  cents) 
cost  on  the  average  eleven  in  279-250  B.C.1 

Thus  set  about  by  countless  officials  and  shorn  to  the 
very  skin,  the  fellahs  lived  under  the  Ptolemies,  "pa- 
tient, laborious,  cheerful,"  yet  filled  with  hidden  bitter- 
ness at  the  magnificence  in  which  their  masters  lived  at 
their  expense  in  Alexandria,  venting  their  rage  in  impo- 
tent prophecies  that  "  the  great  city  at  the  water's  edge 
should  become  a  drying-place  for  the  nets  of  fishers,  and 
its  gods  should  migrate  to  the  native  capital  Memphis."  2 

Clearly,  the  army  of  the  Ptolemies  could  not  be  re- 
cruited from  such  elements.  The  Egyptians  might  be 
put  on  the  warships  as  rowers,  used  in  the  transport 
service,  and,  occasionally  when  the  need  was  great,  in 

1  Glotz,  Journal  des  Savants  (1913),  pp.  16  ff. 

2  Wilcken,  Grundziige,  22. 


THE   EMPIRE   OF  THE   PTOLEMIES     171 

small  numbers  as  soldiers.  But  granted  that  they  might 
be  useful  in  fighting  abroad,  —  at  home  they  belonged 
to  the  enemy  from  whom  the  early  Ptolemies  had  greatly 
to  fear. 

As  such,  the  citizens  of  Alexandria,  Naucratis,  and 
Ptolemais  were  apparently  exempt  from  military  service. 
Hence  the  great  problem  of  national  defense  could  not 
have  been  solved  by  the  founding  of  new  Greek  cities  of 
this  type  in  Egypt  had  there  been  room  for  them,  or  by 
the  founding  of  any  kind  of  cities,  had  Ptolemy  thought 
it  possible  to  organize  the  natives  in  urban  communities 
round  a  Greek  or  Macedonian  nucleus  —  as  Alexander 
may  have  wished  to  do,  as  the  Romans  in  fact  did  in  the 
year  202  a.d.  ;  for,  even  if  Ptolemy  had  cared  for  that 
kind  of  thing,  the  Greek  or  Macedonian  nucleus  did  not 
as  yet  exist  in  Egypt.  It  had  to  be  brought  there  from 
abroad.  Hence  it  was  a  question  of  life  and  death  for 
the  Ptolemaic  dynasty  to  remain  in  constant  communi- 
cation with  the  regions  of  the  eastern  Mediterranean 
whence  came  supporters  of  their  rule,  soldiers  for  their 
armies. 

"But  shouldst  thou  really  mean  a  voyage  out,"  says 
one  Greek  peasant  to  another  in  Theocritus,1  — 

"The  freeman's  best  paymaster  's  Ptolemy. 
(dLschines) 
What  is  he  else? 

(Thyonichus) 
A  gentleman:  a  man 

»  Idyll,  14,  58/.   (Translated  by  Calverley.) 


172  GREEK   IMPERIALISM 

Of  wit  and  taste:  the  top  of  company; 
Loyal  to  ladies;  one  whose  eye  is  keen 
For  friends,  and  keener  still  for  enemies. 
Large  in  his  bounties,  he,  in  kingly  sort, 
Denies  a  boon  to  none:  but,  ^schines, 
One  should  not  ask  too  often.  This  premised, 
If  thou  wilt  clasp  the  military  cloak 
O'er  thy  right  shoulder,  and  with  legs  astride 
Await  the  onward  rush  of  shielded  men: 
Hie  thee  to  Egypt." 

Phoenicia  and  its  hinterland  were  necessary  to  Ptol- 
emy because  of  their  forests  of  timber  for  shipbuilding, 
which  Egypt  lacked.  The  rest  of  his  transmarine  pos- 
sessions were  necessary  because  of  their  stock  of  reliable 
soldiers,  which  Egypt  also  lacked.  Hence,  as  stated 
already,  the  imperial  policy  of  the  early  Ptolemies  was 
a  plain  consequence  of  their  domestic  policy  —  of  hold- 
ing Egypt  as  a  foreign  country. 

Let  us  now  see  what  they  did  with  the  store  of  soldiers 
which  they  possessed  and  with  the  new  recruits  whom 
they  constantly  added  to  it.1  I  have  already  drawn 
your  attention  to  certain  lands  which  the  Ptolemies  "set 
aside"  for  particular  purposes.  One  complex  of  such 
lands  they  assigned  to  the  temples.  And  I  may  remark 
that  while  the  Ptolemies  appointed  and  controlled  the 
priests,  they  also  conciliated  them,  by  leaving  them  valu- 
able perquisites,  paying  to  them  stated  sums  annually, 
building  new  temples  and  repairing  old  ones,  and  allow- 

1  For  the  following  section  the  works  of  Rostowzew,  Bouche-Leclercq 
(vol.  iv),  Wilcken,  and  Lesquier  cited  in  the  Select  Bibliography  at  the 
end  of  this  chapter  are  fundamental. 


THE  EMPIRE  OF  THE   PTOLEMIES     173 

ing  them  to  make  for  their  own  consumption  the  various 
articles  which  they  could  buy  only  at  the  royal  counters 
and  at  monopolistic  prices.  They  also  set  their  land  aside 
in  a  favored  category.  What  is  common  to  this  category 
is  not  a  single  fiscal  arrangement,  but  a  relinquishing  by 
the  king  of  his  right  of  direct  management.  To  its  mem- 
bers he  binds  himself  in  a  way  that  does  not  impair  his 
ownership,  but  does  restrict  his  ability  to  take  posses- 
sion. 

To  this  category  belong  the  "gifts"  of  large  blocks  of 
land  with  their  villages  to  his  courtiers,  who  received 
them  free  from  rent  and  taxes.  The  "friends"  of  the 
Ptolemies,  though  they  resided  in  Alexandria,  were  thus 
landed  proprietors,  absentee  landlords,  who  maintained 
their  luxurious  establishments  in  the  capital  on  the  rents 
which  their  Egyptian  tenants  paid.  Common  soldiers 
could  not  expect  to  become  feudal  lords  by  entering 
Ptolemy's  service.  But  for  his  "loyal  comrades,"  as 
Theocritus !  calls  them,  —  his  officers,  court  dignitaries, 
and  favorites,  —  he  had  such  benefices  to  confer. 

To  the  ordinary  men-at-arms  lots  of  land  all  over 
Egypt  were  assigned;  to  those  of  the  guard  and  the 
cavalry,  sixty-five  and  forty-five  acre  farms,  to  the 
infantrymen,  farms  of  twenty  acres.  For  Egyptian 
conditions  these  were  very  large  units*  and  since  under 
Philadelphus  —  who  perfected  this  system  of  farming 
out  his  soldiers  —  the  army  consisted  of  57,600  foot  and 
1  Idyll,  xvn,  in. 


174  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

23,200  horsemen,  over  one  quarter  of  all  the  arable  land 
in  Egypt  would  have  been  in  their  possession,  if  only- 
land  naturally  watered  by  the  Nile  had  been  given  to 
them,  and  if  none  of  them  were  mercenaries  serving  only 
for  hire.  Many,  however,  were  doubtless  mercenaries  of 
this  type;  and  to  the  rest,  land  was  commonly  distrib- 
uted which  needed  some  expenditure  of  capital  and 
energy  to  be  reclaimed  from  the  desert  or  the  water.  Of 
this  kind  of  land  the  Ptolemies  evidently  inherited  a 
goodly  quantity  from  the  Persians,  whose  government 
had  been  rendered  inefficient  in  the  fourth  century  B.C. 
by  frequent  revolts  of  the  natives. 

The  soldiers  might  sublet  their  lots  in  whole  or  part 
and  live  in  Alexandria  or  elsewhere.  Or  they  might  take 
possession  and  till  them  with  their  own  hands.  To  facili- 
tate the  actual  distribution  of  the  army  over  the  coun- 
try, the  king  attached  to  the  lots  "quarters"  on  the 
premises  of  the  neighboring  Egyptians.  This  was  not  at 
all  to  the  liking  of  the  latter,  as  the  following  letter  of  a 
quartermaster  to  a  county  official  shows : *  "We  have  dis- 
covered that  certain  owners  of  houses  in  Crocodilopolis, 
which  were  once  used  for  quartering  troops,  have  taken 
off  the  roofs,  and  walled  up  the  doors  and  built  altars 
in  their  places.  This  they  have  done  so  as  not  to  have 
them  occupied.  If  then  you  agree,  in  view  of  the  short- 
age of  quarters,  write  Agenor  that  he  make  the  owners 
of  the  houses  take  the  altars  down,  and  build  them  up 

1  Wilcken,  Chrestomathie,  449. 


THE   EMPIRE   OF  THE   PTOLEMIES     175 

again  better  than  before  upon  the  most  suitable  and 
conspicuous  parts  of  the  roofs,  so  that  we  may  be  able  to 
take  possession."  The  gods  had  never  objected  to  hav- 
ing old  altars  replaced  by  finer  ones.  Henceforth,  not 
the  entrances,  but  the  roofs,  were  to  be  protected  by 
religion.   The  ancient  quartermaster  knew  his  business. 

It  was  decidedly  to  the  interest  of  the  government 
that  it  should  have  a  sort  of  garrison  in  residence  in  all 
the  nomes,  or  counties,  of  Egypt  —  trained  soldiers 
ready  to  take  their  places  in  their  companies  at  the  com- 
mand of  the  chief  nome  official,  who  was  also  their 
general. 

These  men  were  by  no  means  all  Macedonians  or 
Greeks.  Some  of  them  were  Persians  who  had  been  in 
the  land  when  Ptolemy  arrived;  some  were  Libyans, 
Jews,  Thracians,  Mysians,  Galatians;  nearly  all  were 
from  the  regions  tapped  by  the  empire  of  the  Ptolemies. 

They  paid  no  rents  for  their  lots,  no  poll-tax,  and  one 
tenth,  in  place  of  one  sixth,  of  the  yield  of  their  gardens 
and  orchards.  Like  the  Llellenes  generally,  they  might 
give  commutation  money  in  lieu  of  manual  labor  on 
dykes  and  canals.  In  other  respects  they  were  taxed 
rather  more  severely  than  the  "royal  tenants";  and,  in 
addition,  they  had  to  pay  certain  feudal  "aids"  to  the 
king.  If  they  failed  to  pay  these  "aids,"  or  if  they  fell 
in  arrears  with  their  taxes,  they  lost  their  holdings. 
Hence  they  were  under  a  financial  constraint  to  make  the 
land,  which  they  commonly  received  as  waste  land,  pro- 


176  GREEK   IMPERIALISM 

ductive.  The  soldiers  were,  accordingly,  the  "pioneers" 
of  Ptolemaic  Egypt,  steadily  at  work  enlarging  the  ara- 
ble areas  of  the  country  and  redressing  the  agricultural 
wrongs  which  it  had  sustained  during  the  troubles  of 
the  later  Persian  regime. 

Their  lots  reverted  to  the  king  when  they  died  or  left 
the  army.  The  king  could  then  add  them  to  his  domain 
or  reassign  them  to  other  soldiers.  During  the  imperial 
period  of  Ptolemaic  history  he  seems  to  have  taken  the 
former  course  whenever  the  land  was  in  a  condition  to 
bring  him  in  a  rent  in  addition  to  the  taxes.  However, 
from  the  very  beginning,  he  undertook  to  make  a  new  or 
a  re-grant  to  the  sons  of  dead  or  superannuated  soldiers 
who  were  trained  for  military  service.  These  were  offi- 
cially designated  "men  of  the  epigone,  or  increase,"  and 
they  entered  the  army  at  the  same  time  that  they  en- 
tered upon  their  inheritance.  In  this  way  the  Ptolemies 
bred  a  crop  of  new  soldiers  in  Egypt,  so  that  they  might 
look  forward  to  being  gradually  less  dependent  upon 
mercenaries  recruited  from  beyond  the  seas.  Egypt  was 
being  enriched  by  a  new  military  caste  which  should 
take  the  place  by  the  side  of  the  new  dynasty  which  the 
"machimoi"  or  "warriors"  had  occupied  during  the  old 
days  of  the  native  Pharaohs. 

Multiracial  though  the  soldiers  were,  they  all  spoke 
Greek.  They  had  to  regulate  their  private  conduct  and 
their  business  affairs  by  the  special  laws  established 
in  Egypt  for  the  benefit  of  the  various  ethne,  or  nation- 


THE   EMPIRE  OF  THE   PTOLEMIES     177 

alities,  to  which  they  belonged.  For  in  Ptolemaic  Egypt, 
as  in  the  Turkish  empire  to-day,  foreigners  brought  their 
own  legal  restrictions  and  safeguards  with  them,  which, 
however,  were  formulated,  for  use  in  the  Ptolemaic 
courts,  in  ethnic  codes.  These  codes,  however,  were 
either  couched  originally  in  Greek,  or,  like  the  laws  of 
Moses,  which  the  Jews  observed,  they  were  translated 
into  Greek  at  an  early  date.  How  much  political  free- 
dom the  various  nations  enjoyed,  it  is  difficult  to  say; 
but  in  general  they  seem  to  have  tempered  the  absolut- 
ism of  the  Ptolemies  only  where  they  were  massed  to- 
gether in  large  numbers,  as  in  Memphis  and,  above  all, 
Alexandria.  Elsewhere  the  ethnic  groups  were,  doubt- 
less, constituted  chiefly  of  the  territorial  soldiers,  or 
cleruchs,  as  they  were  called.1  These,  however,  ceased 
to  have  any  civil  rights  when  called  by  the  king  into 
active  service.  With  them  political  agitation  could  be- 
come effective  only  when  it  became  mutiny. 

Prominent  among  the  institutions  which  the  Hellenic 
and  Hellenized  foreigners  brought  into  Egypt  were  those 
that  centred  in  the  gymnasia.  Some  of  them  were, 
doubtless,  at  first  and  for  long,  a  subject  of  scandal  and 
wonderment  to  the  natives.  As  the  Greeks  ran  and 
tumbled  stark  naked  in  the  palaestrae,  or  in  the  contests 

1  See  for  this  section  Lesquier,  op.  cit.,  pp.  142  ff.;  Mitteis,  Grundzilge 
Einl.  xii ;  Schubart,  W.,  Spuren  politischen  Autonomic  in  JEgypten  unter 
den  Ptolemaern,  Klio,  x  (1910),  pp.  41  ff.;  cf.  Id.  Archiv  fur  Papyrus- 
forsckung,  v,  pp.  81  ff.;  Jouguet,  P.,  La  vie  municipale  dans  V  £gypte 
Romaine  (191 1);  Plaumann,  G.,  Ptolemais  in  Oberasgypten  (1910). 


i78  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

for  which,  as  for  the  army,  the  palaestrae  were  the  train- 
ing-grounds, the  story  of  Heracles  and  Busiris  was  con- 
stantly reenacted;  except  that  in  time  Busiris  came  to 
see  whence  sprang  the  strength  which  he  could  not 
resist.  It  was  in  the  gymnasia  also  that  the  Greeks 
received  their  higher  education  and  by  its  means  that 
they  secured  for  their  sons  the  ideas  which  the  poetry 
and  philosophy  of  Hellas  alone  could  give.  In  the  gym- 
nasia temples  of  Hellenism  appeared  in  county  after 
county  of  Egypt. 

The  foreigners  brought  with  them  into  Egypt  their 
native  religions,  and,  when  they  were  not  monotheists 
like  the  Jews,  they  came  easily  into  sympathy  with  the 
myriad  cults  of  the  natives.  A  religious  rapprochement 
was  thus  established  and  a  bi-religious  milieu  created, 
by  which  a  new  half-Greek,  half-Egyptian  god,  Sarapis, 
whom  Ptolemy  I  introduced  from  Sinope,  prospered. 
Before  long  this  Janus-like  deity,  who  was  endowed  with 
a  sanctity  and  miraculous  power  which  hoary  Egypt 
could  alone  give,  and  with  a  plastic  beauty  peculiarly 
Greek,  became  distinctively  the  great  god  of  Egypt,  and, 
in  conjunction  with  Isis,  Anubis,  and  Harpocrates,  the 
most  active  religious  force  in  the  whole  world  of  the 
Ptolemaic  empire.  Sarapis-Osiris,  the  monarch,  judge, 
and  savior  of  the  world  of  the  dead:  Ptolemy- Pharaoh, 
the  monarch,  judge,  and  savior  of  the  world  of  the  liv- 
ing; —  these  two  and  these  two  alone  received  the  di- 
vine homage  of  Greeks  and  Egyptians  alike.  The  early 


THE  EMPIRE  OF  THE  PTOLEMIES    179 

Ptolemies  willed  the  impossible;  to  accept  the  native 
deities,  cults,  creeds,  and  hierarchies  as  the  active  ele- 
ment in  the  fused  Graeco-Egyptian  religion;  to  let  the 
two  civilizations  represented  in  their  realm  coalesce  in  so 
far  as  their  religious  ideas,  practices,  aspirations,  and 
hopes  were  concerned;  and  at  the  same  time  to  keep 
them  apart  in  other  respects:  to  preserve  in  other  mat- 
ters the  unapproachable  superiority  of  the  invaders. 

Certainly,  success  in  this  attempt  to  graft  the  ancient 
religion  which  he  as  Pharaoh  was  bound  to  accept  and 
preserve  on  the  new  stock  of  Hellenism  without  cor- 
rupting the  fine  flavor  of  the  fruit  hitherto  borne  by  it 
in  Greece,  depended  on  making  the  Greek  cities,  Alex- 
andria, Naucratis,  and  Ptolemais,  and  the  Graeco- Mace- 
donian military  colonies  simply  the  Egyptian  portion 
of  a  Graeco-Macedonian  realm  reaching  over  the  seas  to 
the  head  of  the  ^gean.  This  necessary  support  to  his 
position  in  Egypt  the  third  Ptolemy  jeopardized  when 
he  neglected  to  replace  the  great  fleet  after  242  B.C. 
For  twenty  long  years,  moreover,  he  left  his  army 
at  work  farming  in  Egypt,  with  the  inevitable  result 
that  it  became  immobile.  Such  a  neglect  of  military 
matters  seemed  warranted  by  the  impotence  of  his  two 
great  rivals.  For  during  this  entire  period  Asia  was 
rent  by  a  dynastic  struggle  and  Macedon  was  paralyzed 
by  a  general  insurrection  in  Greece.  His  weak  and  indo- 
lent son  paid  the  penalty  for  his  father's  neglect.    By 


i8o  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

strengthening  his  army  with  26,000  natives,  whom  he 
armed  and  drilled  in  the  Macedonian  fashion  (221-217 
B.C.),  he  saved  the  empire  for  seventeen  years,  when  it 
fell  before  the  combined  attack  of  Macedon  and  Syria 
(202-200  B.C.) ;  but  he  tempted  the  Egyptians  to  lay 
claim  with  the  sword  to  partnership  with  the  foreigners 
in  the  government.  Thus  presented,  their  claim  was 
rejected,  as  was  natural;  but  once  the  empire  was  lost 
and  the  flow  of  immigration  into  Egypt  ceased,  the 
Ptolemies  of  the  "domestic"  period  were  forced  to 
acknowledge  its  justice. 

They  constituted  their  territorial  army  more  and 
more  from  native  soldiers,  to  whom  they  gave  increas- 
ingly larger  lots,  while  they  progressively  diminished 
the  size  of  those  held  by  the  foreigners.  They  ceased  to 
take  back  the  holdings  on  the  death  or  superannuation 
of  the  occupants,  thus  admitting  the  right  of  sons  and 
other  male  descendants  to  get,  in  return  for  military 
service,  not  dry  or  marsh  land,  as  in  the  early  days,  but 
land  already  redeemed  by  their  father's  capital  and 
labor.  Soldiers  ceased  to  be  soldiers  spending  their  spare 
time  winning  new  land  from  the  desert  and  the  swamp 
for  their  master's  estate ;  and  became  farmers  to  whom 
service  in  the  army  was  a  nuisance  and  a  loss.  The 
army  became  thereby  hopelessly  immobile. 

The  age  was  generally  one  of  economic  decline  and 
not  of  economic  advance ;  for  Egypt  had  gained  more, 
as  the  sequel  proved,  from  the  vigorous  government  of 


THE  EMPIRE  OF  THE  PTOLEMIES    181 

the  early  Ptolemies  than  it  had  lost  by  the  expenditure 
of  its  surpluses  on  the  empire.  In  this  decadent  age 
the  Egyptians  gained  admission  freely  to  the  police  and 
administrative  service  as  well  as  to  the  army.  Thus 
elevated  in  social  esteem,  they  were  able  to  intermarry 
with  their  ancient  lords;  so  that  a  considerable  half- 
breed  and  bilingual  population  developed  —  Greek  in 
the  outward  things,  fellaheen,  according  to  Polybius, 
in  character  and  culture.  Alexandria,  he  says,1  "three 
strata  occupy :  the  Egyptian  and  the  native  race,  sharp 
and  (un)civilized.  Then  the  mercenary  troops,  oppres- 
sive and  numerous  and  dissolute;  for  from  old  custom 
they  kept  armed  troops  who  had  learned  to  rule  rather 
than  to  obey,  on  account  of  the  worthlessness  of  the  kings. 
The  third  stratum  was  that  of  the  Alexandrians,  nor  was 
even  this  truly  a  civilized  population  owing  to  the  same 
causes,  but  yet  better  than  the  other  two,  for  though 
of  mixed  breed,  yet  they  were  originally  Greeks,  with 
traditions  of  the  general  type  of  the  Greeks.  But  this 
part  of  the  population  having  disappeared  mainly  owing 
to  Ptolemy  Euergetes  Physkon  (145-116  B.C.)  in  whose 
reign  Polybius  visited  Alexandria,  —  for  Physkon,  when 
revolted  against,  over  and  over  again  let  loose  his  troops 
on  the  population  and  massacred  them,  —  and  such 
being  the  state  of  things,  to  visit  Egypt  was  a  long  and 
thankless  journey."  Foreign  enemies  the  omnipotent 
Roman  Senate  kept  off  during  the  second  century  B.C. 

1  xxxiv,  14  (Translated  by  Mahaffy,  The  Ptolemaic  Dynasty,  p.  191.) 


i82  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

But  unnerved  by  the  menacing  patronage  of  the  great 
republic,  the  Ptolemies,  now  represented  by  men  of 
vigor  and  no  character  or  of  character  and  no  vigor; 
by  women,  who  were  sprung  mostly  from  adelphic 
unions,  of  remarkable  ability,  beauty,  and  morals,  pref- 
aced with  a  period  of  long-continued  dynastic  and  na- 
tional strife  the  dramatic  epoch  of  Ptolemy  the  Piper 
and  Cleopatra  the  Great. 

SELECT  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

1.  Mahaffy,  J.  P.  The  Empire  of  the  Ptolemies  (1895),  and 
The  Ptolemaic  Dynasty  (1899). 

2.  Beloch,  J.   Griechische  Geschichte,  III  (1904)- 

3.  Bouche-Leclercq,  A.  Histoire  des  Lagides,  especially 
vols,  in  and  iv  (1906). 

4.  Rostowzew,  M.  Studien  zur  Geschichte  des  romischen 
Kolonates  (1910). 

5.  WILAMOWITZ-MOELLENDORFF,    ULRICH    VON.      Stoat    Ufld 

Gesellschaft  der  Griechen:  D.   Die  makedonischen  Konig- 
reiche  (19 10). 

6.  Lesquier,  J.  Les  institutions  militaires  de  VEgypte  sous  les 
Lagides  (191 1). 

7.  Kornemann,  E.  JEgypten  und  das  (romische)  Reich.  In 
Gercke  and  Norden's,  Einleitung  in  die  Altertumswissen- 
schaft  ( 1 912),  pp.  272/. 

8.  Mitteis,  L.,  und  Wilcken,  U.  Grundziige  und  Chresto- 
mathie  der  Papyruskunde  (1912). 


VI 

THE  SELEUCID  EMPIRE 

The  main  portion  of  the  conquests  made  by  Alexander 
the  Great  lay  in  the  continent  of  Asia.  On  the  establish- 
ment of  the  regency  this  vast  district  had  been  divided 
among  over  twenty  satraps.  Ten  years  afterwards,  in 
the  fall  of  313  B.C.,  one  of  these,  Antigonus,  known  in 
history  as  Monophthalmus,  or  the  "One-eyed,"  had 
now  held  for  two  years  all  the  territory  that  lay  be- 
tween the  fan-shaped  offshoots  of  the  Himalaya  Moun- 
tains and  the  sea.  The  whole  Asiatic  coast  of  the  Med- 
iterranean from  the  Hellespont  to  Gaza  on  the  Egypt'an 
frontier  was  in  his  possession.    His  fleet  ruled  the  sea. 

The  spring  of  312  B.C.  was  one  of  the  most  critical 
moments  in  ancient  history.  In  Antigonus  the  man 
seemed  come  with  the  will,  ability,  and  power  to  take 
the  place  of  Alexander.  By  his  side  stood  a  son  of  re- 
markable attractiveness  and  brilliancy,  Demetrius, 
surnamed  Poliorcetes,  or  "  Taker-of-Cities " ;  so  that  a 
dynasty  seemed  assured. 

The  work  to  be  done  was  plainly  indicated  and  prepa- 
rations for  its  accomplishment  were  already  completed. 
After  having  stirred  up  an  insurrection  in  Greece  in 
the  preceding  year,  the  fleet  of  Antigonus  had  joined  his 
main  army  which  was  massed  at  the  Hellespont  in  readi- 


184  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

ness  to  cross  into  Europe  for  the  conquest  of  Thrace  and 
Macedon.  In  this  district  Antigonus  conducted  opera- 
tions in  person.  His  son  Demetrius  was  stationed  with  a 
minor  army  in  Palestine  with  instructions  to  avoid  an 
engagement,  and  simply  to  keep  Ptolemy  cooped  up  in 
Egypt  till  the  European  campaign  was  ended.  If  beaten 
in  his  attack  on  Thrace  and  Macedon,  Antigonus  had 
nothing  serious  to  fear  so  long  as  he  was  master  of  the 
sea;  if  victorious,  he  could  then  fall  with  irresistible  force 
upon  Egypt  and  complete  the  unification  of  Alexander's 
empire.  The  whole  campaign  was  admirably  planned 
and  the  troops  well  distributed  for  its  successful  exe- 
cution.1 

That  it  did  not  even  get  started  was  partly  due  to 
Ptolemy,  who,  impelled  by  the  magnitude  of  his  danger, 
took  the  desperate  step  of  adding  many  natives  to  his 
army;  and  partly  due  to  Demetrius,  who,  despite  his 
numerical  inferiority,  his  instructions,  and  the  judgment 
of  his  staff  officers,  risked  a  pitched  battle  at  Gaza,  and 
was  decisively  defeated.  That  the  project  could  never 
again  be  renewed  on  similarly  advantageous  terms  was 
due  to  Seleucus,  the  son  of  Antiochus.  For  taking  a  thou- 
sand men  with  him  this  accomplished  officer,  old  in 
service  though  still  young  in  years,  set  out  straightway 
after  the  battle  of  Gaza  for  Babylon,  his  own  satrapy, 
whence  he  had  fled  to  Egypt  for  fear  of  Antigonus  four 
years  earlier.    Ten  years  afterwards,  in  302  B.C.,  when 

1  Kromayer,  Historische  Zeitschrift,  c,  p.  50. 


THE  SELEUCID   EMPIRE  185 

Antigonus  again  proceeded  to  conquer  Macedon  and 
Thrace,  after  having  beaten  Ptolemy  back  into  Egypt, 
his  great  aim  was  frustrated,  not  only  because  the  king 
of  Thrace,  Lysimachus,  outmanoeuvred  him  by  getting 
an  army  across  into  Asia  Minor,  but  also  because 
Seleucus,  now  master  of  all  the  territory  in  the  rear  of 
Antigonus  between  the  Euphrates  and  the  frontiers  of 
India,  threw  the  decisive  weight  of  his  new  army  into 
the  scale,  and  joined  Lysimachus  in  crushing  their  com- 
mon enemy  at  the  great  battle  of  Ipsus  in  301  B.C. 

Thereby  Seleucus  advanced  his  western  frontier  from 
the  Euphrates  to  the  edge  of  the  Mediterranean,  shifted 
his  capital  from  Babylon  to  newly  founded  Antioch,  and 
brought  his  empire  into  immediate  proximity  with  the 
districts  whence  alone  Greek  and  Macedonian  immi- 
grants could  come.  The  Seleucids  dated  the  founding 
of  their  dynasty  from  the  return  of  Seleucus  to  Babylon 
in  312  B.C.  There  is,  however,  much  to  be  said  for  the 
view  that  their  empire  was  first  established  after  the 
battle  of  Ipsus. 

For  the  next  twenty  years  (301-281  B.C.)  Seleucus 
had  the  great  good  fortune  to  remain  in  secure  posses- 
sion of  the  vast  territory  which  called  him  king;  and 
while  he  failed  to  pass  on  to  his  descendants  all  the  fruits 
of  his  crowning  victory  over  Lysimachus  at  Corupedion 
in  282  B.C.,  he  left  to  his  son  Antiochus  I,  surnamed 
Soter,  or  the  Savior,  and  he  in  turn  about  twenty  years 
later,  to  his  son  Antiochus  II,  surnamed  Theos,  or  the 


186  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

God,  the  fabric  of  their  dominions,  somewhat  tattered 
at  the  edges,  to  be  sure,  but  otherwise  whole. 

The  evil  genius  of  the  Seleucid  empire  during  the  cen- 
tury when  it  was  a  great  power  was  a  woman  —  Laodice, 
the  wife  of  Antiochus  II  and  mother  of  his  successor, 
Seleucus  II,  surnamed  Callinicus,  or  the  Glorious  Victor 
(246-226  B.C.) .  Her  power  as  queen  is  attested  by  other 
evidences,  and  also  by  the  fact  that  she  was  associated 
with  the  king  in  the  worship  accorded  by  the  satrapies 
of  the  realm  to  their  rulers,  every  satrapy  being  required 
by  Theos  to  establish  a  chief-priesthood  in  her  especial 
honor.1  None  the  less,  she  had  to  yield  her  place  to 
Berenice,  daughter  of  Ptolemy  Philadelphus,  when  that 
crafty  monarch  seduced  her  husband  from  his  alliance 
with  Macedon  by  giving  to  him  along  with  his  daughter 
a  prodigious  dowry  and  extensive  territorial  concessions 
(249  B.C.).  She  retired  to  Asia  Minor,  where  she  owned 
large  estates  secured  in  earlier  days  at  the  expense  of  the 
royal  domain,  and  where  she  could  live  in  almost  regal 
state.  For  the  death  of  her  former  husband,  which  oc- 
curred three  years  later,  she  was  probably  not  responsi- 
ble, —  though  rumor  held  her  guilty,  —  since  Theos  had 
already,  on  his  deathbed  apparently,  and  for  reasons  of 
sound  dynastic  policy,  designated  her  oldest  son,  then 

1  Dittenberger,  Orientis  Grata  Inscriptiones  Selecta,  224;  if  the  king  is 
Antiochus  II,  and  not,  as  is  now  claimed  (Pozzi,  Memorie  delta  Reale 
Accademia  di  Torino,  serie  11,  torn,  lxiii,  p.  345,  n.  4),  Antiochus  III.  See, 
however,  Karst,  Geschichte  des  hellenistischen  Zeitalters,  11,  1,  p.  422  and 
Bouche-Leclercq,  Hist,  des  Seleucides,  pp.  90  /.,  470  ff. 


THE  SELEUCID   EMPIRE  187 

a  "youth  nearing  manhood/'  as  his  successor,  to  the  ex- 
clusion of  the  boy  with  whom  his  Egyptian  queen  had 
recently  presented  him.  Nor  is  she  to  be  condemned 
harshly  for  having  had  her  rival  and  her  son's  rival  put 
out  of  the  way;  for  she  acted  not  only  in  self-defense, 
but  also  to  save  the  Seleucid  empire  from  becoming 
simply  an  appanage  of  Egypt  during  the  long  minority 
of  Berenice's  child.  For  conducting  to  a  successful  ter- 
mination, despite  initial  disasters,  the  campaign  against 
Ptolemy  III,  by  which  she  put  her  son  in  possession  of 
his  throne,  she  is  deserving  of  high  credit.  It  was  when 
this  was  accomplished,  and  her  son  was  king,  that  her 
ambition  led  her  into  maternal  and  political  crime;  for, 
in  order  to  retain  the  government,  which  her  oldest  son, 
now  arrived  at  years  of  discretion,  threatened  to  take 
from  her,  she  set  up  against  him  her  younger  son  Antio- 
chus,  surnamed  the  Hawk,  for  whom  she  got  the  admin- 
istration of  Asia  Minor.  The  Seleucids  became  thereby 
divided  against  themselves,  and  for  twenty  years 
(242-223  B.C.)  they  were  so  weakened  by  a  dynastic 
feud  that  they  not  only  neglected  vital  questions  of 
foreign  policy,  but  had  to  permit  the  total  loss  of  certain 
frontier  satrapies  and  the  rebellion  of  almost  all  the  rest. 
Antiochus  III,  surnamed  the  Great,  opened  his  reign 
with  an  error  —  the  attempt  to  deal  with  the  foreign 
situation  before  he  had  put  his  house  in  order;  and  he 
ended  it  with  a  great  disaster  —  his  irreparable  defeat 
by  the  Romans  at  Magnesia  in  190  B.C.;  but  in  between 


188  GREEK   IMPERIALISM 

he  restored  his  authority  over  what  Bevan  in  his  House 
of  Seleucus  calls  "the  essential  body  of  the  Empire"  and 
his  suzerainty  over  its  "outside  sphere."  The  latter  he 
accomplished  by  an  impressive  campaign,  in  Armenia 
(where  ruled  Xerxes,  betrayed  by  his  name  as  an  Iran- 
ian), in  Parthia  (where  Arsaces,  the  third  king  of  a  bar- 
barian line  from  the  Turanian  desert,  which  had  mas- 
tered that  country  a  little  less  than  forty  years  before, 
had  just  come  to  the  throne),  in  Bactria  (where  Euthyde- 
mus,  a  Greek  from  Magnesia,  had  recently  founded  a  new 
Hellenic  dynasty  in  the  place  of  an  old  one  established 
nearly  fifty  years  earlier  by  Diodotus,  "lord  of  the  thou- 
sand Bactrian  cities,"  as  he  is  called),  and  in  India, 
where  a  certain  Sophragasenus,  following  the  examples 
of  Arsaces  and  Euthydemus,  recognized  the  superior 
power  of  the  Seleucid. 

On  his  return  to  Antioch  after  five  years  of  marching 
and  fighting  in  the  Far  East  (210-205  B.C.),  Antiochus 
wrested  Palestine  from  the  now  feeble  grasp  of  the  Ptole- 
mies. This  exploit  gave  him  the  long-desired,  long- 
lacked,  and  long-fought-for  access  to  the  sea;  and  for 
the  first  time  in  the  history  of  the  realm  an  opportunity 
was  secured  for  the  construction  of  a  great  fleet.  Simul- 
taneously, Philip  of  Macedon  fell  before  the  Romans 
at  Cynocephalae  (197  B.C.);  whereupon  Antiochus  went 
vigorously  to  work  dislodging  all  "foreigners"  from  the 
Mediterranean  seaboard  of  Asia  Minor.  This  led  in 
192  B.C.  to  conflict  with  Rome. 


THE  SELEUCID   EMPIRE  189 

Antiochus  the  Great  has  been  late  in  coming  into  his 
due.1  The  mere  fact' that  Hannibal,  whom  the  undying 
hatred  of  Rome  had  driven  into  his  service,  worked  out 
for  him  a  plan  of  campaign  against  the  Romans  which 
he  rejected,  and  that  he  put  the  greatest  general  of  his 
age  in  charge  of  a  new  squadron  of  his  extemporized 
fleet,  have  sufficed  to  rule  out  of  court  in  advance  any 
apology  for  his  defeat.  The  issue  showed  that  the  view 
taken  by  Hannibal  of  the  power  of  Rome  was  right.  It 
is  true  that  it  could  have  been  checked  only  by  a  great 
combination  of  all  the  Mediterranean  states.  But  it  is 
equally  true  that  such  a  combination  was  impracticable. 
Antiochus  had  to  deal  with  the  situation  as  he  found  it. 
He  risked  too  much  for  a  few  frontier  districts  and  a  pos- 
sible hegemony  in  Greece.  But  he  seems  to  have  greatly 
underestimated  the  power  of  Rome,  and  to  have  credited 
the  Senate  with  far  less  energy  and  tenacity  of  purpose 
than  it  actually  possessed.  Once  his  vanguard  was  thrown 
out  of  Greece  by  the  incomparable  Roman  legions,  his 
main  hope  of  defending  Asia  Minor  did  actually  rest  with 
his  fleet.  Hannibal  was,  accordingly,  in  the  right  place. 
But  the  fleet  was  too  new  and  too  weak  as  well  as  too 
scattered  to  hold  the  Romans  in  Europe;  and,  once  the 
veterans  of  the  Second  Punic  War  were  across  the  Helles- 
pont, no  army  in  Asia  could  have  resisted  them. 

The  Seleucids  learned  a  terrible  lesson  on  the  battle- 

1  See  now  Kromayer,  Hannibal  und  Antiochus  der  Grosse  (Neue  Jahr- 
biicherfur  d.  klass,  Altert.  xix  (1907),  pp.  681  ff.). 


i9o  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

fields  of  Thermopylae  and  Magnesia:  the  fatality  was 
that  all  the  peoples  in  Asia  learned  it  also.  That  Antio- 
chus  the  Great  consented  to  surrender  all  his  possessions 
in  Asia  Minor  and  to  pay  to  the  Romans  an  indemnity 
of  one  thousand  talents  a  year  for  twelve  years ;  to  hand 
over  his  battleships  and  to  limit  his  fleet  to  ten  decked 
vessels  and  a  few  small  craft ;  to  give  up  all  his  war  ele- 
phants and  to  keep  no  others  in  the  future;  to  take  no 
Italians  into  his  service  as  mercenaries,  and  to  throw 
open  his  empire  to  the  merchants  and  traders  from 
Rhodes,  proclaimed  only  too  clearly  to  the  Orientals 
that  the  days  of  the  lordship  of  the  Macedonians  in  the 
world  were  past. 

It  was  not,  however,  till  after  the  untimely  death  of 
his  son,  Antiochus  IV,  surnamed  Epiphanes,  or  the  "God 
Manifest,"  in  164  B.C.  that  the  storm  broke  in  all  its 
fury.  The  forces  then  set  in  motion  for  the  destruction 
of  the  Seleucid  empire  were  of  two  kinds,  external  and 
internal.  Of  the  external  forces  we  have  already  con- 
sidered one  —  the  advance  of  the  Roman  power  toward 
the  East.  The  Roman  Senate  had  at  this  time  only  one 
concern  in  its  dealings  with  Syria,  namely,  to  make  the 
Seleucids  harmless.  This  it  accomplished  in  a  variety 
of  ways.  Immediately  after  the  death  of  Antiochus  IV, 
it  sent  commissioners  into  Syria  who  executed  an  unen- 
forced article  of  the  treaty  struck  after  the  battle  of 
Magnesia:  they  burnt  the  Seleucid  battleships  found  in 


THE  SELEUCID   EMPIRE  191 

the  cities  of  Phoenicia  and  hamstrung  the  war  elephants 
which  they  discovered  in  the  royal  arsenals.  By  jeal- 
ously restricting  the  military  establishment  of  the  Seleu- 
cids  the  Senate  broke  their  power  in  all  respects.  Not 
content,  however,  with  binding  the  feet  of  its  victim,  the 
Senate  held  out  an  encouraging  hand  to  all  rebels  against 
his  authority.  A  case  in  point  is  that  of  the  Jews.  Again 
and  again,  between  164  and  120  B.C.,  Judas  and  Jonathan 
Maccabaeus  and  Hyrcanus  I  sought  and  obtained  Roman 
recognition  in  their  struggle  against  their  overlords. 
They  had  national  causes  for  their  repeated  outbreaks 
and  religious  stimuli  to  resist  desperately,  but  it  is  doubt- 
ful whether  they  could  have  carried  their  war  of  inde- 
pendence to  a  successful  termination  without  the  assur- 
ance that  Rome  sympathized  with  their  enterprise.  The 
Senate  helped  on  the  disruption  of  the  Seleucid  realm  by 
still  another  unfriendly  act:  it  joined  with  Pergamum 
and  Egypt  in  lighting  the  fire  of  dynastic  war  in  Syria 
in  153  B.C.  and  in  adding  fuel  to  it  from  time  to  time 
thereafter,  with  the  result  that  the  realm  was  devastated 
by  civil  war  almost  continuously  from  that  date  till 
the  end  of  the  dynasty,  ninety  years  later.  Then,  the 
blackened  hulk,  manned  by  a  mutinous  crew,  lay  help- 
less in  a  sea  infested  with  pirates,  when  Pompey  picked 
it  up  and  towed  it  into  a  Roman  harbor. 

The  other  external  force  which  contributed  to  this 
inglorious  end  of  a  voyage  begun  with  such  fair  promise 
was  set  in  motion  from  the  Farthest  East.  I  do  not  reckon 


i92  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

it  in  this  account  that  the  Parthians  again  rebelled  and 
in  140  B.C.  advanced  their  western  frontier  to  the  Eu- 
phrates, thus  forming  the  philhellen  kingdom  of  west 
Iran  which  grew  behind  the  breastwork  of  the  Seleucid 
empire  to  such  power  that  later  it  disputed  with  some 
success  Rome's  claim  to  suzerainty  in  Asia.    Nor  do  I 
enter  it  here  that  Armenia  established  its  complete  in- 
dependence, and  under  Tigranes  the  Great  annexed  for 
a  time  (83-69  B.C.)  all  of  the  Seleucid  realm  then  remain- 
ing. For  these  are  internal  movements  analogous  to  the 
insurrection  of  the  Jews.    It  was  from  the  banks  of  the 
Hoang-Ho  that  an  advance  toward  the  west  occurred 
in  the  early  part  of  the  second  century  B.C.  which  may 
be  paralleled  with  the  simultaneous  advance  eastward 
of  the  Roman  power  from  the  banks  of  the  Tiber.1  The 
oncoming  Eastern  assailant  was  the  conglomerate  of 
Indo-European  peoples  whom  the  Chinese  call  the  Yue 
Tchi.  They  came  along  the  edges  of  the  great  desert  of 
shifting  sand  in  Eastern  Turkestan  down  which  flows  the 
mouthless  Tarim  River,  not  with  the  elan  of  conquer- 
ors, but  retreating  slowly  before  the  superior  strength 
of  the  Huns  (Hioung  Nou),  their  former  subjects,  with 
whom  they  had  recently  fought  an  unsuccessful  war  for 
the  possession  of  North  China.     It  was  against  their 
conquerors,  we  may  remark  in  passing,  that  the  Chinese 
emperors,  Chi-Houang-ti  and  Wou-ti  of  the  Ts'in  and 

»  Cordier,  H.,  Journal  des  Savants  (1907),  PP-  247  ff.',  Cunningham, 
Numismatic  Chronicle  (1888),  pp.  222/. 


THE  SELEUCID   EMPIRE  193 

Han  Dynasties  respectively,  constructed  in  the  third 
and  second  centuries  B.C.,  to  the  south  of  the  Desert 
of  Gobi,  the  great  Chinese  Limes,  or  Wall.  In  159  B.C. 
the  Yue  Tchi  occupied  Sogdiana.  Twenty  years  later 
(139  B.C.)  they  crushed  the  Greek  kingdom  of  Bactria; 
so  that  in  this  general  region  it  was  only  in  India,  in  the 
vast  district  drained  by  the  Indus  River,  that  Greek 
kingdoms  existed  thereafter.  Somewhere  near  the  open- 
ing of  the  Christian  era  these,  too,  succumbed  to  the 
Yue  Tchi,  now  properly  designated  Indo-Scythians  by 
the  Greeks.  For  several  centuries  the  Indo-Scythians, 
like  the  Huns  who  followed  them  in  the  fifth  century  of 
our  era,  and  the  Turks  who  followed  the  Huns  in  the 
sixth,  kept  open  the  trade  routes  along  which  they  had 
themselves  advanced  when  driven  westward  from  the 
Hoang-Ho.  Their  successors  transmitted  to  the  frontiers 
of  China  Manichaeism,  the  cosmopolitan  religion  of 
Iran:  they  did  a  greater  work.  They  not  only  forwarded 
Buddhism  to  the  Chinese;  but  before  it,  and  with  it,  the 
pure  as  well  as  the  debased  art  of  Greece.  Among  the 
priceless  treasures  which  Dr.  Stein  has  brought  back 
from  the  desert  cities  of  Cathay,  none  are  more  remark- 
able than  certain  clay  seals  attached  to  documents  of 
the  third  century  of  our  era,  found  at  Niya  in  a  district 
then  under  Chinese  control ; 1  for  one  of  them  might  have 
been  made  for  Diodotus,  the  first  Greek  king  of  Bac- 
tria, while  on  others  appears  Athena  Alcis,  the  haughty, 

1  Ruins  of  Desert  Cathay  (1912),  1,  pp.  274,  284. 


i94  GREEK   IMPERIALISM 

helmeted,  promachus  Athena,  hurling  the  thunderbolt, 
whom  the  Antigonid  kings  of  Macedon  and  the  Greek 
kings  of  India  had  put  on  their  coins.1  Not  without 
some  reason,  therefore,  is  the  view  now  being  advanced 
that  the  art  of  China  and  Japan  is  derived,  like  that  of 
Europe  and  America,  from  Greek  sources.2  It  is  an  amaz- 
ing spectacle  to  observe  how  Hellenistic  civilization 
flowed  simultaneously  back  the  channels  to  the  springs 
in  Italy  and  China  whence  came  the  floods  which  over- 
whelmed the  Seleucid  empire. 

After  this  rapid  survey  of  the  political  history  of  the 
Seleucids,  I  wish  to  devote  the  remainder  of  this  chap- 
ter to  considering  the  domestic  policy  of  the  dynasty. 
I  shall  point  out  that  Seleucus  and  his  successors  con- 
tinued Alexander  the  Great's  work  of  founding  city- 
states  in  Asia,  and  that,  having  to  deal  with  priestly 
communities  and  feudal  lords  as  well  as  with  the  occu- 
pants of  the  widespread  royal  domains,  they  refused  to 
exempt  from  their  direct  control  any  lands  not  placed 
under  the  jurisdiction  of  a  city-state.  I  shall  discuss 
briefly  the  internal  structure  of  the  city-states  and  more 
at  length  their  relation  in  theory  and  fact  to  the  mon- 
arch. This  will  finally  bring  up  for  examination  the 
policy  of  Antiochus  IV,  in  whose  reign  the  internal  as 

1  W.  VV.  Tarn,  Journal  of  Hellenic  Studies,  xxn  (1902),  pp.  268  ff., 
and  Antigonus  Gonatas,  frontispiece;  Gardner,  P.,  Numismatic  Chronicle 
(1887),  p.  177. 

*  Encyclopedia  Brilannica11,  s.  v.  Hellenism  (Bevan). 


THE  SELEUCID   EMPIRE  195 

well  as  the  external  development  of  the  Seleucid  empire 
culminated. 

Seleucus  had  been  advanced  to  high  position  in  Alex- 
ander's service  after  Alexander  had  disclosed  his  purpose 
of  fusing  the  Macedonians,  Greeks,  and  Iranians  into 
a  new  cosmopolitan  race.  The  promotion  obtained  by 
him  during  the  course  of  the  bitter  struggle  which  this 
policy  occasioned  suggests  that  he  made  Alexander's 
point  of  view  his  own.  This  surmise  as  to  the  atti- 
tude of  Seleucus  is  confirmed  by  the  fact  that  he  took 
his  place,  after  Alexander's  death,  with  those  who  up- 
held the  cause  of  Alexander's  family,  and  left  it  for  his 
Babylonian  satrapy  only  when  it  became  clear  that 
to  remain  meant  to  perish  without  accomplishing  any- 
thing. 

Seleucus  was  the  only  one  of  the  great  Macedonian 
captains  who  did  not  take  Alexander's  death  as  a  license 
to  discard  their  Iranian  wives.  The  Bactrian  maiden 
assigned  to  him  at  the  great  Susian  marriage  —  Apama, 
daughter  of  Spitamenes  —  became  his  queen  and  the 
mother  of  his  heir,  Antiochus.  The  Seleucid  dynasty 
was,  accordingly,  half  Iranian  from  the  start;  and  for  the 
policy  which  it  inherited  from  Antigonus  and  Alexander, 
and  which  it  prosecuted  vigorously  till  the  death  of  An- 
tiochus IV  in  164  B.C.,  namely,  the  Hellenizationof  Asia, 
it  had  as  warrant  the  practice  of  its  idealized  founder. 

Of  the  Greek  cities  which  Seleucus  planted   in  his 


196  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

realm,  fifty-nine  are  named  by  Appian.1  They  lay 
especially  in  Syria,  in  the  district  between  the  Eu- 
phrates and  the  sea  which  he  sought  to  make  a  second 
Macedonia.  His  son  Antiochus,  to  whom  he  gave  the 
administration  of  the  eastern  satrapies  in  293  B.C.,  was 
particularly  active  in  developing  cities  on  the  Greek 
model  in  that  region ;  and  to  him  and  his  son  Antiochus 
Theos  belongs  the  honor  of  establishing  the  urban  habits 
of  Hellenic  life  in  the  interior  of  Asia  Minor.  In  the  arm 
of  their  realm  which  reached  through  this  peninsula  to 
the  rear  of  the  Greek  strip  on  the  Anatolian  coast,  new 
cities  sprang  up  under  their  auspices  by  the  score.  Nor 
did  the  movement  come  to  an  end  with  the  reign  of  the 
second  Antiochus  in  246  B.C.,  though  it  probably  weak- 
ened at  that  time.  Over  two  generations  later,  in  the 
reign  of  Antiochus  IV,  it  was  again  resumed  actively 
and  directed  especially  into  Palestine,  which  had  been 
newly  added  to  the  realm. 

The  most  striking  feature  in  the  internal  policy  of 
the  Seleucids  is  the  attempted  transfer  into  Asia  of  the 
urban  form  of  life  theretofore  characteristic  of  Hellas. 
Evidently,  these  monarchs  believed  with  Aristotle, 
Alexander,  and,  we  may  add,  Polybius,  and,  indeed, 
all  Greeks,  that  men  who  did  not  live  in  cities  were  un- 
civilized men.  Evidently,  too,  they  thought  it  wise 
and  possible  to  civilize  their  dominions. 

It  is  not  easy  to  form  a  definite  impression  of  the 

1  Syr.  57;  cf.  Droysen,  Gesch.  d.  Hellenismus1,  in,  2,  pp.  254  ff. 


THE  SELEUCID   EMPIRE  197 

political  situation  in  the  Seleucid  realm  when  the  Mace- 
donians first  took  possession,  but  cities  in  the  Greek 
sense  seem  to  have  been  entirely  absent.  This  does  not 
mean  that  towns  were  lacking  altogether,  since,  even 
if  we  disregard  administrative  centres  like  Babylon, 
Susa,  Ecbatana,  Persepolis,  we  may  use  the  term  "town" 
properly  of  places  like  Bambyce  in  Syria,  fourteen  miles 
west  of  the  Euphrates.  There,  in  a  fertile,  well-watered 
valley,  stood  a  famous  temple  of  Atargatis,  the  Syrian 
goddess.  It  was  a  wonderful  establishment,  as  readers 
of  Lucian  know,  with  its  wide  approaches,  its  obelisk- 
like phalli,  its  sacred  fish-pond,  its  shocking  rites.  At  its 
head  were  emasculated  priests,  who  not  only  conducted 
the  ceremonies  and  directed  a  far-reaching  proselytism, 
but  also  governed  the  community  of  temple  slaves 
{hieroduli)  who  tilled  the  land  of  the  neighborhood  for 
their  own  support  and  that  of  the  church.  This  clerical 
form  of  local  organization  had  been  carefully  fostered  by 
the  Persians.  We  all  know  how  in  reorganizing  Judaea 
they  put  the  common  people,  who  were  there  simply  to 
pay  tithes,  under  the  control  of  the  high  priest,  elders, 
and  Levites,  and  made  the  so-called  law  of  Moses  the 
civil  law  of  the  land.  They  proceeded  in  similar  fashion 
throughout  Asia  Minor.  There  Seleucus  found  scores  of 
towns,  big  and  little,  to  which  the  description,  given  by 
Strabo x  of  the  sacred  city  of  Ma  at  Comana  in  Cappa- 

1  xii,  2,  3,  p.  535.    Rostowzew,  Studien  zur  Geschichte  des  romischen 
Kolonates,  pp.  269  ff. 


iq8  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

docia,  is  applicable:  "  In  itself  it  is,"  he  says,  "a  notable 
city,  but  most  of  its  inhabitants  are  god-possessed,  or 
temple  slaves.  They  are  all  of  Cataonian  stock  and  are 
subject  generally  to  the  authority  of  the  king,  but  are 
under  the  immediate  control  of  the  priest.  He  is  lord 
at  once  of  the  temple  and  of  the  temple  slaves,  of  whom 
there  were  more  than  six  thousand,  including  men  and 
women,  at  the  time  of  my  visit.  Attached  to  the  temple 
is  much  land,  of  which  the  priest  enjoys  the  revenues, 
and  there  is  no  one  in  Cappadocia  of  higher  dignity 
than  he  except  the  king."  Similar  to  this  was  the  temple 
of  Zeus  at  Venasa  with  its  three  thousand  temple  slaves 
and  its  land  which  yielded  to  its  priest  an  annual  income 
of  twenty  thousand  dollars  (fifteen  talents) ;  the  temple 
of  Zeus  Asbamaeus  near  Tyana,  of  Apollo  in  Cataonia, 
Mater  Zizimene  near  Iconium,  and  Artemis  Perasia  in 
Castabala.  Similar,  too,  was  the  temple  of  Ma  in  Pontic 
Comana  with  its  swarming  mart,  its  wide  acres,  and  its 
six  thousand  temple  slaves,  of  whom  the  young  women, 
here  as  elsewhere,  were  sacred  prostitutes;  the  temple 
of  Anaitis  in  Zela,  of  Men  in  Cabira,  of  Selene  in  Iberia, 
of  the  Great  Mother  at  Pessinus,  of  Zeus  at  Olba,  and  of 
other  gods  in  other  places  scattered  through  Phrygia, 
Pisidia,  and  Lydia,  as  well  as  Palestine,  Syria,  and 
Babylonia.  The  Seleucids  must  have  found  the  body 
of  their  empire  thickly  studded  with  religious  communi- 
ties, each  subject  to  its  own  code  of  divine  law,  each 
dominated  by  a  masterful  and  long-petted  theocracy. 


THE  SELEUCID   EMPIRE  199 

Under  this  baleful  rule  the  whole  country  had  settled 
gradually  down  during  the  Persian  time  in  progressive 
political  and  economic  stagnation. 

Apart  from  the  mountains  and  the  deserts,  where 
tribal  and  nomadic  liberty  reigned,  —  a  constant  menace 
to  central  government,  —  the  peoples  of  Asia  lived  in 
villages  when  the  Macedonians  came.  Many  of  these 
villages,  villagers  and  all,  were  owned  by  princelings  and 
noblemen,  who,  if  natives,  had  been  undisturbed  by  the 
Persians,  if  Iranians,  had  come  into  their  possessions 
by  reason  of  royal  grants.  All  through  Syria  and  Asia 
Minor  may  be  seen  to-day  the  ruins  of  "square  towers" 
{tetrapyrgice)  and  manorial  castles  such  as  these  grandees 
built  and  fortified  for  defense  against  their  neighbors 
and,  if  need  be,  against  the  royal  authority  itself.1  Those 
who  built  them  had  apparently  had  little  loyalty  to  the 
Persian  king,  but  also  little  inclination  to  obey  his  suc- 
cessor. They  were,  accordingly,  ejected  right  and  left. 
Of  the  estates  thus  obtained,  the  Macedonian  kings 
could  dispose  at  their  pleasure.  They  formed  again  part 
of  the  royal  domain,  which  stretched  in  all  directions  at 
the  edges  of  the  deserts  and  the  mountains,  among  the 
temple  lands,  the  feudal  fiefs,  and  administrative  cities 
—  a  veritable  archipelago  of  landed  property,  tilled  for 
the  crown  by  myriads  of  royal  serfs.  Here  was  the  v\t], 
the  material,  of  which  the  Seleucids  founded  many  of 
their  city-states. 

1  Butler,  Publications  of  an  American  Expedition  to  Syria,  II  (1903), 
pp.  121  ff.,  177;  cf.  Rostowzew,  op.  cit.,  p.  254. 


200  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

The  handle  for  reorganization  which  the  priestly 
towns  offered  to  the  new  government  was  often  the  non- 
ecclesiastical  part  of  the  population.  That  the  temple 
was  regularly  the  centre  of  local  trade  and  the  scene  of 
a  recurrent  bazaar  tempted  to  its  proximity  money- 
changers and  the  like.  When  the  Greek  immigration 
began  this  element  was  naturally  strengthened.  It  was, 
therefore,  possible  for  the  Seleucids  to  give  it  an  urban 
organization  —  a  general  assembly,  a  council,  and  mag- 
istrates; and  in  this  way  to  create  a  new  city-state. 

According  to  invariable  Greek  practice,  however,  such 
a  city  controlled  —  with  certain  limitations  —  its  own 
shrines.  The  great  temples  of  Apollo  at  Delphi  and  De- 
los,  for  example,  were  governed  by  the  citizens  of  those 
towns.  Hence  the  natural  policy  for  the  Seleucids,  and 
the  one  which  they  in  fact  followed  wherever  practicable, 
was  to  subordinate  the  high  priests  and  clergy  to  the 
adjacent  urban  authorities,  thus  solving  the  ecclesiastical 
question  in  a  way  convenient  for  themselves  and  agree- 
able to  European  feeling.  Where  this  did  not  prove 
practicable,  they  often  despoiled  the  temple  of  its  lands 
for  the  benefit  of  their  followers.  Thus  the  village  of 
Bsetocaece  was  taken  from  the  local  temple  of  Zeus  and 
given  to  a  certain  Demetrius,  and  the  sacred  land  of 
Zeus  of  JEza.ni  was  divided  into  lots,  which  were  assigned 
to  cleruchs,  subjected  to  a  tax,  and  attached  to  the 
financial  jurisdiction  of  an  adjoining  city.1    It  is  simply 

1  Dittenberger,  Orientis  Grcecce  Inscriptiones  Selectee,  262,  502. 


THE  SELEUCID   EMPIRE  201 

another  aspect  of  the  same  general  policy  when  king 
after  king  sought  to  lay  "impious"  hands  upon  the 
treasures  stored  up  in  the  temples  of  Bel,  Anaitis, 
Atargatis,  and  Jehovah. 

The  secularization  of  religious  properties  was  a  very 
difficult  matter,  and  it  was  not  pushed  at  all  times  with 
equal  vigor  by  the  Seleucids.  When  the  monarchs  were 
embarrassed  by  foreign  or  domestic  troubles,  they  had 
to  conciliate  the  priests  even  to  the  point  of  undoing 
what  they  had  already  done.  How  easily  a  reaction 
might  occur  we  can  perceive  from  the  case  recorded  in 
the  splendid  inscription  which  Mr.  Butler  has  recently 
found  cut  on  the  inner  wall  of  the  great  temple  of  Artemis 
at  Sardis.1  A  certain  Mnesimachus,  presumably  a 
Macedonian  officer  or  adventurer,  had  got  a  huge  fief 
from  King  Antigonus.  It  consisted  of  the  village  of 
Tobalmura  in  the  Sardian  plain  and  its  appurtenances, 
the  villages  of  Tandu  and  Combdilipia.  On  these  he  had 
to  pay  annual  dues  of  £50  to  the  proper  chiliarchy,  or 
subdivision  of  the  satrapy.  Near  by,  in  Cinara  was  a 
kleros,  or  lot,  on  which  he  paid  £3  yearly.  The  fief  con- 
sisted, in  addition,  of  the  village  of  Periasasostra,  of 
which  the  annual  dues,  payable  to  another  chiliarchy, 
were  £57.  Close  by,  in  Nagrioa  was  again  a  kleros,  on 
which  he  paid  £3  7s.  yearly.  The  fief  consisted,  more- 
over, of  the  village  of  Ilu  in  the  territory  of  the  well- 

1  Buckler  and  Robinson,  Greek  Inscriptions  from  Sardis.  (American 
Journal  of  Archeology,  xvi,  1912,  pp.  11  ff.) 


202  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

known  city  of  Attuda,  of  which  the  dues,  paid  annually 
to  the  city  of  course,  were  £3  5s.  The  manor  (aule)  of 
the  fief  was  in  the  village  of  Tobalmura,  and  together 
with  certain  lodges  held  by  bailiffs  and  certain  gardens 
and  parks  tilled  by  manorial  serfs  in  Tobalmura  and 
Periasasostra,  it  had  once  been  assigned  to  Pytheus  and 
Adrastus,  likewise  Macedonians;  but  later  on  it  had 
seemingly  come  into  the  possession  of  Mnesimachus. 
The  happy  holder  of  this  great  estate  enjoyed,  doubtless, 
the  total  net  yield  of  the  manor  and  the  lots,  and,  in 
addition,  as  the  possessor  of  the  manor  and  lots,  rights 
to  exact  services  in  money,  kind,  and  labor  from  the 
villeins  of  the  villages.  Had  he  been  so  minded  he  might 
have  settled  down  in  Lydia  and  become  a  baron  like 
the  Iranian  nobles  whom  the  Macedonians  dispos- 
sessed; and,  doubtless,  many  Macedonians  and  Greeks 
established  themselves  in  Asia  in  this  fashion.  Mnesi- 
machus, however,  wanted  money  rather  than  "rights"; 
and,  turning  to  the  temple  of  Artemis  in  Sardis,  he  se- 
cured a  loan  of  £1325  from  the  temple  treasurers.  The 
inscription  cut  on  the  temple  wall  records  the  sale  to 
Artemis,  with  right  to  repurchase,  of  Mnesimachus's 
interest  in  the  fief.  His  inability  to  repay  his  loan  re- 
sulted in  the  aggrandizement  of  the  temple. 

Incidents  of  this  sort  were,  doubtless,  of  frequent 
occurrence  and  show  what  the  Seleucids  had  to  guard 
against.  Their  land  policy  seems  to  have  been  prudent 
and  far-sighted.  They  were  bound  to  deal  cautiously  with 


THE  SELEUCID   EMPIRE  203 

their  gigantic  domain,  since  from  it  came  the  most  valu- 
able and  stable  portion  of  their  revenues.  On  the  other 
hand,  they  found  a  limit  set  to  the  quantity  which  they 
could  profitably  retain  by  the  fact  that,  unlike  the 
Ptolemies,  they  inherited  from  the  Persians  a  public 
service  adequate,  not  to  administer,  but  simply  to  super- 
vise administration.  They  did  indeed  increase  the  num- 
ber of  their  satrapies,  without,  perhaps,  diminishing  the 
number  of  chiliarchies  or  hyparchies  into  which  each 
satrapy  was  divided,  and  they  seem  to  have  paralleled 
the  general  service  by  a  distinct  fiscal  service  and  by  a 
distinct  priestly  service;  but,  none  the  less,  they  had  to 
leave  the  details  of  fiscal,  judicial,  and  religious  ad- 
ministration to  the  villages.  Though  we  are  singularly 
ill-informed  as  to  how  they  organized  the  villages,  it  is 
conceivable  that  they  picked  out  certain  persons,  like  the 
elders  in  the  Egyptian  villages,  and  held  them  responsi- 
ble for  the  taxes  of  the  villagers  and  for  their  general 
good  behavior.   These  men  would  be  rather  hostages 
than  officials,  and  would  be  nominees  of  the  central 
government  rather  than  of  the  villages.    But  we  really 
know  nothing  of  the  facts,  except  that  the  villagers  had 
some  means  by  which  they  paid  their  taxes  collectively. 
One  way  by  which  the  Seleucids  could  relieve  them- 
selves of  the  troubles  of  local  administration  and  at  the 
same  time  strengthen  their  hold  upon  the  country  was 
to  make  grants  of  whole  blocks  or  complexes  of  their 
land,  villages  and  villagers  and  all,  to  Macedonian  and 


204  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

Greek  feudatories,  like  Mnesimachus,  who  of  course 
became  responsible  for  the  dues  owing  to  the  crown.  But 
the  evils  of  this  system  had  been  discovered  by  the  Per- 
sian kings  when  they  found  their  vassals  more  unruly 
than  the  villages.  Hence  the  Seleucids  refused  to  give  a 
clear  title  to  those  to  whom  they  made  grants  of  portions 
of  the  royal  domain,  and  in  the  case  of  Mnesimachus  the 
temple  of  Artemis,  to  which  he  sold  his  rights,  had  to 
secure  itself  in  the  contract  against  the  loss  which  it 
might  sustain  should  the  king  recall  his  grant.   On  the 
other  hand,  when  the  king  sold  outright  parts  of  the 
domain,  as  he  frequently  did,  particularly  in  times  of 
financial  distress,  and  the  lands  and  villages  sold  became 
with  their  peasants  private  property,  he  required  that 
they  should  be  added  to  the  territory  of  some  city-state, 
it  being  a  privilege  highly  cherished  by  the  purchasers 
that  they  should  be  given  the  liberty  of  deciding  to 
which  city  their  property  should  belong.   The  Seleucid 
policy  that  land  should  belong  either  to  a  city-state  or  to 
the  crown  was  admirably  calculated  to  destroy  priestly 
and  feudal  sovereignties,  and  it  was  taken  over  by  the 
Roman  emperors,  into  whose  patrimony  in  Asia  Minor 
passed  many  temple  lands  which  had  either  escaped 
secularization  under  their  predecessors  or  had  been  re- 
gained by  the  priests  during  the  later,  weaker  days  of 
the  Seleucid  dynasty.1 

By  a  similar  sale,  or  by  a  gift  outright,  the  colonists 

1  Calder,  Classical  Review,  xxvn  (1913).  PP-  9  ff- 


THE   SELEUCID   EMPIRE  205 

who  formed  a  new  city,  or  the  old  inhabitants  of  a  village 
on  being  constituted  citizens  of  a  free  town,  obtained 
full  ownership  of  the  lots  of  land  assigned  to  them.  The 
citizens,  in  turn,  had  authority,  subject  of  course  to  the 
city's  laws  and  the  constitutions  of  the  realm,  over  the 
serfs  when  there  happened  to  be  any  on  their  holdings. 
In  this  way  the  king  lost  control  of  his  peasants  and 
his  property;  for  the  foundation  was  not  merely  a  new 
city,  but  at  the  same  time  a  new  state.  Its  sovereign 
was  not,  or  not  simply,  the  king:  it  was  the  body  of  its 
franchised  inhabitants  assembled  in  general  assembly, 
and  it  proceeded  to  manage  its  public  affairs  by  means 
of  discussion  and  resolutions,  by  delegating  functions  to 
a  council  and  magistrates,  and  by  determining  its  own 
domestic  and  foreign  policies.  The  language  of  public 
life  was  of  course  Greek.  The  code  of  public  and  private 
law  was,  doubtless,  drafted  according  to  Hellenic  models. 
Gymnasia  appeared  and  with  them  gymnastic  and  musi- 
cal contests  —  the  most  characteristic  marks  of  Greek 
education.  The  deities  they  honored  were  those  whom 
they  themselves  chose :  they  chose  native  gods  and  god- 
desses as  well  as  Greek;  above  all  they  chose  as  their 
chief  city-god  the  living  emperor. 

The  Seleucid  empire  was  a  state  without  a  citizen- 
ship. If  an  Athenian  settled  in  it,  he  remained  an 
Athenian,  even  if  he  became  a  satrap,  unless  he  were 
given  citizen  rights  in  some  one  of  the  free  cities.  In 
other  words,  the  empire  had  as  many  different  citizen- 


206  GREEK   IMPERIALISM 

ships  as  there  were  different  cities,  and  as  many  distinct 
states  as  there  were  distinct  citizenships. 

Accordingly,  each  city  could  adopt  whatever  policy 
it  pleased  in  the  matter  of  admitting  foreigners,  be  they 
Greeks  or  Asiatics,  newcomers  or  natives,  to  its  body 
politic.  It  might  prohibit  the  intermarriage  of  citizens 
with  non-citizens  altogether,  or  it  might  go  so  far  as  to 
open  its  doors  to  bastards.  It  is,  therefore,  impossible 
for  us,  without  such  sources  of  knowledge  as  the  papyri 
afford  for  Egypt,  to  speak  in  any  general  way  of  the 
extent  and  effects  of  racial  fusion  in  the  Seleucid  empire. 
Two  things,  however,  seem  clear:  (i)  Intermarriage 
between  citizens  of  different  cities  was  of  frequent  occur- 
rence and,  doubtless,  of  full  legal  propriety;  (2)  the  great 
mass  of  the  agricultural  population  was  not  much  af- 
fected racially  by  the  proximity  of  Greeks,  Macedon- 
ians, Jews,  or  Iranians.  The  peasants  were  practically 
serfs.  Their  social  inferiority  protected  them  against 
assimilation  by  citizens.  On  the  other  hand,  they  were, 
doubtless,  much  more  deeply  stirred  by  the  European 
immigration  than  were  the  fellahs  in  Egypt;  for  the  in- 
flux into  their  land  was  much  more  abundant  and  more 
spontaneous  than  was  that  into  the  valley  of  the  Nile. 
Here,  too,  Hellenism  had  much  more  effective  agents 
for  its  diffusion  than  it  had  there.  For  within  the  hun- 
dreds of  city-states  in  Asia  we  must  presume  that  inter- 
marriage was  permitted  among  all  citizens,  whether  the 
elements  which  mingled  with  the  Greeks  were  Phryg- 


THE  SELEUCID   EMPIRE  207 

ians,  Lydians,  Syrians,  Jews,  Babylonians,  or  Iranians. 
We  must  presume  that  at  least  the  men  knew  in  a 
fashion  the  Greek  language.  They  certainly  tended  to 
take  Greek  names,  and  in  documents  of  Delos  dating 
from  the  second  century  B.C.  we  meet  with  natives  of 
Bambyce  —  now  a  polls  and  renamed  Hierapolis,  or 
the  Sacred  City  —  who  would  be  indistinguishable  from 
native-born  Greeks  were  it  not  for  the  Semitic  names  of 
their  wives.  Indeed,  some  of  them  may  have  been 
Greeks  who  had  married  Syrian  women.  The  various 
circles  of  Europeans  in  Syria,  and,  though  to  a  less 
degree,  elsewhere  in  Asia,  must  have  been  surrounded 
at  an  early  date  by  a  penumbra  of  half-breeds,  by  means 
of  which  the  sharp  contrast  of  antagonistic  civilizations 
was  lessened.  In  these  circumstances  Greek  ideas  and 
customs  became  a  ferment  which  stirred  the  peoples  of 
Asia  to  the  depths.  The  awakening  of  the  Nearer  East 
was  in  progress  in  the  third  century  B.C.,  and  had  the 
Romans  succumbed  to  Hannibal  and  the  Greeks  main- 
tained their  prestige  unimpaired  for  a  century  or  two 
longer,  the  whole  course  of  history  would  have  been 
changed. 

The  Greeks  came  to  Asia  "not  to  send  peace  but  a 
sword."  They  came  to  fill  the  continent  up  with  can- 
tankerous little  republics  where  formerly  a  dense  multi- 
tude had  lived  in  a  state  of  political  lethargy.  And  curi- 
ously enough  those  who  directed  the  dismemberment  of 
Asia  into  far  more  states  than  even  mediaeval  Germany 


2o8  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

produced  were  the  rulers  who  had  the  responsibility  for 

the  government  of  the  whole  region.   How  explain  this 

anomaly? 

The  anomaly  is  more  apparent  than  real.  The  ruler 
was  not  simply  the  great  landed  proprietor  of  the  cities' 
neighborhood ;  he  was  the  founder,  or  the  descendant  of 
the  heroized  founder,  of  most  of  them ;  he  was  the  "  ben- 
efactor" or  the  "preserver"  of  them  all.  As  such  he  was 
deserving  of  their  homage  and  entitled  to  their  obedience. 
This  they  could  proffer  in  an  unobjectionable  manner 
once  Alexander  had  shown  them  the  way.  They  had 
simply  to  make  their  proskynesis;  to  elect  him  to  mem- 
bership in  their  circle  of  deities,  furnish  him  with  a 
sacred  precinct,  temple,  altar,  image,  procession,  and 
contest,  and  designate  a  priest  to  attend  to  the  sacrifices 
and  other  matters  pertaining  to  his  worship.  This  they 
did  of  their  own  volition  during  the  reign  of  the  founder 
of  the  dynasty.  Apotheosis  without  territorial  limita- 
tions Antiochus  I  demanded  for  Seleucus  "after  his 
departure  from  the  life  among  men,"  and  the  second 
Antiochus  demanded  it  for  himself  and  his  sister-wife 
during  their  lifetime  as  well  as  for  their  "departed" 
father;  so  that  just  as  in  Egypt  and  for  the  same  reasons 
an  imperial  cult  of  the  rulers  dead  and  living  was  estab- 
lished throughout  not  only  the  satrapies  and  hyparchies 
but  also  the  cities  of  the  realm.1 

1  Karst,  Gesch.  des  hellen.  Zeitalters,  n,  i,  pp.  419  ff-  Bouche- 
Leclercq's  treatment  of  this  subject  (Hist,  des  Seleucides,  pp.  469/.),  is 
inadequate. 


THE   SELEUCID   EMPIRE  209 

The  city  had,  accordingly,  a  dual  character:  it  was  at 
once  both  in  theory  and  fact  a  nation  and  a  municipal- 
ity. In  the  former  capacity  it  could  grant  or  withhold 
allegiance  to  the  king;  in  the  latter  it  had  simply  to  obey. 
It  had  for  example  to  pay  tribute  to  him  (phoros  or 
syntaxis),  which  might  be  viewed  as  a  rent  for  the  land 
assigned  to  it,  or  as  the  price  paid  for  military  protection. 
It  might  have  not  simply  a  priest  of  the  king  and  a 
priestess  of  the  queen,  but  also  a  resident  (epistates),  who 
on  occasion  might  also  be  phrurarch,  or  commandant, 
of  the  royal  garrison  when  it  had  one.  The  double  status 
of  the  city  is  further  evidenced  by  the  fact  that  its  citi- 
zens were  subject  not  only  to  the  laws  which  they  them- 
selves passed  but  also  to  the  mandates  (prostagmata) 
which  the  king  issued.  In  cases  of  conflict  there  could  be 
no  doubt  which  was  superior.  The  king  was  in  theory 
absolute  as  a  god  was  absolute.  He  had,  of  course,  citi- 
zenship in  no  state,  but  was  simply  basileus,  or  king. 
This  title,  attached  to  the  name  without  an  ethnicum, 
was  the  only  one  that  the  early  Seleucids  used;  but  the 
later  members  of  the  dynasty,  beginning  with  Antiochus 
IV,  added  to  it  the  title,  such  as  Epiphanes,  or  God  Man- 
ifest, by  which  their  peculiar  office  as  gods  was  indicated. 
Thereafter,  on  their  coins  and  edicts  the  two  titles  ap- 
peared, and  the  monarchs  were  thereby  classified  in  the 
two  worlds  to  which  they  belonged  —  that  of  men  and 
that  of  gods  —  as  completely  as  were  citizens  when  to 
their  names  were  added  the  adjectival  forms  of  their 


210  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

city's  name.  In  either  capacity  they  were  superior  to 
the  cities.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Seleucid  god-kings 
had  to  consider  carefully  the  demands  of  their  cities, 
since  these,  having  the  means  to  organize  resistance, 
could  easily  revolt.  When  they  did  not  get  satisfaction 
they  might  choose  some  other  god-king  instead,  as  the 
cities  in  Parthia  and  Bactria  actually  did ;  or  they  might 
secure  immunity  from  tribute,  as  did  the  cities  in  Asia 
Minor  in  the  reign  of  Antiochus  I.  Room  was,  accord- 
ingly, left  for  a  large  measure  of  municipal  liberty;  and, 
in  general,  the  activities  of  the  citizens  were  numerous 
and  important.  They  had  to  attend  to  the  maintenance 
of  order,  the  administration  of  justice,  and  the  collection 
of  taxes  within  their  several  territories.  Hence  the  cities 
gave  a  stimulus  to  political  interest  and  ambition  such 
as  Asia  had  never  known  before.  They  occupied,  in  fact, 
a  place  in  the  Seleucid  empire  quite  as  important  as  that 
of  the  municipalities  in  the  early  Roman  empire,  of 
which  they  were,  indeed,  the  prototypes. 

The  Roman  empire,  however,  had  not  yet  come  into 
existence.  It  was  the  Italian  federation  under  Rome's 
leadership  which  defeated  Hannibal  and  won  the  battles 
of  Thermopylae  and  Magnesia.^  When  compared  with 
this  aggregate  of  incorporated  and  allied  states,  the  Seleu- 
cid empire  demonstrated  fatal  weaknesses.  Rome  had, 
perhaps,  not  many  more  citizens  on  her  army  list  than 
there  were  males  of  military  age  in  the  franchised  popu- 
lation of  the  Seleucid  cities;  and  her  public  land,  which, 


THE  SELEUCID   EMPIRE  211 

too,  was  her  chief  source  of  revenue,  was  far  inferior  in 
extent  and  yield  to  the  royal  domain  of  the  Seleucids. 
Her  advantages  were  twofold  and  their  enumeration  will 
help  us  to  understand  the  disabilities  under  which  the 
Asiatic  monarchy  labored.     First,  apart  from  the  sol- 
diers on  Rome's  army  list  there  were  few  males  of  mili- 
tary age  in  Italy;  in  other  words,  there  was  no  vast 
native  population  to  hold  in  subjection.   Second,  Rome 
could  mobilize  her  forces  much  more  easily,  quickly, 
and  completely  than  could  the  Seleucids.    The  great  dis- 
tances, often  of  mountain  and  desert,  which  separated 
the  cities  of  Asia  from  one  another;  the  considerable 
trading,  industrial,  Asiatic,  and  otherwise  unwarlike, 
element  in  the  free  population  of  the  Hellenic  and 
Hellenized  cities;  and  the  independence  of  the  cities, 
particularly  in  the  matter  of  giving  or  refusing  military 
aid  to  their  suzerain,  had  no  parallel  in  Italy,  where  the 
territory  was  compact,  the  population  mainly  a  warlike 
peasantry,  and  the  cities  all  bound  to  provide  troops  at 
the  call  of  Rome  to  the  full  extent  of  their  power.   Like 
the  giant  Antaeus  in  his  trial  of  strength  with  Heracles, 
Rome  with  every  fall  renewed  her  might  from  contact 
with  her  native  soil.   The  Seleucids  ruled  over  a  cosmo- 
politan, denationalized  world.  They  had  no  native  soil 
on  which  to  fall.    It  is  of  profound  significance  that 
there  were  and  could  be  no  fellow-citizens  of  Seleucus  in 
all  Asia.    The  loyalty  of  true  men  in  his  realm  was  due 
first  of  all  to  their  cities,  and  it  was  only  by  the  lapse  of 


212  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

time  that  a  secondary  loyalty  to  the  ruling  dynasty 
ceased  to  imply  treason  to  their  native  states.  The 
cities  stood  always  before  the  decision  whether  in  any 
given  case  they  had  more  to  gain  or  to  lose  by  abandon- 
ing the  Seleucid  and  transferring  their  allegiance  to  his 
enemy  or  to  some  other  king. 

It  was  the  tragedy  of  Antiochus  IV  that  through  an 
education  in  Italy  he  came  to  realize  fully  the  political 
grounds  for  the  military  superiority  of  Rome,  and  that 
through  a  sentimental  attachment  for  Athens  and  the 
art,  letters,  and  philosophy  for  which  Athens  stood,  he 
renewed  his  conviction  as  to  the  absolute  superiority 
of  Greek  culture.1  He  attempted  to  push  more  vigor- 
ously than  ever  the  dynastic  policy  of  Hellenization,  by 
which  alone  a  new  nation  could  be  bred  in  Asia,  at  a 
time  when  native  hopes  were  revived;  and  he  tried  to 
draw  the  city-states  of  his  realm  into  more  complete 
dependence  upon  himself  by  the  only  means  available 
to  him  —  the  right  which  he  possessed  as  one  of  their 
gods  to  unhesitating  obedience  in  all  matters  —  at  the 
very  time  when  this  policy  came  into  collision  with  a  re- 
ligion to  which  deification  of  kings  was  an  abomination. 
For  in  200  B.C.  Palestine  had  passed  from  the  control 
of  Egypt  into  the  control  of  Antiochus  the  Great,  where- 
upon his  dynasty  had  to  deal  with  the  Jews.  The  trouble 
was,  of  course,  that  the  Jews  were  monotheists.  Many 
Jews  in  Jerusalem,  as  well  as  in  the  other  cities  of  the 

1  Hellenistic  Athens,  pp.  2,0$  ff. 


THE   SELEUCID   EMPIRE  213 

realm,  were  not  averse  to  Hellenism,  and  frequented 
the  gymnasia,  enrolled  their  sons  in  the  ephebe  corps, 
and  gave  them  Greek  names,  but  the  devout  shrank  with 
horror  from  worshiping  the  emperor,  and  the  peasants 
from  everything  foreign.  Accordingly  an  open  revolt 
occurred  in  Judaea,  chiefly  among  the  country  people, 
when  Antiochus  IV  chartered  Jerusalem  as  a  Hellenized 
city,  substituted  for  the  bizarre  law  of  Moses  an  enlight- 
ened, up-to-date,  Greek  code,  and  set  down  his  own 
image  as  the  Olympian  Zeus  in  the  Holy  of  Holies. 

This  is  the  same  Antiochus  who  twice  led  his  victori- 
ous army  to  the  walls  of  Alexandria,  once  to  retreat  after 
dictating  terms  to  the  Ptolemies,  once  to  meet  a  Roman 
embassy  headed  by  his  old  friend  Gaius  Popillius.  Be- 
fore answering  the  king's  pleasant  greeting,  the  Roman 
handed  to  him  the  message  of  his  Senate  and  curtly  bade 
him  read  it.  He  found  it  to  be  an  order  to  evacuate 
Egypt  immediately.  On  asking  for  time  to  consider  the 
proposal,  he  got  a  further  surprise;  for,  drawing  a  circle 
round  the  king  in  the  sand  with  his  cane,  Popillius  de- 
manded an  answer  "Yes"  or  "No"  before  he  stepped 
outside  of  it.  A  few  months  earlier,  by  crushing  Perseus 
of  Macedonon  the  battle-field  of  Pydna  (168  B.C.),  Rome 
had  rid  itself  of  its  last  serious  rival.  Since  for  Antiochus 
to  resist  meant  now  to  stand  alone  against  the  master 
of  the  world,  the  only  answer  he  could  give  was  "Yes  " ; 
yet  it  meant  the  ruin  of  the  Seleucid  empire.  Thereafter, 
there  was  but  one  free  will  in  the  vast  territory  of  Africa, 


214  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

Asia,  and  Europe  which  lay  between  the  Euphrates  River 
and  the  Atlantic  Ocean  —  the  will  of  the  government 
of  Rome.  Instruments  to  give  it  continuous  effect  in 
Italy  that  sagacious  and  persistent  corporation,  the 
Roman  Senate,  had  made  and  used  already;  and  in  its 
march  to  universal  empire  it  had  broken  and  hurled  to 
the  ground  the  instruments  of  authority  raised  against  it 
by  its  Greek  adversaries.  To  pick  them  up,  mend  them, 
and  improve  them  for  further  use  was  the  imperial  task 
of  the  immediate  future. 

SELECT    BIBLIOGRAPHY 

1.  Schurer,  E.  Geschichte  des  jildischen  Volks  im  Zeitalter 
Jesu  Christi,  I3  (1901),  11 4  (1907). 

2.  Bevan,  E.   The  House  of  Seleucus  (1902) . 

3.  Niese,  B.  Geschichte  der  griechischen  und  makedonischen 
Staaten.  Especially  Vol.  111  (1903). 

4.  Beloch,  J.  Griechische  Geschichte,  111  (1904). 

5.  Rostowzew,  M.  Studien  zur  Geschichte  des  romischen 
Kolonates  (1910),  pp.  240  ff. 

6.  Wilamowitz-Moellendorff,  Ulrich  von.  Staat  und 
Gesellschaft  der  Griechen :  D.  Die  makedonischen  Konig- 
reiche  (1910). 

7.  Bouche-Leclercq,  A.    Histoire  des  Seleucides  (19 13). 


VII 

THE  EMPIRE   OF   THE   ANTIGONIDS 

Of  the  Hellenistic  empires  the  one  from  which  Rome 
suffered  most  and  learned  least  was  that  of  the  Antigo- 
nids  in  Macedon  and  Greece.  We  say  "Macedon  and 
Greece":  the  kings  of  Macedon  from  Philip  II  to  Per- 
seus said  "Hellas";  for  they  never  ceased  to  claim  that 
Macedon  was  a  part  of  Hellas  —  the  part  of  Hellas  which 
had  earned  by  the  achievements  of  Philip  II  and  Alex- 
ander the  right  of  hegemony  for  its  kings.  It  was  an 
imperial  nation  for  which  its  king,  nobles,  and  commons 
had  an  intense  loyalty  and  pride,  but  which  stood  in 
their  thinking  to  Hellas  as  Virginia  did  to  the  United 
States  in  the  ante-bellum  days,  or  as  Prussia  does  to 
Germany,  rather  than  as  Austria  does  to  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  empire. 

It  taught  the  Romans  least  because  it  had  least  to 
teach  them.  The  one  thing  in  which  the  Macedonians 
were  masterful  was  the  art  of  war ;  yet  in  this  the  Romans 
by  native  accomplishment  were  their  superiors.  They 
invented  the  phalanx,  but  the  phalanx  succumbed  to  the 
legion.  In  the  art  of  government  the  Antigonids  were 
resourceful,  but  to  lift  up  a  jellyfish  on  a  spear-point  is 
an  impossible  task.  Yet  that  is  what  they  had  to  do  in 
Hellas.  The  only  lessons  of  government  they  could  teach 


,2i6  GREEK   IMPERIALISM 

were  lessons  of  failure;  but  that  this  is  not  to  their  dis- 
credit is  shown  by  the  inability  of  Rome  itself  to  cope 
with  the  same  situation  till  Hellas  was  dead  and  desic- 
cated. They  were  sagacious  enough  to  realize  that  for  a 
people  with  the  customs,  piety,  and  bluntness  of  the 
Macedonians  a  kingship  was  best  which,  to  speak  with 
Aristotle,  was  a  perpetual  magistracy  and  not  an  abso- 
lute monarchy.  Hence  they  were  under  no  necessity  to 
demand  that  the  Macedonians  worship  them  as  gods, 
and  the  Macedonians,  having  inherited  rights  which  no 
Antigonid  dared  to  ignore,1  were  under  no  legal  neces- 
sity to  thrust  divinity  upon  their  rulers.  Hence  the 
Antigonids  alone  of  the  Hellenistic  dynasties  governed 
as  men  supported  by  their  people's  loyalty,  and  not  as 
gods  to  whom  all  things  were  permitted.  They,  more- 
over, organized  no  official  cult  of  their  family  in  Hellas, 
for  reasons  which  will  appear  later.  It  was  not  Macedon 
but  Greece  which  took  the  proud  Roman  victor  captive 
and  bore  the  arts  to  rustic  Latium.  For  the  Macedonians 
remained  themselves  a  rustic  people,  and  added  little 
or  nothing  to  the  poetry,  painting,  sculpture,  architec- 
ture, and  science  of  Hellas.2  Their  elite  were  rulers  and 
officers,  their  commons  farmers  and  soldiers.  From  the 
time  Philip  II  came  to  the  throne  (359  B.C.)  to  the  battle 
of  Cynocephalae  (197  B.C.),  it  is  impossible  to  find  a 

1  Tarn,   W.  W.,  Journal  of  Hellenic  Studies,   xxix  (1909),  pp.  269/.; 
Beloch,  Griechische  Geschichte,  in,  1,  pp.  386/.;  Hellenistic  Athens,  p.  190. 

2  Mahaffy,  The  Progress  of  Hellenism  in  Alexander's  Empire  (1905), 
P-32. 


THE   EMPIRE  OF  THE  ANTIGONIDS    217 

decade,  and  not  easy  to  find  half  a  one,  during  which  the 
able-bodied  men  of  Macedon  were  not  called  to  the 
standards  at  least  once  either  to  defend  their  country 
against  foreign  attack  or  to  march  north,  south,  east, 
or  west  against  their  lord's  enemies.1  Their  dead  were 
to  be  found  in  every  valley  of  Hellas,  and  their  emi- 
grants in  every  land  of  Asia;  but  theirs  was  a  prolific 
race,  so  that,  despite  their  many  losses  in  the  interval, 
they  put  29,000  Macedonians  in  the  field  in  the  last 
struggle  with  Rome,  or  2000  more  than  stood  under  the 
command  of  Alexander  the  Great  when  he  had  com- 
pleted his  arrangements  for  the  conquest  of  Asia. 

Rome  suffered  more  from  the  Antigonids  than  from 
any  other  Hellenistic  dynasty  because  it  had  there  alone 
to  do  with  a  nation  of  veterans  under  arms.  The  Mace- 
donians were,  as  has  been  said,  an  imperial  people,  loyal 
to  their  kings,  and  ambitious  to  maintain  their  ascend- 
ancy in  the  world.  While  at  war  with  Rome  —  the 
wielder  of  armies  100,000  strong  —  they  were  assailed 
simultaneously  by  their  Hellenic  vassals  and  rivals  and 
attacked  or  abandoned  by  their  Macedonian  kinsmen 
in  Asia  and  Africa;  yet  they  held  out  under  the  Antigo- 
nids, in  the  first  struggle  for  eight  years  (212-205  B-c-)» 
in  the  second  for  four  (200-197  B.C.),  in  the  third  for 
still  another  four  (171-168  B.C.) ;  and  even  after  one  half 
of  their  men  of  military  age  had  fallen  at  Pydna,  and  their 

1  Wilamowitz-Moellendorff,  Ulrich  von,  Staat  und  Gesellschaft  der 
Criechen  :  D.  Die  makedonischen  Konigreiche,  pp.  139  ff. 


2i8  GREEK   IMPERIALISM 

last  king  had  died  in  captivity  and  his  only  son  as  a  clerk 
at  Alba  Fucens,  their  conquerors  were  so  seriously  dis- 
turbed by  the  "throbbings  of  their  ancient  loyalty" 
that  the  Senate  had  finally  to  place  a  Roman  proconsul 
on  the  throne  of  the  great  Alexander  (148  B.C.). 

Though  sprung  from  a  Macedonian  stock,  the  dynasty 
of  the  Antigonids  was  bred  in  Asia,  and  it  was  trans- 
planted into  Macedon  only  in  its  third  generation.  That 
came  about  in  the  following  way.  The  first  Antigonus  was 
made  ruler  of  Phrygia  when  Alexander  the  Great  left 
Asia  Minor  in  333  B.C.,  and  he  was  still  in  possession  of 
that  satrapy  when  his  sovereign  died  ten  years  later. 
With  Phrygia  as  a  starting  point  and  a  nomination  as 
commander-in-chief  of  the  royal  forces  in  Asia  as  a  pre- 
text, he  planned  and  fought  with  such  success  in  the  next 
decade  that  in  the  spring  of  312  B.C.  he  seemed  destined 
to  add  Macedon  to  Asia,  which  he  already  possessed; 
and  with  it  to  support  and  not  to  oppose  him,  he 
counted  on  being  able  to  master  the  whole  of  Alexander's 
empire.  We  have  already  seen  why  this  project  failed, 
and  also  how  a  later  attempt  to  accomplish  the  same 
purpose  cost  him  his  life  and  his  Asiatic  realm.  He  may 
have  been  over-ambitious.  Possibly  no  one  could  have 
prevented  the  dismemberment  of  the  Graeco- Macedo- 
nian world.  Perhaps  the  centrifugal  tendencies  would 
have  proved  too  strong  for  Alexander  himself  had  he 
lived  long  enough  to  test  them.  That,  however,  does  not 


THE  EMPIRE  OF  THE  ANTIGONIDS    219 

make  the  issue  less  of  a  calamity  for  the  Hellenes ;  for  on 
the  battle-fields  of  Gaza  and  Ipsus  it  was  decided  that  the 
alien  Romans  and  not  the  kindred  Macedonians  were 
to  unite  the  world  under  a  single  government.  With  the 
person  of  the  first  Antigonus  went  to  the  grave  the  hope 
of  a  great  people. 

The  sharer  of  his  aspirations  and  the  cause  in  consid- 
erable measure  of  his  defeat  was  his  son  Demetrius,  sur- 
named  Poliorcetes,  or  "Taker-of-Cities."  By  his  dis- 
obedience to  orders  at  Gaza  and  his  impetuosity  in 
action  at  Ipsus,  he  had  done  most  to  lose  his  kingdom ; 
but  after  the  death  of  his  father  he  still  retained  the 
dominion  of  the  sea,  and,  with  it,  value  as  an  ally  and 
ability  to  use  his  forces  at  such  points  as  he  himself 
chose.  After  some  years  of  aimless  adventuring  and  gall- 
ing inactivity  he  chose  to  use  them  in  the  attempt,  twice 
vainly  made  already  in  cooperation  with  his  father,  to 
seize  Greece  and  Macedon.  His  strength  was  incom- 
parably inferior  to  that  used  on  the  earlier  occasions  and 
he  had  still  watchful  enemies  on  all  sides.  The  essen- 
tial difference  was  that  the  house  of  Antipater,  which 
had  ruled  Macedon  and  Greece  since  Alexander  the  Great 
had  crossed  into  Asia,  was  now  represented,  not  by  An- 
tipater's  able  son,  Cassander,  who  died  in  297  B.C. 
after  a  reign  of  nineteen  years,  but  by  his  weakly  and 
dissentious  children.  These  looked  on  inactive  while  he 
blockaded  Athens  (295-294  B.C.)  and  starved  it  into 
submission ;  whereupon  he  brushed  them  aside  and  took 


220  GREEK   IMPERIALISM 

their  place  as  king  of  Macedon  and  suzerain  of  Greecet 
Since  his  wife  was  Phila,  Cassander's  sister,  his  son,  An- 
tigonus,  surnamed  Gonatas,  was  a  grandson  of  Antipa- 
ter  I,  no  less  than  Antipater  II,  who  was  now  the  sole 
survivor  of  Cassander's  family.   Hence,  if  the  right  of 
Demetrius  Poliorcetes  to  the  Macedonian  throne  rested 
upon  nothing  more  substantial  than  the  frustrated  am- 
bition of  his  father,  the  right  of  his  son  was  flawless  after 
the  death  of  Antipater  II.    This,  however,  occurred  in 
288-287  B.C.  at    the  very  time  when   Demetrius,   on 
being  expelled  from  Macedon,  abandoned  Greece  and 
went  to  meet  captivity  in  Asia  for  the  rest  of  his  life. 
Left  behind  in  Greece,  Antigonus  Gonatas  exercised  a 
watchful  suzerainty  there  without  being  king  of  Mace- 
don, which  Pyrrhus  of  Epirus  and  Lysimachus  of  Thrace 
shared  for  a  few  years  (288  to  284-283  B.C.) ,  Lysimachus, 
Seleucus,  and  Ptolemy  Ceraunus  held  alone  in  rapid 
succession  for  another  interval  (283-280  B.C.),  and  Celts 
from  the  north  plundered  and  harried  for  three  years. 
It  was  not  till  277  B.C.  that  Antigonus  succeeded  in  free- 
ing it  from  its  troubles  and  making  it  the  base  of  his 
operations  in  Greece.    He  therewith  planted  in  Europe 
the  dynasty  which  ruled  Macedon  till  the  Roman  con- 
quest (168  B.C.). 

Antigonus  I  and  Demetrius  Poliorcetes  had  formed 
their  political  ambitions  and  ideas  during  the  age  of  the 
diadochi,  when  the  empire  of  Alexander  stood  in  all  its 
magnificence  and  promise  as  a  golden  prize  for  the  able, 


THE  EMPIRE  OF  THE  ANTIGONIDS    221 

courageous,  and  unscrupulous.  They  had  aspired  to 
rule  as  god-kings  over  a  world  in  which  men  and  cities 
rendered  homage  (proskynesis)  to  them,  as  they  had 
rendered  it  to  Alexander.  They  had  viewed  Greece  and 
Macedon  as  alike  desirable,1  the  common  charm  being 
that  they  were  the  mother  of  the  soldiers  and  settlers  of 
whom  their  limitless  realm  had  need.  They  may  have 
coveted  Greece  even  more  than  Macedon.  Certainly, 
Athens,  not  Pella,  was  the  city  of  Demetrius's  dreams. 
He  had  gloried  in  being  its  liberator  in  307  B.C.,  and  when 
it  dashed  his  hopes  by  excluding  him  after  his  defeat 
at  Ipsus,  he  had  suffered  bitter  disappointment.  None 
the  less,  and  despite  the  desperate  resistance  which  it 
had  offered  to  him  in  295-294  B.C.,  he  treated  it  with 
clemency  when  he  was  once  again  its  master.  What  his 
father  had  thought  of  the  approval  of  Athens  he  ex- 
pressed by  calling  it  the  beacon  tower  of  the  world. 
How  highly  he  had  esteemed  the  culture  of  its  inhabit- 
ants he  demonstrated  by  making  a  colony  of  Athenians 
the  nucleus  of  Antigonia  (later  Antioch),  which  he 
founded  as  the  new  capital  of  the  empire  that  had  been 
Alexander's,  but  was  now,  he  hoped,  to  be  his. 

Antigonus  I  had  never  had  the  good  fortune  to  rule 
in  the  land  of  his  birth,  but  Demetrius  Poliorcetes  was 
its  king  for  six  years  (294-288  B.C.).2  As  such  he  showed 

1  For  their  revival  of  the  Hellenic  league,  in  which  Macedon  formed 
simply  one  unit,  see  Klotzsch,  Epirotische  Ceschichte,  p.  130,  n.  I,  and 
Hellenistic  Athens,  pp.  121  /. 

1  For  the  date  see  Mayer,  Philologus,  lxxi  (1912),  p.  227. 


222  GREEK   IMPERIALISM 

conclusively  that  he  had  no  intention  to  reign  there 
patriarchally,  as  Cassander  and  Antipater,  following 
the  example  of  Philip  II  and  his  predecessors,  had  done. 
He  displayed  an  utter  disregard  for  the  established  cus- 
toms of  the  court  and  for  the  limitations  imposed  by 
usage  upon  his  royal  authority.  The  court  he  surrounded 
himself  with  was  the  richly  appointed,  ceremonious, 
uniformed  affair  devised  by  Alexander  in  his  later, 
more  splendid,  more  arrogant  days;  and  by  requiring 
proskynesis  of  the  Macedonian  noblemen  and  commons, 
he  offended,  unnecessarily,  as  it  proved,  the  sturdiest 
sentiment  of  the  nation.1  His  attempt  to  establish  ab- 
solute monarchy  in  unsophisticated  Macedon  was  the 
most  direct  cause  of  the  loss  of  his  kingdom;  for  when 
his  foreign  enemies,  anticipating  the  attack  which  he 
designed  against  them,  assailed  him  from  all  sides,  his 
subjects  hastened  to  abandon  him  and  joined  hands  with 
the  invaders.  They  had  no  longer  heart  for  the  wild 
imperialistic  projects  into  which,  almost  without  per- 
ceiving it,  they  had  been  led  by  Alexander  the  Great. 

Antigonus  Gonatas  had  never  known  the  lure  of  the 
East.  He  had  spent  his  early  manhood  in  Athens  (294- 
290  B.C.),  where  an  unworthy  liaison  with  the  courtesan 
Demo  and  an  intimacy  that  does  him  honor  with  Zeno, 
the  founder  of  the  Stoa,  attest  the  range  of  his  activity. 
He  won  his  spurs  in  his  father's  Boeotian  campaigns  of 
1  Hellenistic  Athens,  p.  148. 


THE  EMPIRE  OF  THE  ANTIGONIDS    223 

292-291  B.C.,  and  spent  the  formative  years  of  his  ca- 
reer as  a  general  and  statesman  in  Greece  (288-280  B.C.). 
Only  once,  when  hard  pushed  in  280  B.C.,  did  he  show 
that  the  blood  of  Demetrius  Poliorcetes  and  Antigonus  I 
flowed  in  his  veins,  namely,  when  he  tried  to  seize 
Asia  Minor,  then  temporarily  without  a  master.  Nor- 
mally, he  acted  like  the  child  of  Phila  and  the  heir  of  the 
policy  of  Cassander  and  Antipater.  And  it  was  in  the 
spirit  of  his  mother's  line  that  he  established  his  govern- 
ment in  Macedon  on  expelling  the  Celts  in  2"jy  B.C. 

His  reign  opened  auspiciously.  Having  obtained — how, 
when,  and  at  what  price,  we  do  not  know  — the  friend- 
ship of  Egypt,  he  got  the  opportunity  to  order  affairs  to 
his  liking  in  Greece.  On  the  other  hand,  his  accession  to 
the  throne  was  accompanied  by  his  marriage  to  Phila, 
his  own  niece,  the  sister  of  Antiochus  I,  the  new 
king  of  Asia.  This  union  sanctioned  an  agreement  by 
which  Antigonus  abandoned  his  claim  to  Asia  Minor  and 
Antiochus  his  right,  as  Seleucus's  son,  to  the  Macedo- 
nian throne.  It  inaugurated  a  policy  by  which  Macedon 
secured  for  eighty  years  (277-197  B.C.)  immunity  from 
attack  or  intrigue  on  the  part  of  the  Seleucids.  His 
friendship  with  Egypt  was  less  enduring,  but  it  gave  him 
ten  years  (277-267  B.C.)  in  which  to  consolidate  his 
power  —  a  period  of  quiet  activity,  interrupted  only  by 
the  return  of  Pyrrhus  from  Italy  and  the  startling  up- 
heaval in  Macedon  and  Greece  (274-272  B.C.)  which 
accompanied  that  adventurous  monarch's  vigorous  as- 


224  GREEK   IMPERIALISM 

sertion  of  his  right  to  rule  those  countries.  The  fall  of 
Pyrrhus  in  battle  at  Argos  relieved  the  tension  of  this 
situation,  but  till  the  time  of  his  death  thirty-two  years 
afterwards,  Antigonus  had  always  to  count  Epirus 
among  his  possible  enemies  when  it  was  not  actually 
his  assailant.  On  his  northern  frontier  he  faced  the 
threatening  Dardanians,  and  on  the  northeastern  the 
marauding  Celts,  who  had  reduced  Thrace  to  the  con- 
dition of  barbarity  that  prevailed  throughout  Central 
Europe.  By  keeping  these  peoples  in  check  he  did  a 
great  service  to  Greece,  which  he  thereby  protected; 
but  for  it  he  got  little  gratitude,  and  it  was  his  suzer- 
ainty over  Greece  which  brought  to  him  and  his  suc- 
cessors most  of  their  many  troubles. 

Just  as  he  was  faithful  to  the  traditional  policy  of  the 
Macedonian  kings  in  his  dealings  with  his  own  people, 
so,  too,  in  regard  to  the  Greeks  the  plan  he  followed  was 
in  general  the  old-fashioned  one,  of  making  them  his 
dependent  allies.  In  states  ostensibly  free  and  self- 
governing  he  secured  a  preponderating  influence  by 
designating  an  individual  as  his  representative  and 
making  him  practically  governor.  Naturally,  the  domes- 
tic opponents  of  such  a  person  called  him  a  tyrant,  and 
such,  in  fact,  the  nature  of  his  position  forced  him  to 
become,  since  he  could  not  hold  his  place  without  break- 
ing both  the  public  and  private  laws.  But  outward 
appearances  were  preserved,  even  when  he  called  in 
Macedonian  troops  to  his  aid,   by  the  old  practice 


THE   EMPIRE  OF  THE  ANTIGONIDS    225 

whereby  he  and  his  adherents  assumed  the  responsi- 
bility for  their  coming. 

Antigonus  Gonatas  and  some  at  least  of  his  governors 
were  pupils  of  Zeno.  That  meant  in  this  connection 
that,  whereas  Alexander  the  Great,  for  example,  had 
been  obliged  to  discard  what  was  most  characteristic  in 
the  politics  of  Aristotle  when  he  identified  himself  with 
the  man  of  transcendent  virtue,  who,  his  teacher  had 
urged,  should  be  made  absolute  monarch  when  found, 
Antigonus  drew  from  his  philosophy  an  obligation  to 
let  none  but  the  sage  rule.1  As  against  the  wisdom  of  the 
ideal  wise  man  the  laws  of  states  which  he  ignored  or 
broke  had  no  avail ;  for,  according  to  his  creed,  they  were 
unnatural  and  hence  unwholesome.  The  wise  man  could 
do  no  wrong.  In  his  actions,  since  he  was  a  law  unto 
himself,  morality  triumphed  over  mere  legality.  An- 
tigonus Gonatas  disdained  to  seek  a  justification  for 
his  acts  by  claiming,  though  a  man,  the  prerogatives  of 
the  gods,  and,  though  there  was  nothing  in  the  panthe- 
istic theory  of  Stoicism  to  prevent  his  being  worshiped 
if  people  wanted  to  worship  him,  he  was  under  no  legal 
necessity  to  pose  as  a  god ;  whereas,  had  he  done  so,  he 
must  have  come  into  conflict  with  the  religious  con- 
servatism of  his  philosophy.  He,  accordingly,  had  no 
difficulty  in  rendering  an  account  to  his  own  conscience 

1  Wilamowitz-Moellendorff,  Antigonos  von  Karystos,  p.  218;  Karst, 
Geschichte  des  hellenistischen  Zeitalters,  11,  1,  pp.  121,  125.  Tarn  {Antigo- 
nus Gonatas,  pp.  276  ff.)  bases  Antigonus's  system  of  tyrants  on  ex- 
pediency, not  on  philosophy. 


226  GREEK   IMPERIALISM 

for  setting  up  "tyrants"  in  his  Greek  dependencies  and 
for  practicing  or  authorizing  lawlessness.  But  he  was 
too  shrewd  a  man  to  suppose  that  because  Zeno  and 
he  thought  his  conduct  justified  he  could  do  what  he 
pleased  to  the  Macedonians  or  Greeks  with  impunity. 
They  could  not  be  expected  to  know  that  their  ruler  was 
a  Stoic  sage  who  could  do  no  wrong,  or  to  make  allow- 
ances for  his  behavior  on  that  account.  Hence,  while  he 
could  justify  his  system  of  government  on  philosophic 
grounds,  there  is  no  evidence  that  he  was  not  a  scrupu- 
lous Macedonian  king  and  a  considerate  suzerain  of 
Greece.  And  had  he  been  left  alone  to  work  out  the 
problem  of  Hellenic  administration  without  outside  in- 
terference it  is  probable  that  his  high  sense  of  duty  and 
his  skill  and  forbearance  would  have  given  Greece  a 
long  period  of  peace. 

The  founder  of  the  first  Macedonian  empire,  Philip  II, 
had  been  opposed  in  Greece  by  Persia,  but  the  re- 
sistance he  had  encountered  because  of  the  diplomacy 
of  Artaxerxes  Ochus  was  as  nothing  when  compared 
with  the  difficulties  raised  up  for  Antigonus  Gonatas's 
uncle,  Cassander,  by  the  promises  and  armies  of  his 
grandfather,  Antigonus  I,  or  with  the  obstacles  he  him- 
self had  to  meet  in  the  intrigue,  money,  and  expeditions 
of  Ptolemy  Philadelphus. 

The  situation  which  existed  in  the  first  ten  years  of  his 
reign  (277-267  b.c)  was  not  of  Antigonus's  creating,  nor 
was  Philadelphus  responsible  for  it.   It  was  Ptolemy  I 


THE  EMPIRE  OF  THE  ANTIGONIDS    227 

Soter  who  had  seized  the  dominion  of  the  sea  on  the 
final  debacle  of  Demetrius  Poliorcetes  (287-286  B.C.)  and 
with  it  the  control  of  the  league  of  the  Islanders.  This 
established  a  long  and,  in  fact,  indefinable  frontier 
between  the  realm  of  Philadelphus  and  that  of  Antigo- 
nus.  The  lordship  of  the  sea  Gonatas  seems  not  to  have 
bothered  about  at  first,  and,  indeed,  the  great  war  which 
broke  out  in  266-265  B.C.  between  the  two  monarchs  — 
the  so-called  Chremonidean  War  —  was  clearly  incited 
by  Egypt  and  not  by  him.  Notwithstanding  that  she 
was  dead  four  years  when  the  actual  conflict  began,  its 
real  instigator  was,  doubtless,  Arsinoe,  the  sister-queen 
of  Philadelphus.  Acting  on  her  policy,  Philadelphus  first 
formed  an  alliance  with  King  Areus  I  of  Sparta  and 
his  allies  (Achsea,  Elis,  Mantinea,  Phlius,  and  part  of 
Crete)  and  with  Athens,  and  then  backed  them  up 
in  the  concerted  effort  they  decided  to  make  to  free 
Greece  from  Antigonus  and  his  "tyrants."  What  the 
real  object  of  the  "brother-gods"  was,  is  a  matter  of 
conjecture.  All  they  accomplished,  in  any  case,  was  to 
give  Antigonus  five  years  of  hard  fighting 1  and  to 
complete  the  ruin  of  Athens  and  the  enforced  quietude 
of  Sparta. 

Therewith  was  accomplished,  what  had  been  long  in 
the  preparing,  the  overthrow  of  the  leadership  which 
city-states  had  held  from  time  immemorial  in  European 

1  For  the  peace  between  Egypt  and  Macedon  made  in  261  B.C.  see 
Inscriptiones  Greece,  XI,  2,  114. 


228  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

Greece.  Henceforth  it  was  not  from  cities  that  signifi- 
cant movements  sprang,  but  from  ethne.  Macedon  it- 
self was  an  ethnos,  or,  at  least,  a  group  of  ethne,  and  it 
seemed  possible  to  enlarge  it  by  adding  to  it  all  the  other 
ethne  in  the  peninsula.  The  difficulty  was  that  two 
other  ethne,  ^Etolia  and  Achaea,  the  first  in  Central 
Greece  and  the  second  in  the  Peloponnesus,  had  each  a 
similar,  if  less  far-reaching,  ambition;  and  while  the 
aspirations  of  ^Etolia  to  acquire  territory  in  the  Pelopon- 
nesus, and  the  aspirations  of  Achaea  to  expand  into 
Central  Greece,  kept  them  normally  in  conflict  with  one 
another;  and  while  each  in  turn  (JEtolla.  in  245-241, 
Achaea  in  220-217  and  212-206  b.c)  got  the  help  of 
Macedon  against  the  other,  and  both  united  only  once 
(238-229  B.C.)  in  a  war  against  Macedon,  Achaea  offered 
till  224  B.C.  and  ^Etolia  till  200  B.C.  an  attractive  alter- 
native for  Macedonian  suzerainty  to  ethne  and  city- 
states  which  could  not  stand  alone.  The  natural  desire 
of  the  new  ethne,  as  of  the  old  city-states,  was,  however, 
to  be  independent  —  a  sentiment  which  /Etolia  and 
Achaea  shared  completely;  and  against  this  powerful 
force  Antigonus  had  to  contend,  after  the  Chremonidean 
War  no  less  than  before  it. 

He  had  come  so  brilliantly  out  of  the  Chremonidean 
War,  however,  that  ten  years  elapsed  before  his  suzer- 
ainty was  again  challenged.  His  most  formidable 
enemy,  Ptolemy  Philadelphus,  was  absorbed  meanwhile 
with  a  dangerous  disturbance  in  Ionia,  occasioned  by 


THE  EMPIRE  OF  THE  ANTIGONIDS    229 

the  revolt  of  Ptolemy,  his  "  son  ",  and  Timarchus,  his  ad- 
miral, to  whose  aid  his  watchful  enemy,  Antiochus  II, 
and  his  daring  maritime  rivals,  the  Rhodians,1  had 
come  (258  B.C.) ;  but  when  this  outbreak  was  brought  to  a 
close  with  the  peace  of  255  B.C.,2  Antigonus  had  to  antic- 
ipate a  renewal  of  his  troubles  in  Greece.  He,  accord- 
ingly, determined  to  cease  being  the  anvil  and  to  become 
the  hammer.  That  meant  the  construction  of  a  fleet 
with  which  to  take  from  Egypt  control  of  the  ^Egean, 
which  had  been  possessed  prior  to  288-287  B.C.  by  his 
father  and  grandfather.  To  accomplish  this  end  he 
renewed  his  alliance  with  Syria,  and  arranged  a  marriage 
between  his  son  and  heir,  Demetrius,  and  Stratonice, 
Antiochus's  sister.  This  being  done,  he  sought  out  the 
admirals  of  Ptolemy  at  Leucolla  near  Cos,  and  defeated 
them  in  a  great  naval  battle  (253  B.C.).  Suzerainty  over 
the  league  of  the  Islanders  was  the  most  striking  gain ; 
but  a  more  substantial  advantage  was  that  with  his  fleet 
he  could  now  ward  off  trouble  in  Greece  and  stir  it  up 
in  Ptolemy's  realm.  The  latter  he  accomplished  by 
dispatching  his  half-brother,  Demetrius  the  Fair,  to 
Cyrene  and  by  snatching  that  kingdom,  which  had  just 
been  vacated  by  the  death  of  Magas  (251-250  B.C.),  from 

1  The  enmity  of  Rhodes  and  Philadelphia  is  proved  by  Blinkenberg's 
La  chronique  du  temple  Lindien.  It  is,  accordingly,  probable  that  the 
defeat  of  Chremonides  by  Agathostratus  at  Ephesus  belongs  to  this 
struggle,  though  something  may  still  be  said,  I  think,  for  242  B.C.  See 
Hellenistic  Athens,  p.  197,  n.  2. 

2  For  this  peace  see  Inscriptiones  Grcecce,  xi,  2,  116.  Its  effect  is  per- 
ceptible in  Athens  {Hellenistic  Athens,  p.  191)  and  in  Achsea  {Ibid.,  n.  1). 


230  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

the  grasp  of  Egypt.  In  the  former  he  had  a  rather 
surprising  lack  of  success.  For  in  251  B.C.  Aratus,  the 
somewhat  melodramatic  hero  of  the  Achaean  league,  on 
mastering  his  native  city  Sicyon  by  a  coup  d'etat,  not 
only  chose  to  accept  a  subsidy  from  Philadelphus  rather 
than  from  himself,  but  added  Sicyon  to  the  neighboring 
ethnos  of  the  Achseans.  And  almost  immediately 
thereafter  Ptolemy  struck  a  second  blow  which  made 
the  first  of  importance.  In  250  B.C.  Alexander,  Antigo- 
nus's  nephew  and  chief  lieutenant  in  Greece,  egged  on 
by  Egypt  doubtless,  revolted  and  set  himself  up  as  an 
independent  monarch,  with  Corinth  and  Calchis,  which 
he  had  held  for  his  uncle,  and  the  Macedonian  fleet  of 
which  these  were  the  naval  stations,  as  his  basis  for 
action.  He  at  once  allied  himself  with  the  Achaeans  and 
forced  Argos  and  Athens  to  pay  him  tribute  (before 
250-249  B.C.).  This  rebellion  paralyzed  the  naval  power 
of  Antigonus.  It  was  doubtless  precipitated  by  the 
disloyalty  of  Antiochus  II  to  Macedon;  for  that  mon- 
arch (now,  in  or  before  249  B.C.)  broke  faith  with  An- 
tigonus and  allied  himself  with  Egypt,  retaining  the 
conquests  he  had  made  during  the  war  and  receiving 
in  marriage  Berenice,  the  only  daughter  of  Philadelphus, 
whose  intrinsic  worth  was  augmented  by  an  enormous 
dowry.  This  base  and,  as  it  proved,  foolish  action  freed 
Ptolemy  to  devote  all  his  energies  to  the  war  with 
Macedon.  The  fleet  of  Egypt  once  more  mastered  the 
iEgean  and  regained  control  of  the  league  of  the  Island- 


THE  EMPIRE  OF  THE  ANTIGONIDS    231 

ers  (249  B.C.).  Simultaneously,  the  pro-Egyptian  party 
in  Cyrene  slew  the  fair  Demetrius,  and  by  the  marriage 
of  their  young  queen  Berenice  to  Philadelphus's  heir, 
effected  the  reunion  of  the  two  kingdoms,  which  had 
been  estranged  since  the  revolt  of  Berenice's  father, 
Magas,  in  274  B.C.1  The  triumph  of  Ptolemy  was  com- 
plete, and  when  his  daughter  promptly  bore  to  her 
Seleucid  husband  a  son,  who  by  the  marriage  stipulation 
was  to  be  his  heir,  the  future  of  the  Ptolemies  seemed 
bright  indeed. 

Between  250  and  245  B.C.  the  fortunes  of  Gonatas 
were  at  a  low  ebb.  He  evidently  bent  before  the  storm, 
unable  to  confront  Alexander  and  Aratus  in  Greece  and 
the  admirals  of  Philadelphus  in  the  /Egean.  Relief 
came  to  him  from  an  unexpected  source  —  the  renewal 
of  the  war  between  Egypt  and  Asia,  when,  on  the  death 
of  Antiochus  II,  his  sister-wife  Laodice  took  up  arms 
against  the  Egyptian  queen  and  her  babe  on  behalf  of 
her  son  Seleucus  Callinicus.  For,  helped  by  the  untimely 
death  of  Philadelphus,  and  despite  the  intervention  of 
the  Egyptian  fleet,  she  succeeded  in  compassing  the 
death  of  her  rivals;2  whereupon  the  new  Ptolemy, 
Euergetes,  took  the  field  in  person  and  made  a  general 

1  Tarn  (Antigonus  Gonatas,  pp.  321  ff.,  449  ff.)  has  Demetrius  slain 
in  258  B.C.,  and  Berenice  married  to  Euergetes,  in  247-246  B.C.  This 
position,  which  Beloch  challenged  (Griech.  Gesch.,  in,  2,  pp.  I33#-X 
leaves  unexplained  the  extraordinary  delay  in  the  marriage  of  the  young 
couple  and  in  the  reunion  of  the  two  kingdoms. 

2  De  Sanctis,  Contributi  alia  Storia  deW  Impero  Seleucidico  (A  Hi  della 
Reale  Accademia  delle  Scienze  di  Torino,  xlvii,  pp.  11  ff.). 


232  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

attack  by  land  and  sea  upon  her  and  her  adherents. 
This  tragic  incident  was  one  of  the  few  pieces  of  good 
luck  experienced  by  Antigonus.  Another  was  the  pre- 
mature death  of  his  nephew  Alexander  (246  B.C.),  fol- 
lowed as  it  was  by  the  ^Etolian  conquest  of  Bceotia, 
and  the  decision  of  Nicaea,  Alexander's  widow,  to  sur- 
render Corinth  and  the  rest  of  her  kingdom  to  Macedon, 
the  arrangement  being  that  she  was  to  take  the  place 
of  the  barren  and  discredited  Stratonice  as  wife  of  the 
crown  prince  Demetrius.  In  245-244  B.C.  the  balance 
in  Asia  inclined  sharply  in  favor  of  Laodice,  and  at  the 
same  time  Antigonus,  aided  by  his  patron  god  Pan, 
recovered  Delos  and  the  Islands.  Having  thus  regained 
what  the  rebellion  of  Alexander  had  cost  him,  and  hav- 
ing settled  his  account  with  Egypt,  Antigonus  had  now 
to  deal  with  Aratus  of  Sicyon  alone.  The  Achaean  was 
too  quick  for  him,  however.  By  a  night  attack,  in  time 
of  peace,  he  treacherously  seized  Corinth  (243  B.C.),  and 
at  once  added  it,  together  with  Megara,  Epidaurus,  and 
Troezen,  to  the  Achaean  league.  The  response  of  Antig- 
onus to  this  audacious  coup  was  to  form  a  pact  with 
his  old  friends  the  iEtolians  to  divide  Achaean  territory 
between  them;  whereupon,  as  the  only  escape  from  so 
great  a  peril,  Aratus  put  the  responsibility  where  the 
responsibility  really  belonged,  by  having  Ptolemy  Euer- 
getes  elected  general  of  the  Achaean  league  on  land  and 
sea  for  242  B.C.  Euergetes  brought  the  Laodicean  War 
to  a  point  where  an  advantageous  peace  was  possible  by 


THE  EMPIRE  OF  THE  ANTIGONIDS    233 

a  victory  over  Callinicus  in  this  critical  year;  but  his 
attempt  to  help  Aratus,  who  tried  to  "liberate"  Athens 
while  his  "commander"  engaged  Gonatas  in  the  ^Egean, 
was  frustrated  by  the  defeat  sustained  by  his  admiral 
Sophron  at  the  hands  of  the  veteran  Antigonus  off  the 
island  of  Andros.  Macedon  still  held  the  JEgean.  In 
the  mean  time  its  allies  the  ^Etolians,  already  danger- 
ously strengthened  by  the  occupation  of  Boeotia,  had 
worsted  Olympias,  the  queen  regent  of  Epirus,  in  several 
engagements,  and  were  on  the  point  of  incorporating  all 
of  Acarnania  in  their  league.  Antigonus  thought  the 
time  had  come  to  call  a  halt.  Euergetes  and  Callinicus 
were  of  the  same  mind.  Accordingly,  the  long  war  was 
concluded  in  242-241  B.C.  by  a  general  peace  arranged 
on  the  basis  of  uti  possidetis.  Antigonus  held  Argos, 
Hermione,  Phlius,  ALgina,  Megalopolis,  and  Orchome- 
nus  in  the  Peloponnesus,  in  Central  Greece  Athens  alone, 
and  in  the  ^gean  Eubcea  and  the  Cyclades,  as  well, 
seemingly,  as  Lemnos,  Imbros,  and  Scyros,  the  colonies 
of  Athens.  Thessaly  was  of  course  his.  His  garrisons 
stood  in  Demetrias,  Chalcis,  and  Piraeus.  Of  the 
4 '  shackles  "  of  Greece  Corinth  alone  was  out  of  his  hands. 
In  240-239  B.C.  he  died  at  the  age  of  eighty,  having  been 
a  king  forty-seven  years,  all  but  ten  of  them  in  Macedon. 

I  have  sketched  the  career  of  Antigonus  Gonatas  in 
some  fullness  chiefly  because  it  has  only  recently 
become   possible  to  give  anything  like    chronological 


234  GREEK   IMPERIALISM 

precision  to  an  account  of  this  remarkable  man.1  His 
reign  deserves  detailed  consideration,  however,  because 
of  the  position  it  occupies  at  one  of  the  culminating 
points  of  Greek  imperialism,  the  only  other  point  of 
equal  importance  being  that  in  which  Alexander  the 
Great  introduced  deification  of  rulers.  The  record  given 
above  shows  clearly,  I  think,  that  the  power  of  Macedon 
did  not  suffice  to  hold  Greece  in  subjection  on  the  prin- 
ciples followed  by  Antigonus  Gonatas,  and  against  the 
opposition  of  Egypt.  Even  the  final  triumph  of  242-241 
B.C.  left  Egyptian  garrisons  in  Thrace,  the  Hellespont, 
Ionia,  and  islands  as  far  advanced  into  the  Mgean  as 
Thera  and  Astypalaea,  Samos  and  Lesbos,  Thasos  and 
Samothrace.  It  left  Achaea  in  possession  of  Corinth 
and  Megara,  Epidaurus  and  Troezen,  as  well  as  Sicyon 
and  at  least  a  foothold  in  Arcadia.  It  left  ^Etolia  in 
possession  of  part  of  Acarnania,  Dolopia,  iEniania, 
Malis,  Doris,  Locris,  Phocis,  and  in  close  alliance  with 
Bceotia.  Heraclea  at  Thermopylae  and  Delphi  with  its 
Amphictyonic  council  were  ^Etolian.  Hence  when  the 
new  king  of  Macedon,  Demetrius  II,  married  Olympias's 
daughter  Phthia,  and  took  Epirote  Acarnania  under  his 

1  The  account  given  in  the  text  differs  from  that  given  in  Hellenistic 
Athens  mainly  because  (led  by  Diirrbach,  Inscriptions  Grcecce,  XI,  2,  pp. 
vi/.  and  Pozzi,  op.  cit.  in  Select  Bibliography  at  the  end  of  the  chapter) 
I  now  return  to  Homolle's  Delian  chronology.  It  differs  only  in  a  few 
details  from  that  given  by  Pozzi.  Tarn's  masterly  biography  {Antigonus 
Gonatas)  reached  me  only  when  this  chapter  was  already  in  type.  The 
complete  data  which  it  contains  agree  well,  I  believe,  with  the  construc- 
tion given  above. 


THE  EMPIRE  OF  THE  ANTIGONIDS    235 

protection  (240-239  B.C.) ;  and  when  ^Etolia,  thus  check- 
mated, entered  into  a  defensive  and  offensive  alliance 
with  Achaea,  the  territory  of  the  two  leagues,  now  united 
in  opposition  to  Macedon,  met,  and  inclosed  completely 
the  Corinthian  Gulf.  The  one  had  grown  strong  despite 
Antigonus  and  the  other  with  his  connivance.  He  had 
been  forced  to  give  ^tolia  a  free  rein  from  need  of  its 
aid  against  Egypt,  Epirus,  and  Achaea.  Now  the  policy 
of  Epirus  was  subservient  to  that  of  Macedon  as  it  had 
been  prior  to  the  accession  of  Pyrrhus  to  its  throne  in 
295  B.C.,  but  the  two  leagues  were  able  to  fight  on  fair 
terms  with  the  two  monarchies,  and  in  238  B.C.  they  de- 
fied Macedon,  now  supported  by  Epirus,  without  hav- 
ing Egypt  as  their  ally.  The  failure  of  the  Greek  policy 
of  Antigonus  Gonatas  may  be  best  gauged  by  the  fact 
that  twenty-seven  years  earlier  Athens  and  Sparta  had 
dared  to  do  the  like,  but  only  when  Egypt,  and  prob- 
ably also  Epirus,  were  fighting  on  their  side. 

The  chief  reason  for  this  striking  difference  is  that  in 
the  interval  the  Achaeans,  following  the  lead  given  to 
them  by  the  ^Etolians,  had  come  to  life  and  shed  their 
ethnic  cocoon.  They  had  long  since  been  a  koinon,  or 
league;  but  up  to  251  B.C.  their  league,  like  that  of 
Bceotia  prior  to  387  B.C.,  like  that  of  the  yEtolians  prior 
to  the  seizure  of  Delphi  in  292  B.C.,  had  been  confined 
strictly  by  the  limits  of  their  ethnos.  The  ^tolians  had 
enlarged  their  territory  under  the  aegis  of  the  Delphian 
Amphictyony.    The  Achaeans  had  no  such  favoring 


236  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

circumstance.  In  their  case  expansion  by  the  incorpora- 
tion of  "foreign"  peoples  was  the  policy  and  achieve- 
ment of  a  citizen  of  the  first  "foreign"  city  to  be 
absorbed,  Aratus  of  Sicyon,  who  saw  a  greater  oppor- 
tunity for  power  as  the  head  of  the  neighboring  league 
than  as  the  "tyrant"  of  his  native  state,  holding  office, 
like  the  priest  at  Nemi,  till  murdered,  or  till  he  had  lost 
the  confidence  of  Antigonus.  At  his  instigation  the 
Achaean  league  was  carried  into  the  territory  of  the 
"foreigner,"  the  necessary  prerequisite  for  such  a 
development  being,  however,  that  the  ethnic  bond 
between  the  Achaean  cities  had  been  canceled  and  re- 
placed by  a  federal  bond.  The  tenacious  theory  that 
common  citizenship  presupposed  community  of  descent 
was  therewith  discarded.  Its  abandonment  opened  to 
the  league  possibilities  of  growth  never  possessed  by 
either  the  city-state  or  the  ethnic  state.  Of  these  the 
^Etolians  and  the  Achaeans  took  advantage  to  the  best  of 
their  abilities. 

They  were  wise  enough,  moreover,  to  perceive  that 
not  only  were  city  institutions  indispensable  for  an  up- 
to-date  polity  —  whence  the  ^Etolians  on  forming  their 
league  in  322-314  B.C.  abandoned  their  three  ancient 
tribes  and  their  multitudinous  villages  and  organized 
in  their  stead  a  score  or  two  of  cities  1  —  but  also  that 
their  federal  system  must  recognize  and  accept  the  pre- 

1  Swoboda,  Die  atolische  Komenverfassung  {Wiener  Studien,  xxxiv, 
1912,  pp.  37/.). 


THE  EMPIRE  OF  THE  ANTIGONIDS    237 

existent  city-states  as  its  units.  This,  as  we  have  seen,1 
had  not  been  done  in  Bceotia  or  in  the  Hellenic  league 
organized  by  Philip  II,  in  each  of  which  the  federal 
synod,  being  constructed  on  the  idea  of  representation 
according  to  population,  made  districts  and  not  cities 
the  units;  so  that  the  smaller  cities  felt  themselves 
discriminated  against  and  tended  to  rebel  against  being 
clubbed  together.  How  far  equality  of  cities  prevailed 
among  the  Achaeans  it  is  impossible  to  say  with  cer- 
tainty: we  are  simply  informed  that  the  voting  there  was 
by  cities.  But  we  are,  I  think,  permitted  to  infer  that 
the  principle  followed  was  "one  city  one  vote."  For  it 
is  unlikely  that  the  old  Achaean  cities,  on  admitting 
Sicyon,  Corinth,  Megalopolis,  and  Argos,  deliberately 
exposed  themselves  to  the  fate  of  the  little  lake  cities 
in  Bceotia  by  giving  these  large  "foreign"  cities  voting 
power  proportionate  to  their  populations.  This  conclu- 
sion holds,  I  believe,  both  for  the  Achaean  representative 
assembly,  or  synod,  which  was  made  up,  seemingly,  of 
successive  fractions  of  the  citizens  of  the  constituent 
cities,2  and  for  the  Achaean  primary  assembly,  or  syn- 
cletus,  which  was  open  to  all  citizens  over  thirty  years 
of  age.  It  holds,  too,  it  seems,  for  the  two  ^Etolian 
assemblies,  the  ordinary  and  the  extraordinary,  which 
were  both  primary,3  but  not  for  the  ^Etolian  council 

1  Above,  chapter  I. 

1  De  Sanctis,  Rivista  di  Filol.  xxxvi  (1908),  pp.  252  ff. 
3  Swoboda,  Studien  zu  den  griechischen  Biinden,  1   {Klio,  xi,    1911, 
PP-  456/.). 


238  GREEK   IMPERIALISM 

which  was  constituted  of  delegates  apportioned  to  the 
constituent  cities  according  to  their  size.  The  Achaean 
and  the  ^Etolian  leagues  represent  in  this  respect  a 
reaction  from  the  earlier  leagues.  Their  hope  was  to 
change  the  stress  of  the  cities,  which  came  into  play, 
from  a  centrifugal  into  a  centripetal  force  by  basing 
their  federations  squarely  on  the  city-states. 

This  they  could  do,  up  to  a  certain  point,  the  more 
easily  because  each  ethnos  had  lacked  a  city-state  of 
outstanding  political  and  economic  power.  Equality 
of  city-states  did  not  conflict  flagrantly  with  realities  in 
either  Achaea  or  ^Etolia.  Hence  the  principle  that  each 
city-state,  irrespective  of  strength  in  the  Aristotelian 
sense,  should  have  a  single  vote  in  the  federal  assembly, 
and  an  equal  voice  in  the  choosing  of  the  federal  cabinet 
{demiurgi;  apocleti),  and  the  federal  executive  (strategus, 
hipparch,  secretary  of  state,  treasurer  or  treasurers) 
appeared  equitable.  In  Bceotia  and  Hellas  in  the  earlier 
time  the  league  had  been  created  by  the  superior 
strength  of  Thebes  and  Macedon  respectively ;  and  these 
capital  states  had  taken  care  that  the  initial  leadership 
should  be  preserved  by  the  institutions  of  the  leagues. 
The  Achaean  and  the  ^Etolian  leagues,  on  the  other  hand, 
were  partly,  no  doubt,  the  result  of  a  compromise 
between  the  constituent  units,  but  mainly  the  conse- 
quence of  foreign  pressure.  The  federal  movement  was 
not  based  primarily  upon  the  activity  of  any  one  city, 
but  upon  a  need  generally  felt.  Hence  the  capital  of  the 


THE  EMPIRE  OF  THE  ANTIGONIDS    239 

Achaean  league  was  ^Egium,  and  the  capital  of  the 
/Etolian  league  Thermon  —  neutral  meeting-places,  like 
Washington,  Ottawa,  and  Canberra.  That  was  some- 
thing new  in  the  annals  of  the  Greek  leagues. 

The  creative  force  of  foreign  policy  is  manifest  in  still 
other  characteristics  of  these  Hellenistic  leagues.  It  was 
almost  inevitable  that  in  those  days  of  executive  effi- 
ciency states  should  be  monarchically  organized.  Hence, 
whereas  there  had  been  eleven  Bceotarchs  in  the  Boeo- 
tian league  and  seven  generals  in  early  third-century 
Acarnania,  a  single  general  stood  at  the  head  of  the 
^Etolians  from  the  founding  of  their  league  and  at  the 
head  of  the  Achseans  after  255  B.C.  That  gave  a  unity 
of  action  otherwise  impossible,  the  lack  of  which,  though 
negligible  perhaps  in  domestic  affairs,  had  been  found 
disadvantageous  in  foreign  affairs.  It  was  a  necessary 
concession  to  a  monarchical  age,  one  which,  however, 
had  been  made  reluctantly  and  with  an  important 
reservation  which  took  from  the  serum  its  malignancy: 
the  generalship  could  be  held  by  the  same  individual 
only  every  alternate  year.  He  might  be  the  uncrowned 
king  of  the  league  one  year ;  the  next  he  must  be  a  pri- 
vate citizen. 

In  still  another  respect  distrust  of  monarchy  and  aver- 
sion to  the  "tyranny"  on  which  Antigonus  Gonatas  had 
based  his  Greek  empire,  are  betrayed  in  the  institutions 
of  the  Achaeans.  The  rule  of  a  city  by  a  tyrant  and 
membership  in  the  league  were  regarded  as  incompatible 


240  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

with  one  another.  This  was,  doubtless,  a  requirement  of 
the  federal  laws,  which,  consisting  of  treaties  negotiated 
between  the  original  cities  in  275  B.C.  and  at  the  admis- 
sion of  new  cities  thereafter,  of  oaths  by  which  these 
treaties  were  sanctioned,  and  of  general  enactments 
made  from  time  to  time  by  special  legislative  process, 
bound  the  citizens  of  the  individual  cities  no  less  than 
did  the  local  laws  which  they  themselves  passed.  Other- 
wise the  city-states  were  at  liberty  to  adopt  whatever 
form  of  government  they  chose.  The  league  championed 
neither  democracy  nor  oligarchy,  though  its  working 
favored  the  well-to-do  classes.  At  most  it  compelled  a 
certain  uniformity  in  local  administration,  its  general 
attitude  being  admirably  symbolized  by  its  monetary 
arrangements,  wherein  the  standard  was  determined  by 
the  federal  authority  while  the  coins  were  issued  by  the 
constituent  cities.1 

The  very  constitutions  of  the  Achaean  and  the  JEto- 
lian  leagues  disclose  the  importance  of  the  part  which 
the  Greek  policy  of  Antigonus  Gonatas  played  in  the 
creation  of  these  dangerous  adversaries  of  himself  and 
his  country.  It  is  true  that  his  son,  Demetrius  II,  fought 
them  to  a  standstill,  wrested  from^Etolia  a  large  part  of 
its  acquisitions,  and  might  have  dissolved  both  leagues 
by  force,  had  not  Epirus  deserted  him  and  gone  over 

1  Swoboda,  Studien  zu  den  griechischen  Biinden,  n.  Die  Stadte  im 
achdischen  Biinde  (Klio,  XII,  1912,  pp.  17  ff.). 


THE   EMPIRE  OF  THE  ANTIGONIDS    241 

to  their  side;  had  not  the  Illyrian  pirates  whom  he  let 
loose  on  this  new  enemy  provoked  the  Romans  to  cross 
the  Adriatic ;  and  had  not  the  Dardanians  moved  down 
on  Macedon  and  defeated  and  killed  him  in  battle. 
Such  "had  nots"  belonged,  however,  to  the  constant 
possibilities,  and  complications  of  this  sort  were  ever 
occurring  in  the  struggle  of  Macedon  for  the  hegemony 
of  Greece.  On  this  occasion  their  issue  was  so  disastrous 
for  Macedon  that  the  hour  of  the  two  leagues  seemed 
come. 

But  what  should  have  been  their  triumph  proved 
to  be  their  destruction.  For  the  frustration  of  their 
hopes  Polybius,1  who  voices  the  opinion  of  Aratus,  held 
the  yEtolians  responsible,  and  it  is  likely  that  he  was 
in  the  main  right.  For  just  at  this  critical  moment,  when 
the  Achaeans  were  face  to  face  with  the  most  serious 
problem  which  their  federal  system  presented,  namely, 
the  reluctance  of  states,  like  Sparta  and  Athens,  which 
were  markedly  stronger  than  the  common  run  of  the 
Achaean  cities,  to  accept  mere  equality  with  them,  the 
/Etolians  not  only  left  them  in  the  lurch  and  made  an 
advantageous  peace  for  themselves  with  Antigonus 
Doson,  the  new  king  of  Macedon,  but,  by  ceding  to 
Sparta  their  Arcadian  cities  (Tegea,  Mantinea,  Orcho- 
menus,  and  Caphiae),  they  made  it  possible  for  Cleo- 
menes,  the  young  Spartan  monarch,  to  rally  round  him- 
self all  the  Peloponnesian  opposition  to  the  Achaeans, 

1  n,  45- 


242  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

and  to  make  a  brilliant  effort  to  establish  once  again  the 
Spartan  hegemony  in  the  peninsula.  Another  view  of 
the  matter  is  that  the  downfall  of  the  Achaean  league  — 
which,  to  escape  Cleomenes,  threw  itself  into  the  arms 
of  Antigonus  Doson  —  was  due  to  the  intervention  of 
Ptolemy  III,  who  backed  up  Sparta,  Athens,  and 
iEtolia  by  his  friendship  and  his  money,1  and  would  have 
gladly  seen  Achaea  eliminated  in  order  that  Greece  might 
present  a  united  front  to  Antigonus  Doson.  In  any  case 
it  was  Antigonus  Doson  who  reaped  the  benefits,  and  it 
seems  unlikely  that  they  were  wholly  an  unearned  in- 
crement. What  he  was  capable  of  he  had  already  shown 
by  joining  heartily  in  the  international  guarantee  of  the 
neutrality  of  Athens  which  had  robbed  Aratus  of  that 
choice  prize.  He  was  clearly  no  common  man,  and  had 
he  not  died  an  untimely  death  shortly  after  the  great 
victory  he  gained  over  Cleomenes  at  Sellasia  (222  B.C.), 
he  would  probably  have  been  much  better  known  in 
history.  His  energetic  and  tactful  conduct  in  this  crisis 
contrasts  sharply  with  the  nerveless  backdown  of  Egypt, 
for  which  the  only  excuse  was  the  imminent  demise  of 
Euergetes  and  the  threatening  attitude  of  Antiochus 
the  Great.  It  cannot  be  denied  that  Antigonus  Doson 
made  a  good  use  of  all  his  opportunities. 

His  settlement  of  Hellenic  affairs  was  characterized 
by  the  revival  of  the  general  synod  established  by  the 
great  Philip.2  Representatives  of  the  Hellenic  states  met 

1  Hellenistic  Athens,  pp.  240/. 

1  Freeman,  History  of  Federal  Government,  pp.  379  ff> 


THE  EMPIRE  OF  THE  ANTIGONIDS    243 

in  formal  assembly  at  Corinth  (224  B.C.),  and  chose  the 
king  of  Macedon  as  their  hegemon.  Subsequently  the 
synod  was  to  meet  at  a  time  and  place  to  be  designated 
by  its  head.  A  mere  enumeration  of  the  states  which  took 
this  action  tells  the  story  of  the  constitutional  develop- 
ment of  Hellas  in  the  Macedonian  age.  They  were  Mace- 
don, Thessaly,  Epirus,  Acarnania,  Locris,  Phocis,  Boeotia, 
Euboea,  Achaea,  and  probably  the  Islanders.  Of  these 
the  first  was  a  kingdom,1  but  all  the  others  were  leagues. 
The  city-states,  which  had  been  everything  in  Philip's 
synod,  have  disappeared,  swallowed  up  in  the  federations. 
Whether  each  of  the  units  had  now  an  equal  number  of 
votes,  or,  as  in  the  time  of  Philip,  a  number  proportion- 
ate to  its  size,  we  do  not  know,  though  the  second  alter- 
native is  the  more  probable  one.  In  both  cases  Macedo- 
nian deputies  took  part  in  the  meetings  of  the  synod  and 
served  as  heads  of  the  Macedonian  interest.  Together 
with  the  deputies  from  Thessaly  and  other  subservient 
states  they  probably  formed  a  majority  in  the  synod. 
In  both  Philip  II  and  Antigonus  Doson,  Macedon  had, 
accordingly,  at  once  hegemons  and  kings.  We  hear  of 
nothing  in  the  revived  Hellenic  league  comparable  with 
the  Committee  of  Public  Safety  of  the  old  one;  but 
nothing  similar  was  now  required,  since  the  generals  of 
the  constituent  leagues  were  the  natural  representatives 
of  these  bodies  when  the  synod  was  not  in  session.  They 

1  And  in  all  probability,  a  league  as  well.   Tarn,  Antigonus  Gonatas, 
p.  54,  n.  36. 


244  GREEK  IMPERIALISM 

had  thus  a  place  provided  for  them  in  the  scheme  of 

Antigonus  Doson. 

The  republican  reaction  against  the  policy  of  Antig- 
onus Gonatas  had  by  no  means  spent  its  force.  This  is 
shown  in  the  seriousness  with  which  it  was  now  reckoned 
with  by  Antigonus  Doson.  He  could  not  ignore  the  well 
established  practice  of  the  league  assemblies  to  decide 
all  important  questions  of  foreign  policy.  Hence  his  synod 
differs  from  that  of  Philip  II  particularly  in  this  impor- 
tant respect,  that  its  action  in  declaring  war,  concluding 
peace,  and  other  like  matters  was  taken  subject  to  rati- 
fication by  the  league  authorities,  and  was,  seemingly, 
binding  only  on  such  of  them  as  ratified  it.1   His  synod, 
in  other  words,  stood  to  the  league  assemblies  as  the 
Achaean  synod  stood  to  the  Achaean  syncletus.  Naturally, 
the  confederates  could  not  withdraw  from  the  hegemony 
at  pleasure,  much  less  join  its  enemies;  so  that  the  re- 
fusal of  a  league  to  accept  a  decision  of  the  synod  to 
declare  war  meant  only  that  it  assumed  a  position  of 
neutrality.    In  Philip's  time  each  city  had  had  to  pay 
per  day  a  fine  of  thirty  drachmae  for  every  horseman, 
twenty  drachmae  for  every  hoplite,  ten  drachmae  for 
every  light-armed  soldier,  and  seven  or  eight  drachmae 
for  every  sailor  who  was  absent  from  a  duly  authorized 
expedition.2    Now  the  leagues  could  refuse  to  cooper- 
ate without  suffering  any  penalty.     They  surrendered 
their  liberty  to  fight  one  another,  and  their  right  to 

1  Polybius,  IV,  26.  *  Wilhelm,  Attische  Urkunden,  1,  p.  36. 


THE  EMPIRE  OF  THE  ANTIGONIDS    245 

contract  alliances  with  outside  states;  but  they  did 
not  surrender  their  diplomacy  entirely  to  the  hegemon, 
though  they  agreed  to  enter  into  no  negotiations  with 
any  outside  king.1  They  gave  their  hegemon  no  right 
whatever  to  interfere  in  their  local  concerns.2 

Such  were  the  generous  concessions  to  local  sentiment 
by  means  of  which  Antigonus  Doson  sought  to  place  the 
hegemony  of  the  kings  of  Macedon  in  Hellas  on  a  secure 
basis.  Never  before  in  the  history  of  the  people  had  a 
conqueror  made  so  noble  a  use  of  his  power.  Antigonus 
Doson  went  in  fact  so  far  in  conciliating  the  Greek 
states  that  had  he  withdrawn  Macedonian  troops  from 
Demetrias,  Chalcis,  and  Corinth,  —  the  three  shackles 
of  Hellas,  —  added  new  conquests  like  Orchomenus, 
Sparta,  and  Messene  to  the  constituent  leagues  instead 
of  to  the  central  organization,  and  possessed  less  personal 
prestige,  it  is  difficult  to  imagine  how  the  Hellenic 
league  could  ever  have  been  brought  into  action.  Prob- 
ably all  that  he  cared  to  be  absolutely  sure  of  was  the 
neutrality  of  the  confederates  who  did  not  support  him 
in  the  field. 

In  any  case  that  was  all  that  his  successor  Philip  V 
was  able  to  accomplish,  when,  in  220  B.C.,  he  had  the 
Hellenic  synod  accept  the  repeated  challenge  of  war 
offered  to«him  by  the  ^Etolians,  who,  taking  advantage  of 
the  accession  of  a  young  and  untried  king  to  the  throne 
of  Macedon,  assailed  his  hegemony  in  Greece  while  it 

1  Plut.,  Aratus,  45.  *  Polybius,  iv,  24. 


246  GREEK   IMPERIALISM 

was  still  precarious.  Had  Doson  lived  to  wage  the  So- 
cial War  (220-217  B.C.),  he  might  have  crushed  the 
^tolians  by  sheer  weight  of  numbers,  and  have  com- 
pleted the  unification  of  Hellas.  Philip  V  fought  bravely 
and  skillfully  and  won  the  respect  of  both  his  friends 
and  his  foes ;  but  before  any  definite  issue  of  the  strug- 
gle had  arrived,  the  campaign  between  Hannibal  and 
the  Romans  had  reached  such  a  point  that  the  hege- 
mon  of  Hellas  dared  not  neglect  it  any  longer. 

"Let  Greece,"  said  Agelaus  of  Naupactus  at  the 
peace  conference  which  followed,1  "be  united;  let  no 
Greek  state  make  war  upon  any  other;  let  them  thank 
the  Gods  if  they  can  all  live  in  peace  and  agreement,  if, 
as  men  in  crossing  rivers  grasp  one  another's  hands,  so 
they  can  hold  together  and  save  themselves  and  their 
cities  from  barbarian  inroads.  If  it  is  too  much  to  hope 
that  it  should  be  so  always,  let  it  at  least  be  so  just  now; 
let  Greeks,  now  at  least,  unite  and  keep  on  their  guard, 
when  they  behold  the  vastness  of  the  armies  and  the 
greatness  of  the  struggle  going  on  in  the  West.  No  man 
who  looks  at  the  state  of  things  with  common  care  can 
doubt  what  is  coming.  Whether  Rome  conquers  Car- 
thage or  Carthage  conquers  Rome,  the  victor  will  not  be 
content  with  the  dominion  of  the  Greeks  of  Italy  and 
Sicily;  he  will  extend  his  plans  and  his  warfare  much 
further  than  suits  us  or  our  welfare.    Let  all  Greece  be 

1  Polybius,  v,  104.  (Translated  by  Freeman,  History  of  Federal  Govern- 
ment, pp.  435/-) 


THE  EMPIRE  OF  THE  ANTIGONIDS    247 

on  its  guard,  and  Philip  above  all.  Your  truest  defense, 
O  King,"  he  continued,  "will  be  found  in  the  character 
of  the  chief  and  protector  of  the  Greeks.  Leave  off  de- 
stroying Greek  cities ;  leave  off  weakening  them  till  they 
become  a  prey  to  every  invader.  Rather  watch  over 
Greece,  as  you  watch  over  your  own  body;  guard  the 
interests  of  all  her  members  as  you  guard  the  interest 
of  what  is  your  own.  If  you  follow  such  a  course  as  this, 
you  will  win  the  good  will  of  Greece ;  you  will  have  every 
Greek  bound  to  you  as  a  friend  and  as  a  sure  supporter 
in  all  your  undertakings ;  foreign  powers  will  see  the  con- 
fidence which  the  whole  nation  reposes  in  you,  and  will 
fear  to  attack  either  you  or  them.  If  you  wish  for  con- 
quest and  military  glory,  another  field  invites  you.  Cast 
your  eyes  to  the  West;  look  at  the  war  raging  in  Italy; 
of  that  war  you  may  easily,  by  a  skilful  policy,  make 
yourself  the  arbiter;  a  blow  dealt  in  time  may  make  you 
master  of  both  the  contending  powers.  If  you  cherish 
such  hopes,  no  time  bids  fairer  than  the  present  for  their 
accomplishment.  But  as  for  disputes  and  wars  with 
Greeks,  put  them  aside  till  some  season  of  leisure;  let  it 
be  your  main  object  to  keep  in  your  own  hands  the  power 
of  making  war  and  peace  with  them  when  you  will.  If 
once  the  clouds  which  are  gathering  in  the  West  should 
advance  and  spread  over  Greece  and  the  neighboring 
lands,  there  will  be  danger  indeed  that  all  our  truces  and 
wars,  all  the  child's  play  with  which  we  now  amuse  our- 
selves, will  be  suddenly  cut  short.  We  may  then  pray  in 


248  GREEK   IMPERIALISM 

vain  to  the  Gods  for  the  power  of  making  war  and  peace 
with  one  another,  and  indeed  of  dealing  independently 
with  any  of  the  questions  which  may  arise  among  us." 
The  speaker  was  right,  and  Philip  took  his  advice. 
But  when  he  became  embroiled  with  Rome,  it  was  the 
speaker's  own  countrymen,  the  ^Etolians,  who,  by  at- 
tacking Macedon  in  the  rear,  contributed  most  to  the 
dreaded  sequel:  that  never  after  212  B.C.  did  the  Greeks 
have  an  opportunity  of  dealing  independently  with  any 
of  the  questions  which  arose  among  them.  At  the  time 
of  the  Social  War  Macedon  missed  its  last  chance  of 
establishing  a  single  state  in  European  Hellas. 

SELECT   BIBLIOGRAPHY 

1.  Droysen,  J.  G.  Geschichte  des  Hellenismus*  ill:  Geschichte 
der  Epigonen  (1877). 

2.  Freeman,  E.  History  of  Federal  Government  in  Greece  and 
Italy  2  (1893).  Ed.  by  J.  B.  Bury. 

3.  Niese,  B.  Geschichte  der  griechischen  und  makedonischen 
Staaten.   Especially  vol.  11  (1899). 

4.  Beloch,  J.   Griechische  Geschichte,  ill  (1904). 

5.  Karst,  J.  Geschichte  des  hellenistischen  Zeitalters,  11,  1 
(1909). 

6.  Ferguson,  W.  S.  Hellenistic  Athens  (191 1). 

7.  Pozzi,  Emilio.  Le  Battaglie  di  Cos  e  di  Andro  e  la  Politica 
marittima  di  Antigono  Gonata.  In  Memorie  delta  Reale 
Accademia  delle  Scienze  di  Torino:  serie  11,  torn,  lxiii 
(1912). 

8.  Tarn,  W.  W.  Antigonus  Gonatas  (191 3). 

THE  END 


INDEX 


INDEX 


Absolutism,  creation  of,  135;  legal- 
ized in  Greece,  147/. 

Acarnania,  234. 

Achaea.   See  League. 

/Etolia.   See  League. 

Agelaus  of  Naupactus,  speech  of, 
246. 

Agon,  in  Athens,  58  Jf . 

Alexander  of  Corinth,  rebellion  of, 
230;  death  of,  232. 

Alexander  the  Great,  4;  deification 
of,  36;  accession  of,  to  throne,  116, 
123 /.;  character  of,  119;  training 
of,  119  ff.;  and  Aristotle,  119  ff.; 
love  of  symbolism  of,  123,  128, 
139;  destroys  Thebes,  123  /.; 
spares  Pindar's  house,  124;  vis- 
its Troy,  124  /.;  cuts  Gordian 
knot,  125/.;  plan  of  Persian  cam- 
paign of,  126/.;  son  of  Zeus,  128, 
133,  162  /.;  in  Persepolis,  129; 
dissolves  Hellenic  league,  129  /. ; 
ceases  to  be  hegemon  of  Hellas, 
130;  ceases  to  be  king  of  Macedon, 
130  /. ;  marries  Roxane,  130; 
adopts  Persian  costume,  130;  tries 
to  establish  Hellenism  in  Asia, 
133/.;  founds  city-states,  134/.; 
plans  conquest  of  West,  134;  and 
absolute  monarchy,  135;  changes 
opinion  as  to  Iranians,  135/. ;  tries 
to  fuse  dominant  peoples  of  Eu- 
rope and  Asia,  136  ff.;  marries 
Persian  princesses,  137;  plans  of, 
144,  rejected  by  the  Macedonians, 
150;  demands  recognition  as  a 
god,  146;  departs  from  the  life 
among  men,  149. 

Alexandria,  155,  157,  163,  213;  new 
Athens,  158;  trade  of,  161  /.;  im- 
perial cult  of  Ptolemies  in,  164^*.; 


vs.  Memphis,  170;  laws  of,  177; 
classes  of  population  in,  181. 

Ammon,  god  of  Cyrene,  126  Jf.;  vis- 
ited by  Alexander,  139. 

Ancient  City,  of  Fustel  de  Coulanges, 
criticized,  7. 

Andros,  battle  of,  159,  233. 

Antigonids,  constitutional  govern- 
ment of,  216;  wars  of,  with  Rome, 
217/.;  alliance  of,  with  Seleucids, 
223. 

Antigonus  I,  Monophthalmus,  183; 
tries  to  take  Alexander's  place  and 
fails,  184  /.;  policy  of,  218  /.; 
monarchy  of,  220/. 

Antigonus  II,  Gonatas,  victories  of, 
at  Cos  and  Andros,  159;  rightful 
heir  of  Macedonian  crown,  220; 
suzerain  of  Greece,  220;  king  of 
Macedon,  220,  223;  education  of, 
222  /. ;  reign  of,  223-233 ;  peace  of, 
with  Egypt,  223;  hostility  of,  with 
Epirus,  224;  protects  Greece  from 
barbarians,  224;  tyrants  of,  in 
Greece,  224  ff.;  relation  of,  to 
Stoa,  225  /. ;  refuses  deification, 
225  /. ;  struggle  of,  with  Ptolemy 
Philadelphus,226,229;  renews  alli- 
ance with  Seleucids,  229;  deserted 
by  Antiochus  II,  230;  recovers 
^Egean,  232 ;  treaty  of,  with  /Eto- 
lians,  232;  empire  of,  233;  death 
of,  233;  failure  of,  in  Greece,  235. 

Antigonus  III,  Doson,  Hellenic 
league  of,  34;  makes  peace  with 
/Etolians,  241 ;  hegemon  of  Hellas, 

243- 
Antiochus  I,  Soter,  185. 
Antiochus  II,  Theos,    185;  deserts: 

Macedon,  230. 
Antiochus  III,  the  Great,  187  ff.; 


252 


INDEX 


wrests  Palestine  from  Egypt,  188; 
and  Hannibal,  189;  peace  of,  with 
Rome,  190. 

Antiochus  IV,  Epiphanes,  policy  of, 
212;  and  the  Jews,  212/.;  invades 
Egypt,  213. 

Antiochus  Hierax,  187. 

Antipater,  house  of,  219. 

Antipater  II,  220. 

Antony,  and  Cleopatra,  153;  as 
Ammon,  162. 

Apama,  wife  of  Seleucus,  195. 

Aratus,  of  Sicyon,  236;  seizes  Sicyon, 
230;  seizes  Corinth,  232. 

Areus  I,  correspondence  of,  with 
Jews,  79. 

Aristocracy,  supported  by  Sparta, 
20;  defined,  20  /.;  destroyed  in 
Sparta,  83;  championed  by  Sparta, 
94. 

Aristophanes,  view  of,  as  to  extend- 
ing Athenian  citizenship,  31. 

Aristotle,  26,  36;  on  equality  of 
states,  33;  training  of,  108;  a  poor 
historian,  108  /.;  theory  of  pro- 
gress of,  109;  empiricism  of,  1 10/.; 
compared  with  Machiavelli,  110 
ff.;  neglects  the  acquisition  of 
power,  111;  makes  city-state  the 
ultimate  political  unit,  112  ff.; 
aversion  of,  for  imperialism,  113; 
"strength"  in  the  political  system 
of,  113  /.;  and  conquest  of  Asia, 
114;  defect  in  politics  of,  114;  and 
Alexander,  119  ff.;  teacher  of 
poetry,  119,  of  politics,  120  /.; 
view  of,  as  to  Asiatics,  122;  and 
deification  of  rulers,  135,  147. 

Armenia,     188;      conquers      Syria, 

192. 
Arsinoe  Philadelphus,  157;  death  of, 
160;  deified,  164;  imperial  policy 
of,  227. 
Art,  in  Athens,  59. 
Artemis,  temple  of,  in  Sardis,  202. 
Asia  Minor,  priestly  communities  in, 

197/- 
Astral  religion,  143. 


Atargatis,  temple  of,  197. 

Athena  Alcis,  in  China,  193  /. 

Athenians,  democratic  imperialists, 
39;  self-confidence  of,  40  /. ; 
political  capacity  of,  56  /. ;  capac- 
ity of,  in  art  and  literature,  59/.; 
demands  upon  time  of,  63  /.; 
blame  Sophists  for  decay  of  de- 
mocracy, 77. 

Athens,  life  in,  11  /. ;  empire  of,  a 
despotism,  23/.;  relation  of,  to  al- 
lies, 24  /. ;  relation  of,  to  cleruchies, 
30;  inability  of,  to  grant  citizen- 
ship to  allies,  30  /.;  refuses  to 
enter  Achaean  league,  32;  size  of, 
42 ;  size  of  empire  of,  42 ;  sphere  of 
interests  of,  43;  empire  of,  com- 
pared with  British  empire,  43; 
funeral  customs  of,  43  /. ;  institu- 
tions of,  49  ff.;  judicial  system, 
50  /.;  competition  of  citizens  in, 
58;  failure  of ,  in  foreign  politics, 
58,  61 ;  slavery  in,  61 ;  absence  of 
leisure  in,  61;  grain  supply  of,  62; 
raw  materials  of,  imported,  62; 
nation  of  noblemen,  65;  obliga- 
tions of  wealth  in,  65;  the  "school 
of  Hellas,"  65;  sea-power  of,  66/.; 
cost  of  sea-power  of,  68  ff.,  in 
lives,  70;  allies  of,  grievances  of, 
70  ff.;  imperial  litigation  of,  72; 
land  policy  of,  72  /.;  promotes 
mediocrity,  73  /.;  reputation  of, 
221;  neutrality  of,  242. 

Augustus,  in  Egypt,  154;  becomes 
Pharaoh,  154. 

Autocracy,  incompleteness  of,  4. 

Autonomy,  urban  in  Greece,  96. 

Bactria,   Greek  kingdoms  in,    188, 

193- 
Bambyce,  church  at,  197. 
Berenice,  of  Cyrene,  231. 
Berenice,  of  Egypt,  becomes  wife  of 

Antiochus  II,  186,  230;  murdered 

187. 
Bceotarchs,  27. 
Bceotia.   See  League. 


INDEX 


253 


Branchidae,  Apollo  of,  128. 
Buildings,  funds  for,  at  Athens,  71. 

Caesarion,  153. 

Callimachus,  court  poet,  160. 

Capitalistic  regime,  in  Plato,  106. 

Carthage,  155. 

Cassander,  219. 

Charlemagne,  5. 

China,  contact  of,  with  Hellenism, 
192/. 

Chremonidean  War,  227. 

Cinadon,  conspiracy  of,  91  ff. 

Cities,  and  freedom,  7  ff.;  and  cul- 
ture, 7  ff. ;  in  modern  sense,  10; 
contrast  of,  with  country,  1 1  ff. 

City-states,  relation  of,  to  ethne, 
6;  described,  9;  agrarian  character 
of,  9;  commerce  and  industry  of, 
10;  family  character  of,  13/.;  care 
of,  for  dead,  14  ff.;  laws  of,  16/.; 
biographies  of,  17;  subordinated 
to  districts,  29;  combined  in  ter- 
ritorial states,  33;  reconciled  with 
imperialism,  36;  ultimate  politi- 
cal units  of  Aristotle,  112;  Aris- 
totle's view  of,  121  /.;  founded  by 
Alexander,  133  /.;  founded  by 
Seleucus,  196,  by  his  successors, 
196,  199,  205;  in  Egypt,  171; 
made  out  of  priestly  communities, 
200;  racial  fusion  in,  in  Asia,  206; 
at  once  nations  and  municipali- 
ties, 209;  loss  of  leadership  of, 
227  /.;  as  federal  units,  237  /.; 
eclipse  of,  243. 

Civil  administration,  at  Athens,  54./F. 

Cleomenes,  career  of,  241  /. 

Cleon,  on  empire  of  Athens,  23/. 

Cleopatra,  the  Great,  152;  and 
Antony,  153/. 

Cleruchies,  30. 

Cleruchs,  in  Egypt,  173  jf.;  position 
of,  175  /•;  Egyptianized,  180  /.; 
in  Seleucid  empire,  201. 

Clisthenes,  51. 

Comana,  in  Cappadocia,  sacred  city 
of  Ma  at,  197  /•»  «n  Pontus,  198. 


Commerce,  in  Athens,  12. 

Committee  of  Public  Safety,  28,  30. 

Competition,  in  Athens,  58  /.   s 

Constantine,  the  Great,  and  deifica- 
tion of  rulers,  36. 

Constitutions,  ancestral,  96/. 

Cos,  battle  of,  159,  229. 

Council  of  the  Five  Hundred,  con- 
stitution and  powers  of,  51  ff. 

Crown  lands,  in  Seleucid  realm,  how 
disposed  of,  204. 

Culture,  origin  of,  in  cities,  7  ff. 

Cyclades,  lost  to  Egypt,  160.  See 
League. 

Cynocephalae,  battle  of,  188. 

Cyrene,  229,  231. 

Dardanians,  invade  Macedon,  241. 

Deification  of  rulers,  35  /.,  127  ff., 
l3l  ff-i  J39  ff-i  real  motive  of, 
145/.;  in  Egypt,  164  J7.;  legalized 
absolutism,  165;  in  Asia,  205, 208; 
attitude  of  Antigonus  Gonatas 
toward,  225  /. 

Delos,  prices  at,  fixed  in  Alexandria, 
170. 

Demetrius  II,  protects  Epirus,  234; 
war  of,  with  leagues,  240  /. ;  death 
of,  241. 

Demetrius  Poliorcetes,  deification  of, 
145;  expectations  of,  183  /.; 
career  of,  219  /.;  monarchy  of, 
220/.;  king  of  Macedon,  221/. 

Demetrius  the  Fair,  king  of  Cyrene, 
229;  murder  of,  231. 

Democracy,  in  Athens,  connection 
of,  with  empire,  41  /.;  principles 
of,  45  ff.;  safeguards  of,  50;  role  of 
experts  in,  58;  not  self-indulgent, 
68/.;  and  mediocrity,  73/.;  failure 
of,  at  Athens  attributed  to  Soph- 
ists, 77/.;  hated  by  Plato,  102. 

Demosthenes,  on  Philip  of  Macedon, 
118. 

Divine  right  of  kings,  3. 

Ecclesia,  constitution  of,  at  Athens, 
49;  powers  of,  50  /.;  freedom  of 


254 


INDEX 


discussion  in,  53  /.;  assembly  of 
experts,  57;  functions  of,  57;  agon 
of  statesmen,  58. 

Education,  the  vice  of  the  Socratic 
school,  98. 

Egypt,  seized  by  Alexander,  126; 
decay  of,  180/.;  empire  of,  234. 

Egyptians,  view  of  Alexander  as  to, 
135;  ruled  over  by  Ptolemies,  168; 
owned  by  the  Ptolemies,  169; 
hatred  of,  for  Ptolemies,  170;  use 
of,  in  military  service,  170  /.; 
admitted  to  Ptolemaic  army, 
180/.;  to  civil  service,  181. 

Emperor,  defined,  3/. 

Empire,  denned,  1  ff.;  of  Rome,  4; 
legally  impossible,  25;  how  se- 
cured, 38;  of  Athens,  criticism  of, 
70  ff.;  of  Ptolemies,  reasons  for, 
160  ff. 

Ephorate,  compared  with  Roman 
tribunate,  83/. 

Epirus,  under  Macedon,  235;  deserts 
Macedon,  240. 

Equality  of  states,  33,  237/.,  241. 

Erythrae,  Sibyl  of,  128. 

Ethne,  predecessors  of  city-states,  6; 
in  Egypt,  176/.;  rise  of,  in  Hellas, 
228;  replaced  by  koina,  236. 

Euhemerus,  142  /. 

Eumenes,    of    Pergamum,    revolts, 

159. 

Euripides,  criticized  by  Plato,  104. 

Europeans,  contrast  of,  with  Orien- 
tals, 131  Jf. 

Federation,  defined,  3. 

Feudal  lords  in  Persian  empire,  199. 

Fiefs,  in  Seleucid    empire,  200  /., 

203/. 
Fleet,  of  Athens,  69  /. 
Foreign  policy,  influence  of,  238/. 
Freedom,  origin  of,  in  cities,  7  ff. 

Gaza,  battle  of,  184. 

Generals,    special    position    of,    in 

Athens,  58. 
Gordian  knot,  125/. 


Government,  science  of,  born,  97. 

Gracchus,  Tiberius,  15. 

Greece,  golden  age  of,  41. 

Greeks,  mania  of,  for  classifying 
things,  80/.;  absorbed  by  Egyp- 
tians, 181. 

Gymnasia,  in  Egypt,  177/. 

Hannibal,  interest  for,  in  Greece, 

246/. 
Hegemony,  nature  of,  25;  of  Sparta, 

25;  becomes  an  absurdity,  25/. 
Heliaea,  constitution  of,  49;  powers 

of,  50/. 
Hellas,  unification  of,  34. 
Hellenism,   in   Egypt,    176/.,    181; 

in  China,   193;  in  Asia,  133  ff., 

205  ff. 
Hellenization,  of  Asia  by  Seleucids, 

I95#-'.  of  Judaea,  212/. 
Helots,    19;  annual  declaration  of 

war  upon,  86  /. ;  confined  within 

Pericec  ring-wall,  87  /. 
Hieroduli,  197  ff. 
History,  character  of,  108/. 
Huns,  192. 

Imperialism,  defined,  4;  evaded  by 
federal  leagues,  32/.;  justified,  36. 
Indemnities,  in  Athens,  64. 
Industry,  in  Athens,  12. 
Ipsus,  battle  of,  185. 
Iranians,  opinion  of  Alexander  as  to, 

136. 
Irreligion,    basis    of    deification    of 

Alexander,  142,  144/. 
Isocrates,  26. 
Isopolity,  defined,  31  /. 

Jews,  kinsmen  of  the  Spartans,  79; 
of  the  gymnosophists,  80;  en- 
couraged in  revolt  by  Rome,  191. 

Judaeus,  Spartan  cecist  of  Judaea,  79. 

Julius  Caesar,  4;  and  Cleopatra,  152 
/.;  as  Ammon,  162. 

Kingship,  Aristotle's  theory  of, 
120/. 


INDEX 


255 


Lacedaemon,  population  of,  85. 

Laodice,  wife  of  Antiochus  II,  186 
ff.;  murders  Berenice,  231 ;  war  of, 
with  Egypt,  231. 

Larisa,  20. 

Leader  of  the  people,  at  Athens,  60/. 

League,  Achcean,  32;  defects  of, 
33/.,  228;  expansion  of,  230;  terri- 
tory of,  234;  alliance  of,  with 
^Etolians,  235;  development  of, 
235  ff-'i  institutions  of,  237  ff.; 
laws  of,  240;  war  of,  with  Deme- 
trius II,  240  /.  .  .  .  ^Etolian,  32; 
defects  of,  33  /.,  228;  treaty  of, 
with  Antigonus  Gonatas,  232; 
expansion  of,  233;  territory  of, 
234;  alliance  of,  with  Achseans, 
235;  development  of,  235  ff.) 
founds  city-states,  236;  institu- 
tions of,  237  ff. ;  dismembered  by 
Macedon,  240;  deserts  Achaeans, 
241;  ally  of  Sparta,  241;  attacks 
Macedon,  245  /.,  248.  .  .  .  Bceo- 
tian,  27  ff.  .  .  .  Hellenic,  under 
Sparta,  20  ff.,  89  /.;  under  Philip 
II,  28  ff.,  244;  under  Antigonus 
Doson,  34,  242  ff.;  dissolved  by 
Alexander,  129  /.;  under  Anti- 
gonus I,  221  ...  of  Islanders, 
159,  227,  229,  230  /.,  232.  .  .  . 
Peloponnesian,  20,  89,  95. 

Leagues,  as  federal  units,  243;  ex- 
tent of  powers  of,  244. 

Leisure,  lack  of,  in  Athens,  61. 

Literature,  in  Athens,  59  /.;  the 
corruptor  of  the  Athenians,  103/. 

Lot,  election  by,  in  Athens,  52,  53, 
55;  theory  of,  55. 

Lysimachus,  king  of  Macedon,  220. 

Maccabaeus,  correspondence  of,  with 
Sparta,  79/. 

Macedon,  relation  of,  to  Hellas,  215; 
army  of,  217;  national  state  in, 
217;  Roman  province,  218;  trou- 
bles of,  224. 

Macedonians,  heirs  of  Alexander, 
149;    establish   a    regency,    149; 


refuse  to  carry  out  Alexander's 
plans,     150;    characteristics    of, 

215  /.;  sacrifices  of,  for  empire, 

216  /.;  aversion  to  imperialism, 
222. 

Magas,  of  Cyrene,  death  of,  231. 
Magnesia,  battle  of,  190. 
Machiavelli,  compared    with   Aris- 
totle, uo./f. 
Messenians,  revolts  of,  87. 
Meyer,    Eduard,    on     proskynesis, 

131  ff- 
Mnesimachus,  fief  of,  201. 
Monarchy,  influence  of,  239. 
Municipality,  and  city,  17  f. 

Napoleon,  on  generalship,  122;  on 
Alexander,  123. 

Nation,  and  city,  17  ff. 

Naucratis,  163,  168. 

Nectanebus,  reputed  father  of  Alex- 
ander, 162. 

Nicaea,  dupe  of  Gonatas,  232. 

Olympias,  wife  of  Philip,  marriage 
of,  116,  religion  of,  118/.;  queen 
of  Epirus,  233  /. 

Oration,  Funeral,  significance  of,  45/. 

Orientals,  contrast  of,  with  Euro- 
peans, 131  ff. 

Ostracism,  function  of,  in  Athens, 
60/. 

Palestine,  becomes  Seleucid,  188; 
Hellenization  of,  196,  212/. 

Pan,  patron  of  Gonatas,  232. 

Panchaea,  143. 

Parthians,  rebellion  of,  188,  192; 
power  of,  192. 

Patriotism,  in  city-states,  18/. 

Pella,  118,  221. 

Pergamum,  incites  dynastic  war  in 
Syria,  191. 

Pericles,  41 ;  law  of,  regarding  citi- 
zenship, 14;  Funeral  Oration  of, 
44  ff.;  and  art,  48;  and  drama,  48; 
and  Plato,  48  /.;  aim  of,  in  intro- 
ducing indemnities,  64/.;  ideal  of, 


256 


INDEX 


64  /.;  defends  misuse  of  tribute, 
71  /.;  judgment  on,  by  Thucy- 
dides,  75  /. 

Perioecs,  19;  ring  of,  around  Spar- 
tan land,  88. 

Persepolis,  129. 

Persia,  supports  hegemony  in 
Greece,  25;  feudal  lords  in  empire 
of,  199. 

Persians,  conciliated  by  Alexander, 
130,  131;  Hellenization  of,  133; 
foster  local  religions,  197  ff. 

Pharaoh,  sole  god  on  earth,  163. 

Phila,  wife  of  Antigonus  Gonatas, 
223. 

Philip  II,  and  Thebes,  28  /.;  hege- 
mon  of  Hellas,  28  ff.;  relations 
of,  with  Olympias,  116;  murder 
of,  116;  achievements  of,  116  ff.; 
court  of,  118. 

Philip  V,   war  of,   with  iEtolians, 

245/- 
Phoenicia,     source    of    timber    for 

Egypt,  172. 

Phthia,  queen  of  Macedon,  234. 

Plato,  26;  a  student  of  his  present 
alone,  99;  without  sense  of  historic 
truth,  99  /.,  107;  misreads  the 
future,  100;  historic  conceptions 
of,  100  /. ;  and  governmental 
control,  101  /.;  disgust  of,  for 
democracy,  102;  abandons  theory 
of  individual  liberty,  102;  dislike 
of,  for  Athenian  empire,  103;  dis- 
like of,  for  Athenian  culture,  103/. 
assailant  of  materialism,  105; 
advocate  of  aristocracy,  106/. 

Plutarch,  15. 

Poetry,  place  of,  in  Greek  education, 
119/. 

Politics,  in  Athens,  56  /.;  instruc- 
tion of  Alexander  in,  120. 

Polybius,  in  Egypt,  181. 

Polytheism,  elasticity  of,  140/. 

Pompey,  conquers  Syria,  191. 

Popillius,  Gaius,  213. 

Priests,  governments  of,  in  Asia 
Minor,  197/. 


Proskynesis,  of  individuals  estab- 
lished, 131;  meaning  of,  131  ff.', 
of  cities,  147/.;  under  the  diadochi, 
164/.,  208,  221. 

Prussia,  divine  right  of  kings  in,  3, 

37- 
Ptolemais,  163/. 

Ptolemies,  dynasty  of,  151  /. ;  empire 
of,  restored,  153/.;  imperial  policy 
of,    155;    saved    by    Rome,    160; 
deification  of,  in  Greek  cities,  164; 
army  of,  167  /.,   173  ff.\  owners 
of    land    and    people    of    Egypt, 
169;  farmers,  manufacturers,  mer- 
chants, 169  /.;  temple  policy  of, 
172/.;  land  policy  of,  172/.;  gifts 
of,  to  friends,  173;  abandon  land 
policy,  180;  later  monarchs,  181/.; 
lose  Palestine,  188;  incite  dynas- 
tic war  in  Syria,  191. 
Ptolemy,    son   of    Lagos,    goes   to 
Egypt,  150/.;  founds  a  dynasty, 
151;  founds  an  empire,  1 55  /•  ?  son 
of  Ammon,   162  ff.;  king  of  the 
Macedonians,     166   /.;    religious 
policy    of,    178   /.  .  .  .  Ceraunus, 
220.  .  .  .  Philadelphus,     155;    eu- 
logy of,  by  Theocritus,  156,  171  /.; 
character  of,  157/.;  diplomat,  158; 
occupies  Ionia,  159;  forces  of,  167; 
revolt  in  Ionia  against,  228;  war 
of,  with  Antiochus  II,  229,  with 
Rhodians,    229,    with    Macedon 
and  Syria,  230  ff.  .  .  .  Euergetes, 
victorious  in  Asia,   159;    beaten 
on  sea,  159;   neglects  fleet,  179; 
war  of,  in  Asia,  231  /.;  generalis- 
simo of  Achaean  league,  232  /.; 
weakness  of,  242.  .  .  .  Philopator, 
military  policy  of,  180.  ..  .  Euer- 
getes II,  "the  god,"  166,  181.  .  .  . 
The  Piper,  152. 
Pydna,  battle  of,  213,  217. 
Pyrrhus,  king  of  Macedon,  220;  in- 
vades Macedon,  223/. 

Quartering    of  troops,   in    Egypt, 
174/- 


INDEX 


257 


Races,  fusion  of,  in  Seleucid  empire, 
206. 

Reaction,  age  of,  95  ff.;  of  Plato, 
unreality  of,  106/. 

Reformation,  age  of,  in  Greece,  83. 

Reformers,  political,  26. 

Religion,  and  deification  of  rulers, 
141/.;  in  Egypt,  178/. 

Representation  according  to  popu- 
lation, 27,  33/.,  237,  243. 

Rhodians,  war  of,  with  Ptolemy  II, 
229. 

Romans,  heirs  of  Greeks,  5;  em- 
pire of,  35;  save  Ptolemies,  160; 
war  of,  with  Illyrians,  241,  with 
Macedonians,  248. 

Rome,  Senate  of,  disarms  Seleucids, 
190/.,  encourages  revolt  of  Jews, 
191,  sets  up  usurpers  in  Syria,  191; 
emperors  of,  use  Seleucid  land 
policy,  204;  Italian  federation  of, 
compared  with  Seleucid  empire, 
210  /.;  intimidates  Seleucids, 
213/.;  imperial  problems  of,  214. 

Rotation  of  office,  in  Athens,  55  /. 

Roxane,  married  by  Alexander,  130. 
136. 

Samians,  get  Athenian  citizenship, 

31. 

Sarapis,  178. 

Sea-power,  benefits  of,  66  ff.;  gained 
by  Alexander,  126  /.;  of  Egypt, 
156,  158;  struggle  for,  between 
Egypt  and  Macedon,  159;  aban- 
doned by  Egypt,  160;  first  gained 
by  Egypt,  227;  restored,  230,  lost, 

233- 
Seleucids,  hemmed  in  by  Egypt,  159; 
division  in  dynasty  of,  187;  get 
access  to  sea,  188;  lose  prestige  in 
Asia,  189/.;  disarmed  by  Rome, 
190/.;  dynastic  war  among,  191; 
half  Iranian,  195;  expansion  of,  196 
ff.;  crown  lands  of,  199;  land  policy 
of,  202  /. ;  administrative  service 
of,  203;  local  government  of,  203, 
205;  empire  of,  a  conglomerate 


of  states,  205  ff. ;  relation  of,  to 
city-states,  208;  difficulties  of, 
211;  intimidated  by  Rome,  213/. 

Seleucus,  son  of  Antiochus,  184;  at 
Ipsus,  185;  reaches  Mediterra- 
nean, 185;  at  Corupedion,  185; 
faithful  to  Iranian  wife,  195;  rela- 
tion to  Alexander,  195.  .  .  .  Calli- 
nicus,  186. 

Sellasia,  battle  of,  242. 

Semites,  view  of  Alexander  as  to, 

135/- 

Sicilian  expedition,  76. 

Sicyon,  added  to  Achaean  league, 
230. 

Siwah,  oasis  of,  visited  by  Alexander, 
126/.,  I39jf- _ 

Slavery,  r61e  of,  in  Athens,  61  /. 

Social  War,  246. 

Socrates,  97. 

Sparta,  size  of,  19;  Peloponnesian 
league  of,  20;  Hellenic  league  of, 
20  /.;  supports  aristocracy,  20; 
pretexts  of,  for  tyranny,  25;  re- 
fuses to  enter  Achaean  league,  32  /. ; 
funeral  custom  of,  43;  home  of 
poets  and  musicians,  81  /.;  golden 
age  of  art  at,  82;  absence  of  ty- 
rants in,  84;  military  life  of,  84/.; 
puritan  movement  in,  85;  army 
of,  86;  danger  of,  from  Helots,  87; 
growth  of,  87  ff.;  change  of  for- 
eign policy  by,  88  /.;  in  conflict 
with  democratic  movement,  89/.; 
domestic  situation  in,  when  hege- 
mon,  90  ff.;  imperial  problems  of, 
93  ff  1  donation  to,  from  ^Etolians, 
241. 

Spartans,  kinsmen  of  the  Jews,  79  /. 

Stasis,  22  ff. 

Stoa,  philosophy  of,  in  Macedon, 
225  /.  _ 

Superiority,  essential  in  empire,  2. 

Susa,  great  marriage  of,  136  jf. 

Symmachia,  basis  of  Spartan  em- 
pire, 20  /.;  of  Athenian  empire, 

24/.. 
Sympolity,  defined,  32  /. 


258 


INDEX 


Syncretism,  religious,  in  Egypt,  178/. 

Synod,  Boeotian,  27  ff.;  Hellenic,  of 
Philip  II,  28  /.,  of  Antigonus 
Doson,  242  ff.;  Achaean,  237. 

Taxes,  in  Athens,  68. 

Temples,  in  Egypt,  172  /.;  subordi- 
nated to  city-states  by  Seleucids, 
200;  despoiled  by  Seleucids,  200/. 

Thebes,  hegemony  of,  26;  position 
of,  in  Bceotia,  27;  destruction  of, 

123/. 
The  mi  stocks,  policy  of,  39  /. 
Theocritus,   on   Philadelphus,    156, 

171/. 
Theopompus,  on  Philip  II,  118. 
Thermopylae,  battle  of,  189/. 
Thucydides,   on   stasis,   22  ff.;   on 
l    empire,  23  /. ;  Funeral  Oration  of, 

44  ff.;  on  the  Athenian  empire, 

75/.;  political  sense  of,  77. 
Tigranes  the  Great,  conquers  Syria, 

192. 


Tribute,  how   used  by  Athenians, 

71. 

Troy,  visited  by  Alexander,  124  /. 

Truth,  in  Plato,  98. 

Tyche,  worship  of,  by  the  irreligious, 

144. 
Tyranny,  outlawed,  239  /. 
Tyrants,  absent  in  Sparta,  84;  in 

Greece,  224  /. 

Universality,  logical  issue  of  impe- 
rialism, 4/. 

Worship  of  the  dead,  so-called,  14  ff. 

Xerxes,  army  of,  40. 

Yue  Tchi,  immigration  of,  192; 
occupy  Sogdiana,  Bactria,  and 
India,  193. 

Zeno,  tutor  of  Antigonus  Gonatas, 
222. 


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